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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis, submitted for the Cranfield DBA programme, examines and explores the impact 
of gender demography on male and female director‟s role interpretations and contributions. 
The study was inspired by the scarcity of females on corporate boards and a desire to seek an 
understanding of how women and men contribute to boards.  The study brings together the 
literature on females on boards, and on board roles and processes, revealing that both bodies 
of literature could benefit from more in-depth understanding of board processes. 
 
The thesis reports the results of two empirical studies based on in-depth interviews with male 
and female non-executive directors on Icelandic corporate boards. The first study of non-
executives of male dominated boards supported many of the findings reported in earlier 
studies.  Females were found to be active in critical questioning and pushing for better 
decision making. Males on the other hand stressed the importance of informal interactions.  
The study offered an understanding of the exclusion and low social and power status of 
females on male dominated boards.  The second study, conducted two years later, on non-
executives on both male dominated as well as gender integrated boards and an all female 
board, revealed in much more detail the nature of traditional board interactions and the 
benefits of a more balanced composition or even an all female composition.  Males on 
gender integrated boards adopted the valuable role of questioning and holding management 
accountable, previously found to be mainly adopted by females.  In addition, a shared 
understanding of roles and purpose between males and females was found to prevail on those 
boards.  The gender integrated boards and the all female board possessed a much higher 
degree of openness, interaction and trust, resembling to a large extent the description of 
exemplary boards found in the literature, and the females on those boards were found to be 
quite confident. Finally, the findings question if the importance of informal relationships can 
be generalised, as those were found to have no relevance on gender integrated and all female 
boards.   
 
The study adds to the growing body of literature on board roles and processes, and the 
female board literature, and has significant implications for practice.  It reveals the 
shortcomings of male dominated boards and challenges them to fundamentally change the 
ways they act and perform.  It demonstrates how female non-executive directors bring 
valuable contributions and that a better gender balance can positively affect the dynamics of 
the board. 
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CHAPTER I – LINKING DOCUMENT 
 
This chapter is intended to pull together the main themes across the three projects of 
this DBA study.  It starts with a section on background and rationale for the research, 
and continues by providing an overview of the research process as well as reporting 
on the first scoping study of the relevant literature.  Key findings are summarised and 
a section is dedicated to the theoretical, methodological and practical contributions.  
This part concludes by discussing the limitations of the study and gives proposals for 
further research. 
 
It should be noted that projects in chapters II and III were written early in the DBA 
process when the author had limited experience in academic writing. 
 
1. Background and rationale for the research 
 
The initial motivation for conducting this piece of research was to understand the 
reasons for the scarcity of women in powerful positions on corporate boards of 
directors, and to offer an insight into what possible benefits boards were missing by 
lacking female directors.  It later developed into a qualitative analysis of role 
interpretation in the context of male dominated and gender balanced boards as well 
as an all female board. 
 
The advancement of women to the upper echelons of corporations has been slow 
(Daily et al., 2000), with the board level as no exception (Catalyst, 2003a, b; Singh & 
Vinnicombe, 2006; Sealy & Vinnicombe, 2009).  Research on women directors has 
to date mainly covered numbers and proportions of women on corporate boards 
(Singh & Vinnicombe, 2004; Catalyst, 2003a, b; Dalton & Daily, 1998; Daily et al., 
1999), slow advancement (Burgess & Tharenou, 2002; Kanter, 1977), advancement 
strategies and barriers to advancement (Powell, 1989; Eagly & Carli, 2003; Powell & 
Butterfield, 2003; Catalyst, 2004b; Burgess & Tharenou, 2002; Elmuti et al., 2003;  
Ragins et al., 1998; Vinnicombe et al., 2000; Burke, 2000, 1997; Pajo et al., 1997), 
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as well as profiles and characteristics of female directors (Burgess & Tharenou, 
2002; Burke, 1995, 2000; Kesner, 1988; Zelechowski & Bilimoria, 2004; Singh et 
al., 2008) and finally how women have integrated into the  boardroom (Sheridan, 
2001; Marshall, 1995; Bradshaw & Wicks, 2000).  More recently attempts have been 
made to demonstrate a link between the representation of women on boards and 
corporate results (Bilimoria, 2000; Singh & Vinnicombe, 2004a; Carter et al., 2003; 
Schrader et al., 1997; Stephenson, 2004; Bryan, 2001; Daily & Dalton, 2003).  These 
studies, however, did not demonstrate a causal link between the input (number of 
female directors) and output (corporate results such as profit or share price) 
variables. What was missing were attempts to analyse how gender demography 
might have an affect on board dynamics and interactions, that in turn might lead to 
better results.   
  
Very few studies have looked at actual activities of female board members and 
sought to understand in what ways they were affecting or contributing to the 
activities, processes and decision making of the board.  Many of the attempts have 
focused on the women‟s specific roles as “female advocates”, examining women‟s 
impact on female issues, equal opportunities and balancing work/family needs and 
other “soft issues” (Burke 1994a, 1997, 2000; McGregor et al., 1997; Bilimoria & 
Huse, 1997), as well as impact on philanthropic issues (Ibrahim & Anglidis, 1994; 
Wang & Coffey, 1992) and their impact on masculine hegemony on the board 
(Bradshaw & Wicks, 2000).  Only five studies were identified that actually examine 
the impact of female directors on general board effectiveness (Bilimoria & Huse, 
1997; Fondas & Sassalos, 2000; Huse & Solberg, 2006; Zelechowski & Bilimoria, 
2003; Konrad et al., 2008). Women directors were found to make an impact by 
facilitating a comfortable atmosphere and moving the discussion to a wider set of 
stakeholders, while not being afraid to ask difficult and probing questions (Bilimoria 
& Huse, 1997; Fondas & Sassalos, 2000; Huse & Solberg, 2006; Zelechowski & 
Bilimoria, 2003; Konrad et al., 2008). However these contributions are diminished in 
non inclusive cultures on the largely male dominated boards (Huse & Solberg, 2006; 
Zelechowski & Bilimoria, 2003; Konrad et al., 2008).  From these three studies, 
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female directors report that women are bringing a new/different perspective into the 
boardroom, and to some extent fostering a more open culture.  At the same time they 
seem to be facing rather conservative and quite masculine rules and norms of 
behaviour, and experiencing non inclusive cultures. Studies have indicated that 
women could be more active contributors by making alliances with the most 
influential actors (Huse & Solberg, 2006; Zelechowski & Bilimoria, 2003), spending 
time on preparation and being present in decision making arenas (Huse & Solberg, 
2006). 
 
What is still missing is a more profound understanding of women‟s contributions 
(defined as speaking and being heard) and how they are, or are not, being surfaced at 
board level. A crucial factor to understanding board member impact and 
effectiveness lies in understanding the nature of their role interpretation.  The 
literature on women on boards seems to be somewhat isolated from the corporate 
governance field concerning board roles and corporate governance reforms. Hence 
the effect of board and directors‟ roles and responsibilities has not been taken 
sufficiently into the discussion of the women on boards literature.  Without linking 
these two, a profound understanding of the benefits and values of increased female 
participation at board level is difficult to achieve.   
 
Despite increased interest in corporate governance reforms, surprisingly little is 
understood about actual board behaviour and the effect of individual board members 
on board dynamics and culture (Pettigrew, 1992; Huse, 1998;  Daily et al., 2003).  
Recent reforms have largely been based on an agency theory perspective (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983) emphasising the controlling role of the board, but less attention has 
been given to the serving or stewardship role (Davis et al., 1997) or the networking 
or resource dependence role (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  Increased interest in board 
reforms has led to a stream of research on structural factors such as board 
composition, governance structure, and professional and social background of the top 
management team but empirical data, primarily relying on proxies, show inconsistent 
findings on whether the latter have an impact on company performance  (Zahra & 
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Pearce, 1989; Johnson et al., 1996; Dalton et al., 1998, 1999; Jensen & Zajac, 2004).  
Inferential leaps have been made from input variables such as board performance 
with no direct evidence of the processes and mechanisms which link the inputs to the 
outputs (Pettigrew, 1992).  Phrases like “The field of corporate governance is at a 
crossroads” (Daily et al., 2003) and “The coming revolution in corporate 
governance” (Leblanc, 2004a) are common in contemporary board literature.  This 
has called for increased encouragement of qualitative research focusing on what 
boards or board members actually do, rather than what they look like (for example 
Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003). Although the number of studies on actual board 
behaviour and activities has been increasing (Lorsch & McIver, 1989; Demb & 
Neubauer, 1992a; Pettigrew & McNulty, 1995; Huse, 1998; McNulty & Pettigrew, 
1999; Roberts & Stiles, 1999; Pye, 2002; Roberts et al., 2005), further research on 
expanding the board literature to observational and qualitative studies has been called 
for (Huse, 2003; Pettigrew, 1992; Daily et al., 2003; Jensen & Zajac, 2004).   
 
Much of the research on boards of directors is centred around the role of the board, 
the context effect on the role, and the role of the non-executive directors (for 
example Mace, 1971; Lorsch & McIver, 1989;  Zahra & Pearce, 1989; Demb & 
Neubauer, 1992a; Higgs, 2003; Roberts et al., 2005; Jonsson, 2005) .  This type of 
board research is largely rooted in board role theories such as agency theory (Fama 
& Jensen, 1983), stewardship theory (Davis et al., 1997), stakeholder theory 
(Freeman, 1984)  and resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978).  
Boards are becoming more active and more aware of their responsibilities.  Much of 
the nature of the board‟s role is becoming clearer and the paradoxes of being close 
enough to give valuable guidance and counsel, but yet distant enough to provide 
sound assessment and evaluation, have been drawn attention to (e.g. Demb & 
Neubauer, 1992a; Roberts et al., 2005).  However, very few attempts have been 
made to look at the effects of different board compositions with regard to individual 
board member characteristics such as gender, age, education, ethnicity etc.  In this 
context, several comments have been made from a methodological and 
epistemological standpoint. Pye (2004) notes that traditionally research has looked at 
 20 
boards as homogeneous groups that perform generic functions and that the literature 
often does not differentiate between organisational contexts or between individual 
and group behaviour.  Roberts et al., (2005) support the search for theoretical 
pluralism and greater understanding of board processes and dynamics.  In a 
commentary on the Roberts et al. study (2005), Pye & Pettigrew (2005) point to the 
need for strengthening the theoretical and methodological foundations of board 
process to encourage clarity of epistemological assumptions underpinning the 
research process. They also stress the importance of attention to the issues of context 
and process over time and their relationship to outcomes, and caution against the 
attempt to over-generalise from qualitative data.  They also stress the importance of 
clarity of the level of focus and analysis, as well as being more careful in 
distinguishing between individual behaviour and effectiveness, and board behaviour 
and effectiveness. Finally, they point to the fact that not only are studies of actual 
behaviours of boards and directors scarce, but the little knowledge that does exist is 
not as well theorised or as effectively cross-referenced as are agency studies.  Pye & 
Pettigrew (2005) call for a shift of focus of board studies to an alternative and well 
founded process perspective on board behaviour.     
 
Previous studies on female directors have not explicitly related female board 
experiences to the framework of board roles. They have frequently focused on 
contributions that could explicitly be related to female board members (e.g. Burke, 
1994a, 1997; Bilimoria & Huse, 1997; Bradshaw & Wicks, 2000; McGregor, 2003; 
Zelechowski & Bilimoria, 2003; Huse & Solberg, 2006; Konrad & Kramer, 2006) as 
opposed to general roles and contributions of females as directors, with all the roles 
and responsibilities that come with that position. Furthermore these studies were 
limited to examining the female experience.   
 
This study seeks to add to the women on corporate board‟s literature (WOCB) by 
examining the general role interpretations and contributions of females and 
comparing and contrasting them to male role interpretations against the context of 
male dominated boards, and boards with gender balance and female domination.   
 21 
 
This study builds on previous examinations of the non-executive role (e.g. Demb & 
Neubauer, 1992a; Roberts et al., 2005). It aims to answer calls for clarity in the level 
of analysis (Pye & Pettigrew, 2005) focusing on the individual, and the individual‟s 
interpretation of his or her role and contribution on the board.  It furthermore seeks to 
add to the understanding of contextual factors (Pye, 2000. 2001a) particularly the 
nature of role interpretation and perceived contributions by males and females on 
boards with different gender demographics.   
 
The aim of the study is to develop an understanding of non-executive directors‟ roles 
and contributions at the individual level, focusing on comparing and contrasting male 
and female role interpretations within two different contexts.  The two empirical 
studies offer examinations of the effect of gender on role interpretation, first by 
examining it in the context of male dominated boards and later moving to gender 
balanced and female dominated boards.   It offers an understanding of gendered role 
interpretation as well as an indication of the effect of board gender demography on 
role interpretation and actual contributions. It also offers inputs into how the non-
executive role is interpreted by male and female incumbents and how the gender 
demography of the board impacts on those interpretations.   
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2. Overview of the research process   
2.1. Introduction 
When I enrolled on the Cranfield DBA programme in September 2004, my curiosity 
centred on the observation that women were scarce in the upper echelons of large 
corporations throughout the western world.  In 2003 the discussion of the scarcity of 
women on corporate boards had started surfacing in the media in my home country, 
Iceland.  The reason for media focus on the board level, as opposed to other levels, is 
probably twofold; first, numbers and proportions at board level are relatively easy to 
measure since they are usually publicly documented, and second it has been argued 
that this very top level within companies reflects more than anything the proportional 
power of women in the corporate world.  General explanations offered for the lack of 
women on boards were predominantly lack of qualifications and lack of interest by 
women.  Having worked for a number of years in executive positions in the business 
world and participating in forming a women‟s business network, I was not at all 
content with these shallow explanations and felt a strong urge to understand in more 
depth the reasons and underlying assumptions for this skewed situation and hopefully 
be able to contribute to facilitating changes.   
 
I came to Cranfield with a handful of stray thoughts on the subject.  When I started 
examining the literature, what first caught my attention were that the themes of lack 
of qualifications and lack of interest had certainly been offered as explanations for 
low proportions of females on board, but other issues, such as masculine hegemony 
of the boards had started surfacing.  Early on I became particularly fascinated by 
papers on the business case for advancing females to the board level; suggesting that 
higher proportions of females on the board could deliver improved business results 
such as, increased profitability, higher return to shareholders, improved company 
reputation, better understanding of the growing female market and better corporate 
governance (Bilimoria, 2000; Singh & Vinnicombe, 2004; Carter et al., 2003; 
Schrader et al., 1997; Stephenson, 2004; Bryan, 2001; Daily & Dalton, 2003).  
 23 
Although these studies indicated a link between the number of women on boards and 
improved performance, causal relationship had not been demonstrated.   
 
My research question undertook several changes and developed through the course 
of the programme.  An overview is presented in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Development of the research question and its execution in the DBA 
 
I wanted to gain an understanding of how 
 women were affecting the activities of the boards they were entering.  I started 
looking at papers relating to dynamics, interaction and diversity and by January 2005 
the research question read: 
 
What impact do female board members have on board dynamics, processes, power 
structure, and decision making procedures and will the latter lead to improved 
corporate governance and/or corporate performance? 
 
Why so few women on corporate boards? September 2004
Demonstrating the business case for more women directors November 2004
What impact do female board members  have on board dynamics, 
processes, power structure, and decision making procedures and will the 
latter lead to improved corporate governance and/or corporate 
performance?
January 2005
How do women on boards experience being, or becoming directors? How 
does women's presence on the board affect board culture, board dynamics 
and board behaviour? Scoping study - Nov 2005
What are the experiences and activities of directors  on corporate boards? 
What are the experiences of female directors? 
Systematic review - June 
2006
How do non-executive board members interpret their roles and 
contribution as individuals, and is there a gendered effect?
Project 2 - May 2007
How does board gender demography affect individual role interpretations 
and what impact does it have on female director contributions?
Project 3  - June 2009
How do male and female non-executive dirctors interpret their roles and 
contributions in different gender-demographic contexts
Linking document              
- Dec 2009
Development of research question September 2004 - October 2009
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Developing my thoughts further, I found that a crucial part of being able to gain a 
deeper understanding of the issue was a thorough understanding of the role of the 
board and its directors.  By the time I handed in the Scoping Study, in November 
2005, I had identified three main themes in the literature that underpinned my 
research focus; the literature on board and director roles, the literature on women on 
boards and the literature on board processes and culture (see figure 1).   
 
 
 
Figure 1: A field map, November 2005   
 
2.2. The scoping study 
In the scoping study I aimed to answer the following questions:  
How do women on boards experience being, or becoming directors?  
How does their presence on the board affect board culture, board dynamics or board 
behaviour?  
 
The aim of the scoping study was to examine the theoretical foundations for a study 
of the role of the board and its directors, and to identify what was known about 
women on boards.  Furthermore it examined various board process issues such as the 
impact of diversity, appointment procedures, board dynamics and culture.  Revisiting 
the Scoping study at the end of the DBA process is quite interesting as the literature 
review covers many of the topics that eventually surfaced as main findings in the 
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final phase of the study.  The following is a short review of the main themes 
extracted from the literature in the scoping study.   
2.2.1. The role of the board and its directors 
The section on board and director roles details the four main theories framing the 
board role; agency theory, stewardship theory, resource dependence theory and 
stakeholder theory.  These theories, particularly agency theory, have guided 
corporate governance research for the past decades, but recent papers have criticised 
their singular approach (Pye & Pettigrew, 2005).  Structural reforms, mainly 
encouraged by an agency view of the board role, have led to inconsistent findings on 
performance. This has shown the need for a deeper level of understanding regarding 
the often complex and contradictory roles of directors.  This type of understanding 
has started to emerge through the work of, for instance: Lorsch & McIver (1989), 
Demb & Neubauer (1992a), Roberts et al., (2005), Stiles (2001), Pye (2001a, 2002, 
2004), Roberts & Stiles (1999), Huse (1998), Pettigrew & McNulty (1995, 1998) and 
McNulty & Pettigrew (1999).  These authors have brought attention to the paradoxes 
of the director role; the necessity of being detached from considerations of self 
interest while retaining commitment to and involvement with the company; the 
capacity of having in-depth first hand knowledge while still bringing a wider context 
perspective (Demb & Neubauer, 1992a) and that of being engaged but non-
executive, being challenging yet supportive, independent yet involved (Roberts et al., 
2005).  Furthermore, Pye, (2001a, b, 2002) draws attention to the effect of context 
and time on board composition, meeting frequency and on how environmental and 
contextual changes affected the way chairmen, directors and CEOs talk about 
organising.  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the role of directors has been 
described as being gate keepers by second guessing management proposals (Stiles, 
2001) and acting as sounding boards to test ideas and question assumptions to 
encourage better management preparation leading to better decision making 
(McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999). 
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2.2.2. The literature on female directors 
An examination of the extant literature on women on boards resulted in very 
interesting findings.  My review revealed that most of the research on the topic was 
about numbers and proportions of women on corporate boards (Singh & 
Vinnicombe, 2004a; Catalyst, 2003a, b; Dalton & Daily, 1998; Daily et al., 1999), 
slow advancement (Burgess & Tharenou, 2002; Kanter, 1977), advancement 
strategies and barriers to advancement (Powell, 1989; Eagly & Carli, 2003; Powell & 
Butterfield, 2003, Catalyst 2004b; Burgess & Tharenou, 2002; Elmuti et al, 2003; 
Ragins et al., 1998; Vinnicombe et al., 2000; Burke, 2000, 1997; Pajo et al., 1997) 
and finally profiles and characteristics of female directors (Burgess & Tharenou, 
2002; Burke, 1995, 2000; Kesner, 1988; Zelechowski & Bilimoria, 2004;  Singh et 
al., 2008). What has developed more recently are attempts to demonstrate a link 
between women‟s board representation and corporate results (Bilimoria, 2000; Singh 
& Vinnicombe, 2004a; Carter et al., 2003; Schrader et al., 1997; Stephenson, 2004; 
Bryan, 2001; Daily & Dalton, 2003).  These studies did not demonstrate a causal link 
between the input (number of female directors) and output (corporate results such as 
profit or share price) variables, nor how different gender proportions might impact on 
board dynamics that in turn might lead to better results.   
 
The few studies identified in the scoping study as looking at actual activities of 
female board members almost all focused on the women’s specific roles as “female 
advocates”.   The studies examined women‟s impact on female issues, equal 
opportunities and balancing work/family needs and other “soft issues” (Burke 1994a, 
1997, 2000; McGregor et al., 1997; Bilimoria & Huse, 1997), impact on 
philanthropic issues (Ibrahim & Anglidis, 1994; Wang & Coffey, 1992) and their 
impact on masculine hegemony on the board (Bradshaw & Wicks, 2000).  Only two 
studies identified actually looked at the impact of female directors on general board 
effectiveness.  Fondas & Sassalos (2000) found that female directors positively 
affected management decision making, by being highly prepared and motivated as 
well as having an objective status as an outsider. This was particularly important 
when board norms were collegial and consensus driven. Bilimoria & Huse (1997) 
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found in an interview study that female directors mainly contributed by facilitating a 
comfortable atmosphere while not being afraid to ask difficult and probing questions. 
This finding was supported very clearly in both of my empirical studies.   
2.2.3. Other relevant board issues 
The scoping study concluded with a section on various board issues, many of which 
were revisited throughout the research process.  It looked at directors’ 
characteristics and the examination of links between the individual characteristic of 
top management teams, such as educational level and functional background, and 
corporate performance (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Bantel & Jackson, 1989; 
Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990).  It also looked at ideas on the advantages and 
disadvanages of diversity, found to be beneficial to boards when strategic 
complexity is high and perspectives of diverse members are accepted by majority 
members (Ingley & van der Walt, 2003). But in order to realise the benefits of 
increased diversity, companies need to take action and create a culture where 
diversity is fostered (Kochan et al., 2003).  Increased diversity in the boardroom 
should increase creativity and stimulate debate around important strategic issues 
which will lead to increased decision comprehensiveness and improved decision 
making (Simons et al., 1999), particularly in turbulent times (Carpenter & Westphal, 
2001).   
 
Board appointment procedures were also briefly examined in the scoping study, 
but these did not surface again until the results of Project 3 emerged.  The traditional 
appointment approach was defined as identifying candidates by “who you know” 
rather than “what you need” (Tyson, 2003; Sheridan & Milgate, 2003), as well as 
emphasising personal preferences of board members rather than qualifications (Nash, 
1989).  Hegemonic views of board recruiters indicated that reforms were unlikely to 
be initiated by those in the current position of power (Sheridan & Milgate, 2003) and 
directors with demographic profiles similar to the current directors are frequently 
chosen (Westphal & Zajac, 1995).   
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The issue of board processes was discussed very briefly but expanded on 
substantially in the systematic review.   The research on board processes identified 
different types of board, depending on relative power and activities (Strebel, 2004; 
Pye & Camm, 2003; Jonsson, 2005) indicating that increased activity and high board 
power in relation to CEO power could be related to improved results, and that boards 
with high power in relation to the CEO power tended to have higher numbers of 
females on the board (Pearce & Zahra, 1991).  In addition, the scoping study touched 
upon the indication that board interlocks had benefits (Westphal & Milton, 2000; 
Carpenter & Westphal, 2001), described later in my research process as social 
capital, frequently found lacking in the case of female directors (Singh & 
Vinnicombe, 2004b).   Finally I discussed the prevailing masculine culture of the 
upper echelons of business (Ragins et al., 1998; Marshall, 1995) particularly at board 
level (Bardshaw & Wicks, 2000) as a hindrance to the progress of female 
advancement and effectiveness in the boardrooms. As women are mostly in minority 
positions on boards, there is a high risk that their impact and voice might be 
restricted (Ingley & van der Walt, 2003).   
 
As my main area of interest was studying actual behaviour and experiences of 
directors I wanted to examine in more detail what had been done in this field.  I was 
interested in looking at what had been studied with regard to role interpretation.  
Therefore I decided to focus on what was known about activities and experiences of 
directors, both male and female, for the next project of the DBA – the Systematic 
Review.   
 
2.3. The Systematic Review – Project 1 
My aim with the Systematic Review was to gain an understanding of how board 
members behave and act on a board.  My aims were to identify all relevant studies 
that had been done on board members‟ experiences, behaviours and, where available, 
effects on board dynamics and culture, in order to have a clear and concise picture of 
what is known on these topics.    
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My systematic review research question was: 
 
What are the experiences and activities of directors and non-executives on 
corporate boards of directors? 
 
Sub questions included:  
 How do directors and non-executives experience being a director? 
 How does director behaviour affect board dynamics? 
 How do directors affect board behaviour? 
 How do directors affect board culture? 
 
The following keywords were used to form search strings: director/ board member 
experience, -  director/ board member activities, -  director/ board member role, - 
director/ board member behaviour, - director/ board member  impact, - board 
behaviour, - board dynamics, - board culture, - women directors, - female directors, 
- qualitative studies. The context of the review and the research question was 
corporate boards and boards of directors.  Therefore it was considered vital to 
include these terms in all the search strings.  
 
The search strings provided an enormous amount of literature on board roles and 
behaviours.  Papers were assessed by a predetermined inclusion/exclusion criteria 
(see the Systematic Review Chapter III).  The papers included were found to cover 
four main areas of board research: the role of the board and its directors, board 
involvement in strategy, topics examining board dynamics, and finally research 
on female directors’ experiences.  
 
2.3.1. The role of the board and its directors 
The studies of Mace (1971), Aram & Cowen (1986), Lorsch & McIver (1989), Demb 
& Neubauer (1992a), and Roberts et al., (2005) provided valuable insights and 
frameworks to actual board activities and procedures, and are cited time and again 
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throughout my study.  Mace (1971) portrays boards as providers of advice, counsel 
and discipline, particularly in a crisis situation, but rarely having time for analysis 
and/or asking discerning questions that, although considered to be of vital 
importance to Mace, were commonly seen as unwelcome.  Aram & Cowen (1986) 
provide a model for effective board processes, emphasising the necessity of having 
skilled people on the board, with adequate information and a clear understanding of 
their role and the specific conditions of the company.   Lorsch & McIver (1989) find 
that board norms generally discouraged open questioning and challenging, and that 
directors typically lacked a forum for discussion. They concluded that much relies on 
the CEO or chairman to create inclusive working procedures and an atmosphere of 
openness and dialogue.   Demb & Neubauer (1992a) offer a prescriptive framework 
for non-executive directors: setting corporate strategy, overall direction mission and 
vision of the company, followed by succession activities, controlling, monitoring and 
supervising activities.  Demb & Neubauer (1992a) conclude by recommending 
frequent meetings, a moderate sized board and the establishment of opportunities to 
have retreats and specific discussions on performance, and mission and performance 
reviews.  Finally, Roberts et al., (2005) conclude that non-executive directors deliver 
most value when they are engaged but not leading, challenging but supportive and 
independent yet involved.   
 
Board identity is changing from a focus of representing the owners to a focus of 
representing the company. Boards are now encouraged to focus on meeting the 
interests of the organisation as a distinct entity separated from but bounded by the 
interests of the shareholders (Gopinath et al., 1994). A new form of teamwork is 
emerging, where directors and managers collaborate effectively in order to achieve 
corporate success, and boards should constantly be working on crisis prevention 
(Lorsch, 1995).  
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2.3.2. Boards dynamics 
The systematic review addressed a number of issues relating to the social interactions 
of the board members.  Traditional studies have revealed that consensus has been the 
norm for executive groupings and, although differences in opinions or perspectives 
have existed, they have rarely been addressed in the boardroom (Hill, 1995). Board 
norms traditionally discourage open questioning and challenging, and directors 
typically lack a forum for discussion (Lorsch & McIver, 1989).  However 
prescriptive studies of board effectiveness encourage challenging and constructive 
conflict (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; Roberts et al., 2005), teamwork, common 
sharing of goals, active engagement and openness (Nadler, 2006; Finkelstein & 
Mooney, 2003; Pettigrew & McNulty, 1995) and advocate independent, high quality 
individuals with diverse backgrounds and knowledge (Finkelstein & Mooney; 
Leblanc & Gilles, 2005; Nicholson & Keil, 2004; Letendre, 2004; Leblanc, 2004a).  
Finally, the role of the board leader, typically the chairman, in creating an 
atmosphere of trust and openness has been identified as crucial (Kakabadse et al., 
2006a; Nadler et al, 2006; Pye, 2000, 2001b).   
2.3.3. Female directors 
The systematic review covered the few studies of female directors identified in the 
scoping study.  It added two significant studies.  Zelechowski & Bilimoria (2003) 
found that despite being in the highest position and being highly influential, women 
directors could not attain full effectiveness in non-inclusive cultures, and concluded 
that in order to reach optimal effectiveness, influence and inclusion must both be 
present.  Huse & Solberg (2006) found that women‟s contributions were highly 
dependent on their ability and willingness to make alliances with the most influential 
individuals on the board, tended to practice high levels of preparation and defained 
asking challenging questions as their main contribution.   
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2.3.4. Moving to the empirical studies 
Moving from the systematic review to the first empirical study was somewhat of a 
challenge.  The key results of the systematic review, leading to the definition of a 
research gap, were the following:   
 Board activity and involvement has traditionally been reported as low (Mace, 
1971; Lorsch & McIver, 1989). However boards are increasingly becoming 
active and empowered (Lorsch, 1995; Roberts et al., 2005; Nicholson & Kiel, 
2004), which in turn calls for higher levels of interaction and integration.  
However more needs to be understood in terms of board relationships, 
interactions, teamwork and decision making.   
 
 The definition and nature of the role of the board as a collective unit has been 
fairly well established and documented (Mace, 1971; Aram & Cowen, 1986; 
Lorsch & McIver, 1989; Demb & Neubauer, 1992a; Roberts et al., 2005). 
However there is little documentation on how individual board members 
interpret their roles.   
 
 Board processes have been shown to have a significant influence on board 
effectiveness (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; Roberts et al., 2005; Nadler, 
2006; Pettigrew & McNulty, 1995; Leblanc & Gilles, 2005; Nicholson & 
Keil, 2004; Letendre, 2004; Leblanc, 2004a). The culture, behaviour and 
dynamics are shaped largely by the interaction between individual board 
members and the collective experiences of the board as a group.  The 
effectiveness of the chairman and the chairman/CEO relationship has been 
researched in a number of studies (Kakabadse et al., 2006a; Nadler, 2006; 
Pye, 2000, 2001b), but little is understood about the interaction between 
other individual board members and how they relate to each other in 
carrying out their roles.   
 
 The qualitative studies of women directors have mainly dealt with the issues 
of women‟s experiences of the masculine board culture and ways to adapt to 
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it or confront it (Bilimoria & Huse, 1997; Fondas & Sassalos, 2000; 
Zhelechowski & Bilimoria, 2003; Huse & Solberg, 2006). What remained 
to be examined was how women define and experience their role as non-
executive directors and how that was similar or different to their male 
counterparts.   
 
 Research to date has often relied on limited data due to lack of access to this 
elite sample. Ability to gain access to board members could therefore, 
enhance current findings.   
 
These issues provided the foundations for the first empirical study. 
 
2.4. Overview of methodology across both empirical studies 
The main aim of the empirical studies was to add to the level of understanding of 
actual behaviour on the boards. The literature (Pettigrew, 1992; Huse, 1998; Daily et 
al., 2003; Leblanc, 2004a; Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003 ) have repeatedly called for 
studies examining what boards or board members actually do rather than what they 
look like, but access to this very busy and elite group has been difficult. Due to 
personal networks and contacts, I had the unique opportunity to approach members 
of boards of large Icelandic companies and examine their views on their roles on 
boards.  This access gave a perfect opportunity for input towards answering my 
research question on individual role interpretation.  This section provides an 
overview of the methodology applied in the two empirical projects. 
2.4.1. Philosophical perspective 
In social science research, researchers are faced with a choice of a philosophical 
position on how they are going to make assumptions about the nature of the social 
world (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002; Blaikie, 1993).  Understanding the philosophical 
issues influences the choice of research design (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002).  The 
two contrasting views of the philosophical tradition are positivism and social 
constructionisim.  Positivism is characterised by the main claim that knowledge is 
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primarily based on observed facts (Comte, 1853, cited in Easterby-Smith et al., 
2002). It is based on the ontology that reality is external and objective, and the 
epistemological assumption that knowledge is only of significance if it is based on 
observations of this external reality.  Among the characteristics of positivism are that 
observers must be independent, their aim is to identify causal explanations, science 
proceeds through a process of hypotheses and fundamental laws, concepts need to be 
operationalised so facts can be measured quantitatively, and samples should be of 
sufficient size to allow for generalisation (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002).  In contrast 
with positivism, a new paradigm has been developed during the past century 
claiming that reality is not objective and exterior but rather socially constructed and 
given meaning by people, particularly through a sharing of experience by using 
conversation and language (Berger & Luckmann, 1966).  According to social 
constructionism, the social scientist‟s task is not to gather facts and measure how 
often patterns occur, but rather to examine different constructions and meanings that 
people place upon their experience.  The focus is on understanding why people have 
different experiences and meanings rather than search for causes and fundamental 
laws.   
 
The contrasting characteristics of positivism and social constructionisim are 
summarised in table 2 (adopted from Easterby-Smith et al., 2002:30). 
 
Table 2: Contrasting implications of positivism and social constructionism   
 
Positivism Social Constructionism
The observer must be independent is part of what is being observed
Human interests should be irrelevant are the main drivers of science
Explanations must demonstrate causality
aim to increase general understanding 
of the situation
Research progress through hypothesis and deduction
gathering rich data from which ideas 
are induced
Concepts
need to be operationalised so they can 
be measured
should incorporate stakeholder 
perspectives
Units of analysis should be reduced to simplest terms
may include the complexity of "whole" 
situations
Generalization through statistical probability theoretical abstraction
Sampling requires large numbers selected randomly
small number of cases chosen for 
specific reasons
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As the purpose of this study is to examine and gain an understanding of director‟s 
interpretations and meaning of their roles, responsibility and experiences on 
corporate boards of directors, it seems appropriate to adopt a social constructionist 
view of reality.  The aim is, according to social constructionism, to increase general 
understanding of the situation, gather rich data with the aim of inducing ideas, and 
look at both the complexity of the “whole situation” and a small number of cases 
chosen for a specific reason.    
 
Thus, the study is interpretivist, drawing on social constructionist principles that 
social reality is based on the actions and reactions of social actors (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1968; Blaikie, 1993). This reality is accessed through interpretation of 
the reported experiences of the actors as they make sense of the world and give 
meaning to their experiences. Their interpretations and meanings further shape their 
behaviour and actions and thereby influence their world. So the actors influence, and 
are influenced by their social reality. Furthermore, the epistemological assumptions 
underpinning the research process are of a feminist nature, claiming that women‟s 
experiences, although presumably different from males‟ experiences, are equally 
valid as a basis for knowledge (Blaikie, 1993). 
2.4.2. Research strategy 
Following the argument in the previous section, a social constructionist approach 
dictated a qualitative study. My aim was to extend the understanding of director‟s 
role individual interpretation as well as man and women‟s contributions to the board, 
by examining their role interpretation in general, and comparing and contrasting that 
to men‟s role interpretations.  Whilst access to observation of board meetings would 
be problematic for confidentiality reasons, I was confident I would be able to gain 
access to individual directors. Indeed, as the issue revolved around individual 
interpretation, with the individual as the unit of analysis, in-depth interpretive 
interviews were considered the most appropriate method (Easterby-Smith, et al., 
2002).  Although my main concern was for individual role interpretation, as opposed 
to the board being the unit of analysis, it must be acknowledged that since I wanted 
to look for gendered similarities and differences, the data analysis had to take 
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different groups of individuals, based on gender and board composition into 
consideration.   
2.4.3. Research design 
The unit of analysis in this study is the individual director.  I decided to have the 
interview schedule semi structured covering particular areas regarding roles and 
activities but not a highly structured set of questions.  The same interview schedule 
was used in both empirical projects.  The interview schedule was designed to 
explore, in as much detail as possible, the individuals‟ interpretation of their role on 
the board.  Rather than asking explicitly about how they defined their role, 
interviewees were asked indirectly about issues and themes relating to role 
interpretation, such as why they were asked to serve on a particular board, their 
purpose and activities on the board, what they thought was expected of them and 
what they do to fulfil those expectations. In addition they were asked about: 
 how they behave and interact in a typical board meeting  
 how their behaviour compares with that of other board members 
 to whom they feel accountable as a board member 
 what they have gained from serving on the board 
 what would be their greatest contribution or added value to the board.   
In order to shed light on the importance of social ties to role effectiveness, the 
interviewees were also asked to describe the nature and importance of informal 
relationships in their board roles. 
2.4.4. Selecting interviewees    
The size of corporate boards in Iceland ranges from three to nine people, with five as 
the most common size.  Icelandic boards consist only of non-executive directors. 
While it is allowed by Icelandic corporate law to have the CEO serve as a board 
member, common practice is to have the CEO attend and participate in all board 
meetings, but not as a formal member.  The dual Chairman/CEO role is prohibited by 
Icelandic corporate law.   
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Project 2 
My context was the Icelandic business environment. I wanted to examine women‟s 
role interpretations in large corporations and compare and contrast it to that of males.   
I chose my sample from the 50 largest Icelandic companies (by revenue, as listed 
companies are less than 30 and in the past years only two to four of them have had a 
female board member at any given time).  As at the time of the first study (Project 2), 
women were very scarce on the boards of large companies, all the women 
interviewed were “tokens” on their boards.   
 
My context definition for the first study (Project 2) was: 
a. Male dominated boards (since that would normally be the situation on any 
board) 
b. Icelandic companies in international expansion (context – small economy to 
large economy transition phase), as these were both interesting and easily 
accessible.  
 
My interviewee recruitment strategy was to list and target female members of boards 
in the defined context.  Six female board members from large Icelandic boards were 
interviewed.  Subsequently male counterparts for the six boards were identified.  Due 
to access difficulties, interviews could only be obtained from male board members 
from three of the boards, so five males from three boards were interviewed.   
 
Since most of the interviewees served on multiple boards, more than 50 boards were 
represented, including 12 of the top 50 companies in Iceland. 
 
Project 3 
When it was time to conduct the research for project 3, there had been extensive 
changes in the macro economy.  These changes led to the restructuring of many 
boards which, in many cases, resulted in boards with a much higher female 
representation than previously seen.  Needless to say, the context was no longer 
international expansion, but rather a survival strategy.  My approach in Project 3 was 
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to select two samples for my interviews.  One sample was from the newly formed, 
gender balanced or female dominated boards, consisting of five females and three 
males, and a second sample from three large Icelandic companies with male 
dominated boards, consisting of three females and three males (see table 3).  The 
second sample set very much resembled that of Project 2, apart from the fact that one 
board had two women and of course the fact that all companies in project 3 were 
facing a recession period and economic difficulties.  As the aim of this second study 
was to examine the effect of gender composition, it was considered logical to use the 
same interview schedule as in project 2, probing for as much detail as possible about 
the role interpretation of each individual.   
 
 
Table 3: A summary of the sample across both empirical projects.   
 
2.4.5. Data collection  
Project 2 
The interviews for Project 2 took place between November 2006 and April 2007, 
either at the interviewee‟s work facilities or at the interviewer‟s office.  The 
interviews were semi structured and followed a pre-developed interview schedule but 
the interviewees were allowed to deviate from the schedule and the interviewer 
probed with additional questions when interesting topics came up, for instance 
regarding specific qualifications, examples of boardroom interactions and 
explanations regarding the importance of relationships and trust.  Most of the board 
members had substantial board experience and drew their comments and insights 
from various boards.   The interviews were audio taped and the recordings lasted 30-
80 minutes.  The interviews were conducted in Icelandic, which is the native 
Project 2
Time of study Nov 2006-Apr 2007
Type of company Large Icelandic companies Large Icelandic companies
Gender 
demography
Male dominated boards   
females in token position (20%)
Male dominated boards     
females in token or minority 
position (20%)
Balanced boards 
males and females 
40-60% All female boards                   
Females in study 6 3 3 2
Males in study 5 3 3 0
Project 3
March-May 2009
Large Icelandic companies
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language of all interviewees.  The fact that many of the interviewees were known to 
the interviewer seemed to have a rather positive effect in terms of openness and 
willingness to share information. 
  
Project 3 
The interviews for Project 3 took place between March and May 2009, again either at 
the interviewee‟s work facilities or at the interviewer‟s office. The interviews were 
semi structured and followed the same pre-developed interview schedule as the 
interviews for Project 2.  Interviewees were allowed to deviate from the schedule and 
the interviewer probed with additional questions when interesting topics came up.  
These deviations revolved specifically around the dynamics, open discussion or 
personal experiences that illustrated the points the interviewees were making.  Since 
the interviewees had been selected based on their presence on a particular board, they 
were asked to keep that board in mind as a focal board, but also encouraged to 
compare and contrast the focal board with other boards on which they currently or 
had recently served. It transpired that most of the board members had substantial 
board experience and drew their comments and insights from various boards. These 
interviews were also audio taped and the recordings lasted 45-65 minutes, with two 
exceptions where the interviews lasted around 30 minutes. There was no indication 
that the length of the interviews added to the profoundness of the content, as 
interviewees of the longer interviews often drifted away from the topic. Again, being 
acquainted with many of the interviewees seemed to facilitate openness and sharing 
of information.  
2.4.6. Data analysis   
The interviews were conducted in Icelandic, the native language of the interviewer 
and interviewees, audio recorded and transcribed in full (in Icelandic).  The text was 
transferred to the NVivo software tool intended for analysis of qualitative data, in 
order to facilitate the structuring of emerging themes.   
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The analytical process for both empirical studies mainly followed a structure 
described in Easterby-Smith et al., (2002:123-124).  The steps in my data analysis 
process were the following: 
 
1) Read and familiarise with the transcripts 
2) Identify themes in the interviews and compare them to themes emerging from 
the literature 
3) Transcripts were transferred to NVivo, coding all text into free-nodes and 
subsequently structuring into tree-nodes   
4) A second coding resulting in sub-nodes 
5) Themes and subthemes analysed and constructed into chapter headings  
6) Under each chapter heading a presentation of the issue was made and the 
issue was backed up with selected quotes from the transcripts that illustrated 
that particular point.    
7) A reassessment of the themes and chapter headings  
 
A more detailed description of the analytical process can be found in the 
methodology chapters of each empirical project (VI-4 and V-5).   
 
Since the interviews were conducted and transcribed in Icelandic, illustrative quotes 
needed to be translated into English.  The translation was done by the author and the 
supervisors checked the English translations.  Care was taken to be as accurate in the 
translation as possible, without losing the content and meaning of the quotes.  No 
particular difficulties arose in the translation process. 
 
As the research design followed a social constructionist view, the focus in the data 
analysis was on pulling out themes and patterns occurring in the conversations, rather 
than counting the numbers of instances particular issues were mentioned or the 
number of directors bringing them up.   
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Although the initial aim was to focus on individual directors as the unit of analysis, 
as the research progressed it was interesting to see responses come together in 
subgroups: in the first study as two subgroups – males and females on male 
dominated boards; and in the second study three groups emerged: 1) males on male 
dominated boards, 2) females on male dominated boards and 3) males and females 
on the gender integrated boards and on the all female board.  
Analysing qualitative data is always prone to biases due to the expectations and 
preconceived ideas of the researcher (Easterby-Smith, et al., 2002).  My approach 
was to observe the data with curiosity and an open mind.  The result was that indeed 
many of the issues and themes emerging came as interesting surprises to me.   
 
2.5. The first empirical study - Project 2  
2.5.1. Background and rationale 
My main objective for the first empirical study was to deepen the level of 
understanding of how male and female non-executive directors interpreted their roles 
and how this related to their effectiveness and contribution. As effectiveness and 
contributions are difficult to assess, gaining an understanding of male and female 
individual role interpretations could contribute to the understanding of how men and 
women experience, interact and engage with board culture, dynamics and behaviour.  
It could also cast light on how they adapt to and sustain their position on the board, 
whether they feel they are getting their point across.  Further, it could also shed light 
on to what extent they were perceived as tokens. A token position is described by 
Kanter (1977) as individuals in a skewed group where there is a large preponderance 
of one type over another (i.e. a ratio of 85:15). The numerically dominant group has 
control over the group and can be labelled as dominant, while the smaller group is 
labelled as tokens, seen as representatives of their category rather than individuals.  
 
As I was going to study directors on Icelandic boards which contain only non-
executive directors, I decided to use a recent study by Roberts et al., (2005) on the 
role of the non-executive as a main building block and extend it to include the effect 
of gender on role interpretation, which had not been addressed by Roberts et al. 
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(2005).  As reports on male domination of boardroom culture (e.g. Bilimoria & Huse, 
1997; Bradshaw & Wicks, 2000; Sheridan, 2001; Huse & Solberg, 2006; 
Zelechowski & Bilimoria, 2003) indicate that the way female board members 
experience their roles and express their behaviours is not the same as their male 
counterparts, an understanding of how gender composition operates at board level is 
needed.  
 
Figure 2: A field map at the start of project 2 
 
In addition I wanted to keep in mind and make a note of issues regarding interactions 
and informal relationships,  as previous research had shown that powerful and tight 
networks of influence affect board conduct and performance (Pye, 2004) and that 
social ties to members of the majority were found to positively affect minority 
influence (Westphal & Milton, 2000).   
 
The study aimed to answer the research question: 
 
How do non-executive board members interpret their roles and contribution* as 
individuals, and is there a gendered effect? 
 
*Contribution is defined as the value added by a particular board member to the culture, activities and decision 
making of a board, but NOT as any type of boardroom participation or impact.  
Director’s 
individual roles
Gender
Are perceived 
roles gendered?
Role interpretation
Board 
processes
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2.5.2. Project 2 findings 
Project 2 built on previous examinations of the non-executive role (e.g. Demb & 
Neubauer, 1992a; Roberts et al., 2005) and aimed to answer calls for clarity of the 
level of analysis (Pye & Pettigrew, 2005) by focusing on the individual, and the 
individual‟s interpretation of his or her role and contribution on the board.  It also 
attempted to add to the understanding of contextual factors (Pye, 2000, 2001a, b) 
particularly in relation to the nature of role interpretation and perceived contributions 
by males and females on male dominated boards.   
 
The key findings are extensively reported in chapter 3, but briefly they include the 
following:  Men and women alike seemed to embrace the paradoxical role of being 
both controlling and consulting, as well as paying attention to a wider pool of 
stakeholders.  While male non-executives were found to engage more in general and 
strategic contributions, females were found to contribute specific knowledge and 
skills, and in particular, asked challenging questions.  However due to the females‟ 
lack of informal relationships, considered of vital importance by their male 
counterparts, and an assumed status of lower authority than that of the males, project 
2 concluded that the valuable contributions of females might not be realised.    
 
2.6. Moving on - Project 3 
2.6.1. Background and rationale  
A few months after completing project 2, in the autumn of 2007, changes in my 
employment situation made it necessary to ask for a one year suspension of my 
studies.  Due to multiple commitments I asked for a further four month extension 
which meant that I was not back on track until January 2009.  During that time there 
had been drastic changes in the economic environment, and this allowed for an 
interesting follow up study.  The economy suffered a severe downturn, seriously 
affecting the situation of many companies. In some instances, entire boards of large 
companies were dismissed and new boards were formed.  When these boards were 
reconstructed it was considered very important that their members had not been 
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involved in any previous activities of the companies and that they were considered to 
be indisputable. This search process resulted in boards with a high female 
percentage.  These conditions provided an excellent opportunity to further the results 
of my second project and compare how male and female directors interpret their 
roles both on a male dominated board and on a gender balanced board.  This led me 
to the following research question:   
 
How does board gender demography affect individual role interpretation and 
what type of impact does it have on female director contribution? 
 
I chose to examine three recently constructed boards. The percentages of females on 
these boards at the time of the second study were 40%, 60% and 100%.  Two of 
these boards could be considered to be gender balanced (gender balance meaning at 
least 40% representation of either gender), while one was exclusively female.  In 
Project 2, the representation of women on the focal boards was 20% or less (that is 
usually one woman out of five board members). Furthermore, the individuals who 
had been appointed to the restructured boards typically have a different background 
to those who were dismissed, for instance many coming from academic positions.  
However, gender composition was not the only factor that had changed since the 
interviews for Project 2 were conducted.  
As already noted there have been some drastic changes in the macro environment as 
a result of the economic crisis. This economic context might affect individual 
contributions and the way roles are interpreted.  This is why I decided to also 
interview males and females from boards where women were represented in token or 
minority positions (20-30%) within companies that had also been hit by the financial 
crisis, without it leading to the reconstruction of their boards.   
 
Finally, what had to be kept in mind were the unusual circumstances of newly 
constructed boards and what criteria were used for selection of its members of those 
new boards, coming from a rather different background than a previously 
“traditional” board member.   This is in contrast to the boards of the other companies 
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examined in this project, whose boards were quite similar to the boards of the Project 
2 study, that is consisting of members that were either large shareholders themselves, 
appointed by large shareholders, were employees of large shareholders, or appointed 
as independent non-executives.   
2.6.2. Literature update for Project 3 
As a significant time has passed since I started my DBA research, I considered it 
essential to update the literature review. The aim was to better reflect both the current 
positioning of the research question as well as adding any currently published 
research on the subject.  Literature previously consulted has already been covered in 
this chapter, but the most notable additions to the literature review of Project 3 were 
the following:   
 
Traditional board culture 
The literature on traditional board culture was revisited and updated, sharpening the 
focus on the observation that traditional board cultures discourage open questioning 
and challenge and encourage norms of consensus and polite behaviours (Mace, 1971; 
Lorsch & McIver, 1989; Hill, 1995; Nadler et al., 2006, Hambrick et al., 1996).   
 
Process improvement efforts  
The literature on process improvement efforts was extensively reviewed.  It indicated 
that board efficiency can mainly be attributed to: 
 The quality of individual board members and careful selection (Finkelstein & 
Mooney, 2003; Cascio, 2004; Letendre, 2004; Murphy & McIntyre, 2007) 
including their expertise, experience, skills and insight (Pettigrew & 
McNulty, 1995; Leblanc & Gilles, 2005; Maharaj, 2008a),  the ability to 
make independent decisions (Letendre, 2004; Leblanc, 2004a; Leblanc & 
Gilles, 2005; Maharaj, 2008a) and diversity in terms of human, and social 
capital as well as experiences and values (van der Walt & Ingley, 2003; 
Letendre, 2004; Murphy & McIntyre, 2007),   
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 Functionality of board processes: asking challenging questions (McNulty & 
Pettigrew, 1999; Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; Roberts et al., 2005; Maharaj, 
2008a), to foster open discussion, candour and constructive debate  (e.g. 
Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Sonnenfeld, 2002; Rindova, 1999; Roberts, 2002; 
Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; Roberts et al., 2005; Siciliano, 2005; Nadler et 
al., 2006), finding the appropriate level of engagement; (Nadler et al., 
2006; Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003),  adequate access to information 
(Demb & Neubauer, 1992a; Letendre, 2004; Leblanc, 2004a),  work 
together as a team with a common goal (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; 
Aram & Cowen, 1986), and finally engage in a feedback process and an 
evaluation of the board‟s own performance, (Sonnenfeld, 2002; Cascio, 
2004; van der Walt & Ingley, 2003; Nadler et al., 2006) and have a clear 
sense of what is expected of them (Murphy & McIntyre, 2007).   
 
Groupthink 
An emerging theme in the empirical projects was the issue of groupthink. Groupthink 
is prone to occur when there is a high level of similarity in terms of social and 
ideological background (Janis, 1972).  Among symptoms of groupthink are illusions 
of invulnerability, an unquestioning belief in the morality of the group, a tendency 
for rationalising warnings and negatively stereotyping those who are opposed to the 
group‟s views.  Although diversity has been associated with initial conflict, it can 
enhance a group‟s performance if it is integrated.  Homogenous groups tend not to 
recognise how similarly members think because they share common values and 
norms (Maznevski, 1994). As boards have been found to be particularly susceptible 
to homosocial reproduction, a cycle often broken only when faced with a crisis 
(Boone et al., 2002; cited in Murphy & McIntire, 2007), they may be particularly 
vulnerable to groupthink.  
 
Social ties 
In addition to the already cited papers on social ties, a recent paper was consulted, 
claiming that the biggest predictors of influence on a board were ties to others, 
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membership in cliques, and prior relationships with other directors, and that a greater 
density of strong ties might lead to higher levels of trust on the board (Stevenson & 
Radin, 2009).  
 
Board gender demographics 
The previously cited literature on gender demographics was reviewed. The work of 
Ely (1995) and Kanter (1977) demonstrates that the relative number of females in the 
workplace and in positions of power can, to a great extent, restrict or facilitate the 
input and effectiveness of females.  In a very relevant recent study (Konrad et al., 
2008; Erkut et al., 2008; Konrad & Kramer, 2006) on Fortune 1000 board members, 
demonstrate the effect of having three or more women on a board.  The study 
suggests that two women on a board, as opposed to one, increased the women‟s 
feelings of inclusion and comfort, provided validation and decreased stereotyping, 
resulting in a greater impact on the board.  However, symptoms of tokenism 
prevailed; women still had to work hard to be heard and had to be careful in keeping 
a certain level of distance from each other in order to avoid being seen as 
conspirators.   When the number of women on the board reached three or more, a 
critical mass seems to have been achieved.  The women were more comfortable 
being themselves and associating with one another, the likelihood of stereotyping 
was drastically reduced and the women felt free to be more active, raise issues and 
felt they were being heard.  Even more interestingly, reaching this critical mass 
seemed to have an impact on the males as well, resulting in their adoption of a more 
collaborative style.   In addition it seemed to have an overall positive impact on the 
dynamics in the boardroom, shifting it to a more female oriented style – “Women’s 
tendencies to collaborate, to ask difficult questions and to raise a broader set of 
issues start to become the boardroom norm.” (Konrad et al., 2008, p.155). 
2.6.3. Project 3 findings 
The findings of project 3 are reported extensively in chapter 3.  As in my previous 
study both males and females on both types of board (that is traditional and newly 
established) had a similar general understanding of their basic roles and seemed to 
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embrace the paradoxes of holding management accountable, as well as adopting 
supporting roles and participating in strategy. In contrast to project 2 findings, males 
and females both reported making strategic contributions.  Females on both types of 
board, like the females in Project 2, defined questioning and improving board 
performance and decision making as one of their key roles.  Males on gender 
balanced boards, interestingly, also defined questioning and improving board 
performance and decision making as one of their key roles, whereas the males on 
male dominated boards did not.   In addition, informal relationships were not seen as 
important by either males or females on boards with a gender balance or high level of 
females, but were seen as vital by males on male dominated boards.  In addition, 
boards with a gender balance or entirely female had highly effective dynamics, 
described as high levels of open discussion, questioning and a trusting atmosphere, 
whereas male dominated boards showed symptoms of ineffective dynamics. Finally 
gender balance and female boards seemed to result in a perceived higher power 
status of female board members which, in turn, led to increased role fulfilment by the 
females.   
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3. Key findings 
 
The findings of this DBA derive from two key empirical studies.  While the first 
empirical study offered interesting findings in terms of how role interpretations are 
gendered, the second study added both contrast and depth to the initial findings, as 
well as an opportunity to examine the effect of gender demography on role 
interpretation.  
3.1. Key findings of Project 2 
The findings of Project 2 provided an understanding of how male and female 
directors interpreted their roles. Most research to date on the role of the board has 
looked at it from the perspectives of agency, stakeholder and stewardship.  In line 
with Roberts et al.(2005) and Pye & Pettigrew (2005), the findings of this study 
indicate that the board role is substantially more complex. The findings support the 
view that going beyond the traditional theoretical framework is necessary and that a 
search for theoretical pluralism and a greater understanding of board processes and 
dynamics are needed in order to fully understand the workings of corporate boards.   
 
The study revealed the following key findings:   
3.1.1. Basic role interpretation 
Embracing the paradoxes. Both males and females reported bringing a different 
perspective as an important contribution. Both parties explicitly stated shareholders 
as their number one priority, while looking out for other stakeholders was also seen 
as important by both males and females.  In addition both males and females saw the 
advising and consulting roles as important.   
3.1.2. Nature of contribution 
Male board members assumed a general role and emphasised strategic input.  
Male board members in this study reported a high level of strategic input to the 
boards on which they served; the females, however, did not.  Furthermore, the males 
reported having an input on a very wide and general level. 
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Females associate their roles with specific knowledge and skills. Females 
generally identified their main contribution as bringing specific, often professional, 
knowledge and skills to the board. 
Females adopt a role of supporting the CEO or other board members and 
facilitating a good atmosphere. Females seemed to interpret and enact a supporting 
role to a much deeper level than the males did and also talked about making a 
contribution by facilitating a comfortable atmosphere.  
Females are much more vocal about their role of asking intriguing questions. 
Females spoke a lot about the highly valuable role of questioning and pushing for 
better preparation of management as well as their role to improve decision making. 
3.1.3. Reaffirmation 
Some issues that emerged indicated that females needed some level of reaffirmation 
of their value, whereas the males seemed to take their authority for granted. 
Females talked about the importance of preparation.  The females were quite 
vocal about the importance of being well prepared at board meetings while there was 
no mention of this subject by the males 
Different assessment of contributions.  Females generally assessed their own 
contribution through the feedback they received, often from fellow board members.  
The males generally assessed their contributions through corporate results.   
3.1.4. Relationships 
Males considered the development of informal relationships as vital to board 
effectiveness.  Males were very vocal about the importance of establishing and 
developing informal and personal relationships with their fellow board members and 
considered it a crucial part of being effective on a board.  Females on the other hand 
had only low levels of informal relationships with their fellow board members. 
3.1.5. Trust 
Trust was discussed very differently by males and females.   Males‟ interpretation 
discussion of trust evolved from the discussion of the importance of informal 
relationships and was considered a key ingredient of successful board membership.  
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Trust was something that was built up over time and helped to predict the behaviour 
of other board members.  Women on the other hand talked about the importance of 
acquiring trust as individuals among their fellow board members.   
3.1.6. A question of authority 
The key findings of Project 2 are summarised in table 4. The observation that 
females looked for reaffirmation from other board members, emphasised the 
importance of being trusted, and the feeling that they were not part of powerful 
networks reveals that their relative power status and level of authority was rather 
uncertain, whereas the overall sense of the male comments portrayed an authority 
that was taken for granted. The informal relationship and trust with other board 
members was such that they assumed they made useful contributions.  
 
 
Table 4: Summary of the findings of Project 2.  
 
3.2. Key findings of Project 3 
The findings of the second empirical study were quite broad.  Project 2 left me with 
the question as to whether the valuable but different contributions of female board 
members were appreciated.  The observations that female board members on the 
male dominated boards in project 2 had to struggle for respect and did not participate 
in powerful networks provided a reason to question the impact and the actual 
effectiveness of their contributions and speculate whether they were given an 
FEMALES MALES
Basic role interpretation
specif ic / expert
Nature of contribution probing / questioning general / strategic
facilitating a good atmosphere
Reaffirmation feedback business results
Authority uncertain taken for granted
Relationships lacking endured and essential
Trust important to gain trust endured and the key ingredient
s
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looking out for shareholders interests (Agency)
looking out for interests of other stakeholders (Stakeholder)
advising and supporting (Stew ardship)
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informal “out-group” status on the board. It was clear that the norms of the 
boardrooms were masculine and challenging to the token women on boards.  
 
In project 3, I sought to explore if the gender demography of boards would affect 
individual role interpretation and, if so, how it would impact on female directors‟ 
contributions.  Project 3 examined the views of directors from three types of board: 
gender balanced boards, an all female board that had recently been reconstructed due 
to the economic crisis, and male dominated boards of companies whose boards had 
remained intact during the economic crisis. The key findings are as follows. 
3.2.1. Role interpretation 
Similar understanding of basic roles.  As in my previous study both males and 
females on all three types of board in Project 3 had a similar general understanding 
of their basic roles and seemed to embrace the paradoxes of holding management 
accountable, as well as adopting supporting roles and participating in strategy.  In 
addition a responsibility towards a wider pool of stakeholders, such as employees, 
customers, creditors and society in general was considered to be an important part of 
their responsibilities.  
Females and males reported strategic contributions equally.  Contrary to the 
findings of Project 2 females and males alike, on all types of board, talked about the 
importance of their strategic contributions. 
3.2.2. Specific role interpretation 
Females on all types of board defined questioning and improving board 
performance as key roles.  As in Project 2, women on all types of board continued 
to define critical questioning and helping to improve board performance and decision 
making as one of their key roles. 
Males on gender balanced boards defined questioning and improving board 
performance as key roles.  Unlike the males in project 2, and the males on male 
dominated boards of project 3, the role interpretation of males on boards with a 
gender balance resembled that of females. The males on gender balanced boards 
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defined critical questioning and improvement of board performance and decision 
making as one of their key roles. 
 
In terms of a more specific role interpretation, this study demonstrated that board 
gender demographics seemed to have more of an effect on males‟ role interpretation 
than on females‟ role interpretation.  Females from both male dominated and gender 
balanced/female boards continued to emphasise questioning and improving board 
performance and decision making as central to their roles.  However males on gender 
balanced boards were found to adapt to these roles, namely to put forward critical 
questions, to probe, improve decision making and push for better board practices, to 
a much greater extent than males on male dominated boards. 
 
On gender balanced boards males and females had a shared role definition. 
The males and females on gender balanced boards shared an understanding, not only 
of their basic role, but also in the way they described being successful in their role 
and to whom they felt accountable. The males‟ role definition had shifted notably 
and become similar to the role definition of females on all types of board, namely 
defining their key role as asking critical questions, making managers accountable and 
improving board performance.  Both males and females were very vocal about the 
level of open interactions, candour and trust on the boards and seemed to have made 
a point of discussing their mutual roles and objectives very early in the process.  The 
level of trust was particularly described as “not being afraid to voice your views and 
opinions, even though they contrast with those of other board members”.  This is 
very much in contrast with the findings of Project 2 where the male interviewees 
defined informal relationships as prerequisites of building trust amongst board 
members which in turn was connected with predictability of behaviour, which they 
felt would lead to a more effective board.   
3.2.3. Relationships 
On gender balanced boards and the all female board informal relationships 
were not considered important.  Informal relationships still seemed to be 
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considered an important factor by the males on boards with male dominance, 
supporting the findings in project 2, where males defined informal relationships as a 
prerequisite of trust, which in turn was, in their opinion, a necessity on an effective 
board.  The females in project 3 again lacked informal relationships and did not think 
they were important. Interestingly, on the gender balanced boards, informal 
relationships were not considered to play an important role by males either.   
3.2.4. Dynamics 
Gender balanced boards and the all female board had highly effective 
dynamics.  The boards with all females or a gender balance seemed to possess some 
of the qualities that are described in the literature as features of highly effective 
boards, such as: engaging in open discussions and active debate, asking challenging 
questions and sharing a common goal (Maharaj, 2008a; Murphy & McIntyre, 2007; 
Leblanc & Gilles, 2005; Roberts et al., 2005; Leblanc, 2004a; Cascio, 2004; 
Letendre, 2004; Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; Sonnenfeld, 2002; Roberts, 2002; van 
der Walt & Ingley, 2003; McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999; Rindova, 1999; Pettigrew & 
McNulty, 1995; Demb & Neubauer, 1992a; Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Aram & 
Cowen, 1986). The board members had high levels of knowledge and skills, 
independence of mind, as well as bringing individual diversity to the board.   
 
Male dominated boards did not have as effective dynamics as gender balanced 
and all female boards.  In contrast, members from boards with male domination 
were not as vocal about boardroom dynamics and director interactions.  This lack of 
discussion, combined with a high emphasis on relationships outside the boardroom, 
may suggest that the openness and interactions of these boards are substantially 
lower.   This is supported by the persistent focus of the males on the importance and 
weight of the Chairman/CEO interactions, and comments by a female director that a 
tradition for over-emphasis on the Chairman/CEO relationship somehow muted or 
demobilised the board as an entity.  Repeated comments from females on male 
dominated boards indicated that questioning, from women directors in particular, 
was generally not seen as welcome. Matters sometimes needed to be discussed “off 
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the record” to get points across and here the females felt they were not being 
successful in pushing things forward.  These observations may indicate that male 
dominated boards are less open.   
3.2.5 Power status and role realisation 
High female representation leads to a higher power status of female board 
members and a greater sense of contribution.  The relative positioning of females 
on all types of board in Project 3 seems to have shifted from Project 2 where females 
reported serving auxiliary functions, were somewhat insecure about their authority 
and felt excluded from the informal networks.  However, the degree of the shift is 
much greater in the case of the females on boards with gender balance or all female.  
The overall sense from the conversations with these females, and their manner of 
presentation, indicated a high level of confidence with their role and position as 
board members, compared to the female interviewees in Project 2.  There was a 
sense that they were contributing and doing the right thing even though it wasn‟t 
“confirmed and approved” by external feedback. 
 
Females on male dominated boards in Project 3 were more active than females 
on male dominated boards in Project 2, but voiced the feeling of being excluded.  
Females on male dominated boards in Project 3 engaged more than females in 
Project 2 in strategy discussions and emphasised having a general function in a 
similar way to the males. This is in contrast with Project 2 where females were found 
to consider their input to be in terms of specific knowledge and skills.   An 
explanation for this higher level of activity cannot be directly derived from the 
research data. Two factors could possibly have an effect; the fact that the females in 
Project 3 had more experience in serving on boards, and/or that the critical 
conditions of the company could push them to be more vocal and proactive.   The 
females on male dominated boards persistently voiced their frustrations and feelings 
about not being effective enough, their questions not being well received, and their 
efforts not being recognised.  They lacked the informal networks which were again 
defined as important by their male counterparts.  In project 3, there is evidence that 
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the females on male dominated boards are to some extent stepping into more active 
roles but, as they do not share the males‟ views and ideas on how to run an effective 
board, they experience frustration and not being optimally effective.   
 
  
Table 5: Summary of findings of projects 2 and 3 
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improving board 
performance
Females' contributions 
are less likely to be 
valued due to lack of 
inclusion
Males see informal 
relationships as extremely 
important.                                                       
Women are excluded 
from informal 
relationships
Not discussed
Females' role 
interpretation does NOT 
seem to be affected by 
gender demography.
Informal relationships are 
seen as important by 
males on male dominated 
boards.
Females on male 
dominated boards 
comment on lack of open 
discussions and questions 
not being welcomed.
Males tend to adopt roles 
like questioning and 
improving board 
performance when 
female proportion on a 
board is balanced or 
high.
Informal relationships 
seen as UNimportant by 
both males and females 
on boards where female 
representation is high.
Candour and open 
discussions seen as a vital 
part of being effective as a 
board by both males and 
females on boards with 
gender balance or high 
female representation
P
ro
je
c
t 
3
  
  
  
 
How does 
gender 
demography 
have an effect?             
Females' contributions 
are much more likely 
to be valued when 
female representation 
is high due to an equal 
power status to males.
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4.  Contributions    
4.1. Contributions to knowledge 
The theoretical contributions of this study are divided into three sections: roles and 
contributions; male dominated boards; and, gender balanced and all female boards.   
Table 6 provides an overview of the theoretical contributions.   
 
 
Table 6: Summary of theoretical contributions 
Proposition Previous research Project 2 Project 3
Females are less active in the strategic role Not reported before
Board members embrace the paradoxical roles of 
controlling, supporting and boundary spanning
Roberts, McNulty & Stiles, 2005; Demb 
& Neubauer, 1992 Supported Supported
Female directors add valuable contributions; 
asking challenging questions and pushing for 
better results 
Bilimoria & Huse, 1997; Huse & Solberg, 
2006, Konrad, Kramer & Erkurt, 2008 Supported Supported
Social culture and norms of the board rooms are 
of masculine nature Bradshaw & Wicks, 2000 Supported
Supported for male 
dominated boards
Females accommodate by high levels of 
preparation, influencing behaviour and facilitating 
a comfortable atmosphere
Huse & Solberg, 2006, Zelechowski & 
Billimoria, 2003; Bilimoria & Huse, 1997 Supported Questioned
High levels of informal relationships have positive 
effects on impact on the board level
Westphal & Milton, 2000; Pye, 2004; 
Carpenter & Westphal, 2001 Supported
Questioned and 
extended
Females lack or neglect the benefits of social 
capital which can potentially diminish their 
effectiveness Singh & Vinnicombe, 2004 Supported
Contradicted for 
gender balanced boards
Females have low social  and power status on 
male dominated boards Emerged Deeper understanding
Lack of gender balance can inhibit effectiveness Kanter, 1977; Ely, 1995 Supported Supported
Gender integration can facilitate effectiveness Kanter, 1977; Ely, 1995 Supported
Critical number of women reduces the effect of 
tokenism, creates a more supportive atmosphere 
and affects male participants and the dynamics 
of the board in general Konrad, Kramer & Erkurt, 2008
Supported and 
expanded
Gender balanced boards have high levels of male 
and female similarities and shared ideology and a 
unified understanding of role and role execution Emerged
Gender integrated and all female boards have 
higher levels of openness, interactivity, candour 
and trust Emerged
Females on gender balanced and all female 
boards have high levels of confidence and 
feelings of being valued Emerged
R
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s
 a
n
d
 a
c
ti
v
it
ie
s
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4.1.1. Role interpretation 
The study supports previous findings of board members embracing the paradoxical 
roles of controlling and consulting as well as paying attention to the boundary 
spanning role and looking out for the interests of a wider pool of stakeholders 
(Roberts et al., 2005; Demb & Neubauer, 1992a).   Both these empirical studies 
indicate that both males and females, either on male dominated or gender integrated 
boards, had a similar general understanding of their basic roles and seemed to 
embrace the paradoxes of holding management accountable, as well as adopting a 
supporting role and participating in strategy, and a responsibility towards a wider 
pool of stakeholders.   
 
The role adopted by female board members has been associated with promoting the 
interests of a wider pool of stakeholders (Konrad & Kramer, 2006).  In this study, 
males and females alike explicitly stated shareholders as their number one priority 
while looking out for other stakeholders, as well as adopting an advisory and 
consulting role, was seen as important by both males and females.  This study 
therefore does not support that promoting the interests of a wider pool of 
stakeholders is attributed to females.     
 
The males in Project 2 reported having an input on a very wide and general level, 
whereas the females interpreted their role as bringing specific input based on specific 
knowledge and skills.  The nature of these contrasting role interpretations by males 
and females has not been reported in any previous studies to my best knowledge.   
 
The study supports earlier findings which indicate that the role of asking challenging 
questions and pushing for improved decision making is a major contribution of 
female directors (Bilimoria & Huse, 1997; Huse & Solberg, 2006; Konrad et al., 
2008).  
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Project 2 Project 3
Males Males Males
FemalesFemalesFemales
Effective 
dynamics
Importance of 
Relationships
Centre of power
Authority taken 
for granted
Importance of 
relationships
Centre of power
Taking control
Asking questions
Independence 
Authority present
Asking questions
Seeking 
improvements
Asking questions
Nurturing roles
Authority lacking 
Feelings of 
confidence 
and being 
valued
Voicing 
feelings of 
not being 
valued
Inefficient 
dynamics
Asking questions
Independence 
Authority present
Reconstructed boards
Gender balance or females in 
high proportions
Boards of large companies
Females in token or minority positions
Boards of large companies
Females in token positions
  
Figure 3: A summary of the findings of Projects 2 and 3.   
 
4.1.2. Male dominated boards 
It was evident from my results of both projects 2 and 3, that the social culture and 
norms of boardrooms are quite masculine and deeply rooted in predetermined 
assumptions about behaviour and success supporting the ideas of masculine 
hegemony (Bradshaw & Wicks, 2000) and non inclusive cultures (Zelechowski & 
Bilimoria, 1997) on the board. 
 
My results from male dominated boards supported earlier findings on women‟s 
accommodation strategies on male dominated boards. They tend to practice high 
levels of preparation (Huse & Solberg, 2006; Zelechowski & Bilimoria, 2003), 
engage in influencing behaviour and alliance building (Zelechowski & Bilimoria, 
2003) and facilitate a good atmosphere in the boardroom (Bilimoria & Huse, 1997).  
However, results from gender balanced and all female boards in Project 3 question 
that high levels of preparation, influencing, alliance building and informal 
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relationships are inevitable female behaviours (Huse & Solberg, 2006; Zelechowski 
& Bilimoria, 2003). High levels of preparation can be attributed to efforts to 
counteract tokenism and informal relationships only seem to play a role when they 
are seen as the norm of the majority and part of the group culture.  
 
The importance of informal relationships, previously found to have positive effects 
on board dynamics (Westphal & Milton, 2000; Pye, 2004; Carpenter & Westphal, 
2001), was supported by the male interviewees on male dominated boards. The 
males reported engaging in informal relationships to be a very important part of 
being successful in their role. However, females on male dominated boards seemed 
to lack or neglect the benefits of informal relationships, not associating them in any 
sense to their role, which could potentially diminish their effectiveness, supporting 
Singh & Vinnicombe (2004).  Westphal (1999), Westphal & Milton (2000), Pye 
(2004), and Stevenson & Radin (2009), indicate that social ties on boards are 
important for effectiveness.  However, their research only covered male dominated 
boards.  According to my findings social ties are important only to the extent that 
they are part of the “rules and norms” of the board. The rules and norms on the other 
hand are most often established by the “majority” or the body holding the power on a 
particular board.   Therefore my findings extend the findings of these studies and 
question their generalisability.    
 
Project 3 brings to the forefront issues around the lack of female social status, 
touched upon in previous literature (Huse & Solberg, 2006; Zelechowski & 
Bilimoria, 2003; Konrad et al., 2008).  The lower social status of females on boards 
is supported by the finding that they attributed their contribution on the board to 
tangible factors, such as specific knowledge and skills, and high levels of 
preparation, and that they look for reaffirmation through peer feedback and feel they 
have to earn trust in the boardroom.  In addition, the fact that the women did not 
participate in informal relationship building, defined by males as essential for 
effectiveness on the board, further suggests that their general power status on the 
board is low.  This observation is somewhat different from the importance of 
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inclusion at board level as discussed by Zelechowski & Bilimoria (2003).  It is rather 
the issue of being a part of the actual power cluster and perhaps engaging in informal 
relationships in order to make alliances with such parties (Huse & Solberg, 2006).  
The highly masculine culture of the board (Ragins et al., 1998; Marshall, 1995; 
Bradshaw & Wicks, 2000) and a minority status on boards (Ingley & van der Walt, 
2003) may mean that female voices are not heard.  These previous findings support 
the observations of my study; Since the females are generally not part of the informal 
network of male dominated boards, their contributions are less likely to have an 
impact.   
4.1.3. Gendered balanced and all female boards 
In line with Kanter (1977) and Ely (1995) the findings suggest that a lack of gender 
balance can inhibit female contribution. As already discussed, high levels of 
preparation and influencing tactics have been found to be important behaviours of 
females on male dominated boards (Huse & Solberg, 2006; Zelechowski & 
Bilimoria, 2003).  My study reveals that when the boards are gender balanced or all 
female there is no indication that these tactics have any relevance.  In addition the 
informal relationships that were considered very important on male dominated 
boards had no relevance on gender balanced and all female boards.  
 
My findings support and add to the findings of Konrad et al., (2008) that a critical 
number of women will not only reduce the effect of tokenism, and create a more 
supportive atmosphere where females are more likely to raise issues and be heard, 
but also that this critical number does affect the male participants and the dynamics 
of the board in general.  
What emerged very clearly was the difference in dynamics and interactions between 
the male dominated boards and the boards with higher proportions of females.  The 
male dominated boards seemed to have many of the cultural characteristics described 
by Mace (1971), Lorsch & McIver (1989), Hill (1995) and Nadler et al. (2006) who 
mention issues such as discouraging challenging and open questioning, and norms of 
consensus and that delicate polite behaviours and taboos seem to paralyse the board‟s 
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ability to act.  The male dominated boards in my study seemed to have rather low 
levels of open discussions, emphasising the importance of informal relationships and 
the Chairman/CEO dialogue, making the boards less effective, but also potentially 
muting those who are not considered a part of the board “norm”.  On the other hand, 
gender integrated boards and the all female board seemed to possess many of the 
characteristics described as ideal boards in prescriptive literature: promoting open 
discussion  (Sonnenfeld, 2002; Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; Cascio, 2004; Nadler, 
2006; Buchholtz et al., 2005; Maharaj, 2008a), asking challenging questions 
(Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; Roberts et al., 2005; Nadler, 2006; Maharaj, 2008a), 
and sharing a common goal (Aram & Cowen, 1986; Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; 
Murphy & McIntyre, 2007).  This is in line with Pearce & Zahra, (1991), who found 
that boards with high power, in relation to the CEO power, tended to have higher 
numbers of females on the board, and Fondas & Sassalos (2000) who found boards 
with one or more females to have a greater more effect on management decision 
making.   
 
What explicitly emerged was the importance of high levels of open interactions, 
candour and trust on the gender balanced and all female boards.  The board members 
seemed to have made a point of discussing their mutual roles and objectives very 
early in the process.  Although individuals came from different backgrounds and 
even though the level of informal relationships and previous acquaintances was very 
low, their frequent meetings, open interactions and sharing a common goal seemed to 
have brought them sufficiently together to have, in a relatively short time, developed 
a high level of trust amongst each other.  The level of trust was particularly described 
as “not being afraid to voice your views and opinions, even though they contrast with 
those of other board members”.   This is very much in contrast with the findings 
from male dominated boards (in both Project 2 and 3) where the male interviewees 
defined informal relationships as prerequisites of building trust amongst board 
members.   
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What emerged as characteristic of the women on gender balanced boards and the all 
female board was their high level of confidence.  In fact this confidence level could 
both be considered to facilitate effective contributions or be a result of the females 
feeling that they are being effective.  
 
In addition, what emerged on the gender balanced boards was the high level of 
similarities and shared ideology between male and female directors, and a unified 
understanding, not only of their basic role, but also in the way they talked about 
being successful in their role and to whom they felt accountable.   
 
Finally, the importance of informal relationships and building trust through external 
interaction which had high relevance on the male dominated boards, seemed to have 
no significance on the gender integrated and all female boards. 
 
The findings from project 3, in which male and female directors were interviewed on 
two gender balanced boards and one all female board, indicated interesting 
differences in perceptions of their non executive director role and contributions 
compared to the male and female directors on male dominated boards.  These 
findings are tentative and now need to be tested on further samples. 
 
4.2. Contributions to methodology 
While this study does not provide concrete contributions to methodology it applies 
methods that have not been used very much in this context. 
 
The study answers calls for increased emphasis on qualitative research methods at 
board level focusing on what boards or board members actually do, rather than what 
they look like (Daily et al., 2003; Leblanc, 2004a; Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003) and 
focusing on processes and mechanisms which presumably link the inputs to outputs 
(Pettigrew, 1992).   
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It furthermore contributes to the sharpening of the focus onto individual board 
members as the unit of analysis (Pye & Pettigrew, 2005), examining interpretations 
of each individual board member on their role on the board and their board 
experiences as opposed to commenting on boards as whole entities or eliding 
between individual and collective role interpretation. 
 
Finally, it contributes to looking at role interpretation in different contexts, 
particularly in terms of gender demography, responding to calls of paying attention 
to the issues of context and process over time, and their relationship to outcomes 
(Pye & Pettigrew, 2005).   
 
4.3. Contributions to practice 
4.3.1. Recommendations for male dominated boards  
The results of this study reveal the somewhat ineffective dynamics of traditionally 
composed boards.  Traditional male dominated boards lack the levels of open 
discussion and challenge that are considered essential for effective boards.  The 
actual power and decision making seem to take place through informal relationships 
and sometimes in an isolated dialogue between the chairman and CEO, muting the 
board members who are not a part of the informal system.  Reforms and 
improvements are unlikely to yield better results when the traditional culture of the 
boards remains intact.  In order to improve board results and be able to 
fundamentally change the ways they act and perform, they need to make every board 
member accountable; the boards need to open up the discussion that takes place at 
the formal board meeting and allow for a more candid and confronting debate.  In 
addition they need to emphasise discussions on the collective roles, responsibilities 
and objectives of the board, and build a combined level of trust between all board 
members by allowing open discussion, appreciating different perspectives and 
encouraging challenging questions.   
This process is much more likely to be successful if the composition of boards is 
substantially restructured to include a higher level of gender diverse individuals, with 
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sufficient knowledge and skills, but also with the courage, integrity and rapport to 
reassess the traditional ways of board procedures.   
4.3.2. The case of the female director 
Females seem to be consistently more inclined to take on the role of asking 
challenging questions and pushing for better results. This study indicates that adding 
females to the board is beneficial.  However, in order for this added value to 
materialise, the input must be appreciated by the board, and that depends on the 
prevailing boardroom culture.   
 
In my opinion, most attempts to demonstrate the benefits of having females on 
boards have looked at female board members in a male dominated context, where 
their way of defining their role is not aligned to the definition of the majority of the 
board members, and thus their potential impact is not materialised.    What my 
research implies is that when boards are gender balanced or female dominated and/or 
when traditional rules and norms do not exist, women on boards feel like “fish in 
water” and their very valuable contributions are realised.  In my opinion, this study 
reveals that the scarcity of females on boards might precisely be a result of prevailing 
norms and assumptions about what is anticipated of a board member – a model 
females are unlikely to fit into or confirm to.   On the other hand, boards, 
traditionally male dominated, are in desperate need of redefining their ways of 
defining effectiveness, towards a more open and interactive style.  Possibly this can 
be accomplished by actively recruiting members from a wider pool of talent and 
increasing the representation of board members previously regarded as 
unconventional, typically females.  Until then the few token females on male 
dominated boards might have to be satisfied with coping strategies such as high 
levels of preparation and making alliances with the most influential members.   
 
4.4. Conclusions 
This thesis provides three important findings.   
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It seems quite clear that female non-executive directors can bring valuable 
contributions by challenging questioning and pushing for better results. Increased 
gender balance seems to direct male directors towards adopting a role similar to what 
females were found to adopt throughout both projects.  In addition, a higher 
proportion of females on boards does seem to positively affect the dynamics of the 
entire board, making it more open, challenging but at the same time constructive.   
 
The main obstacles to valuable female contributions seem to be the closed and tightly 
networked cultures of the traditionally male dominated boards, where matters tend to 
be discussed/settled through informal relationships.   This study provides evidence 
that increasing the gender balance of boards changes male contribution on the board 
and opens a way for increased female contribution, which in turn may positively 
impact on board performance.  Females on gender balanced and all female boards 
were found to be much more confident, repeatedly expressing feelings of being 
effective.   
 
Finally the findings of this study question the importance of female preparation and 
alliance making, and reveal that informal relationships are only an essential part of 
being effective on a board in the male dominated context.  
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5. Limitations and suggestions for further research 
 
5.1. Limitations 
The limitations of this study and its findings can be grouped into two sections.  First 
there are a number of issues regarding the study design, as a qualitative study is 
limited to a small sample size and a particular context.  Second it must be 
acknowledged that there can be alternative explanations for the differences found 
between the interpretations of board members on boards with different gender 
demographics.   The proceeding section will in turn cover both types of limitations.   
 
5.1.1. Limitations due to study design  
This thesis reports the findings of a qualitative study, based on two sets of in-depth 
interviews with a total of 24 board non-executive directors.  A qualitative research 
method allows for more depth and understanding of the issues to be examined.  
However qualitative studies are generally based on a small sample size, within a 
particular context, which means that the findings cannot be used to generalise about a 
larger population (Easterby-Smith et al, 2002) and this certainly applies to the 
findings of this study.   
 
Sample size 
In this study the first set of data was gathered through 11 in-depth interviews of six 
females and five males all being directors of male dominated boards.  The second set 
was gathered through 14 interviews with; three females from male dominated boards, 
three females from gender balanced boards, two females from an all female board, 
three males from male dominated boards and three males from gender balanced 
boards. This is obviously a small and limited sample.  Previous qualitative studies on 
female non executive directors have been based on sample sizes of four to eight 
interviewees (Bilimoria & Huse, 1997; Zelechowski & Billimoria, 2003; Huse & 
Solberg, 2006).  Although subgroups in this study contain a limited number of 
interviewees, the sample is in general quite comparable to previous studies.   
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Narrow context 
It should be acknowledged that the study is conducted on non executive directors on 
Icelandic boards only.  Although the boards of many of the 50 largest Icelandic 
companies were represented, the study is limited to one country and a rather small 
one.  This fact cautions against generalizations and conclusions drawn to how things 
are in other countries with different cultures and different economic conditions.   
Finally the particular conditions and context, whether company or economy related, 
at the time of the study can have an effect on the results and further limit the ability 
to generalise from the findings.   
 
Researcher bias 
Using in-depth interviews as a research method requires a high level of involvement 
of the researcher.  The study and its results are therefore subject to a researcher bias. 
This applies to the perceptions and beliefs of the researcher that might have affected 
the research design, the interview conduct and probing, analyses of transcripts, and 
interpretation of results.  My initial desire to examine, and perhaps demonstrate, the 
valuable contribution of female directors might have affected my objectivity and 
interpretation of the data.  My way to counteract that was to approach the data with 
an open mind and sense of curiosity, searching particularly for making sense of the 
whole conversation rather than looking for certain trends and cues.  Indeed a 
substantial amount of the knowledge and understanding derived from the data did 
come as a surprise.  My previous personal board experience might have been a cause 
for developing certain assumptions about director behaviour and role interpretation, 
but also offers a deeper understanding of the board‟s tasks and responsibilities.  
Finally, as already mentioned in this thesis, my previous relationships and 
acquaintances with some interviewees could have affected my tone and as well as the 
conversation, as well as the data interpretation.  However, in general, I felt that this 
factor was beneficial, as the interviewees I knew personally seemed to be more open 
and willing to share ideas.   
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5.1.2. Alternative explanations for the findings 
Although this study sets out to examine gendered role interpretations and the effect 
of gender demographics on board directors‟ behaviours, it should be explicitly stated 
that several other factors could have contributed to the research outcome.  This 
particularly applies to the results of Project 3, where the effects of board gender 
demography on role interpretation are studied.  Although the differences detected 
between the two types of board in the study have, in previous studies, been 
associated with gender demography (Konrad et al., 2008), they could also be 
attributed to other factors, for instance the economic context, the unusual recruitment 
process of the new boards, individual characteristics of the interviewees or other 
situational context.  Each of these factors will be discussed briefly.  
 
Economic context 
The findings of this study indicate that contextual factors can have an effect on role 
interpretation and an impact on female directors‟ effectiveness.  As indicated in the 
literature review, boards have been reported to become more active in times of crisis 
(Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Mace, 1972; Mace, 1973), but such apparent effects of 
crises on board dynamics and discussion is not known to have been reported 
previously.  In fact Lorsch & MacIver reported on rigid norms and behaviours all too 
often paralysing boards‟ abilities to act, and delaying detection of problems or an 
upcoming crisis (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989).   
 
In the context of a worsening economic situation, board members seem to be feeling 
the increased pressure of the responsibility borne by the board.  This is consistent 
with the findings of Lorsch & MacIver (1989) that boards become more open in 
periods of crisis.  This might indicate that the female input of asking challenging 
questions, probing for answers and pushing for improvement, might be considered of 
higher value in times of crises, as opposed to when things are booming.  In an 
economic upswing there may be a higher likelihood of groupthink, less reason to 
question methods in general and there is not a pressing need for alternative solutions. 
Therefore alternative views might not be as welcomed.   
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The unusual circumstances of the recruitment process 
Taking into consideration that the conditions and circumstances during the 
recruitment of the new boards were quite unusual, the criteria for recruitment could 
very well have an effect on how individual board members perceive their roles.   
 
In my previous study there were indications that individual role interpretations could 
be attributed to reasons for the appointment of particular board members.  This 
indicates that “who” appoints directors and under what conditions can affect how the 
individual behaves on the board and how the role is enacted.    The circumstances 
regarding the appointment of the three new boards were indeed quite extreme.  When 
the companies collapsed, all the previous board members were dismissed and new 
ones were appointed.  Due to the extreme gravity of the situation one might even say 
that the board members were in fact appointed to “speak up”.  The boards of the 
other companies, however, similarly to the boards of the Project 2 study, consisted of 
members that were either large shareholder themselves, appointed by large 
shareholders, were employees of large shareholders, or were appointed from 
alternative sources for the sake of being independent non-executive directors. This 
could be explored as a possible explanation for the difference in role interpretation 
and particularly the large difference in board dynamics reported by the interviewees.     
 
Individual characteristics of interviewees 
Individual characteristics of interviewees could certainly have an effect on the results 
of the study.  Indeed the newly formed boards consisted of individuals that were 
particularly chosen because they were considered to be highly professional and 
undisputed.  While many of the new members had extensive board experience, others 
did not.  Although not detectable in the background information gathered in the 
study, individual characteristic could possibly account for the differences found in 
role interpretation and the individual‟s description of board dynamics.   
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Other circumstantial factors 
The financial crises leading to the reconstruction of the boards examined created a 
situation very different from the one prevailing in the previous years and what could 
be considered “normal” business circumstances.   While this context could offer 
various explanations, in my opinion it might have been precisely the failure of the 
business system that lead both to the recruitment of boards with unusual 
composition, and triggered the new directors appointed in these “new times” to 
question the ways things had been done previously.  Traditional rules and norms 
have not fostered an ambience of open discussion, task conflict and challenging 
questions.  Faced with a huge task, the newly appointed members knew that they 
should do anything but emulate the norms and behaviours of their predecessors, and 
it was up to them to find out how.  The after crisis notion that traditional rules and 
norms had to be thrown out and others had to be established can very well be offered 
as explanations for the very different dynamics on these boards.     
 
5.2. Suggestions for further research 
This study builds mainly on references from two bodies of literature; the corporate 
governance literature, and the women on boards (WOB) literature.  This section will 
offer suggestions for further research to each body of literature in turn, but 
concluding that both sets could benefit from more cross consulting, or even merging 
the two.   
 
5.2.1. Expanding the corporate governance literature 
  
Role theories 
The corporate governance literature is rooted in theories that describe or explain 
what the role of a board should be.  According to these theories a board should 
according to agency theory (Fama & Jensen, 1983) be controlling, according to 
stewardship theory (Davis & Donaldson, 1997) supporting, boundary spanning 
(Pfeffer, & Salancik, 1978) and in line with stakeholder theory looking out for the 
interest of a wider pool of stakeholders (Freeman, 1984)).  These theories, that seem 
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to be fairly well established, do however not take into account how boards can or 
should accomplish their role and what could facilitate the process.  In other words, it 
seems that it is fairly well established what boards should do, but less so how boards 
should fulfil their role.  Attempts in predicting board effectiveness have mainly 
focused on director characteristics rather than interaction, assuming that a certain 
characteristic, such as independence, will lead to certain behaviour (Finkelstein & 
Mooney, 2003).  
 
The repeated calls for process research (Daily et al., 2003; Leblanc, 2004a; 
Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003, Pettigrew, 1992) highlight the need to expand on the 
knowledge and understanding of how boards act and interact in order to fulfil their 
roles, and the need for alternative ways of theorising on boards (Pye & Pettigrew, 
2006), namely on what makes a board effective in fulfilling these roles.   
 
My study revealed that gender and board composition had an effect on how 
individual board members interpreted their roles and how they acted to fulfill it.  This 
implies that various other contextual factors could also affect these things and thus 
influence how effective the whole board is.   Further process research on role 
interpretation of board members and the effect of different contextual circumstances 
on role interpretation and ultimately effectiveness is therefore recommended. Further 
studies in this area could contribute to building theories on what makes board 
members or entire boards effective in fulfilling their roles.  Existing theories fall 
short in this matter and further consultation with other bodies of literature including 
literature on team dynamics and top management team interaction is encouraged.  
Furthermore, opening the “black box” of board behaviour calls for a different 
approach, not only in terms of research methods, but also a redefinition of what to 
examine, in what context. 
 
The results of my study particularly recommend four avenues for further exploration; 
the effect of gender composition on role interpretation, the effect of the recruitment 
process on role interpretation,  what factors can facilitate open discussion, active 
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debate and critical questioning on boards, and finally to examine further the issue of 
trust in the context of boards.   
 
The effect of gender composition on role interpretation 
The main focus of this study was to examine the effect of different gender 
compositions on the role interpretation of male and female directors.  The findings 
indicated that interviewees had a fairly unanimous understanding of the role of the 
board. It was in how they acted to fulfil the roles that they differed.  All the women 
reported a similar tactic, but the male tactic differed depending on whether they 
served on male dominated or gender balanced boards.  While these findings are 
supported by Kramer et al. (2008), as well as Ely (1995) and Kanter (1977), further 
research in this same area is needed in order to support or contradict these findings.  
Establishing the effect of gender composition on role interpretation and tactics for 
role fulfilment is essential to conduct theories on the effects of board composition.   
 
The effect of the recruitment process on role interpretation 
One of the main alternative explanations for the differences found between members 
of male dominated boards and the other boards were the unusual circumstances of 
the recruitment process of the newly formed boards.  The results of my first study 
indicated that the reason or circumstances of appointment could have an effect on 
how roles were interpreted and executed.   
The issue of who gets appointed, why and how, and how that relates to role 
interpretation and role fulfilment is an avenue that is interesting to explore further. 
The current literature on board recruitment is limited and seems to be restricted to 
dealing with the issue of director independence and ability to make decisions 
independent of management (Leblanc, 2004b; Cantor, 2005; Conger & Lawler, 2001; 
Maharaj, 2008b; Olson & Adams, 2004; Watson, 2004). 
 
What factors produce an exemplary board?  
My research revealed that the gender balanced and all female boards had many of the 
characteristics of exemplary boards, such as high levels of interaction and open 
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discussion, practiced critical questioning and had a shared vision (Aram & Coven, 
1986; Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Demb & Neubauer, 1992; Pettigrew & McNulty, 
1995; McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999; Rindova, 1999; Roberts, 2002; Sonnenfeld, 2002;  
Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; van der Walt & Ingley, 2003; Cascio, 2004; Leblanc, 
2004; Letendre, 2004; Leblanc & Gilles, 2005; Roberts, McNulty & Stiles, 2005; 
Nader et al., 2006; Murphy & McIntyre, 2007; Maharaj, 2008).  
These findings indicate that it would be interesting to examine further what factors 
characterise boards that possess these qualities.  In depth interviewing or observation 
of board meetings could be used to assess the level of activeness while also 
examining contextual factors such as composition, individual director characteristics, 
backgrounds and other factors.     
 
Trust, in the context of boards 
One of the more interesting findings of this study portrays how the issue of trust is 
differently defined on male dominated boards on one hand and the balanced or all 
female boards on the other.  While trust was defined as “not being afraid to voice 
your views and opinions even though they contrast with those of others” on balanced 
and all female boards, it was mainly defined as “being able to predict behaviour” on 
the male dominated boards.  Examining this issue further could help shed light on 
many of the underlying assumption on board behaviour and interaction.  First of all it 
would be interesting to examine if similar findings are reported in different cultures, 
countries and context.  Second it would be interesting to examine what effect 
different definitions of trust have on board effectiveness.   
 
Applying a gendered lens to corporate governance research 
In general the corporate governance literature has been blind to many contextual 
factors affecting the work of the board.  The issue of gender has largely been absent 
in mainstream corporate governance literature. Taking into consideration the fact that 
the business world is becoming increasingly complex and that the talent pool is 
increasingly populated by women, there is a growing need to make use of the most 
capable resources that can contribute different viewpoints to the increasingly 
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complicated decision making arena.  This applies to both boards and the literature 
that examines their roles and effectiveness.  Therefore incorporating a gendered lens 
into the general corporate governance literature, for instance by focusing on 
gathering data from both male and female board members while examining board 
procedures, is highly encouraged.  
 
5.2.2. Advancing the WOB literature 
 
The WOB literature has to date focused only on studying women, as opposed to 
gaining understanding of male and female similarities, differences and interactions.  
Some studies have focused on women‟s contribution to particular roles, such as the 
stakeholder role and effect on corporate governance procedures or philanthropy 
(Ibrahim & Anglidis, 1994; Wang & Coffey, 1992; Singh & Vinnicombe, 2004).  
However the field in general needs to move from looking at what type of roles 
women enact to studying how women can be effective in their role execution.   
 
The few studies looking at role effectiveness of female board members have to a 
great extent focused on accommodation and influencing tactics (Bilimoria & Huse; 
1997; Bradshaw & Wicks, 2000; Zelechowski & Bilimoria, 2003; Huse & Solberg, 
2006), and the effect of social capital (Zelechowski & Bilimoria, 2003; Huse & 
Solberg, 2006).  Gaining an understanding of these issues might be highly relevant 
for women‟s effectiveness in male dominated cultures.  However, my findings 
indicate that adaptation strategies are not necessarily needed when boards have 
higher numbers of females, nor will they result in changing the board behaviour to a 
more active communication style.  Therefore, being attentive to cultures and norms 
of boards when studying women‟s role execution is highly recommended.   
 
Finally, bringing the WOB literature closer to mainstream corporate governance 
literature by studying male and female differences, similarities and interactions could 
contribute to the understanding of board dynamics through a gendered lens, uncover 
 76 
issues of culture and underlying assumptions and further shed light on the benefits of 
board diversity. 
 
5.3 Reflections on my learning and personal experience  
This five and a half year journey leading to this final piece of writing for the DBA 
thesis has been very educating, both in terms of academic training as well as personal 
development.  My motivation to undertake research in the field of women on boards 
was due to the scarcity of women on boards and in top executive positions.  I was not 
content with the explanations offered for female scarcity at board level.  My personal 
experience, working with professional women and serving on a few corporate 
boards, told me that it was too superficial to claim that women either lack 
qualifications or personal interest or the ambition to rise to the highest levels of the 
corporate world.   I was also sceptical about the reasoning that women would have to 
learn to adjust and adapt to the male way of “doing business”, as myself and many of 
my female colleagues had voiced the frustrations of the highly political and 
sometimes unprofessional culture of the male dominated business world.  It was clear 
to me that as women represent half the workforce in Iceland, and have for more than 
25 years outnumbered men as university students and graduates, that the business 
world was not making full use of the human capital available in the country.   
 
At the time I started my studies the discussion on female scarcity on boards had just 
begun to surface in Iceland, and the discussion of quotas in Norway was fairly 
recent.  As I felt that the act of introducing quotas was a rather harsh reaction, I was 
eager to find ways to demonstrate that there were actual benefits to increasing 
diversity in the boardroom by adding females.   
 
My journey and findings have demonstrated that increasing the number of females 
on boards can actually be quite beneficial as they can bring valuable contributions, 
improving the overall performance of the board, so indeed the business world was 
missing out on not utilising female talent.   But the study also revealed that it was 
more complicated than simply putting the women to work, as prevailing norms and 
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cultures can inhibit the benefits females can bring to the board.  The study to me 
uncovered that the culture and norms of the board, which have been created over 
decades, or even centuries, of male dominance are very rigid and not receptive to 
either different types of board members or different definitions of how to be 
successful.   
 
Formal training for new board members has not been very common.  It is only quite 
recently that one of the universities in Iceland started to offer courses with the aim of 
training board members with regard to roles, procedures and responsibilities of the 
board.  Being one of the main lecturers in this programme, it seems to me that the 
conventional way to learn the board role is for new members to watch and listen to 
those already on the board.  This way, new members learned the prevailing norms 
and traditions, instead of simply having an opportunity to obtain a foundation and 
then be able to only critically and independently assess the board processes and the 
issues facing the board.   
 
My personal conclusion is that balance might have existed in the world of business 
when the entire economy relied only on the male workforce.  As the economy has 
become more complex, diverse and fast paced there is a need for more diverse talent 
within the workforce.  Darwin‟s evolution theory tells us that homogeneity will lead 
to exemption.  Homogeneity in the decision making arena will lead to groupthink 
and exaggeration.  This is one of the things I believe the recent economic crisis has 
taught us.   The world has changed and the balance needs to be restored.  My study 
demonstrates that the creation of new boards provides an opportunity both for 
recruiting more females and for creating new rules and norms.   
 
This is an observation that has been put into practice by my current employer Audur 
Capital, a financial service company founded by two experienced women with the 
aim of incorporating feminine values into finance, as those values have been largely 
absent from that sector.  As with the male dominated boards, the financial sector has 
been dominated by males and male driven values.  Female executives and directors 
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have been scarce and short-lived in that sector.  Instead of trying to change this very 
prevailing culture from the inside, the founders of Audur Capital decided to create a 
company built on values such as risk awareness, long-term orientation and profit 
with principles – values traditionally lacking in the financial sector – to which both 
males and females could adhere.   
 
It is my firm belief, supported by my research findings that it is time to redefine the 
mantras of what it takes to be successful in business, and harvest both the male and 
the female talent available to the business world. We simply cannot afford not to. 
 
 
 
. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The advancement of women to the upper echelons of corporations remains slow 
(Daily et al., 2000), with the board level being no exception (Catalyst, 2003a, b; 
Singh & Vinnicombe, 2004a).   
 
Interest in the reforms of corporate governance has led to a stream of research in the 
areas of board composition, governance structure, and professional and social 
backgrounds of the top management team but empirical data show inconsistent 
findings on whether those reforms have an impact on company performance  (Zahra 
& Pearce, 1989; Dalton et al., 1998; Jensen & Zajac, 2004; Dalton et al., 1998). 
 
Research in the field of women on boards has covered the areas of: numbers and 
proportions of female board members; profile of female directors including social 
capital and human capital; advancement strategies of female directors and barriers to 
their advancement; and, making a business case for women directors.  
 
Little is known, however, about the experiences of women on corporate boards – 
their effect on board processes, team dynamics, and governance.  In addition, very 
little is known about how male and female directors experience becoming and being 
board members.   
 
The main studies that have been identified on women‟s experiences in the upper 
echelons of business are the following: Kakabadse et al., (1998) surveyed 750 
managers in the UK and Australia on leadership styles; Lord (2005) interviewed 34 
women in leadership positions of Australian universities on leadership roles; and, 
Gallese (1991) interviewed 24 senior female directors in the US, on women‟s 
aspirations to top positions.  Burke (1994a, 1997) surveyed close to 300 women 
serving on boards of directors in Canada, particularly looking at their  efforts to 
promote women‟s issues.  Two qualitative studies on women on boards of directors 
have also been identified: Bilimoria & Huse (1997) interviewed two American and 
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two Norwegian women board members on their board experience; and, Bradshaw & 
Wicks (2000) interviewed 20 Canadian women board members, particularly on the 
issues of raising a different voice in the boardroom or conforming to current 
procedures.  The research proposed will largely build on these latter two papers. 
 
According to Pettigrew (1992), research on corporate governance and boards of 
directors has largely followed three traditions: interlocking directorates and 
institutional and societal power; the study of boards of directors; and, the 
composition and correlates of top management teams.  Many of those studies, 
however, rely on proxies for characteristics and performance, and very little is 
understood about the actual behaviour of board members and board processes (Huse, 
1998; Daily et al., 2003).  Furthermore, expanding the women on boards literature 
with fine grained research has been suggested by the major scholars in the field i.e. 
(Bilimoria, 2000; Mattis, 1993; Burke, 1993). Although the number of studies on 
actual board behaviour and activities has been picking up (Lorsch & McIver, 1998; 
Demb & Neubauer, 1992a; Pettigrew & McNulty, 1995; Huse, 1998; McNulty & 
Pettigrew, 1999; Roberts & Stiles, 1999; Pye, 2002; Roberts et al., 2005), further 
research on expanding the board literature to observational and qualitative studies 
has been called for (Huse, 2003; Pettigrew, 1992; Daily et al., 2003; Jensen & Zajac, 
2004). This study seeks to contribute to the gaps in the board literature and the 
women on boards literature. 
 
The proposed research looks at:   
How do women on boards experience being, or becoming, directors?  
How does their presence on the board affect board culture, board dynamics or board 
behaviour?  
 
These questions will be addressed in an exploratory study by conducting in-depth 
interviews with female board members as well as two to three of their fellow male 
board members.  The aim is to gather empirical data from 25-30 members of six to 
eight boards of the largest Icelandic companies.    
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Three main areas of literature have been identified as relevant to this study: the 
corporate governance literature serves as a theoretical framework, including the role 
of the board and the underlying theories; the women on board literature is covered in 
detail to explore the area of research done so far; and finally, literature on board 
diversity, board dynamics appointment procedures and board culture since these 
issues are likely to emerge in an exploratory study. 
 
Women on boards
Numbers – Demographics –
Business case – Advancement
Research focus and
Relevant literature
Gender diversity; 
impact on board 
behaviour, activities, 
experiences
Boardroom 
dynamics as 
special kind of 
team
Corporate governance
Board roles / Director’s roles
Board (team) diversity,
board processes & 
board culture
Women’s effect on 
board dynamics and 
board behaviour
 
Figure 4: A map of the research focus and relevant bodies of literature 
 
The aim of this literature review is to set the theoretical foundations for the role of 
the board, and to identify what is known about women on boards and what is known 
about various board issues such as the impact of diversity, appointment procedures 
and board dynamics and culture. This entails a review of the literature on corporate 
governance, board and director roles, director characteristics, the impact of diversity 
on board performance, board processes and gendered culture. 
2. Governance, Board Roles and Structures  
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Major theoretical underpinnings of the research to be undertaken are board roles and 
governance structure.  This chapter serves to clarify the roles of the board and the 
main theoretical assumptions relating to those different roles. Since the proposed 
research project will focus on non-executive directors, the chapter covers in 
particular the role of the non-executive director.  Finally, this section acknowledges 
the recent calls for reforms in governance and covers research that has been done in 
the field of governance structure and performance. 
2.1 The role of the board  
The functions of the board have been summarised by several researchers including 
Monks and Minow (2004) as the following: to select, evaluate and, if necessary, 
replace directors and decide on their compensation; to review and approve financial 
objectives and major strategies; to provide advice and counsel to top management; to 
select and recommend for elections candidates for the board of directors and evaluate 
boards‟ processes and performance; and to review systems to comply with laws and 
regulations (Monks & Minow, 2004).  Three main roles of board directors have been 
identified in the literature; to oversee and control the actions of managers, to serve 
management by providing sound advice, and to provide resources such as access to  
useful relationships and information (Johnson et al., 1996; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). 
Several theories underpin the role of the board and can be associated with the roles 
identified. 
2.1.1. Agency theory and the controlling role  
The governance literature defines the control role of the board as one of paramount 
importance (Zahra & Pearce, 1989; Monks & Minow, 2004).  In addition to guarding 
shareholders‟ interests by monitoring management performance, the hiring and 
firing, and compensation of the CEO and other top level managers, are central to the 
controlling role (Johnson et al., 1996). The control role stems largely from agency 
theory which claims that separation of ownership and control calls for a monitoring 
function by a board of directors that will ensure that executives act in the interests of 
the shareholders rather than themselves (Fama & Jensen, 1983).  Agency theory 
supports the view that a board should be composed primarily of outside directors to 
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ensure that objectivity and a sufficient amount of independence from management 
are secured.  
2.1.2. Stewardship theory and the serving role 
In contrast to agency theory, stewardship theory takes a different view of managers, 
its core being that interests of managers and their principals are aligned. Therefore 
stewards will act in the company‟s best interest at any given time (Davis et al., 1997) 
and hence the control function of the board is not as central as in the agency 
perspective. The serving role is considered to be of wide significance, considering 
that a large amount of director time is spent on advising and supporting the CEO and 
management (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989). Inside directors are in this aspect considered 
valuable due to their firm and industry expertise, but outside directors are valued for 
their objectivity and wide exposure to the external world (Demb & Neubauer, 
1992a).  
2.1.3. Resource dependence theory and the resource dependence role 
The resource dependence role of the board (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) relates to the 
importance of securing and facilitating access to essential resources such as capital, 
expertise and information.  External directors have particularly been associated with 
serving the resource dependency role, and a company that has to rely to a large 
extent on external resources should therefore aim for a large board that would 
essentially provide more linkages to the external environment.  
2.1.4. Stakeholder theory 
Stakeholder theory has its roots in the conviction that companies have a wider 
responsibility than only to shareholders.  Stakeholders can be defined as “any group 
or individual that can affect or be affected by the realization of a company‟s 
objectives” (Freeman, 1984).  Stakeholders can be grouped into contractual 
(primary) stakeholders and community (secondary) stakeholders (Clarke, 1998; 
Pesqueux & Damak-Ayadi, 2005). Contractual stakeholders are those who have a 
direct and determined relationship to the company, such as shareholders, employees, 
customers, distributors, suppliers and lenders.  Community stakeholders are situated 
 85 
at the borders of a firm and may be impacted by its actions without having a 
contractual connection to it, such as consumers, regulators, government, media and 
local communities (Clarke, 1998). Instrumental stakeholder theory claims that firms 
which practice stakeholder management will perform better in terms of financial 
outcome, growth etc., but  normative stakeholder theory emphasises the intrinsic 
value of meeting ethical obligations (Pesqueux & Damak-Ayadi, 2005). 
 
Attention has been drawn to the fact that recent scandals in the corporate world did 
not only harm shareholders but affected to a wide extent other stakeholders (Huse, 
2003).  It has also been claimed that the relationship between firms and other 
stakeholders has been damaged by the constant drive to maximise shareholder value, 
resulting in the destruction of long-term shareholder value (Cassidy, 2003).  Bringing 
stakeholder representatives to the board has, however, not resulted in increased 
stakeholder performance (Hillman et al., 2001). 
 
2.2. The roles of executive and non-executive directors 
According to Demb & Neubauer (1992a), boards and their individual directors deal 
with the tension of two paradoxes: the necessity of being detached from 
considerations of self interest while retaining commitment to and involvement with 
the company; and, the capacity of having in-depth, first hand, knowledge while still 
bringing a broad wider context perspective. While non-executive directors have 
particularly been associated with detachment and broad perspective, executive 
directors are considered valuable for their in-depth knowledge and involvement with 
company affairs. 
2.2.1. The role of the non-executive director 
The role of the non-executive director (NED) has been receiving greater attention 
during the past decades (Higgs, 2003).  “Non-executives are seen as “guardians” of 
the corporate good and act as buffers between the executive directors and the 
company‟s outside shareholders” (Pass, 2004:53).  Demb & Neubauer (1992a) state 
that non-executive directors are most valued for their independence, their objectivity 
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and their wide range of experience with matters outside the company and its 
industry.  Based on agency theory assumptions, corporate governance reforms have 
largely emphasised increasing the levels of independent, non-executives as a means 
to enforce the board‟s control role.  It has, however, been highlighted that in order to 
serve as consultants to management and contributors to strategy, non-executives 
must acquire a certain level of rapport and accountability with management (Roberts 
et al., 2005).  Higgs (2003) defines the role of the non-executive director as the 
following: to constructively challenge and contribute to strategy development; to 
scrutinise the performance of management, to manage risk and secure that 
information is accurate; and to determine appropriate levels of remuneration of 
executives and play a prime role in appointing and when necessary removing 
directors.  NEDs are claimed to bring the unique benefits of serving a boundary 
spanning function (Zahra & Pearce, 1989), where their diverse knowledge of the 
complex business environment and position as outsiders gives them a unique vision 
of the system that surrounds and maintains organisational well-being (Barratt & 
Korac-Kakabadse, 2002).  
 
In a recent survey, NEDs were perceived as crucial to the board function and 82% of 
FTSE chairman felt they were effective (Russell Reynolds Associates, 2002). 
Chairmen furthermore felt that NEDs should devote more time to board activities, 
and increased demands on their time should result in higher pay.   Another recent 
survey of UK non-executive directors revealed that a substantial majority (91%) are 
current or former executives of other companies and the average number of non-
executive directorships held by each director is around two (Pass, 2004).  
2.2.2. The role of the executive director 
In countries with a one tier board, such as the UK and US, executive (or inside) 
directors are those who hold a full time executive position with the company and are 
often responsible for particular business units.  Executive directors thus, as full-time 
employees, “carry the mandate to fully develop their businesses” (Demb & 
Neubauer, 1992a:102).  Executive directors are considered particularly valuable to 
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the board for two reasons: first they bring to the board an in-depth knowledge and 
experience of the company and its industry and are able provide first hand access to 
information; second their personal interests and perhaps financial well-being are 
aligned with the well-being of the company, which implies that they will be more 
involved and committed to the objectives of the companies businesses (Demb & 
Neubauer, 1992a).   
 
The role of the executive director is by nature dual: that of being responsible for 
developing their part of the business and, as directors of the company, being 
responsible for the benefits and well-being of the company as a whole. This duality is 
thought to bring some difficulties to the role of the executive director.  Furthermore, 
the fact that the executive directors are more attached, have more personal stake and 
are more involved in company affairs, brings about the danger of their putting self-
interests ahead of company interests, and a certain tendency to acquire a kind of a 
tunnel vision after a long tenure with the same company.  The role of the non-
executive director is precisely to balance out these potential disadvantages.  
 
2.3. Corporate governance and board performance  
Corporate governance mechanisms have been defined as essential means for 
achieving corporate ends (Sternberg, 1998), and being “about the use of corporate 
power and the ability to control this power” (Huse, 2003:215).   In recent years 
several measures have been taken to reform governance procedures (Cadbury 1992; 
Sarbanes-Oxley, 2002; Higgs, 2003)  largely seeking to increase board independence 
particularly by increasing the number of outside directors and by separating the 
CEO-Chairman roles. Iceland, like other western countries, has followed suit and the 
Icelandic stock exchange and the Chamber of Commerce jointly published 
“Guidelines for Corporate Governance” in early 2004 (Icelandic Chamber of 
Commerce, 2004) building largely on the Cadbury and Higgs reports. 
 
The increasing importance of the board‟s self evaluation of performance has been 
highlighted (Higgs, 2003), and tools to assess the collective board‟s knowledge of 
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governance principles and legal duties have been developed (Heracleous & Luh Luh, 
2002). However, few companies have formal evaluation processes (Russell Reynolds 
Associates, 2002), and attention has been drawn to the difficulty of finding the 
correct measuring tools and the high risk of deceptive results if the improper tools 
were to be used (Scissons, 2002). 
 
A few studies have been able to show a positive relationship between an increased 
number of outside directors and social responsibility (Ibrahim & Angelidis, 1995) 
and on lower levels of corporate fraud (Uzun et al., 2004).  Furthermore, a meta 
review of board size and financial performance did show a positive relationship 
between the two (Dalton et al., 1999), while other studies show the opposite (Pearce 
& Zahra, 1992).  Despite activism towards board reforms, research aimed at 
demonstrating a link between performance and board governance structure has 
resulted mostly in conflicting findings (Zahra & Pearce, 1989; Johnson et al., 1996).  
A meta review of research on board composition (insider/outsider ratio), leadership 
structure (combined/separated Chairman/CEO roles) found no relationship between 
those and financial performance (Dalton et al., 1998).   
 
Although agency theory activists have been quite successful in pushing for increased 
levels of outside directors and for director independence (Russell Reynolds 
Associates, 2002), stewardship theory and the benefits of the inside director 
contribution has regained significance (Dalton & Daily, 1999) since research has 
failed to demonstrate a relationship between higher levels of outsiders and corporate 
performance (Dalton et al., 1998; Daily & Dalton, 2004). 
 
It should also be noted that despite the increased pressure to increase board 
independence from management, it has been demonstrated that increased board 
independence will not necessarily moderate CEO power, since CEOs have been 
shown to adapt to increased board power by influencing director selection towards 
more passive directors (Zajac & Westphal, 1996) and by exercising higher levels of 
ingratiation and persuasive behaviour towards board members (Westphal, 1998), 
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indicating that increased independence of directors does not necessarily result in 
increased board power. 
 
In terms of corporate governance, research also shows conflicting findings. A recent 
paper by Gompers et al., (2003) did demonstrate a strong relationship between 
corporate governance and stock returns in a study of 1,500 companies during the 
1990‟s.  In the study, 24 distinct corporate governance provisions were used as 
proxies for shareholder rights, indicating that increased rights of shareholders were 
positively linked with corporate performance. However, in another study of 115 
randomly selected UK companies, no evidence was found of linkage between board 
characteristics recommended by the Cadbury report and firm‟s financial performance 
(Laing & Weir, 1999).  
 
Conflicting findings have been attributed to the application of different theoretical 
frameworks, differences in the definition of financial performance and the fact that 
the bulk of the data relies on proxies rather than actual observations of behaviour 
(Zahra & Pearce, 1989; Johnson et al., 1996).  It has also been suggested that board 
composition and board behaviour might have an indirect, rather than a direct effect 
on financial performance, adding further weight to the need for a more fine grained 
analysis that can shed light on any causal relationships between board composition 
and particular features that may impact on firm performance (Zahra & Pearce, 1989; 
Dalton et al., 1998).  
 
2.4. How do board members contribute? 
The preceding sections have elaborated on the role of the board and non-executive 
directors.  Governance research conducted to date has mainly focused on linking 
board size, composition and CEO duality to corporate performance.   Conflicting 
findings call for a more detailed analysis on what actually happens on the board and 
how board members, individually and collectively, contribute to the different roles of 
the board (Pettigrew, 1992; Huse, 1998; Daily et al., 2003).   
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Little work has been done in this field although interests and efforts seem to be 
increasing.  A frequently cited qualitative study by Lorsch & MacIver (1989) finds 
that board members do play a contributing role and have even been found to take 
quite a participative role in times of crisis.  Demb & Neubauer (1992a) did a 
qualitative study based on interviews with 71 board members from eight countries.  
The study dealt with: defining the tasks of the board; division of responsibility 
between the board and managers; commitment versus detachment of board members; 
board culture and climate; and, evaluation of board performance.   
 
More recent studies include Roberts et al. (2005), Stiles (2001), Pye (2001a, 2002, 
2004), Roberts & Stiles (1999), Huse (1998), Pettigrew & McNulty (1995, 1998) and 
McNulty & Pettigrew (1999). Roberts et al., (2005) conducted 40 in-depth interviews 
with company directors, commissioned for the Higgs Review. Challenging strict 
agency perspectives towards board reforms, they concluded that non-executive 
directors needed a certain level of attachment, and particularly accountability, 
towards executives in order to be of value both in the contribution and monitoring 
roles of the board.  Non-executives delivered, according to their findings, most value 
when: they were engaged but non-executive, challenging but supportive, and 
independent but yet involved.   In an examination of the impact of the board on 
strategy, Stiles (2001) conducted in-depth interviews with 51 directors and surveys 
of 121 company secretaries and four case studies of UK plcs.  Stiles defined the 
board‟s involvement in strategy as: defining business and setting values; maintaining 
strategic frameworks; gate keeping by second guessing strategy proposals from 
management; confidence building by helping managers refine and perfect their plans; 
and, selecting directors.   
 
Pye (2004) analysed the effect of social capital and the impact of external relations 
on the internal working of boards, particularly looking at the effect of context and 
time using empirical data from two interview studies conducted in the late 1980‟s 
and late 1990‟s respectively.  Furthermore Pye (2001a, 2002) observed a change in 
how directors talked about and explained their organising.  While in the late 1980´s 
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explanations were rather diffuse and evolved around decentralisation, 
divisionalisation and diversification, explanations a decade later were more 
consistent with directors being fairly unanimous in emphasising strategic focus, 
shareholder value and corporate governance.   Her papers also gave a valuable 
perspective on studies of organisations from a methodological perspective, putting 
forward the question of whether organisational studies could be replicated.  Roberts 
& Stiles (1999) particularly looked at Chairman/CEO relationships by interviewing 
30 chairmen/chief executive dyads.  They defined basically two types of relationship 
– competitive and complementary – with the latter far outweighing the former in 
terms of effectiveness and success.   
 
Huse (1998) looked at boards‟ relationships with stakeholders in a qualitative study; 
he looked particularly into the Scandinavian tradition of having employee 
representatives on the board.  Pettigrew & McNulty (1995, 1998) studied power and 
influence in and around the boardroom, where they defined among others minimalist 
and maximalist boards according to the relative involvement and impact of the board.   
Their conclusion was in line with Lorsch & McIver (1989) that non-executive‟s 
influence tends to peak in times of crisis, and that negative influence seemed to be 
easier for non-executives to exercise than positive influence.  They also found that 
the chief executives‟ and chairmen‟s attitudes and behaviours, as well as relative 
expertise and experience, power from internal and external power figures, authority 
from board committees and relationships and network building outside the board, 
tended to affect the power status of individual non-executives (Pettigrew & McNulty, 
1995).  In a later paper McNulty & Pettigrew (1999) looked at the strategic role of 
chairmen and non-executives.   Their findings revealed that strategies are rarely 
initiated by non-executives and that the high rate of approval of management‟s 
strategy by the board does not necessarily reflect the board‟s rubber stamping role 
but rather, since they are actively used as sounding boards to test ideas and question 
assumptions, management tends to prepare their proposal better in order to increase 
the likelihood of approval. A key feature was the non-executives‟ role in encouraging 
 92 
strategy being formed.  Finally the paper reported that non-executives seemed to be 
more involved in strategy than in previous studies.   
 
The recent studies have certainly added to the understanding of board behaviour, but 
a great deal remains to be done.  The proposed research will seek to add to the 
foundations of board and directors‟ activities.  
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3. Research on women directors 
 
The research into women on boards has contributed substantially to the women in 
management literature.  This chapter will review the main research areas on women 
on boards, which are largely focused on numbers, characteristics and how women 
progress to the board rather than what happens once they are on the board. 
 
3.1. The representation of women on corporate boards 
The early research agenda on women on boards has to a great extent focused on 
descriptive statistics of women on boards.  Data have been formally collected since 
the mid 1990s in the US by Catalyst (Fortune 500), and since the late 1990‟s in the 
UK (FTSE 100), Canada (Catalyst), and in 2004, the Nordic countries did a joint 
census. The advancement of women onto corporate boards of directors has been slow 
in past years, although significant improvement is reported in most cases as far as 
non-executive (equivalent to outside directors in the US) directors are concerned. 
Little progress is reported on executive or inside directors. The substantial 
improvement on the number of boards with at least one female member looks 
promising, but the somewhat slower advancement of the proportions of seats held by 
women might be an indicator of women on boards being largely seen as tokens 
(Burgess & Tharenou, 2002; Kanter, 1977). 
 
In the UK, the number of women on FTSE 100 boards has gone from 5.8% in 2000 
to 9.7% in 2004.  The number of non-executive directors (NEDs) is reported 
significantly higher and has risen from 9.1% in the year 2000 to 13.1% in 2004 
(Singh & Vinnicombe, 2004a). The number of male only boards went down from 
42% in 2000 to 31% in 2004.   
 
In the US, the percentage of women board members on the Fortune 500 boards has 
been tracked by Catalyst since 1995.  During this time the number has risen from 
9.6% to 13.6% in 2003 (Catalyst, 2003a).  The number of all male boards in the US 
has gone down from 19% in 1995 to 10.8% in 2003.  Despite these significant 
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improvements in the number of directors in the US, figures for female corporate 
officers and inside directors are far less encouraging.  In 1997, women held only 
2.5% of the highest echelon positions of the Fortune 500 and only eight women held 
an inside board member position, down from ten a decade earlier (Dalton & Daily, 
1998).  There has been no increase in the number of female CEOs, and no sign of 
change in the foreseeable future (Daily et al., 1999).  Contrary to what might be 
expected from increased levels of female entrepreneurs there seems to be no sign of 
increase in the level of female directors in the Inc.100 (Daily et al., 1999). 
 
Figures from Canada indicate that women held 11.2% of directorships of the FP 500 
companies, and 51.4% of boards were all male (Catalyst, 2003b). 
 
A study by the Centre for Corporate Diversity in Norway on the 500 largest 
companies in the five Nordic countries reveals the average percentage of women on 
boards to be 16.5%, ranging from as high as 21.6% in Norway down to 11.4% in 
Iceland.  With the exception of Iceland, all countries had a higher proportion of 
women on boards that were listed on the national stock exchange (17.8% average).  
The proportions of all male boards ranged from 26.8% in Norway to 50% in the 
Icelandic companies.  The Nordic companies had a relatively high proportion of 
boards with a 25% or higher representation of females, averaging at 27.8%. This 
might very well be due to the smaller average size of the boards in the Nordic 
countries, 7.6 members, compared to the average size of 11 in the UK, US and 
Canada (Nordic 500, 2004). According to Nordic 500, Icelandic companies seem to 
lag significantly behind their neighbours.  Due to the fact that only 14 Icelandic 
companies were included in the data, the results might be misleading.  Recent data 
show that the figures are 11.4%  for the 100 largest Icelandic companies, and 7.4% 
for the 26 companies listed on the stock exchange (Frjals verslun, 2005).  (See 
Appendix 1 for more information on Icelandic boards). 
 
Women seem to be largely absent from the Chairman role.  In the period between 
2000 and 2004, only one woman (appointed in 2003) has served as Chairman of a 
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FTSE 100 board (Singh & Vinnicombe, 2004a).  Of the 242 companies listed on the 
Canadian Stock Exchange, three boards were chaired by women (1.2%) (Catalyst, 
2003b). None of the companies listed on the Icelandic Stock Exchange has a female 
Chairman of the board, but out of the 100 largest companies three boards are chaired 
by women (Frjals verslun, 2005). 
 
A number of studies have shown that the size of the company increases the 
probability of having a woman on the board (Burke, 2000; The Conference Board of 
Canada, 2002; McCormick et al., 2002; Catalyst, 2003a; Singh & Vinnicombe, 
2004a). It has furthermore been stressed that care should be taken when comparing 
Fortune 500 to other companies (Burgess & Tharenou, 2002) and boards with fewer 
members. 
 
3.2. Profiles and characteristics of female directors 
A number of studies have examined the profiles and characteristics of female 
directors, using demographics or information on education and proxies from 
published sources. A study of women across five countries (US, Canada, Australia, 
Israel and New Zealand) revealed that the average age of women on boards ranged 
from 47-56 years, being by far the highest in the US. A substantial majority were 
university graduates 68-93% and levels of graduate education ranged from 28-83% 
(Burgess & Tharenou, 2002).  Burke found that female directors on Canadian boards 
in 1992 were younger, better educated, more likely to have business-oriented 
backgrounds and to be full-time employed in organisations than a decade earlier, 
indicating that they were becoming, not only a well prepared but also a much needed 
resource in an era of pressures for improving effectiveness of corporate boards 
(Burke, 1995). Furthermore Kesner concluded as early as 1988 that women were not 
appointed for „window dressing‟ purposes but were holding important positions on 
the boards of large corporations (Kesner, 1988).   
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Female corporate inside directors of Fortune 1000 firms were found to differ 
significantly from a random set of their male counterparts. Although men and women 
did not differ in terms of experience-based qualifications or board tenure 
(Zelechowski & Bilimoria, 2004), which is an improvement from the 1980s where 
women were shown to have less tenure and were less likely to have business 
occupations (Kesner, 1988), they were found to hold fewer directorships of other 
corporations, hold less powerful corporate titles, occupy more staff functions and be 
less likely to be top earners of the corporation in addition to earning considerably 
less than male inside directors (Zelechowski & Bilimoria, 2004). This indicates that 
women might be ascending to top levels without gaining the associated prestige, 
influence and impact, resulting in a decreased likelihood of advancing to the CEO 
position. 
 
Burgess & Tharenou (2002) found that female executive directors had greater 
managerial achievement, higher education levels and were older than their male 
counterparts, indicating higher rates of acquisition of human capital.  A recent study 
comparing human capital of newly appointed male and female directors to the boards 
of FTSE 100 companies found that male directors were more likely to be 
executive/inside directors than females and were also more likely to have sat on 
FTSE 100 boards previously, but were similar in age and ethnicity, nationality, 
international work experience and international board experience. Women were also 
found to be more likely than men to possess both business and community expertise 
(Singh et al., 2006).  
 
3.3. Women’s strategies for advancement to board level 
A good deal of research has focused on women‟s advancement strategies.  This 
section will deal with the factors that have been identified as essential for 
advancement to the executive and non-executive director appointments. 
 
Contemporary literature on management and leadership indicates the growing 
importance of an androgynous management style (emphasis on both tasks and 
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people) (Powell, 1989) and for the female leadership advantage (Eagly & Carli, 
2003). Despite these observations, and the fact that men and women seem to have 
similar aspirations to access the top management suite (Catalyst, 2004b; Powell & 
Butterfield, 2003), women are arriving on the board at a much slower rate.  There is a 
substantial difference in the paths to the executive and the non-executive board seat.  
While the executive seat is achieved through normal career progression and often 
achieved in the mid to late thirties or early forties age period, the non-executive seat 
is normally accessible at the end of an executive career, often going to CEOs of other 
companies (Burgess & Tharenou, 2002).  
3.3.1. Advancing to executive directorships 
Some of the traits needed for advancement of both males and females to management 
include making the right career decisions, gaining human capital through education 
and experience, as well as possessing interpersonal and relational assets.  Family 
determinants seem to play a role too, but at very different levels for males and 
females. Having a spouse and children is likely to be beneficial for men, but it is 
more often than not inhibiting for women (Elmuti et al., 2003).  Although women are 
more likely to have their career advancement inhibited by negative stereotyping 
(Catalyst, 2004b), both male and female managers tend to display stereotypical 
masculine personality characteristics.   Furthermore, being similar to those already in 
the majority or in positions of power is likely to affect one‟s career favourably 
(Kanter, 1977; Elmuti et al., 2003). 
 
Studies of women who have succeeded in breaking through the glass ceiling show 
quite consistent findings e.g. (Ragins et al., 1998; Catalyst, 2004b). The critical 
factors identified are: 1) constantly exceeding expectations; since women are 
generally stereotyped as not credible they report having to work harder than men and 
make themselves indispensable, 2) developing a style that men are comfortable with; 
that is having to deal with all the dos and particularly the don‟ts, in order to fit in, 3) 
seeking difficult or high visibility assignments; women are shown to have to 
explicitly state interest or otherwise are assumed not being interested, and 4) having 
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an influential mentor (Ragins et al., 1998; Catalyst, 2004b). Males and females have 
been found to follow a similar route to achieving directorships, with gaining a 
mentor, challenging assignments and gaining visibility being key factors to success 
(Vinnicombe, 2003; Vinnicombe et al., 2000). The importance of fitting in and the 
emphasis on hard work is supported by Bradshaw &Wicks (2000) in their research 
on female board members in Canada.   
3.3.2. Advancing to non-executive directorships 
For women, gaining a seat on a board seems quite dependent on their skills in 
managing visibility. Burgess & Tharenou (2000) define the most critical factors for 
getting on a board to be, in addition to training and career development: ability to 
create a public image, to have extended impression management skills (self 
promotion skills), to use networks, and to have CEO and board contacts.  Burke‟s 
findings indicate that visibility to male CEOs, board members and chairmen was the 
most common route to board nomination (Burke, 2000). Data from New Zealand 
indicate that a high public profile is important for women wanting to get on boards 
(Pajo et al., 1997).  Burke has furthermore identified personal relationships as well as 
track record and appropriate expertise as the most important factors for board 
nominations (Burke, 1997) 
 
3.4. Barriers to women’s advancement 
Many of the obstacles and barriers reported by women aspiring to the top level can 
be associated with negative stereotypes (Kanter, 1977). Women identify negative 
stereotyping as a hurdle in 46% of cases while men report the same in 5% of cases 
(Catalyst, 2004b). While stereotyping often affects women in a negative manner, 
males have been known to gain from stereotyping. Women are rejected because they 
lack training yet men can more easily get jobs for which they are not specifically 
trained (Ragins et al., 1998).  
 
Other barriers to women‟s advancement, that were more significant for women than 
for men, are exclusion from informal networks, inhospitable work environment and 
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lack of mentors (Ragins et al., 1998; Catalyst, 2004b), as well as the greater need to 
have a good track record and lack of cultural fit (Lyness & Thompson, 2000).  Men 
and women seem to attribute lack of line experience as an obstacle for women but 
not so much for men  but displaying a style different from organisational norms and a 
lack of awareness of organisational politics were experienced as hurdles equally by 
men and women (Catalyst 2004b).  
 
Powell & Butterfield (2002) identify five theoretical explanations for the slow, or 
lack of, advancement by diverse individuals to management levels that are largely 
occupied by white males: discrimination, jobholder schema, similarity attraction, 
social identities and status, all favouring the recruitment of more white males. They 
also identify one framework (organisational culture promoting equal employment 
opportunities) as supporting the opposite, although their empirical research did not 
support any of those theories in particular (Powell & Butterfield, 2002).  Although 
women on boards match up to their male peers‟ qualifications, some bias toward 
selecting members on committees has been detected, with a larger proportion of 
nominations to compensation, executive and finance committees going to males 
(Bilimoria & Piderit, 1994a).  This indicates support for a certain form of homosocial 
reproduction at the board and top management level (Kanter 1977). However, Singh 
& Vinnicombe (2003) found no evidence of committee membership bias in FTSE 
100 boards, where male and female directors were equally likely to sit on 
nomination, remuneration and audit committees. 
 
The main reasons for a scarcity of women on boards is believed to be lack of interest 
on behalf of CEOs or others recruiting for boards, lack of women‟s visibility, and the 
persistent belief that women are not yet qualified.  CEOs view lack of experience 
(line management, profit and loss responsibilities) as the single biggest hurdle to 
women‟s advancement to top management, with “not having been in the pipeline 
long enough” as a close second (Ragins et al., 1998).  Burke reported that Canadian 
women directors‟ views of the scarcity of women on corporate boards include the 
fact that board recruiters do not know where to look for qualified women. The 
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recruiters do not think women are qualified enough and companies are not interested 
in looking for women, or are afraid to take on women that are not already on boards. 
Finally, women directors believe that there are not enough qualified women making 
their interest known (Burke, 1997).  
 
Male CEOs report a lack of qualified women as the main reason for their scarcity, 
followed by not knowing where to look and women not making their interest known 
(Burke, 1994b). Studies from New Zealand and Australia report similar findings 
(Pajo et al., 1997; Sheridan, 2001; Sheridan & Milgate, 2003).  Recruitment criteria 
have been found to be different for companies having two or more women directors 
compared to those having less than two women directors (The Conference Board of 
Canada, 2002). Burke (1994b) reported CEOs to be looking for the same qualities in 
females as they would look for in males, making it difficult for any female to 
measure up.   
 
An interesting explanation for the slow advancement of women into the boardroom 
is the view that women directors might dilute executive power.  In general, board 
members who are outsiders or independent are claimed to dilute executive power. 
Women directors in general are more likely to be independent or have outsider 
status, which by definition could make them less attractive as board members to 
those in power (Fondas, 2000).  
 
A recent paper by Singh & Vinnicombe (2004b) argues that the scarcity of women in 
the boardroom may be explained by the social exclusion of females by male 
dominated groups and by the fact that women in general possess lower levels of 
social capital, and are thus less likely to bring indirect benefits from access to 
information and resources from their network.   
 
In order to advance more women to board and top executive levels, companies would 
need to commit to a culture of equal opportunities and promote the business benefits 
of such strategies (Powell, 1990). Top executive and front line managers alike should 
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be committed to fostering and embracing a work environment that appreciates the 
contribution of male and female initiatives (Mattis, 2001). CEOs are critical change 
agents for advancing women to the board level, and if they do not understand the 
nature of the barriers for women, it is nearly impossible for them to develop effective 
solutions (Ragins et al., 1998; The Conference Board of Canada, 2002). 
 
3.5. The business case for women directors 
In recent years there has been a growing shift from a focus on equal opportunity and 
affirmative action, towards promoting diversity as a business perspective and a way 
to utilise the skills and benefits of a wider pool of available resources in order to stay 
competitive in an international environment (Cassell & Biswas, 2000; Gilbert et al., 
1999; Robinson & Dechant, 1997).  Almost all UK top companies state a 
commitment to diversity management, particularly gender and ethnic or cultural 
diversity, on their websites, with a substantial number of companies in other 
European countries following suit. Individual diversity, particularly at senior level, is 
seen as desirable, for better decision-making, better reputation and better governance 
(Point & Singh, 2003). 
 
Substantial attention has been paid in the last few years to demonstrate the business 
case for increasing the number of women directors (e.g. Stephenson, 2004; Bryan, 
2001; Daily & Dalton, 2003), rather than emphasising affirmative action (Carter et 
al., 2003) which is believed to be of inferior benefit and even likely to increase the 
risk of women and minorities receiving a token status (Biggins, 1999).  
 
Bilimoria (2000) identifies and suggests further research on four key factors for 
making the business case for women directors: 1) Overall corporate financial status 
and reputation; 2) Strategic input on women‟s product/market issues and corporate 
direction; 3) Effective boardroom behaviours; and 4) Contribution to corporate 
women employees. Bilimoria (2000) also quotes Catalyst studies on the connection 
between profitability and the presence of women on boards. Those findings were 
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further supported by a study by Catalyst (2004a) reporting both higher return on 
equity and total return to shareholders for companies with female representation.  
Data from the UK also indicate a link between the presence of women and financial 
performance (Singh & Vinnicombe, 2004).  An extensive study of Fortune 1000 
companies showed that firms with two or more women directors, were larger firms, 
had larger boards, met more frequently and had higher return on assets than firms 
with no women directors (Carter et al., 2003).  A study by Schrader et al. (1997) 
indicated that large firms with high percentages of women managers also had high 
return on assets, return on equity and return on investment.  The lack of connection 
of financial performance to level of women in top management was, however, 
attributed to the lack of a critical mass of women at this level. 
 
The effect on reputation is highlighted by the view that advancing more woman has 
to do with gaining credibility through signalling to all stakeholders (most of which 
have diverse memberships) that their voices will be heard at the top (The Conference 
Board of Canada, 2002).  Furthermore Bilimoria (2000) points to the additional 
pressures of institutional investors and shareholder associations on corporations to 
put more emphasis on diversity,e.g. the TIAA/CREF (Biggs, 1995; Browder, 1995).   
 
Several arguments have been put forward about the increasing purchasing power of 
women, concluding that companies can better meet market needs if women are 
involved in top decision making (Mattis, 2000; The Conference Board of Canada, 
2002; Gilbert et al., 1999). In addition, a more diverse group that possesses different 
levels of experiences, attitudes and perspectives has been shown to add to creativity, 
which in turn leads to more innovative business solutions and better use of business 
opportunities (Bilimoria, 2000). 
 
More recently it has also been suggested that the representation and/or proportion of 
women on boards is positively related to better corporate governance practices 
(Singh & Vinnicombe, 2004a; The Conference Board of Canada, 2002); however, a 
causal relationship has not been demonstrated. 
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3.6. What is known about the activities of women on boards? 
Relatively little is known about the experiences of women directors and the impact of 
women on board activities. Burke (1997) reported that, although women directors 
felt they were in general making little impact on issues regarding female issues,  they 
did feel their contribution was mostly towards making female employees feel more 
positive about working for the company.  An earlier study by Burke showed that 
female directors had little impact on top level women, with the exception of possibly 
acting as role models (Burke, 1994a) 
 
Women reported that they saw issues of equal opportunity, balancing work/family 
needs, social responsibility issues, environmental issues and issues of female 
customers as important and appropriate for boards to address. However, although 
they felt a certain responsibility towards those issues, they were not likely to draw 
attention to them (Burke, 1994a;  McGregor et al., 1997). 
 
Female board members have been associated with being more philanthropically 
driven (Ibrahim & Angelidis, 1994), and a positive relationship has been found 
between the number of women and minority directors, and the level of charitable 
contributions made by companies (Wang & Coffey, 1992). 
 
Women are said to gain benefits from being directors. Women report the acquisition 
of skills, application of skills for strategy development and learning more about 
corporate governance, as their main personal benefits from serving on a board.  Less 
important benefits were income, raising women‟s issues, helping own careers, 
additional personal prestige and contacts (Burke, 2000). 
Fondas & Sassalos (2000) studied 115 large US corporate boards, finding that boards 
with one or more females had more influence over management decisions.  They 
reasoned that female directors were often well prepared and highly motivated having 
had to face high hurdles in their advancement.  They possessed a diverse and varied 
background, were more likely as outsiders to be objective and independent, and 
brought a different voice to the boardroom.  These factors were found to positively 
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affect management decisions, provided the norms of collegiality, equality, consensus 
and private decision making prevailed on the board.   
While few studies have considered the impact of women at board level, even fewer 
have been of a qualitative nature.  In a study based on interviews with 20 white 
women who sit on Canadian boards, Bradshaw & Wicks (2000) explored how these 
women first experienced and then complied with or resisted hegemonic masculinity. 
Their findings indicated that these women had generally reached their position 
through hard work and assimilating male behaviours.  They perceived themselves 
primarily as caretakers of shareholders‟ interests and were unlikely to see themselves 
as, or act as, change agents, but highlighted the importance of fitting in and not 
rocking the boat. Thus they were much more likely to comply with the masculine 
hegemony rather than resist it.  Bilimoria & Huse‟s (1997) study of two American 
and two Norwegian female directors and their board experiences revealed their 
common perception of adding, as females, a new, more diverse perspective to the 
boardroom, focusing on women‟s and other soft issues and being an inspiration to 
other women in the company.  They also indicated putting in an effort to enhance 
board effectiveness by facilitating a comfortable atmosphere while not being afraid 
to ask difficult and probing questions. A difference was observed between directors 
from the two countries with respect to their awareness of and attitudes towards 
gender-related boardroom processes and structures. The Norwegian women were 
more feminist oriented, talking about having to confront the male environment, while 
the American women talked about the importance of fitting into the culture 
(Bilimoria & Huse, 1997).   
 
Two large qualitative studies of women leaders have been identified.  A qualitative 
study of 24 senior female directors identified that misconceptions about women‟s 
ability to achieve and exercise power was a recurring theme in hindering women 
from reaching the top (Gallese, 1991).  Lord  (2005), who did an exploratory study 
on the experience of 34 women in leadership positions of Australian universities, 
found the impact of gender to be a central core around how they talked about 
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stepping and settling into, and strengthening and sustaining their leadership roles. 
Lord  (2005) concluded by supporting Marshall‟s (1984) findings that women in 
business are travellers in a world that was not designed by them nor for them. 
 
3.7. The scarcity of research on women’s impact on boards 
Numbers of women on boards and in leadership positions remain low.  Research has 
shown that women who get to the board seem neither to lack human nor social 
capital.  Explanations for the low numbers have focused on advancement and barriers 
to advancement.  Less attention has been given to their turnover rate that could 
possibly account for the slow rise in numbers.   
 
Exploring the business case has also been a theme of interest. Most studies of the 
business case rely on the practice of correlating numbers of females on the board to 
corporate outcomes.  Many of these studies have shown a positive relationship 
between the two, but the cause and effect relationship remains to be explained.    
 
The experiences of women on boards and their impact is a largely under-researched 
area. Tapping into their experiences can contribute to explaining how they settle into 
and sustain their board position and how they affect board culture, dynamics and 
behaviour.  In order to gain an understanding of the board environment, the next 
chapter will cover areas of board dynamics and research on the effect of directors‟ 
characteristics and board diversity.  
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4. Board issues 
 
The following chapter will deal with matters that are likely to surface in the process 
of the exploratory fieldwork. The issues looked into include, director characteristics, 
diversity and performance, benefits and problems related to diversity, board 
appointment procedures, board processes and the impact of gendered culture on the 
board.  The chapter serves mainly as an overview of various board issues that the 
author has encountered throughout the course of the first year of the DBA 
programme.  The issues are not necessarily intended to serve as major frameworks 
for the gathering of empirical data. 
 
4.1. Director characteristics, board diversity and performance 
In 1984, Hambrick and Mason called researchers‟ attention to the need to investigate 
in more detail the upper echelons of corporations, namely the relationship between 
the composition of individual characteristics of top management teams (TMTs) and 
corporate performance (Hambrick & Mason, 1984).   Although TMT usually refers 
to the executive team, issues concerning member characteristics are also applicable 
to the board level (Jensen & Zajac, 2004).  Hambrick and Mason identified a need 
for research based both on clinical and statistical methods; however, statistical 
methods have been largely predominant in the field of research on board and TMT 
composition (Zahra & Pearce, 1989; Johnson et al., 1996).   
 
Several studies have been directed at directors and top executive characteristics and 
corporate performance.  Innovation has been found to correlate with TMT 
educational levels and functional background (Bantel & Jackson, 1989), and 
executive team tenure has been found to have a significant effect on firm‟s strategy 
and performance (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990).  Demonstrating a business case 
for diversity on the top management team has, however, not been an easy task.  
Hambrick et al. (1996) found heterogeneous teams exercised a broader gathering of 
information, higher decision creativity and boldness, but demonstrated friction and 
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slowness in decision making and action.  Murray (1989) hypothesised that the 
benefits of homogenous and heterogeneous management teams were contingent on 
circumstances, with the former being more effective in stable environments of fierce 
competition, and the latter more suitable in a changing environment. They concluded 
that the relationship between management and performance was subject to multiple 
factors too difficult to identify and untangle.  Ingley & van der Walt (2003) drew 
similar conclusions on the benefits of board diversity from a variety of sources (e.g. 
Milliken & Martins, 1996; Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Westphal & Milton, 2000; 
Carpenter & Westphal, 2001) and developed a model indicating diversity to be 
beneficial when strategic complexity was high, and when the perspective of diverse 
members were accepted by majority members, thus resulting in a realised but 
unexpected outcome. These findings strengthen the case for taking a closer look at 
how members who are visibly different (i.e. females) do or do not deliver benefits to 
the board. 
 
A large review of the impact of team diversity in general found no evidence of 
diversity being either particularly good for business or resulting in problems of 
increased conflict.  Similarly, the authors argued strongly for changing the emphasis 
from promoting diversity, through a simple business case, to emphasising the need 
for companies to take action and create a culture where diversity is fostered so that 
benefits from all the diverse talent available could be realised, (Kochan et al., 2003).  
This is an equally valid assumption in the context of boards. 
 
Following inconsistent findings on the effects of diversity and governance structure 
on strategy and performance at the top management level, Jensen & Zajac (2004) 
have suggested combining the emphasis of directors‟ and executives‟ individual 
characteristics in upper echelon theory (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) with the 
structural emphasis of agency theory (Fama & Jensen, 1983).  Jensen & Zajac (2004) 
subsequently found that demographic characteristics did predict corporate 
diversification and acquisition strategies, but that they varied significantly depending 
on the governance position in which the characteristics were observed, which 
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suggests that distinction should be made between different subgroups of corporate 
elites when researching the effect of management elites. A more fine grained analysis 
looking into the characteristics of board members, their view of their role as board 
members as well as their qualitative impact, may well contribute to this line of 
research. 
 
4.2. Diversity of board members 
The aim of the proposed study is to look at the effect of women board members on 
board culture, behaviour and dynamics.  As women on boards can be assumed to 
increase the level of diversity of the board, having an understanding of the benefits 
and problems of diversity is of relevance.  The following sections will explore the 
main findings of research on group and board diversity. 
4.2.1. Benefits of diversity 
Increased group diversity is claimed to bring both cognitive and symbolic benefits 
(Milliken & Martins, 1996). One of the key roles of boards, in addition to the 
controlling and advising roles, is to provide the essential links between the company 
and key resources necessary to maximise its performance (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
Recruiting board members from a broader range of backgrounds will enhance and 
widen these links (van der Walt & Ingley, 2003).  Several moral factors argue for 
diversity, such as diversity in order to reflect the profile of broad ownership or the 
increased level of social responsibility by representing a wider profile of society. In 
addition, increased diversity at the boardroom table should increase creativity and 
stimulate debate around important strategic issues which will, in addition to decision 
comprehensiveness (looking at issues  with a wider lens and considering multiple 
approaches, courses of action and decision criteria), lead to improved decision 
making (Simons et al., 1999; Simons et al., 1999) particularly in turbulent times 
(Carpenter & Westphal, 2001). Job-related diversity (diversity in experience in 
strategic decision making) is particularly claimed to provide more benefits than 
visual or non job-related diversity (Simons et al., 1999). Furthermore, Forbes and 
Milliken argue that diversity will have a positive impact on the board‟s task 
 109 
performance and thus firm performance, through increased cognitive conflict that is 
associated with better decision making, and through higher levels of the presence of 
functional area knowledge and skills (Forbes & Milliken, 1999).   
4.2.2. Problems related to board diversity 
Although increased diversity has been associated with a positive impact on board and 
firm performance, several factors indicate that bringing diversity to the boardroom 
will be a double edged sword, leading to negative effects such as a decrease in group 
cohesiveness and use of knowledge and skills (Milliken & Martins, 1996; Forbes & 
Milliken, 1999). Increased group diversity has been associated with a higher turnover 
of group members due to lower levels of social integration (O‟Reilly et al., 1989), 
implying that minority group members might not only be burdened with low impact 
levels but also be at higher risk of defecting from the group.  Furthermore, Goodstein 
et al. (1994) found that increased diversity was limiting to the strategic function of 
the board, particularly in directing strategic change during periods of environmental 
turbulence. 
 
The concept of fault-lines as a way of determining the nature of diversity has been 
defined by Lau & Murnighan (1998). Fault-lines divide a group‟s members into 
subgroups on the basis of one or more attributes.  Gender is an example of a factor 
that divides a group into male and female subgroups. If particular members are 
separated from other members by more than one fault-line, the fault-line is claimed 
to be stronger.  Lau and Murnighan argue that whereas diversity in general can add 
the benefits of increased creativity, strong fault-lines within a group will increase the 
level of subgroup conflict and lower performance.   
 
4.3. Board appointment procedures  
Building on cases that advocate diversity in the boardroom, there is strong criticism 
of the common procedures of requiring previous boardroom or top management 
experience, and the traditional approach of identifying candidates by “who you 
know” rather than “what you need” (Tyson, 2003; Sheridan & Milgate, 2003), as 
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well as emphasising personal preferences of board members rather than 
qualifications (Nash, 1989). Hegemonic views of current male directors indicate, 
however, that reforms are unlikely to be initiated by those who are currently in the 
position of power (Sheridan & Milgate, 2003).  The effect of socio-psychological 
and socio-political factors on CEOs and board members, leading to the choice of 
directors of with demographical similarity, has been identified by research (Westphal 
& Zajac, 1995).   It has also been highlighted that the apparent lack of planning in the 
director recruitment process is not compatible with stricter guidelines regarding the 
selection and nomination processes of board members (Daily & Dalton, 2004), and 
the need for greater transparency in the nomination process of top executives has 
been drawn to attention  (Cutting & Kouzmin, 2002).    
 
The Higgs Review, issued in 2003, indicated that an open, fair and rigorous 
appointment process is essential to a successful board (Higgs, 2003). The review also 
revealed that a high level of informality surrounds the current processes of 
appointing non-executive directors and that almost half of non-executive directors 
surveyed for the review were recruited through personal contacts or friendships. 
Very few (4%) went through an interview in their recruitment process, and even 
fewer (1%) were recruited after answering an advertisement, which Higgs thought 
could lead to an overly familiar atmosphere in the boardroom (Higgs, 2003). Higgs 
concluded and recommended that in order to practice a rigorous, fair and transparent 
recruitment process, all boards should have a nomination committee which should 
consist of a majority of independent non-executive directors.  The nomination 
committee should evaluate the balance of skills, knowledge and experience on the 
board before making an appointment and should prepare a description of the role and 
capabilities required for a particular appointment (Higgs, 2003).  
 
The Tyson Report, which focused on how board effectiveness could be enhanced 
through a wider range of background and experiences among board members, 
recommended  primarily that a broader, more rigorous and more transparent search 
process was needed as well as casting a wider net for the director search (Tyson, 
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2003). The need to increase diversity in the boardroom, to formalise and make the 
recruitment process more transparent and to look in non traditional places has been 
highlighted in the popular press (e.g. Connolly, 2004; Stackpole, 2003). Bilimoria & 
Piderit (1994b) suggested that although boards do seem to pay attention to diversity 
when appointing to board committees, a more stringent process for committee 
appointment was needed.  Finally, due to increased pressures for board performance, 
companies are experiencing more difficulties in recruiting directors with the time and 
right qualifications, particularly with adequate skills in finance and accounting 
(Harris, 2002). 
 
While tapping into the experiences of women directors, specific recruitment 
procedures for female directors could be identified and explored. 
 
4.4. Board processes 
It has been highlighted that directors should generally be more active in participating 
in decision making processes (Scherrer, 2003).  As this paper has already argued 
little has been done on measuring the level of participation or on understanding how 
directors contribute to decision making processes. 
 
Strebel (2004) identifies four main board roles – auditing, coaching, steering and 
supervising – that are contingent upon four factors: board perspective, board 
behaviour, internal conditions and external conditions.  A board will assume an 
auditing role when management is effective and insignificant externalities are 
involved, a coaching role when management is ineffective and the perspective is 
focused and short-term, a steering role when the board is involved with execution 
and the perspective is broad and long-term, and a supervising role when the board 
assumes a monitoring role and externalities are significant.  Similarly Pearce & 
Zahra (1991),  identified four types of boards depending on the relative CEO/board 
power after interviewing and surveying CEOs and board members.  Caretaker 
boards, (low CEO and low board power), and statutory boards (high CEO/low board 
power) tended to lack independence and necessary expertise as well as being 
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associated with a lack of understanding of their responsibilities.  The most effective 
boards were the proactive boards, where board power was high in relation to CEO 
power, and participative boards, where both board power and CEO power were 
found to be high, more often associated with being more efficient, better informed 
and more careful but still quicker in decision making. Boards with high power in 
relation to CEO power are not only associated with higher financial performance, but 
tend to have a higher number of females on the board. (Pearce & Zahra, 1991).   Pye 
& Camm (2003) similarly defined four different roles for non-executives: consultant, 
auditor, super-NED and tame pensioner, depending on how active they were in their 
strategic contribution and risk management contribution.  They concluded that the 
importance of each role was rather contingent and possibly different remuneration 
schemes would apply to directors acting in different roles.  In a recent study Jonsson 
(2005) constructed a two dimensional model from the literature in order to map the 
roles of Icelandic boards.  The model distinguished board roles in terms of power and 
involvement and gave the labels Rubber stamping to low power, low involvement 
boards, Advisor to high involvement low power,  Watch dog to high power low 
involvement and finally Pilot for high power, high involvement boards.   
 
4.5. Benefits of board interlocks 
Multiple directorships are one way in which a board gains access to diverse 
resources. Early research on board interlocks and social networks focused largely on 
counting the number of board interlocks but lacked any examination of the 
substantive context of board appointments (Pettigrew, 1992).  While governance 
reforms tend to criticise interlocks and promote the independence of directors, those 
interlocks have been found to be beneficial. 
 
Carpenter & Westphal (2001) found interlocks to contribute to strategy by providing 
directors with relevant strategic knowledge and perspective. In stable times it is of 
particular benefit to companies to have directors who serve on boards of companies 
of a similar nature, while in turbulent times experience from a variety of sectors and 
industries can prove beneficial.  However female directors are less likely to hold 
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multiple directorships than male directors (Singh & Vinnicombe, 2004), making 
them less attractive as directors in terms of corporate linkages. 
 
The effect of social capital on an individual‟s impact on board processes has been 
studied by Westphal & Milton (2000) who suggest that minority influence on boards 
can be improved if minority members have previous experience of being in a 
minority position on a board, and if they have direct or indirect social network ties to 
majority directors through common memberships, for example of other boards 
(Westphal & Milton, 2000).  This could be particularly beneficial to women directors 
who tend more often than not to be in a minority position.  
 
4.6. The impact of gendered culture on the board 
Attention has also been drawn to the gendered culture; the business world being 
primarily masculine (Marshall, 1984).   Women who have reached the upper levels 
report feeling as  constantly being tested out and as if they had interrupted the 
“normal life” of the senior men who had no willingness to develop a culture in which 
women could be included more equally (Marshall, 1995).  CEOs have been reported 
to: “have no way of understanding the corporate environment faced by their female 
employees because it is an environment that they do not currently experience, nor 
did they face it in their rise to the top” (Ragins et al., 1998:36).  These findings 
imply that women face an additional burden when rising to the upper echelons 
(Marshall, 1995).  Research on the board level confirms masculine hegemony, 
leading to women conforming to prevailing boardroom procedures rather than acting 
as instigators of change (Bradshaw & Wicks, 2000). 
 
When examining women‟s experiences of serving on boards and their impact on 
boardroom dynamics, it is very relevant to be aware of and look for reports on the 
impact of gender culture differences at board level. Considering that women are 
mostly in minority positions on boards increases the risk of their impact and voice 
not being heard and thus they will not be contributing to the activities of the board 
(Ingley & van der Walt, 2003). 
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5. Identifying the research gap 
 
This paper started by exploring the role of the board and the theoretical 
underpinnings of corporate governance.  Recent reforms have focused on increasing 
the number of outside directors and separating the role of the CEO/chairman, but 
research shows inconsistent findings on whether these reforms improve performance 
or not (Dalton et al., 1998). Dalton et al. (1998) concluded that research in this arena 
would be unlikely to be fruitful and attention should rather be given to how board 
members actually make an impact.  Research on actual board behaviour has been 
gaining ground but more remains to be done (Daily et al., 2003).  
 
The women on boards literature has largely focused on the number of women, their 
characteristics and how they get to board positions, as well as correlations between 
number of female directors and corporate performance.  Very few studies have been 
done examining the experience and impact of women on boards apart from the 
Bilimoria & Huse (1997) study, which was limited to a very few interviews, and the 
Bradshaw & Wicks (2000) study which the proposed study will largely draw on.  
 
Gaining an understanding of the experiences and impact of women on boards can 
contribute to the understanding of how women affect board culture, dynamics and 
behaviour and even whether they are more likely to adopt certain governance roles.  
It can also cast light on how they adapt to and sustain their position on the board, 
whether they feel they are getting their point across and to what extent they are 
perceived as tokens.   
 
The proposed research will be a response to a call for further research on board 
culture and dynamics, and will contribute to the understanding of the individual 
board member effect on those issues.   The next step in the research process is to 
conduct a systematic review of the literature addressing the question of what is 
known about directors‟ experiences and their effects on board dynamics and culture.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Despite the interest and emphasis on corporate governance reforms in the last decade 
surprisingly little is understood about actual board behaviour and the effect of 
individual board members on board dynamics and culture (Pettigrew, 1992; Huse, 
1998; Daily et al., 2003).  Recent reforms have largely been based on an agency 
perspective (Fama & Jensen, 1983) emphasising the controlling role of the board, but 
less attention has been given to the serving or stewardship role (Davis et al., 1997) or 
the networking or resource dependence role (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The research 
tradition on boards has developed around board structures and the effects of reforms 
such as increasing the level of non-executives and separating the chairman and CEO 
roles in order that the board can fulfil its agency-based control role.  Research has 
primarily relied on proxies, looking at board size, board composition (executives vs. 
non-executives), leadership structure (combined/separated chairman/CEO role) and, 
in some instances, demographics, and relating those to financial performance (Zahra 
& Pearce, 1989; Johnson et al., 1996). Studies have also been done on the 
relationship between compliance with corporate governance provisions and financial 
performance (Gompers et al., 2003; Laing & Weir, 1999), and relating board 
composition or demographics to compliance to corporate governance provisions 
(Singh & Vinnicombe, 2003).  Results have revealed largely inconsistent findings 
(Dalton et al., 1999).  Great inferential leaps have been made from input variables 
such as board performance with no direct evidence on the processes and mechanisms 
which presumably link the inputs to the outputs (Pettigrew, 1992).  Phrases like 
“Board research on cross roads” (Dalton et al., 2003) and “The coming revolution in 
corporate governance” (Leblanc, 2004a) are common in contemporary board 
literature.  This has called for a string of qualitative research, focusing on what 
boards or board members actually do rather than what they look like.  
 
The aim of the systematic literature review process is to establish, in an objective and 
standardised way, what is currently known about an area of research, and therefore to 
lead to the question of what is not yet known. The aim of this systematic review is to 
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take account of the research that has been done with the aim of and the attempt to 
open “the black box” of boards and examine in particular board behaviour, dynamics 
and culture, and ultimately, to define a gap in the body of knowledge and literature 
on board processes. 
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2. Methodology 
2.1. Research question 
 
In the protocol the following aim and research questions were put forward: 
 
The aim of the review is to answer the question: 
 
What are the experiences and activities of directors (including non-executives) on 
corporate boards of directors? 
 
Additional sub questions were proposed as follows 
 How do directors and non-executives experience being a director? 
 How does director behaviour affect board dynamics? 
 How do directors affect board behaviour? 
 How do directors affect board culture? 
 
Furthermore the aim was to address the research question: 
 
What is the experience of females in the director, top executive and leadership 
roles?  
 
The reason for including this question was the fact that I am interested in taking a 
gendered approach to board studies.  At the end of the review the main research 
question has remained the same and the four sub question are addressed in the 
review.  However I decided to drop the second main question posed in the protocol: 
 
What is the experience of females in the director, top executive and leadership roles?  
 
The reason for doing so is that when starting to use the search strings and reviewing 
titles of abstracts and full papers, the researcher realised that this question called for a 
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different review addressing a substantially different set of literature looking at female 
leadership style in various context, which was not at all my focus.  Furthermore it 
was concluded that the aim the researcher sought by putting the second question 
forward, i.e. to explore women‟s experiences and activities as directors and non-
executives, would be fulfilled by the first research question, since the search 
strings and search criteria would include studies on both male and female directors.  
A short check was made in order to verify that conclusion, and it was found that 
articles identified through the search strings that were particularly composed to 
address the second research question and dealt with women‟s experiences and 
activities on the board, had also emerged through other search strings.  Therefore 
search strings 6 and 7 (see chapter 2.2.2) which were composed explicitly to address 
the second research question, were deleted from the review.   
 
2.2. Search strategy 
The search strategy set forward in the protocol included four main sources of data: 
1. Articles and books from the scoping study 
2. Articles, books, working papers and other publications recommended by the 
review panel 
3. Journal articles identified by database search, based on keywords and search 
strings 
4. Journal articles, books, working papers etc. by cross-referencing the sources 
identified through the three previous strategies 
 
The sequence of the use of each strategy was the following: 
1. Initial approach to panel members 
2. Using keywords and search strings to identify relevant articles 
3. Cross-referencing those articles that were identified and selected in the 
database search 
4. Reviewing the scoping study for relevant articles 
5. Seeking final recommendations from panel members 
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2.2.1. Panel recommendations 
In the research protocol, a list of persons forming a panel for assistance and 
recommendations was put forth.  All the persons in the list were contacted during the 
process of the review, although their level of involvement varied. In addition to the 
members on the list, Dr. Annie Pye, at The University of Bath, whom the researcher 
met at EURAM, was added to the list.  
 
Person Title / Organisation Role 
Val Singh Senior research fellow / 
Cranfield School of 
Management 
DBA supervisor 
Andrew Kakabadse Professor / Cranfield School of 
Management 
DBA panel member 
Ruth Bender Senior lecturer / Cranfield 
School of Management 
DBA panel member 
Susan Vinnicombe Professor / Cranfield School of 
Management 
DBA panel member 
Morten Huse Professor / BI -Handels 
Högskolen, Norway 
Board specialist 
Diana Bilimoria Associate Professor / Case 
Western Reserve University, US 
Women / board specialist 
Deirdre Andersen PhD student / Cranfield School 
of Management 
SR - assistance 
Heather Woodfield Information specialist Database specialist 
David Denyer Senior research fellow 
/ Cranfield School of Mgmt. 
SR - specialist 
Table 7: List of panel members consulted in the systematic review process. 
 
In addition to the listed members, the researcher sought assistance and advice from 
cohort colleagues in the Cranfield DBA programme.  
 
At the beginning of the process, panel members were either formally or informally 
asked to recommend articles or papers for the review.  The suggestions made were 
rather general but were noted down and later checked against the identified data from 
search strings and cross referencing.  It was therefore decided to make an effort to 
include the panel at a later stage in the process and once all papers from the scoping 
study, data base search and cross referencing had been identified, the full list was 
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sent to panel members and they were asked to review the list and make suggestions 
for additions.  The recommended items were reviewed and assessed, first according 
to the selection criteria for titles and abstracts and then according to the full paper 
selection and quality criteria.   
2.2.2. Database search with keywords and search strings 
A substantial part of the review was based on a database search using keywords 
developed from the research questions and structuring these keywords into search 
strings.  The search strings were run through five databases which yielded over 500 
articles.  These articles were reviewed and assessed, first according to selection 
criteria for titles and abstracts and then to selection criteria for full papers, as well as 
being assessed in terms of quality. 
Keywords 
From the research question and sub questions the following set of key words was 
identified: 
 
Director experience 
Director activities 
Director role 
Director behaviour 
Director impact 
 
After trial searches had been done it was discovered that the term “board member” 
was frequently used instead of the term “director”.  Therefore “board member” was 
used in addition to the term “director” in connection with the key words in the search 
strings.   
 
The keywords board behaviour, board dynamics and board culture were identified 
as relevant since the aim was to look at directors‟ experiences and impacts on those 
issues.  
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Furthermore the keywords women directors and female directors were considered 
important in identifying gendered experience, but for reasons already discussed these 
were dropped from the search.   
 
Finally the goal was particularly to look for answers built on qualitative data and 
therefore the keywords qualitative studies were identified and included. 
 
The context of the review and the research question is corporate boards and boards 
of directors.  Therefore it was vital to include these terms in the search strings. 
 
Search strings 
The following search strings were constructed: 
 
1. (board member* experienc* OR director* experienc*) AND (board* of director* OR corporate 
board*) 
2. 
 (board member* behavio* OR director* behavio*) AND (board* of director* OR corporate 
board*) 
3. 
 (board member* impact OR director* impact) AND (board* of director* OR corporate board*) 
4.  
  (board member* activit* OR board activit*) AND (board* of director* OR corporate board*) 
5. 
   board behavio* OR board dynamic* OR board culture* 
6.  
(women director* OR female* director*) OR(women board member* OR female board 
member*) AND experienc* 
7. 
(women director* OR female* director*) OR(women board member* OR female board 
member*) AND (board* of director* OR corporate board*) 
8.  
qualitative AND (board* of director* OR corporate board*) 
Table 8: Search strings from protocol  
 
As already stated, the decision was made to eliminate search strings numbers 6 and 7 
since these were explicitly composed to address the second research question in the 
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protocol; “What is the experience of females in the director, top executive and 
leadership roles?” which was eliminated. 
 
Therefore the search strings applied in the review were the following: 
1. (board member* experienc* OR director* experienc*) AND (board* of director* OR corporate 
board*) 
2. 
 (board member* behavio* OR director* behavio*) AND (board* of director* OR corporate 
board*) 
3. 
 (board member* impact OR director* impact) AND (board* of director* OR corporate board*) 
4.  
  (board member* activit* OR board activit*) AND (board* of director* OR corporate board*) 
5. 
   board behavio* OR board dynamic* OR board culture* 
8.  
qualitative AND (board* of director* OR corporate board*) 
Table 9:  Search strings used 
 
Databases  
The following databases were identified as relevant for the searches: 
 
ProQuest  and EBSCO are the most widely used search engines for business and are 
considered to be a reliable and thorough source business publications.  These two 
databases were strongly recommended by Heather Woodfield, information specialist 
at Cranfield University Library.  
 
After some consideration it was decided to include PsycINFO, since the research 
questions evolved around individual experiences and conceptions of the board and 
board behaviour.  Although this source did not yield many references, some of them 
were quite relevant for the purpose.  Similarly Social Sciences Citation Index and 
Sociological Abstracts, which were recommended by Heather Woodfield, were 
included for the sake of relevance of the articles found, although they did not yield 
large quantities of articles.  
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It was considered originally to include Blackwell and Elsevier, but a decision to 
exclude them was based on the grounds of their intention being to provide the full 
text of articles, rather than just identifying them. Furthermore articles stored in 
Blackwell and Elsevier are likely to surface in searches through ProQuest, EBSCO 
and the other databases included. 
 
Finally it was recommended by Heather Woodfield to include Google Scholar.  
After several attempts of running the search strings through that database, yields 
were quite far from being in the relevant areas, and considerable rearrangement of 
the search strings was needed to yield relevant data.  It was therefore concluded that 
the Google Scholar database should not be included in the study. 
Search string yield 
The following number of journal articles was identified through the use of the eight 
search strings initially constructed.  
 
 
Table 10: Search string yield 
 
2.2.3. Articles and books from cross referencing 
After identification and final selection of articles from the database search, the 
reference lists of those articles were reviewed.  Initially articles and books were 
selected on the basis of titles.  These titles were matched against the articles already 
ProQuest EBSCO PsycINFO
Social 
Science 
Citation 
Index
Sociologic
al 
abstracts
search strings # of hits relevant # of hits relevant # of hits relevant # of hits relevant # of hits relevant
1
(board member* experienc* OR director* experienc*)AND 
(board* of director* OR corporate board*)
118 16 5 2 3 3 1 1 0 0
2
(board member* behavio* OR director* behavio*) AND 
(board* of director* OR corporate board*) 71 26 7 4 0 0 1 1 0 0
3
(board member* impact OR director* impact) AND (board* of 
director* OR corporate board*) 61 21 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
4
(board member* activit* OR board activit*) AND (board* of 
director* OR corporate board*) 106 14 8 5 0 0 4 2 2 0
5
board behavio* OR board dynamic* OR board culture*
19 8 29 18 23 7 18 11 7 0
6
(w omen director* OR female* director*) OR(w omen board 
member* OR female board member*) AND experienc*
52 9 41 17 17 6 19 na 15 na
7
(w omen director* OR female* director*) OR(w omen board 
member* OR female board member*) AND (board* of 
director* OR corporate board*)
109 39 42 11 15 6 18 na 14 na
8
qualitative AND (board* of director* OR corporate board*)
20 8 9 8 *** 0 0 11 0
Total 549 141 133 68 58 22 61 15 49 0
*** search did not yield any relevant data
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selected for the full paper review, and the remaining articles went through an abstract 
review, using inclusion and exclusion criteria for titles and abstracts.   After passing 
through the abstract review the remaining papers and books were assessed according 
to inclusion and exclusion criteria for full papers, as well as quality criteria. 
2.2.4. Articles and books from the Scoping study 
All articles and books included in the scoping study were appraised according to the 
criteria set out in chapter 2.3.  However, this was not done until the review of 
abstracts and titles from the search string yield and cross referencing was completed.  
 
2.3. Selection Criteria and Paper Selection  
Papers reviewed were not limited to certain time frame, geographic area or sector.   
2.3.1 General selection criteria for titles and abstracts     
The following selection criteria were developed for reviewing titles and abstracts.   
Inclusion criteria: 
 
Papers have to have directors and executives in 
the board context as their main theme. 
 
Papers have to be related to the experiences or 
activities of the board or members on the 
board.   
 
Papers have to consider director activities and 
director roles on the board in general sense. 
Rationale: 
 
The focus of the study is the corporate board 
and its directors. 
 
The focus of the study is the corporate board 
and its directors. 
 
The focus is directors and boards in general, 
papers concerning particular tasks and topics 
are beyond the scope of the review. 
Selection of papers will not be sector or region 
specific. 
 
Selection of papers will not be limited to a 
particular time frame. 
 
The study is done in a general context but 
should not be sector or region specific. 
 
In a general context there are no particular 
turning points within the board context.  The 
field is relatively new so it is predicted that the 
bulk of papers will be recent although papers 
dated further back will be interesting to look at. 
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Exclusion criteria: 
Papers relating to the external experiences of 
boards, prior experiences of directors and 
papers where the term experience is used as a 
learning sample will be excluded. 
 
Papers regarding boards of non-profit 
organisations will be excluded.   
 
Papers related to the role of boards in strictly a 
legal context will be excluded.  
 
Papers related to roles under certain conditions 
such as in takeovers, bankruptcy etc., or 
relating to board roles only in certain 
industries, such as banking, will be excluded.   
 
Papers covering board activities that apply to a 
particular sector only (such as banking) will be 
excluded. 
 
When using a search string containing the word 
quality, the word must be in a research context. 
Rationale: 
The term experience is used in a personal 
contextually related manner, therefore other 
meanings or contexts should be excluded. 
 
 
The focus of the study is companies and 
corporations 
 
The context is business and individuals, not 
legal frameworks. 
 
The focus is on general experiences and 
activities not on particular context specific 
events. 
 
 
The study is sector non-specific. 
 
 
 
The term quality relates to the research method. 
Table 11: Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
 
2.3.2. Selection criteria for full text papers      
Conceptual/theoretical papers must:  
 Include theories or frameworks that apply to board or director behaviour, 
activities or board member experiences or their effects on dynamics or culture 
on the board   
 Present or define its contribution to existing knowledge 
 
Empirical papers must contain: 
 A clear definition of methodology 
 A clear definition of sample and sample selection 
 Either 
o interviews with directors,  
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o surveys of directors  
or 
o case studies involving directors.   
Empirical papers built on proxies or data from annual reports will not be included. 
 Clear reports on results and the ability to link them to previous research and 
findings 
 A contribution to existing knowledge on actual board behaviour 
 
Methodological papers must contain: 
 Clear and consistent assumptions 
 A review of methodologies adopted earlier in addressing same question  
 Justifications for the methodologies used 
 
2.4. Yield from selection criteria 
2.4.1. Database search 
The following table shows the number of articles identified from each database 
through each search string, as well as the number of articles assessed as relevant 
from reviewing titles and abstracts. 
 
 
Table 12: Relevant articles from search strings after reviewing titles and abstracts 
 
ProQuest rele- EBSCO rele- PsycINFO rele-
Social 
Science 
Citation 
Index rele-
Sociological 
abstracts rele-
search strings # of hits vant # of hits vant # of hits vant # of hits vant # of hits vant
1
(board member* experienc* OR director* 
experienc*)AND (board* of director* OR 
corporate board*)
118 16 5 2 3 3 1 1 0 0
2
(board member* behavio* OR director* 
behavio*) AND (board* of director* OR 
corporate board*)
71 26 7 4 0 0 1 1 0 0
3
(board member* impact OR director* 
impact) AND (board* of director* OR 
corporate board*)
61 21 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
4
(board member* activit* OR board activit*) 
AND (board* of director* OR corporate 
board*)
106 14 8 5 0 0 4 2 2 0
5 r  behavio* OR board dynamic* OR 
board culture*
19 8 29 18 23 7 18 11 7 0
8 qualitative AND (board* of director* OR 
corporate board*)
20 8 9 8 *** 0 0 11 0
Total 549 93 133 40 58 10 61 15 49 0
*** search did not yield any relevant data
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The number of articles selected for full paper review from the database, after 
reviewing titles and abstracts, was 158. There were 67 duplicates, resulting in a net 
number of 91 articles selected for full paper review.  
 
 
Table 13: Summary of search string yield after reviewing titles and abstracts  
 
After the full paper review of the 91 articles 44 were accepted based on a full paper 
review. 
2.4.2. Cross referencing 
The following table shows the number of articles identified through cross 
referencing.   
 
Table 14: Yield from cross referencing  
Search string yield                                     
& review of titles and abstracts total relevant
ProQuest 549 93
EBSCO 133 40
PsycINFO 58 10
Social Science Citation Index 61 15
Sociological abstracts 49 0
Total from all databases 850 158
DUPLICATES 67
Number of papers for full review from serch strings 91
Cross referencing total rejected accepted
Number of references in the 44 articles included 1477
Selected references after review  of titles 300
duplicates 132
Numer of references for abstract reviewing 168
Allready review ed as full papers 17
accepted 14
rejected 3
References for abstract review 151
books 25
accepted 5
rejected 19
not available 1
Reports and w orking papers 11
rejected due to lack of availability 11
Journal articles for abstract review 115
abstract not available 14
rejected after review  of abstract 61
accepted for full paper reveiw 40
TOTAL FROM CROSS REFERENCING 168 109 59
Number of references for full paper review 45
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The number of references selected for a review of the abstract after having reviewed 
titles and removed duplicates was 151 of which 25 were books.  Since it was not 
possible to review the abstracts of the books, books were selected on the basis of the 
relevance of the title, elaboration on the theme in the citing article and the number of 
times it appeared in the cross referencing. One book selected for full paper review: 
Stiles & Taylor, 2001: Boards at work; how directors view their roles and 
responsibilities, was not available in time for the completion of the review. 
Furthermore, the eleven reports identified by assessment of title were not available 
for abstract review and were therefore dropped from the review.  Finally abstracts 
could not be located for 14 references which were subsequently dropped.   
2.4.3. References from scoping study 
As already noted references used in the scoping study were reviewed after 
identifying papers from database search and cross referencing.  Of the references in 
the scoping study, 34 were considered relevant for the systematic review.  Of those 
32 had already been included in the review and only two passed on to full paper 
review.  
 
 
Table 15: Yield from Scoping study  
References from scoping study total
Total number of references in scoping study 146
Number of relevant references from review ing titles and 
abstracts 34
Already included in full paper review  from search strings 
and cross referencing 32
Number of references for full paper review 2
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2.5. Quality Appraisal 
The following scheme for quality appraisal was set forth in the research protocol: 
 
  0 - Low or absent 1- Medium 2 - High Not applicable 
Well defined theory 
not enough 
information to assess 
theory is fairly well 
defined 
theory is very well 
defined 
element not applicable 
to the paper 
Alignment of concepts and 
ideas 
not enough 
information to assess 
concepts and ideas are 
fairly well aligned 
concepts and ideas 
are very well aligned 
element not applicable 
to the paper 
Research design 
not enough 
information to assess 
research design is 
fairly rigorous and 
reasonably justified 
research design is 
rigorous and very 
well justified 
element not applicable 
to the paper 
Conclusion in alignment 
not enough 
information to assess 
the conclusions are 
fairly well in 
alignment with the 
theme of the paper 
the conclusions are 
very well aligned 
with the theme of the 
paper 
element not applicable 
to the paper 
Contribution to knowledge 
not enough 
information to assess 
contribution to 
knowledge is claimed 
but is limited in 
importance or 
significance 
contribution to 
knowledge is 
significant 
element not applicable 
to the paper 
Appropriate methodology 
not enough 
information to assess 
methodology is 
acceptable  
methodology is very 
appropriate 
element not applicable 
to the paper 
Data analysis 
not enough 
information to assess 
data analysis 
contributes reasonably 
to understand the aim 
of the paper 
data analysis very 
significant for 
concluding the aim 
of the paper 
element not applicable 
to the paper 
Table 16: Quality appraisal criteria 
 
Papers were assessed according to the quality criteria at the same time as conducting 
the review of full papers. Those papers not passing the quality review had also been 
excluded on the basis of exclusion criteria.  Therefore all the papers passing the 
inclusion/exclusion criteria passed the quality review.  
 131 
2.6. Number and sources of accepted papers 
 
 
Table 17: Number and sources of accepted papers 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Sources of papers accepted 
 
Full paper review total rejected na accepted
Source
Search strings 91 46 1 44
Cross referencing 45 15 1 29
Scoping study 2 0 0 2
Panel recommendations 2 0 0 2
140 61 2 77
Search strings
56%
Cross referencing
38%
Scoping study
3%
Panel 
reccomendations
3%
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2.7. Excluded articles from full paper review 
Articles were excluded during the full paper review according to full paper selection 
criteria and quality criteria.  The following is a list of reasons for exclusions. 
 
 
Table 18: Reasons for rejection after full paper review 
 
2.8. Data Extraction 
The data from the articles that passed through the initial evaluation of titles and 
abstracts were extracted into a ProCite format.  Information on the nature of the 
paper and study characteristics, along with quality assessment and key findings were 
recorded into the ProCite format.  
 
The data served as basis for inclusion or exclusion of full papers and for the quality 
appraisal.  All decisions on inclusions or exclusions and the rationale for those 
decisions were recorded into the ProCite format. Articles that passed through the full 
paper review and the quality appraisal continued to the synthesising stage.  
 
2.9. Synthesis 
For the papers that passed through the full paper review and quality appraisal, a 
detailed description of key concepts and findings was constructed.  Issues and key 
Reasons for rejection after full paper 
review number
Based on archival data - not a contribution to behaviour 6
Main focus not on boards - not w ithin the scope of the 
review 10
Not a contribution to know ledge on board behaviour 11
Theoretical framew ork lacking  3
Theoretical framew ork lacking - lacks contribution to 
know ledge on board behaviour 17
Not w ithin the scope of the review  due to legal focus 6
Deals w ith volunteer boards 3
Not dealing w ith board processes but underpins the 
research question 5
Total - rejected after full paper review 61
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findings were grouped into themes and a comprehensive picture of the ground 
covered was constructed.  The aim was to synthesise and put together an image of 
the experiences of board members and their effect on board dynamics, behaviour and 
culture and in that way to contribute to the understanding of board processes.  
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3. Descriptive analysis 
3.1. Types of studies included 
Of the 77 papers and publications included in the review, 25 were of a theoretical or 
conceptual nature, 50 contained empirical data, and two were purely methodological.  
 
 
 
Table 19: Types of papers included 
 
 
  
  Figure 6: Percentages of paper types 
 
3.2 Studies by journals 
The 77 papers came from a surprisingly high number of journals.  In all articles from 
32 journals were included.  Of these, 19 journals contributed only a single article.  
Thirteen journals contributed two or more articles; of these Long Range Planning 
Types of papers included number
Theoretical / conceptual 25
Empirical 50
Methodological 2
Total - accepted after full paper review 77
32%
65%
3%
Theoretical / conceptual
Empirical
Methodological
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and Corporate Governance – an international review, contributed by far the highest 
numbers, ten and nine articles respectively.   
 
 
Table 20: Sources of references 
 
3.3. Studies over time 
No particular time constraints were set for the review.  The rationale was that there 
are no particular turning points within the board context.  The field is relatively new 
Journal name
number of 
articles percentage
British journal of sociology 1 1,4%
Entrepreneurship and regional development 1 1,4%
European journal of work and organizations 1 1,4%
European management journal 1 1,4%
Human relations 1 1,4%
International journal of management 1 1,4%
International review of women and leadership 1 1,4%
The journal of business strategy 1 1,4%
Journal of general management 1 1,4%
Journal of management development 1 1,4%
Journal of managerial issues 1 1,4%
Journal of managerial psychology 1 1,4%
McKinsey Quarterly 1 1,4%
The Mid-Atlantic journal of business 1 1,4%
MIT Sloan management review 1 1,4%
Organization studies 1 1,4%
Organizational dynamics 1 1,4%
Organizational research methods 1 1,4%
Vanderbilt law review 1 1,4%
Academy of management journal 2 2,8%
Administrative sicence quarterly 2 2,8%
International studies of management and organizations 2 2,8%
Journal of business venturing 2 2,8%
Academy of management executive 3 4,2%
Academy of management review 3 4,2%
British journal of management 3 4,2%
Corporate governance 3 4,2%
Journal of management studies 4 5,6%
Women in management review 4 5,6%
Harvard business review 5 7,0%
Corporate governance - an international reveiw 9 12,7%
Long range planning 10 14,1%
Total 71 100%
Books and book chapters 6
Grand total 77
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so it is predicted that the bulk of papers would be recent although papers dated 
further back were considered interesting to look at. 
 
The 77 papers included in the review were published in the time interval between 
1958 and 2006.  The bulk of the papers are, however, less than a decade old.  Of the 
50 empirical papers 76% are from 1997-2006, and of the 25 theoretical papers 64% 
are from the same period.  Of all the papers in the review 71% were published within 
the last 10 years.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Dates of publication  
 
3.4. Empirical studies by countries  
The bulk of the empirical studies came from the UK and the US.  A few studies were 
conducted in Canada, Scandinavia and Australia & New Zealand. Three studies were 
conducted across two to eight countries.  
 
Table 21: Empirical studies by countries  
 
Empirical studies by countries
UK 18
US 17
Scandinavia 5
Australia & New Zealand 4
Canada 2
Netherlands 1
2-8 countries 3
50
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
19
71
19
73
19
75
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
Empirical
Theoretical
Methodological
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Figure 8: Studies by countries - percentages
36%
34%
10%
8%
4%
2%
6%
UK
US
Scandinavia
Australia & New Zealand
Canada
Netherlands
2-8 countries
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4. Overview of board research 
 
After reviewing papers and publications the selected items were grouped into the 
following themes: role of the board and its directors; board‟s involvement in 
strategy; boards as social entities; and female board members. 
 
Research on board behaviour can be divided into a number of subgroups.  The first 
group to emerge was research elaborating on the role of the board and its directors. 
These papers expand on the control, strategy and service roles (Zahra & Pearce, 
1989), rooted in the agency (Fama & Jensen, 1983), stewardship (Davis et al., 1997) 
and resource dependence perspectives (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).   
 
  
 
 
Figure 9: Boards roles‟ and Boards‟ involvement in strategy 
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A related theme is the board‟s and directors‟ involvement in strategy.  The debate 
runs from the speculation of whether the board can or should be involved in strategy, 
to examining how the board and its directors are in effect involved in strategy.  
Although research on boards‟ and directors‟ involvement in strategy serves as an 
important background for the research to be undertaken, it is not a focal theme in the 
proposed research. 
 
The third theme identified is a fragmented one; defining the board as a social entity, 
a team of individuals drawn together to make decisions that should at minimum 
protect the value of shareholders, and preferably augment their value.  This section 
was grouped into several sub themes: power and control; chairman/CEO 
relationships; social ties; and, empirical research on board behaviour, processes and 
culture.   
 
 
 
Figure 10: Boards as social entities 
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The fourth and final theme was that of women directors in particular. The reason for 
grouping the female studies in a separate theme is that these studies tend to deal 
explicitly with women‟s experiences of and confrontation by the traditional rules and 
norms of male dominated boards, but not with board interrelations as such.  
Considering the fact that I aim to take a gendered approach to board interaction they 
are highly relevant for the proposed research.  
 
 
 
Figure 11: Female directors 
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5. The board – its directors and roles 
 
A great deal of the work done on boards deals with the role of the board in general, 
or the role of the non-executives and the role of the board in strategy in particular.  
This chapter starts by looking at some of the earliest work identified, and 
observations on the board and its roles.  It then goes on to look at the main pieces of 
research in this field. Research on the board‟s general role branches off, in the early 
1990s – on the one hand to look at the role of the non-executive director and on the 
other to look at the contextual factors of the board‟s role.  An additional branch was 
looking at roles of committees which are elaborated on in one of the papers 
identified.  Research dealing with the board‟s role and involvement in strategy in 
particular, branches fairly quickly off the stream of research dealing with the board 
role in general.  Research on board‟s involvement in strategy is dealt with in a 
separate chapter.   
 
5.1. Early observations 
The earliest publication identified for this systematic review dates back to 1958 
(Smith, 1958).  Its title; “Put the board of directors to work!” sets the stage for the 
discussion that was to follow throughout the next five decades. The author points out 
that although boards bear the ultimate responsibility and accountability to the 
shareholders, they were largely seen as no more than “a legal fiction”. The paper 
presented a call for the transformation of boards into free constituencies composed of 
capable, independent members and acknowledged that although it would not be 
possible to pin down specific principles in the role of the board, it was necessary to 
start making improvements on the current practice (Smith, 1958).  In his seminal 
study on boards, based on in-depth interviews with 75 directors and shorter 
discussions with hundreds of others, Mace (1971) found the board‟s role to be a 
provider of advice and counsel, to serve as some sort of discipline, and to act in crisis 
situations.  However, according to Mace, the board did not have primary influence 
nor did it establish the basic objectives, corporate strategies or policies of the 
 142 
company.  He also found that board members rarely asked discerning questions or 
even selected the president. Mace basically concluded that the board of directors was 
a largely inactive endeavour, or at least less active than it could or should be.  
Elaborating further on his findings in two journal articles, Mace (1972, 1973) 
describes the role of the board as being advisory to the president, providing 
discipline, and taking action in crisis, such as replacing the CEO.  He concluded the 
reality of board activities to be that directors rarely had time for analysis, discerning 
questions were commonly unwelcome and that the CEO was not being replaced 
unless in extraordinary circumstances.  Mace advised boards to get rid of inside 
directors, define the specific functions of the board and put them in writing as a 
charter for board activities, establish criteria for formal evaluation, encourage critical 
questioning by board members (as it was their own company) and that compensation 
should be as high as the expectations towards the directors (Mace, 1972, 1973).   
 
A great deal of research on boards in the last three decades has been inspired by 
these early discussions. Research focusing on the insider/outsider ratio, board power 
and leadership structure and the role of the board in general has been the main area 
of interest.  Although boards, corporations and their environment and context have 
largely developed since then (e.g. Gopinath et al., 1994) the reality of boardrooms 
described by Mace still seems to hold to some extent (e.g. Nadler et al., 2006). While 
Smith (1958) and Mace (1971,1972,1973) advocated increased board activities and 
involvement, the alternative argument was to accept the limitations inherent to a 
board and manage expectations accordingly, and limitations should be made clear 
(Bavly, 1986).   
 
5.2. Roles and activities – Empirical studies 
Four empirical studies fitted into the category primarily focused on roles and 
activities.  Of these the studies by Lorsch & MacIver (1989) and Demb & Neubauer 
(1992a, b) are by far the most significant.  
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Calls for increased activity and accountability of boards raised questions such as 
what type of information is necessary for directors to assume these increased levels 
of activity and responsibility.   In a study involving interviews with 45 directors and 
chief executives and case studies of the evolution of seven corporate boards, boards 
were found to develop from a legitimising stage, through an auditing stage to a 
directing stage (Boulton, 1978).  The author defined five areas of changing emphasis 
of director information needs as the board develops: 1) Reporting formats – from 
general to more detailed, 2) Time horizons – from focus on the past and present to a 
future and long-term focus, 3) Performance criteria – from lack of any significant 
criteria to management by objective programmes,  4) Decision making process – 
from low involvement to high involvement, and 5) Information variety – from simple 
to more diverse and complex.  
 
Another early examination of value creating boards (Aram & Cowen, 1986) involved 
case studies of three boards identified by surveying 13 directors and CEOs of large 
companies, who were asked to identify firms with board-management relationships 
having the greatest likelihood of creating and maintaining shareholder value.  
Directors‟ involvement in the central managerial process of the firm was analysed in 
terms of three basic elements of planning and control: goal and strategy formulation, 
management control, and executive compensation.  Directors in each firm were 
found to participate actively in reviewing business strategies of the company and its 
divisions and in all cases senior officers and managers jointly evaluated strategic 
issues.   In terms of management control, each company provided several ways to 
evaluate current information, quarterly reports were discussed at full board meetings 
and materials distributed well in advance.  Finally, all the firms tied a major portion 
of annual incentive bonus to performance targets which were established in the 
planning process and reviewed on a monthly basis.  The authors built a model for a 
management process by which value creation can occur at the board level.  The 
model emphasised the necessity of the general conditions of having skilled people 
with adequate information and a clear understanding of their role and specific 
conditions.  They also emphasised the importance of having adequate time to devote 
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to the value added tasks, a board agenda intended to promote value added activity, 
and a system for supplying directors with adequate information for effective decision 
making (Aram & Cowen, 1986).   
 
One of the most widely cited publications is Lorsch and MacIver‟s book published in 
1989. The findings and discussions are based on interviews with over 100 directors, 
CEOs and corporate officers, and surveys of around 900 outside directors of the S&P 
400. The authors examined directors and their perceptions of their roles, as well as 
the boards‟ working styles and habits in normal times and in times of crisis.  Lorsch 
& MacIver (1989) identified three types of directors‟ constitutions: the traditionalists 
who viewed their task to be strictly defined as taking care of shareholders‟ interests; 
the rationalisers who viewed that paying attention to the interests of other 
stakeholders would eventually lead to the shareholders being better off; and finally, 
the broad constructionists who believed that companies had a wider duty in society 
of contributing to the greater good of all their stakeholders and therefore the board‟s 
and directors‟ duty was to serve all these parties.  In normal times the directors saw 
the job of the board to be caring and nurturing the CEO, giving just advice, and 
serving as a sounding board for management, determining strategic direction and 
advocating for “doing the right thing”.  The meeting agenda had the main effect of 
determining was discussed at meetings, and since the CEO controlled the agenda he 
also ruled the discussion. In general, boardroom norms were found to discourage 
directors from openly questioning and challenging CEO performance or proposals.  
Directors were found to lack a forum for discussion, and the reluctance to violate the 
group‟s norms was a potential for the delay in detecting problems or an upcoming 
crisis.  According to Lorsch and MacIver‟s findings, it was in times of crisis that the 
boards actually did become active and step into play.  Although the nature of the 
crisis was found to affect specific challenges, all too frequently the norms of delicate 
behaviours and taboos seemed to paralyse the boards‟ abilities to act. Only when 
these norms were overcome was the board ready to deal with the crisis at hand.  
Lorsch & MacIver (1989) concluded that in order to be effective, boards must be 
adequately involved at normal times in order to be able to prevent trouble and crises.  
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In order to make this happen, much relies on the CEO or chairman to create inclusive 
working procedures and an atmosphere of openness and dialogue. 
 
The most extensive study on boards and board roles was done by Demb & Neubauer 
(1992a) when they interviewed 71 directors from 11 boards in eight different 
countries.  In their studies Demb and Neubauer found a remarkable similarity across 
countries and sectors, with regard to the role of the board.  In their interviews and 
surveys of over 200 directors (Demb & Neubauer, 1992b), they found that less than 
20 activities were associated with boards‟ tasks and responsibilities.  Of these the 
same five predominated as the high priority tasks of the board.  Setting corporate 
strategy, overall direction, mission and vision of the company was seen as priority 
number one, followed by succession activities and controlling, monitoring and 
supervising activities. Reviewing and approving the use of resources and taking care 
of shareholders were considered to be the fourth and fifth high priority tasks of 
boards.  Demb and Neubauer identified three main paradoxes that boards have to 
deal with.  The first is the fact that the board bears clear legal responsibility, while 
management possesses the infrastructure, knowledge and time to be able to bear that 
responsibility. The paradox thus is; “how to allow both the board and management to 
retain effective control without diminishing the initiative and motivation of the 
other.” (Demb & Neubauer, 1992:13).  The second paradox deals with the fact that 
board members are expected to provide critical judgement on management 
performance, and at the same time ensure that this judgement is independent.  The 
former requires in-depth knowledge and intimacy with the affairs of the corporation, 
while the latter requires detachment and distance.  The third and final paradox 
focuses on the working style of the board.  As a working unit the board needs the 
trusting familiarity of a close-knit group, while at the same time group members 
should be independent, be able to raise critical questions of colleagues and resist 
groupthink.  Demb & Neubauer (1992) suggest activities that may assist in enabling 
boards to deal with the paradoxes.  First they suggest a balance of executive and non-
executive members and the separation of the roles of chairman and CEO, or 
alternatively a process that can empower the outside directors with an opportunity for 
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non-executive directors to interact on strategy and make sure they have good access 
to information. In addition, they suggest frequent meetings and the establishment of 
committees, when needed, for more in-depth exposure and better control, including a 
nomination committee.  They furthermore suggest that boards should be no larger 
than eight to ten members to ensure adequate participation in discussion, and they 
advocate retreats and specific discussions of performance and mission. Finally they 
recommend boards to periodically review their performance.   
 
5.3. Theorising on roles and activities  
Following the initial empirical work, one theoretical and one conceptual paper on the 
role and activities of the board were identified.  
 
Gopinath et al. (1994) discuss the changing role of the board and its search for a new 
strategic identity. They conceptualise the evolution of the board from a traditional 
model to an emerging model in three dimensions: change in underlying assumption, 
board identity and board role. The change is from the underlying assumption that the 
commonality of interests between shareholders, management and the corporations is 
to be maintained to the emerging assumption that interests of shareholders and 
management may diverge from that of the corporation.  Board identity is changing 
from the focus on representing the owners to the focus of representing the company, 
and the board role from a control/service role to a strategic decision 
making/control/service role.  The authors conclude that “Boards would find 
themselves better grounded if they focus on meeting the interests of the organization 
as a distinct entity separated from but bounded by the interests of the shareholders” 
(Gopinath et al., 1994:183). 
  
In a 1995 Harvard Business Review article, Lorsch elaborated further on the role and 
involvement of boards. According to Lorsch (1995) the 1990‟s was the decade of 
empowering boardrooms.   This empowerment, Lorsch claimed, would call for 
CEOs‟ clear understanding of the power and responsibilities of the board, and the 
non-executives‟ recognition and respect for the boundary between monitoring 
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management and actually managing the company.  Above all this would call for a 
new form of teamwork where directors and managers collaborate effectively in order 
to achieve corporate success. Lorsch claimed that protests for increased board 
empowerment were misguided. First the increased power of the board does not 
necessarily imply decreased CEO power. Second the advising and monitoring do not 
need to be in conflict simply because being effective in each role is based on the 
same ingredient – access to information, and time for board members and 
management to discuss that information. Thirdly, board members are not only useful 
in a crisis situation, they should constantly be working to prevent a crisis, or 
practising skills and knowledge to be better equipped to handle a crisis situation 
should one occur.  And finally that increased empowerment does not imply that the 
level of activity and integration cannot or should not depend on a company‟s 
situation.  Directors of empowered boards are focusing on constant evaluation of 
CEO performance and corporate strategy.  Key ingredients for such empowerments 
are directors‟ appropriate knowledge of company affairs and the effective self 
monitoring of the board itself (Lorsch, 1995).  
 
The work by Lorsch & MacIver (1989) and Demb & Neubauer (1992) raised an 
abundance of issues and questions that research could address.  A continuing issue 
was the board‟s and directors‟ roles.  Some of the following research looked at the 
board‟s role based on context, and a new stream of research, looking at the non-
executive role in particular, seemed to emerge. These will be dealt with in the next 
two sub-chapters.  Other issues concerning board behaviour and processes such as 
the chairman/CEO relationship, the issues of power and control, the effect of social 
ties, and last, but not least, the effect of boardroom culture, processes and 
relationships on board activities, were areas on which a new window of 
understanding on the workings of the board was about to be opened. The latter issues 
will be the topic of later chapters of this review.  
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5.4. Looking at the role and context 
Five papers that dealt particularly with the role of the board and context were 
identified; two are theoretical and three empirical – interestingly all the empirical 
studies come from Scandinavian countries. These vary from the company‟s life cycle 
stages to macro environmental changes.   
 
From an inter company perspective Johnson (1997) theorises on how the role of the 
board, and therefore its need for different capabilities, changes over the company‟s 
life stages.  Companies in their early life, i.e. at the inception stage, tend to face their 
main challenges in terms of securing resources; therefore a board with ties to 
resources could help a company to conquer this challenge.  During the growth stages, 
issues such as operations, control and coordination are theorised to become more 
demanding and therefore the company has a greater need for managerial expertise.  
Finally during the maturity stage, organisational prestige becomes the focus of 
attention and boards in that life stage therefore tend to seek members who can bring 
prestige and social contacts (Johnson, 1997).  
 
Strebel (2004) also discusses the need for a board to adopt different kinds of roles 
based on different circumstances from both an internal and external perspective.  In a 
company with a strong management team and low levels of externalities, the board is 
well fitted to take on a monitoring/auditing role.  In the case of strong management 
but a high level of externalities, the board should switch to a supervisory role, 
advising management on how to deal with the externalities.  In the case of a weak 
management team, boards should either adopt a steering role, when externalities are 
high, or a coaching role when the levels of externalities are low.  Strebel (2004) 
concludes that a board must take conditions into consideration when determining its 
dominant role at any given time.  An important step that boards must take is to 
recognise or anticipate when a change in condition calls for a role shift.  
 
In an ethnographic study of three companies facing different challenges and 
situations, Huse (1998) found the role of the board to be highly contingent. The 
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companies were either recovering from bankruptcy, restructuring due to changing 
market conditions, or refinancing.  The role of the board was found to be quite 
dependent on the situation each particular company was facing. In the case of the 
recovering company the role was mostly legitimising, while in the restructuring 
company it was advising, and monitoring was the role of the company in the phase of 
refinancing.   
 
Along the same lines is a preliminary study of board roles and role development of 
Icelandic boards (Jonsson, 2005).  The study proposes four main board roles from the 
literature: rubber stamp, watch dog, advisor and pilot.  Directors of eleven Icelandic 
companies were exposed to an open ended questionnaire on the role of the boards on 
which they served, and how this role has evolved during the past years.  Different 
boards were found to assume different roles – either a single role or a mixture of 
roles.  Roles were reported to have changed over time and in that sense had been a 
response to the company‟s changing needs and changing environment. These 
findings cast further light on the fact that both company and industry specific factors 
and, at times, the evolution of contextual factors, can affect the role assumed by the 
board.  
 
Moving finally to a more macro level, Jonnergard et al., (2004) explored the way 
Swedish companies responded, over a five year period, to changes in the national 
pattern of corporate governance.  They found that as the pattern of corporate 
governance had shifted towards more external constraints, boards‟ activities had 
shifted more towards decision management; they had added a substantial amount of 
activities to their agenda and shifted their focus more towards a financial orientation. 
However, the values and attitudes of directors appeared to be more stable over this 
relatively short time period.   
 
These studies certainly cast light on the fact that boards are by no means static, 
insulated entities that can shape and determine their own workings at will, but rather 
dynamic bodies that are shaped and affected by the very context in which they work.  
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5.5. Looking at the non-executive role in particular 
Although Demb & Neubauer (1992) elaborated quite substantially on the non-
executive roles and highlighted the difference between executive and non-executive 
directors‟ roles, the most likely reason for the particular interest in the role of the 
non-executive, stems from the emphasis that is put on this role by reports on 
governance reforms (i.e. Cadbury, 1992; Higgs, 2003, etc.).  Two theoretical papers, 
that have the non-executive‟s role as its main focus, were identified. The only 
empirical study was that of Roberts et al., (2005) commissioned for the Higgs 
review.  This chapter also includes a commentary by Pye & Pettigrew (2005) on the 
Roberts et al. (2005) paper.   
 
According to Barratt & Korac-Kakabadse (2002), non-executive directors can be 
seen to act primarily as the formal link between the shareholders and the firm. Their 
role is to act as advisors to management and make sure that the company is being run 
in the interests of its owners.  Non-executives can be defined as boundary spanners 
and as such they have a unique perspective on shareholder management. The 
boundary spanning position can, however, potentially lead to role conflict, but with 
adequate clarification of the expectations towards the non-executive role, the 
possibility of role conflict could be diminished. Finally non-executives can serve as 
reflexive educators, by educating executives about the perceptions of others.  
 
An interesting paper by Schaffer (2002) theorised about the difference between 
executive and non-executive directors‟ assessment of firm performance, and related 
directors‟ assessment processes to attribution theory.  Executive directors were 
theorised to generally tend to displace the blame away from management and 
attribute poor performance to environmental factors.  Non-executive directors would, 
on the other hand, be more inclined to rely on certain informational cues 
(consistency, consensus and distinctiveness) in making attributions.  High 
distinctiveness, high consensus and low consistency would be related to external 
causes, whereas low distinctiveness, low consensus and high consistency would be 
related to internal causes. 
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An extensive study on the non-executive role in particular was done by Roberts et 
al., (2005), who conducted 40 in-depth interviews with company directors, 
commissioned for the Higgs Review. Non-executives delivered, according to their 
findings, most value when they were engaged but non-executive, challenging but 
supportive, and independent but yet involved.  Non-executives must have the 
adequate means to know what is going on, take time to listen and learn before trying 
to contribute, and make sure that the executive responsibility of driving the decision 
making is not overridden. Thus the non-executive should serve as a contributor rather 
than as an active player.  A vital role of the non-executive is that of asking informed 
but challenging questions phrased in the appropriate context, i.e. probe for “what is 
being done? , why? and, how does that affect so-and-so?”  While the importance of 
independence, i.e. the capability to see things objectively and to foster openness, was 
stressed, it was not seen as relevant to distinguish and separate the tasks and 
responsibilities of board members into the three conventional roles of serving, 
controlling and boundary spanning, rather that the directors should seek to 
embrace the paradox that implicitly lies in the demands of the different roles.  
Challenging strict agency perspectives towards board reforms they concluded that 
non-executive directors needed a certain level of attachment and particularly 
accountability towards executives in order to be of value both in the contribution and 
monitoring roles of the board.   
 
Commenting on the Roberts et al., paper, Pye & Pettigrew (2005) stressed the need 
to strengthen the theoretical and methodological foundations of board process 
research.  Although the commentary served well to point to the limitations of the 
Roberts et al. study, it is an even more significant contribution to the framing and 
understanding of board process research in general.  As such, this paper will be 
elaborated on further in subsequent chapters.  
 
5.6. Examining the role of committees 
One of the papers identified focused specifically on the roles of board committees.  
Spira & Bender (2004) compared and contrasted the tasks of the auditing and 
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remuneration committees.  These two committees can be seen as having a conflicting 
role; the audit committee being largely of a conformance nature whiles the 
remuneration being of a performance nature.  The findings of the researchers 
indicated that although membership of each committee makes different demands and 
requires a slightly different focus, the tasks are not as irreconcilable as has been 
suggested, and do depend on different individual behaviours and relationships. 
 
5.7. Conclusions on the role of the board and its directors 
A good deal of the research covered in this chapter is centred around the role of the 
board, the context effect on that role, and the role of the non-executive directors.  
This type of board research is largely rooted in board role theories such as agency 
theory, stewardship theory and resource dependence theory.  Although no definite 
conclusion can be drawn from research into the role of the board and its directors, it 
can be inferred that boards are becoming more active and more aware of their 
responsibilities.  A good deal about the nature of the board‟s role is becoming clearer 
and the paradoxes of being close enough to give valuable guidance and counsel, but 
yet distant enough to provide sound assessment and evaluation have been drawn 
attention to (e.g. Demb & Neubauer, 1992a; Roberts et al., 2005).  While early 
studies emphasised the non-executive‟s distinct roles of controlling, serving and 
advising (e.g. Pearce & Zahra, 1989), later studies have stressed the importance of 
embracing the paradox that implicitly lies in the demands of the different roles 
(Roberts et al., 2005).  Boards are by no means insulated and static entities, but rather 
dynamic social makings that are affected by their environment and context (i.e. 
Jonsson, 2005; Jonnergard et al., 2004).    
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6. The role of the board in strategy 
 
The particular issue of the board‟s role and involvement in strategy has been the 
foundation for a significant stream of research.  Although this stream of research can 
be classified within the strategy and decision making arena, being aware of and 
understanding this dialogue is important for a researcher of board behaviour. The 
subsequent subchapters will give an overview of work in the field of the board‟s role 
and involvement in strategy. 
 
6.1. Theorising on the director’s role in strategy 
Early discussion on boards and strategy centred largely on the appropriateness and 
capability of the board to become involved in strategy (e.g. Andrews, 1981).  A 
decade later Goold & Campbell (1990) addressed the question of what type of 
contribution to strategy non-executives could make, given their limited time, 
knowledge and insight into a particular company.  Their general view was that the 
strategic role was limited, but they did identify three potential strategic roles for non-
executives.  Due process: making sure there is a process for strategy in place; 
commercial logic: checking for the robustness of decision making; and strategic 
control: monitoring non-financial goals of the company.  Zahra (1990) had a 
different point of view and argued for increased participation of the board in strategy.  
In his article he describes three schools of thought regarding the board‟s involvement 
in strategy.  The first ideology promotes the strict protection of the shareholder 
interest view, indicating that the only role directors play in strategy is to review, 
counsel and ratify management decisions.  The second school of thought considers 
the contribution of boards to strategy to be in terms of refinements, probing and 
ensuring that agreement on direction exists among the executives.  The third and 
final ideology is the one advocated by Zahra (1990), which argues for the need for 
boards to go beyond their control and service role, and form a partnership with the 
CEO in mapping strategic directions for the firm.  Zahra (1990) argues that 
considerable gains can be realised by the increased involvement of the board in 
strategy formulation and development.  He furthermore went on to outline possible 
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ways for promoting the participation of directors in strategy, namely: careful 
selection of directors, including strategic items in directors‟ orientation programmes, 
broadening directors‟ strategic span of attention and defining areas of potential 
interest.   Zahra concludes that to realise the board‟s full potential and move away 
from rubber-stamping activities, attention should be given to the board‟s 
composition, internal processes and the appropriate mix of skills that directors 
possess (Zahra, 1990).  
 
In line with Zahra, Rindova (1999) argues that despite limited time and specific 
company or industry knowledge, directors can still be a very useful source for 
strategy input and decision making.  Due to their broad exposure to different 
business contexts and their substantial experience of decision making, they can be 
considered to possess valuable problem solving expertise. Involving directors in 
strategy and decision making can thus enable the board to deal more effectively with 
complexity and uncertainty.  Outside directors‟ involvement will also reduce the 
effect of problem familiarity and increase scanning effectiveness. External variety is 
claimed to lead to increased diversity of interpretation frameworks and conceptual 
models, whereas requisite variety is related to the diversity of perspectives relative to 
the complexity of a firm‟s environment.  Boards are also claimed to benefit from 
representative variety which refers to the diversity of perspectives relative to 
different stakeholders interests (Rindova, 1999). 
 
6.2. Strategy involvement – empirical evidence 
Seven empirical studies focusing explicitly on the strategic role of the board and its 
directors were identified (Henke, 1985; Judge & Zeithaml, 1992; Fried et al, 1998; 
Sicilliano; 2005; McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999; Stiles, 2001; Nadler et al., 2006).  
Four of these studies Henke, 1985; Judge & Zeithaml, 1992; Fried et al, 1998; 
Sicilliano; 2005) are focused on measuring the level of strategic involvement and/or 
the effect of input variables such as size, organisational age, level of outside 
representation, or venture capitalist involvement to output variables such as financial 
performance. Three studies (McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999; Stiles, 2001; Nadler et al., 
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2006),  based mainly on interview data, are aimed at understanding the elements and 
nature of strategic involvement.  
 
6.2.1. The level of strategic involvement 
In the earliest study, Henke (1986) surveyed 234 directors of Fortune 1000 
companies and found that the level of strategic involvement had increased compared 
to Mace‟s (1971) findings. Henke found boards to be active in influencing the 
decisions of numerous strategy related issues. However, the boards did not seem to 
recognise their relatively high level of involvement in strategy decision making.  
Chairmen were therefore claimed not to be taking advantage of the board members‟ 
knowledge and expertise. That being the case, boards did not seem to be influencing 
their firms‟ future in a coherent manner.  
 
Judge & Zeithaml (1992) conducted research into the board‟s involvement in 
strategic decision processes by interviewing 114 board members of companies from 
four populations: general medical hospitals, biotechnology firms, textile firms and 
large diversified firms from the Fortune 500.  They related the interview findings to 
archival data on firms‟ age, business diversification, board size and insider 
representation.  Their findings indicated that institutional and strategic choice 
frameworks both appeared to be useful in explaining board involvement in the 
strategic decision making process.  Organisational age was found to be positively 
related to the strategic involvement of boards, whereas its level of diversification was 
negatively associated with board involvement, which is consistent with the industry 
perspective.  The board size and the level of insiders were found to be negatively 
related to board involvement, offering support to the strategic choice perspective. 
Finally, board involvement was found to be positively related to financial 
performance.  The authors concluded that their findings support that the institutional 
and strategic choice perspectives offer complementary explanations for board 
involvement (Judge & Zeithaml, 1992).  
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Building on Judge and Zeithaml‟s research, boards of companies backed by venture-
capital firms were found to be more involved both in strategy formulation and 
evaluation than boards of companies where members did not have large ownership 
stakes (Fried et al., 1998). However, they did not find performance to be related to 
the level of board‟s strategic involvement.  
A recent study by Siciliano (2005) identified three levels of strategy from the 
literature: traditional. reviewing and collaborative.  It then addressed the question of 
the level of board involvement in strategy as well as examining if a relationship 
exists between strategic activities of the board and organisational performance level.  
Overall the level of participation was found to be at mid-range, and directors 
generally reported a higher level of strategy involvement than the level reported by 
CEOs. The study found a relationship between weak financial performance and the 
probability of the board being involved in traditional strategy planning (low 
involvement), and also found that firms performing better tended to be involved with 
managers as partners in strategy making decisions (high involvement).  The paper 
concluded that the organisation‟s final condition is linked to the board‟s strategy role, 
although it did not explain its causality (Siciliano, 2005).   
6.2.2. The nature of strategic involvement 
In a study involving interviews with 108 company directors of large UK companies, 
McNulty & Pettigrew (1999) looked at the strategic roles of chairmen and non-
executives.   Their findings revealed that strategies are rarely initiated by non-
executives and that the high rate of approval of management‟s strategy by the board 
does not necessarily reflect the board‟s rubber stamping role.  Rather, since the 
directors are actively used as sounding boards to test ideas and question assumptions, 
management tends to prepare its proposals in a way that is likely to increase the 
chances of the board‟s approval. A key feature was the non-executives‟ role in 
encouraging strategy to be formed.  The paper reported that non-executives seemed 
to be more involved in strategy than previous studies had indicated.   
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Stiles (2001) conducted in-depth interviews with 51 directors, surveyed 121 
company secretaries and analysed four case studies of UK plcs.  Stiles‟ main aim was 
to identify the perceptions of directors of themselves as to their role and influence in 
the running of their organisation, with particular attention to the strategic process. 
Stiles defined the board‟s involvement in strategy as: defining business and setting 
values; maintaining strategic frameworks; gate keeping by second guessing strategy 
proposals from management; confidence building by helping managers refine and 
perfect their plans; and, selecting directors.  Stiles furthermore found that the 
strategy-making process was not practised in a top down fashion, but rather was 
typically developed at business unit levels. However, the board was responsible for 
setting strategic parameters, within which strategic activity took place.  Although the 
boards‟ activities tended to be seen as limited to coordination, and checking for 
consistency and coherence of proposed strategy, Stiles found their activities were far 
from limited to those factors.  He found board activities to be rather of a multi-
functional nature. Directors play an important role in maintaining the quality of 
objective setting and confidence building amongst executives. Furthermore he found 
that internal dynamics shape individual boards and have great influence on their 
harmony and effectiveness.  Their level of effectiveness depends largely on the 
nature and quality of the information given to non-executives, and the time non-
executives devote to the scrutiny of business.  Directors were found to emphasise the 
importance of doing a good job and a desire to be seen as good stewards.  Finally 
Stiles concluded that the human capital present on the board can be a major source of 
competitive advantage providing not only skills and capabilities but also unique 
interrelationships and sets of routines that form the dynamics of the board (Stiles, 
2001).   
 
Nadler et al. (2006) believe that the strategic process actively involves the board but 
is to be led by the CEO and his team while engaging the board in every step.  The 
benefits to the approach of involving the board are that they generally lead to a better 
thought out strategy than one developed by management alone.  In addition, directors 
tend to be more content if they feel they have been able to make a contribution and 
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the process will result in a more profound understanding of the company which will 
affect how the board will work in the future, and hence invite even more thoughtful 
discussions between management and the board.  Finally, board involvement will 
lead to a stronger ownership and director support for management and the company‟s 
direction (Nadler, 2006). 
 
6.3. Conclusions on the role of the board in strategy 
Research on the board‟s role in strategy has moved from arguing whether it is 
possible or even appropriate for the board to be involved in strategy (e.g. Goold & 
Campbell, 1990; Zahra, 1990), to the measurment of the level of strategic 
involvement of boards and looking at the nature of board‟s strategic involvement.  
The level of strategic involvement of the board, as with other board activities, seems 
to be increasing (Henke, 1986; McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999).  Involvement is found 
to lead to better developed and better thought out strategies which can be attributed 
to increased levels of discussion, scrutiny and questioning by the board (i.e. McNulty 
& Pettigrew, 1999; Siciliano, 2005).   
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7. Boards as social institutions 
 
Alderfer (1986) called attention to the board as a group with dynamics and patterns 
that affect the behaviours of the board and its members, and that board members 
tended to see themselves rather as individuals than as groups. In his empirical study, 
based on interviews with 41 CEOs and directors, Aldefer found three main factors 
that affect the group‟s dynamics: how they act as a group; the board-CEO 
relationship; and, the effects of subgroups of directors on the board-management 
relationship.  Almost a decade later, Hill (1995) conducted a study based on 
interviews with 42 directors in 11 large British companies, with the aim of studying 
how the board of directors works as a social institution. He looked particularly at 
the role of directors, the relative power position of directors, consensus on the board 
and relationship to owners.  He found much of the routine work of the board to be 
concentrated on monitoring activities, although providing strategic direction and 
planning for the future was seen by directors as their main purpose. Furthermore, he 
found that elites existed within the board, primarily concentrated around the 
chairman and the CEO.  The chairman‟s role was considered to be a powerful one, 
particularly in terms of controlling the agenda as well as the nomination of non-
executives, and the appointment and dismissal of the CEO.  The way the chairman 
and CEO work together was seen as the board‟s single most important relationship.   
Interestingly, Hill (1995) found that consensus was the norm of executive groupings, 
and even though differences in opinions or perspective existed they were rarely 
addressed within the boardroom.   The importance of board members being 
compatible with the board and working together on a consensual basis with 
collective responsibility was stressed.  Hill concluded that; “For managers to make 
the leap into the board, it is not enough to run a major operation successfully: they 
also have to be well known by senior colleagues and have established reputations for 
breadth of vision and collegiality.” (Hill, 1995:273).  In essence, Hill‟s findings can 
be categorised into the following sections: board roles, power and control issues, 
chairman/CEO relationships, teamwork and culture, and the effect of social capital.  
Research on boards and their roles has already been elaborated on in this review.  
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The subsequent chapters will in turn deal with the four remaining issues, but calls for 
research on board processes and some methodological issues will also be looked at.  
7.1. Further calls for process oriented research 
Recently there have been several calls for increased focus on process analysis. Five 
of the papers included in this review explicitly deal with this issue.  
 
Sonnenfeld (2002) dismisses the idea of rules, regulations and structural board 
improvements to improve the effectiveness of a board.  The essence of effective 
boards, he claims, lies in the human factor and how people work together.  Great 
boards are those with a climate of trust and candour, those which foster a culture of 
open discussion, and encourage board members to look at issues from alternative 
perspectives.  Furthermore they ensure that individuals are held accountable and that 
they share information with other board members.  Finally they constantly engage in 
evaluation of the board‟s own performance, for instance in terms of quality of 
discussion, credibility of reports, use of constructive professional conflict, 
interpersonal cohesion and level of knowledge. 
 
Finkelstein & Mooney (2003) point in the same direction.  Their analyses of the top 
and the bottom quartile performers of the S&P 500 in 2000 show no differences in 
board size, percentage of outsiders nor the presence or absence of CEO duality, 
leading them to the premise that governance research must look beyond the “usual 
suspects”  (i.e. size, composition, leadership structure etc.) in order to explain board 
effectiveness. They claim the ability of boards to practise effective corporate 
governance depends on the quality of the individuals and their ability to get their 
work on the board done as a team.  From a study which involved interviewing 32 
directors, the authors identified five factors crucial for board effectiveness.  First is 
the ability of the board to engage in constructive conflict, intelligently challenging 
and questioning actions of management with the aim of improving decision making.  
Second, is to avoid destructive conflict, i.e. conflict that leads to counter 
productiveness rather than to added value.  The third factor for success is to 
emphasise that the board works together as a team with a common goal. The fourth is 
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to know the appropriate level of strategic involvement, and the final factor is to 
address decisions comprehensively, with an adequate level of depth and knowledge.  
The authors give recommendations for procedures to increase the likelihood of these 
factors materialising: getting the right people on board, putting a meaningful 
structure in place, setting the stage for effective board meetings and steer board 
meetings to improve board processes.  These four procedures for effective board 
conduct were named: selecting, structuring, staging and steering (Finkelstein & 
Mooney, 2003). 
 
Two articles from the same issue of Academy of Management Executive in 2004 
elaborate further on the issue.  Letendre (2004) quotes a 1999 Korn/Ferry survey of 
7,000 directors of 902 publicly traded Fortune 1000 firms, and having correlated the 
survey results with their measure of corporate return on investment, finds that the 
five attributes of effective boards are knowledge, information, power, rewards and 
opportunity/time. Letendre further points to the significance of studies that have been 
directed towards examining board dynamics and concludes that the crucial factors in 
healthy and constructive boardroom dynamics are independent, intrepid, informed, 
and diverse directors willing to speak up when concerned or in doubt, and willing to 
challenge each other‟s and management‟s assumptions.   The other article by Cascio 
et al. (2004) highlights the importance of the board social system for board 
functioning and discusses the importance of the role of the group leader, the 
feedback process and board members‟ selection.   
 
Leblanc (2004a) joins those who criticise looking at size, composition and leadership 
structures in order to find performance‟s secret ingredient. He points to three 
fundamental areas that need to be addressed by researchers in order to determine the 
nature of board effectiveness.   An important area for examination is looking at the 
independence of judgement, and the competencies and behaviours of the chairman as 
well as examining the selection procedures for the chairman.  Furthermore, 
examining the behavioural “posture” of the CEO in the boardroom, i.e., the role he 
assumes relative to the roles other board members assume, is a potential area for 
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further research.  Finally he recommends looking into the effectiveness of individual 
directors, including independence of mind, and notes that competencies and 
behaviours need to be emphasised as opposed to their “regulatory” independence.   
Like several others, Leblanc concludes that “The only possible way to know whether 
boards operate well is to observe them in action – to see and understand the 
processes by which they reach decisions.” (Leblanc, 2004a:440). 
 
7.2. Issues concerning research methods 
Calls for increased research into board processes, dynamics and relations, brings 
forth the need to apply appropriate research methods. Two methodological papers 
were identified and included in this study.  Those papers address in particular the 
issues at hand when moving from structural research to process research.   
 
The first paper (Currall et al., 1999) seeks to demonstrate the synergies of combining 
qualitative and quantitative methods in a single study of group process.   The study 
involved “participant as observer” data from a corporate board collected over a five 
year period, and quantitative survey data testing hypotheses developed in the 
observation process. The authors argue that by assembling qualitative and 
quantitative methodological elements in a synergetic manner, knowledge of group 
processes can be enhanced.  The main contribution of the paper is the combination of 
qualitative and quantitative methods to emphasise both discovery and justification in 
a single study. 
 
Samra-Fredericks (2000) presented an argument and a framework for “boards in 
action” research.  She claims that numerous papers and studies have argued for a 
more in-depth analysis of board‟s activities and behaviours.  She argues that 
questionnaires and interviews provide only a limited scope for understanding action 
and behaviours, and proposes a method of immersion in social settings associated 
with observation and audio taping, followed by detailed transcribing and analysing.  
She suggests that through studying directors‟ talk-based interpersonal routines it is 
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possible to develop an understanding of how factors such as knowledge and 
experiences translate into boardroom processes.   
7.3. Power and control in the boardroom 
The issue of power and control is a prevailing one and has been addressed by some 
authors either in general or in particular.  
 
Mace‟s (1971) findings and conclusions indicated that corporate power was mainly 
in the hands of management, since the board, and particularly outside directors, had 
little time to attend to, and low involvement in, company matters.  This view was 
opposed by Mizruchi (1983) who argued that since the board had the power to 
replace the CEO and management, the ultimate control of the corporation resides 
with the board. He illustrated his point by providing numerous examples of boards 
actually exercising this power in the 60‟s and 70‟s, and argued that even though non-
executive board members might be selected and appointed by the CEO, this does not 
ensure that they will, once in office, passively support management.   
 
The power issue was elaborated on by Lorsch & MacIver (1989) who found that 
power largely resided with the CEO who controlled the boardroom agenda and set 
the norms for boardroom behaviour, and it was only in times of crisis when the board 
actually did assume some level of power.  This was later seconded by Hill (1995). 
 
Three studies that dealt particularly with power in the boardroom were identified for 
the purpose of this review.  A study based on surveys and archival data from 221 
large and medium sized US companies (Westphal, 1998), indicated that changes in 
board structure which increased the board‟s independence from management 
(increasing the level of non-executives) were associated with higher levels of CEO 
integration and persuasion behaviour towards board members. Such behaviours in 
turn served to offset the effect of increased structural board independence on 
corporate strategy and compensation policy, indicating that increasing the 
representation of non-executive directors did not necessarily decrease CEO power.     
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Two key papers addressing the issue of power from studies based on interviews with 
directors in UK companies dealt with the issues of power and control in the 
boardroom (Pettigrew & McNulty, 1995, 1998). The key contribution of the former 
paper was to identify boards exercising either minimalist or maximalist behaviour 
depending on the level of activities of the non-executive directors.  The paper‟s 
conclusion was in line with Lorsch & McIver (1989) that non-executives‟ influence 
tends to peak in times of crisis, and that negative influence seems to be easier for 
non-executives to exercise than positive influence which tended to be interpreted as 
unwanted non-executive intervention.   Petigrew & McNulty (2005) found that the 
chief executives‟ and chairmen‟s attitudes and behaviours affected the ability of non-
executives to use and exercise power.  Furthermore, relative expertise and experience 
of non-executives, power from internal and external power figures, as well as 
authority from board committees, and relationships and network building outside the 
board, were found to be elements of building up the power and status of individual 
non-executives.  Finally the skill and insight of the non-executive of knowing when 
and how to intervene was found to be an important factor in attaining power and 
influence (Pettigrew & McNulty, 1995).   
 
In the latter study, Pettigrew & McNulty (1998) examined in particular the critical 
incidence of the dismissal of the chairman of two companies, and the process of shift 
in power from the chairman to the non-executives.  In both cases performance 
weakness of the firm over time had built up the context to challenge the chairman.  
The authors observed that the normative assumption of board citizenship could 
potentially neutralise the power of non-executives, and the context and structure 
could, however, lead to the turning of potential power into power in use (Pettigrew & 
McNulty, 1998). Finally, both of their papers called for more understanding of 
behavioural dynamics. 
 
When examining board working processes, Nadler et al. (2006) defined three areas 
for potential improvements.  First, the importance of the flow of information to the 
board is highlighted. The problem here is that boards tend to get too many data and 
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too little information.  Directors are frequently showered with raw data but lack the 
relevant information.  The type of information circulated tends also to be of limited 
focus, mainly financial data and management‟s processed strategy proposals; what is 
lacking is a broader context and information that can help directors gain a deeper 
understanding of the company and its environment.  Furthermore the flow of 
information is controlled by management and therefore directors do not have as open 
an access to information as they should have.  Secondly attention is drawn to the 
impact of the board agenda on what is being discussed at board meetings and how 
productively board members spend their time together.   
 
Based on this limited number of studies, the indication seems to be that context, 
behaviour and relationships have more impact on power than mere structural factors.  
 
7.4. The chairman/CEO dyad 
Recently the relationship between chairmen and CEOs has become a theme that 
interests researchers. The increasing pressure for separating the chairman/CEO role, 
rooted in an agency perspective, has raised questions on what their relationship, 
interaction and role responsibilities in effect are.  The relevance of chairman/CEO 
studies for this review mainly lie in the fact that the nature of the relationship has 
been found to affect the way board dynamics develop.   
 
Five studies included in this review were identified as mainly contributing to the 
understanding of the chairman/CEO relationship.   
 
One of the early papers that examined the role of the chairman in particular was a 
study by Parker (1990) based on interviews with 15 UK chairmen.  Parker explored 
the changing business environment and the evolution of temporary corporations and 
then went on to describe priorities for actions, concluding with the fundamental role 
of the public company chairman.  In essence Parker describes the role of the 
chairman as “Making tomorrow‟s company out of today‟s” (Parker, 1990:36).  The 
priorities for action described by Parker include the importance of the chairman in 
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providing board leadership and ensuring that the board gives the company long-term 
strategic direction, and in addition, emphasising and ensuring that the company‟s 
culture is robust and adaptive, and enhancing the quality, motivation and morale of 
the people who work for the company.  Finally the chairman should be “capable of 
leading his own company on the acquisition trail and of defending it against other 
acquirers” (Parker, 1990:42).  Parker concludes by stating that chairmanship is a 
highly subjective activity, and that every successful chairman is by definition a 
leader.  Furthermore, he says that the role of the chairman is becoming increasingly 
demanding and that teamwork is essential for successfully dealing with the future 
of corporations.   
 
An extensive tracer study spanning two years, on chairman/general manager 
relationship within the NHS was conducted by Stewart (1991).  Five different roles 
adopted by chairmen were described: partner role, emphasising shared 
responsibility; executive role, where the chairman instructs the manager; mentor role, 
when the chairman acts as a coach and counsellor; consultant role, where the 
chairman waits to be approached for advice; and finally distant role, where the 
chairman devotes little time and effort to the task.  The partner role, where each 
player complemented the other, was found to be the most common.  The study found 
the chairman and manager role to be very dependent upon one another and to occupy 
overlapping domains.  This in essence implies that what each party can do is very 
dependent upon the behaviour of the other.   
 
Roberts & Stiles (1999) drew upon role theory, leadership theory and agency theory 
when reporting findings from their research containing interviews with 30 
chairmen/CEO dyads. Role theory describes how a mutual understanding of a 
person‟s roles develops, while leadership theory lends the ideas of the role to shaping 
the companies‟ culture, affecting the emotional dynamics of the chairman/CEO 
relationship and procedures of succession.  Finally agency theory serves as the main 
argument for the separation of the two roles at the apex of the corporation.   The 
findings of Roberts and Stiles indicate that there is no clear line separating the roles 
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and responsibilities of each party.  The strategic and external relations were found to 
be particularly prone to overlap and the nature of negotiation of roles between the 
two was found to be contingent on context, recent history and whether either the 
chairman, CEO, or both were recruited internally or externally.  The benefit of 
separating the two roles was therefore found to be highly dependent on the process 
and nature of the relationship established between the chairman and the CEO.  Early 
encounters were found to be particularly important for the succeeding development 
of the relationship, and the transition from CEO to chairman was found to be prone 
to feelings of loss of potency.  The authors highlighted that the nature of the 
chairman/CEO relationship could be a decisive influence on the quality of other 
board relationships.  The separation of the two roles results in the change that a 
relationship between two individuals, the Chairman and the CEO is placed at the 
apex of the organisation instead of an individual is.  While a too close relationship 
can potentially lead to danger, a competitive and confrontational relationship can 
also have seriously negative effects. Although separation of the two roles might be a 
necessity, it will, in these authors‟ opinion, not be a sufficient condition for success.  
According to Roberts & Stiles (1999), success will depend upon the ability of the 
two individuals to develop and build a trusting relationship where both can 
complement each other‟s role.   
 
Roberts (2002) examined the chairman‟s role further in a study containing 35 
interviews with chairmen, chief executives and non-executive directors of large UK 
companies.  He defined the complementary role of the chairman to be to contribute 
to CEO performance as well as creating conditions for other non-executives to 
contribute, and concluded that adopting this role could significantly add to the value 
of board contribution.  He also described a different, more counterproductive role of 
the chairman; the complementary role, where executives and non-executives engage 
in the role of complementing each others‟ work without ever questioning or 
scrutinising it.  Again, roles were considered to vary, based on different traditions 
and different contexts.  However, the importance of the chairman‟s role, as a 
complementary factor to the CEO competencies, was frequently stressed.  In addition 
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to making sure the strategy items were on the board‟s agenda, the effective role of 
the chairman was described as: being able to create an atmosphere for questioning, 
challenging, explanation and debate.   In the author‟s own words: “To see non-
executives simply as representing distant shareholders‟ interests risks foreclosing 
these positive potentials” (Roberts, 2002:517).   Roberts pointed out the risks of the 
chairmen becoming too aloof, seeing their role as merely running board meetings, 
and that of becoming too confrontational, undermining and questioning the CEO‟s 
mandate. In order to create complementary board relationships, Roberts concluded 
that three key conditions were an essential support.  First, he considered openness, 
trust and lack of suspicion to be essential.  Second, chairmen must be willing to 
develop their knowledge of the company and its conditions and facilitate the 
knowledge gaining of other non-executives.  Finally, the complementary skills and 
knowledge of each one have to be brought together in a skilful manner.   
 
In a very recent study, Kakabadse et al., (2006a) uncovered four themes: the role of 
the chairman, the nature of the chair/CEO relationship, impact of the relationship on 
board effectiveness, and attributes of an effective chairman.  The chairman‟s role 
was described as creating a platform for participation, respecting the division of roles 
between the chairman and CEO, and managing boardroom dynamics.  Effective 
relationships were described as the two having “a personal chemistry” or “sharing a 
philosophy” and the like.  The critical factor, however, was found to be the ability of 
the two to: “interpret information and events in a mutually synergistic manner” 
(Kakabadse et al., 2006a:144). An important impact on board effectiveness was 
found to be the balance in the chairman/CEO relationship and level of quality 
information from executives.  Furthermore, attention was drawn to the importance of 
the absence of conflicting relationships.  Finally, the capacity to work through board 
tensions as well as gaining a shared perspective from board members were seen as 
the most important attributes of an effective chairman.  “An outstanding chairman is 
able to comfortably raise submergent concerns to the realm of evident and workable 
dynamics.” (Kakabadse et al., 2006a:147).  The responsibility for creating an 
effective board was reported to be the shared responsibility of the chairman and 
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CEO.  Study participants emphasised that the chairman and CEO were responsible 
for, and had no choice but to work on their relationship, and to ensure that their 
interactions were effective.   
 
The only US study that elaborates on the chairman/CEO relationship is by Nadler et 
al. (2006). In terms of board leadership, the opposing views of separate or united 
chairman/CEO roles are still dominant in the US.  Around one third of the 
commission members of the study sided with the separation of the role of the CEO 
and that of an outside independent director acting as non-executive chairman.  The 
importance of board independence and the view that the two roles are indeed very 
different jobs that demand different skills were the main reasons behind this logic.  
Another third of the commissioners were very clear on their view of combining the 
two roles as it leaves no doubt as to who is in charge and accountable for the 
company‟s success or failure, and that the separation of roles would inevitably lead 
to power struggles.  A third group felt that someone was needed to serve as the leader 
of independent directors, although they did not have preferences whether this role 
was served by a non-executive chairman or a lead director.  The overall opinion was 
that it was appropriate to have one person providing leadership to the non-executive 
directors over a period of time rather than rotating the leadership role.  It was 
considered of vital importance to clearly delineate, depending on the context, the 
responsibilities of the CEO on the one hand and the chairman/lead director on the 
other.  The shared opinion was that, except in unusual cases, the CEO should be the 
one communicating with the outside world, not the chairman/lead director. The 
essential skills and capabilities of a successful chairman/lead non-executive were 
seen as the ability to gain the trust and respect of board members, to be an 
independent thinker and willing to challenge the CEO when necessary and to build a 
constructive working relationship with the CEO, fostering open communication. 
Furthermore, it was considered important to have the ability to conduct effective 
meetings, have good listening skills and enough knowledge about the company‟s 
business and industry.  The leader of the board should be seen as a facilitator and 
first among equals, rather than as the boss of the board (Nadler et al., 2006). 
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The findings of those studies indicate clearly that the actions and attitudes of 
chairmen and CEOs, and in particular the relationship between the two, can largely 
affect the culture and dynamics of a board.  Activating non-executives, encouraging 
open discussion and debate and shaping an interactive culture on the board, can to a 
great extent be enhanced, or inhibited, by chairman/CEO activities.   
7.5. Teamwork and culture 
The literature identified in this review, focusing on teamwork and culture, is 
extremely fragmented. The approach taken for this issue is to start off by reviewing 
theoretical papers about the board as a team or decision making group, and then to 
take a look at empirical research in this field.  Empirical studies are grouped into key 
studies focusing, to at least some extent, on teamwork and culture, and other studies 
that touch upon the issue but might have a different main agenda.  
7.5.1. The board as a (decision making) group 
A number of theoretical and conceptual papers deal with the board as a group 
involving relationships, teamwork, discussion and collective decision making.   
 
In a theoretical paper on boards and group decision making, Bainbridge (2002) 
examined the role of the board and put forth the question: “Why is a group (the 
board) an appropriate control mechanism for corporations?”  He found that groups 
have been associated with superior decision making and better monitoring, as well as 
increasing institutional memory, and the ability to grasp and process information.  
The author also acknowledges the downside of groups such as social loafing and 
agency problems, but demonstrates that inbuilt group mechanisms for self control, 
peer pressure and social norms of the group are claimed to outweigh these 
shortcomings. The author therefore concludes that since the process of group 
interaction has synergistic effects that allow groups to outperform even the best 
decision makers, corporations are well served with a group as its top decision making 
unit (Bainbridge, 2002). 
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By combining the literature on boards of directors with the literature on group 
dynamics and work group effectiveness, Forbes & Milliken (1999) built a model of 
board processes that explains the effects of demography on board processes.  The 
model considers four demographic measures: job-related diversity, proportion of 
outsiders, board size and board tenure, and its effects on six types of board processes 
– effort norms, cognitive conflict, presence of functional area knowledge and skills, 
presence of firm specific knowledge and skills, use of knowledge and skills, and 
cohesiveness.  The model was developed as an answer to the call for research on the 
processes that linked board demography to firm performance.  
 
A paper by Cutting & Kouzmin (2002) discusses the shift from managerialism to 
politicism in the cognitive focus of corporate decision making, essentially increasing 
the authority of stakeholders.  The paper concludes that it is necessary for sound 
decision making and group learning to build in corporate processes of methodical 
environmental scanning and logical analysis of the relevant production process.  
They suggest that corporate boards should be required to develop a value statement 
that has an adequate contribution from society‟s social perspective.  Those values 
could be used to measure organisational and corporate board performance.  The 
authors conclude that boards need to give increased authority to a mandatory 
separate chair, require formal processes or election of competent and independent 
directors, and give power and resources to a director of corporate assessment. 
 
Van der Walt & Ingley (2003) elaborate on the effect of increased diversity, in terms 
of a wider variety of human and social capital, on boardroom dynamics.  They claim 
that increased diversity can lead to a broader perspective on issues, a richer source of 
innovative ideas, a broader level of wisdom and increased discussions that in turn 
would lead to better decision making. 
 
Nicholson & Kiel (2004) propose a model that conceptualises the board as a social 
phenomenon.  The model is based on the premise that an effective board will have an 
effective fit between its intellectual capital and the role required of it, based on 
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contextual input variables.  The model seeks to explain how a board‟s intellectual 
capital influences board behaviours and how this behaviour ultimately is linked to 
corporate performance.  The contextual input variables that determine the firm‟s 
intellectual capital requirements and the role of the board are organisation type, legal 
framework, constitution, history and strategy.  The board performs its roles by 
applying its intellectual capital to the tasks at hand.  The intellectual capital is 
composed of the board members‟ human, social and cultural capital as well as the 
board‟s social and structural capital. As boards are becoming increasingly active 
there is a need to start taking an integrated approach towards the boards‟ set of roles 
instead of analysing those roles separately.  The authors propose that “effective 
governance results from a mix of intellectual capital that enables the board to carry 
out a set of roles dictated by the company‟s individual circumstances” Nicholson & 
Kiel, 2004:443). The challenge in governance is to understand the roles required of a 
particular board and to match the intellectual capital accordingly.  
7.5.2. Studies on culture and teamwork 
The calls for more research focusing on actual board behaviour have encouraged 
researchers to start working towards opening the “black box” by examining the link 
between demographics or behaviour and board performance.  Some studies have 
adopted the model developed by Forbes & Milliken (1999).  Amongst those is a 
study by Gabrielson & Winlund (2000) who examined the relationship between the 
board‟s task performance and the level of knowledge and skills, preparation and 
commitment, independence, the level of formal routines, the extent of formal 
evaluation and board‟s meeting frequency. Preparation and commitment, directors‟ 
independence and degree of formal routines were related positively with both the 
control and service role, whereas use of knowledge and skills was only related to the 
service roles and no relationship was found between formal evaluation procedures or 
frequency of meetings with task performance.  The paper concluded that a clearly 
defined working style in the board enhances task performance.  
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Few ethnographic studies have been done in the board context.  A notable exception 
is a study by Huse (1998) where the author became the chairman of three boards and 
kept a diary of his actions for 15 months.  As well as reporting a contingent nature of 
the board roles, Huse also noted the importance of trust, time availability and paying 
attention to relationships and emotions in the boardroom. Trust and emotions were 
found to play an important part in the board‟s activities. Directors‟ feelings toward 
the chairman, and his feelings towards other board members were found to vary over 
time, and trust could not be taken for granted in board relationships.  The author put 
forward a model including the factors that deserve further research and investigation, 
namely board membership, board processes and board perspective (Huse, 1998). 
 
The most notable studies in the literature on board culture and dynamics are those by 
Pye (2000; 2001b; 2002).  The papers are based on two empirical interview studies 
of chairmen, CEOs, executive and non-executive directors of twelve boards, first 
conducted in 1987-88 and again on nine of the twelve still existing in 1999.  Pye 
(2000) reported that the business environment had undergone significant changes in 
these ten years which had largely affected the way boards were composed and how 
they worked.  A large indicator of change in focus was the fact that while the phrases 
“strategic focus”, “shareholder value” and “corporate governance” were a 
commonality to almost all interviews in 1999 they were practically non-existent ten 
years earlier.  Boards were in general found to be smaller in the later study, with a 
higher proportion of non-executives; age and tenure were lower and a much greater 
emphasis was put on the “value added role” of the board members.  Women, who 
had basically been non-existent in the earlier study were, however, still largely 
absent from the corporate boards of directors.  In terms of activities and dynamics, 
non-executive directors were found to have become much more influential in 
decision making whereas previously they were either allies of the chairmen or 
connected to “the right networks”.  Furthermore, the selection of directors seemed to 
follow a more structured approach than before.  Formal evaluation was, however, 
largely absent – only one out of the nine boards was practising the use of a formal 
board evaluation process.   The role of the chairman in activating the potential of the 
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non-executive directors was highlighted, and organising away-days and keeping 
regular informal contact with the non-executives were seen as the roles of 
competitive chairmen.  Frequency of board meetings had increased from the general 
rule of four meetings a year to six to twelve times a year plus committee meetings.  
Being in contact with investors and the City was seen  as being of much higher 
importance than before. CEOs, however, did not seem to see their roles being very 
different from before, largely defining their task as that of a change agent.  The paper 
finally goes on to examine the chairman/CEO relationship as a central hub for 
creating the board atmosphere and culture.  The involvement of chairmen, from 
full-timers to various arrangements of part-timers, and their relationship with the 
CEO, provide an important underpinning to boardroom culture as well as signalling 
to the external world.  As commonly described, the chairman/CEO relationship 
should strive to be complementary, supportive and harmonised without losing out on 
the criticality of thought (Pye, 2000). 
 
Pye (2001b) elaborates further on the effect of culture on board behaviour.  She notes 
that non-executive effectiveness is in many ways largely shaped by the board culture, 
and also examines how board culture and performance are evaluated by board 
members and investors. She again notes the environmental and contextual changes 
that have affected the way chairmen, directors and CEOs talk about organising and 
that the board profile has changed in terms of composition.  Although the role of the 
non-executive directors has changed, it still has the main two components of calling 
upon the accountability of management and safeguarding the interests of 
shareholders, as well as being expected to take part in strategic decision making.  
Directors were found to describe the expectations towards their performance as 
contextual, indicating that there is a different culture amongst different kinds of 
boards, in many cases driven by the chairman, CEO or the chairman/CEO 
dyad.  Pye (2001b) also observed that the larger the board the more likelihood of a 
dictated culture, and chairmen were even claimed to be the main enablers or 
inhibitors of non-executives‟ effectiveness. Effectiveness of non-executives was also 
defined in terms of their relative power established within a relationship, i.e. if they 
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lack access to information or an understanding of the nature of items on the 
corporate agenda they cannot be expected to deliver maximum effectiveness, and 
despite the will and skill of non-executives, they can be considerably more or less 
effective depending on the boardroom culture. Board processes were frequently 
defined by directors as: “what‟s on the agenda”, indicating a lack of awareness of the 
cultural element, and again underscoring the power of the chairman/CEO to form 
processes by composing the agenda.  Finally, institutional investors were found to 
have more power and influence over shaping the corporate future, and essentially the 
most likely party to influence the replacement of a chairman.     
 
Pye‟s studies (2001b; 2002) furthermore give a valuable perspective on studies of 
organisations from a methodological perspective, putting forward the question of 
whether organisational studies could be replicated.  Pye (2002) concludes that: 
“sense making (Weick, 1995) offers the most appropriate perspective by which to 
appreciate these changing explanations” (Pye, 2002:922).  
 
One of the most extensive studies on the behavioural aspects of boards is one by 
Leblanc and Gilles involving interviews with close to 200 directors and observations 
from numerous board meetings (Leblanc & Gilles, 2005).  The study demonstrates 
that it is possible to study boards in real time and that decision making processes are 
greatly influenced by the behavioural characteristics of individual directors.  The 
authors point out best practices in terms of selection, operation and job descriptions 
for directors.  Furthermore, they note that communicating clearly what is expected of 
board members and assessing performance are helpful to improve the effectiveness 
of the board, but are nowhere close to being the ultimate factors of success.  The 
essence of successful boards lies in the nature of how people on the board relate to 
each other, participate in discussion and reach decisions, and that will be affected by 
people‟s individual views, prejudices, behavioural patterns and cultural background.   
The authors propose a workable model of board efficiency that is composed of board 
structure, board membership and board processes.  Board structure and its effect on 
board or corporate performance has been widely researched and findings indicate 
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that structure alone cannot account for the presence or lack of board effectiveness.  
Leblanc and Gilles (2005) turn to the board membership and board processes for 
complementing explanations.  Board membership is concerned with the 
competencies of individual directors, whereas board processes are defined as: “The 
manner in which a board organize to, and actually do make, decisions may be 
described as “board process”.” (Leblanc & Gilles, 2005:138).  In the authors‟ 
opinion, effective directors must possess independence of mind, and a certain level 
of competence and behavioural characteristics. From the empirical data they define 
four types of functional directors and four types of dysfunctional directors based on 
their behavioural characteristics.  The functional directors ranked high in their ability 
to persuade fellow directors and emphasise looking for effective decisions for 
perplexing problem, they had the capacity to cooperate with their fellow directors 
and worked acceptable decisions out through constructive debate.   The main types 
of functional directors were called change agents, consensus builders, counsellors 
and challengers.   The dysfunctional types were called controllers, conformists, 
cheerleaders and critics who tended to rank low on the persuasive scales and were 
found to lack the ability to make a positive contribution to the decision making 
process.   Furthermore, the authors defined two main types of chairmen: the 
functional conductor and the dysfunctional caretaker.  The conductor was found to 
possess the ability to involve other directors in discussions and to effectively 
orchestrate the discussion and decision making process, whereas the caretakers’ 
main characteristic was a lack of leadership abilities in general. 
 
Leblanc and Gilles (2005) concluded that a revolution in corporate governance 
research is on the horizon.  To be effective, boards must be composed of a group of 
people with distinct behavioural characteristics that will allow them to work 
effectively as a team.   In order to be effective in terms of contributing positively to 
the corporation, a board must possess an adequate mix of behavioural characteristics, 
skills and capabilities (Leblanc & Gilles, 2005).   
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In a recent book (Nadler et al., 2006) based on in-depth interviews with a 
commission of 50 directors, CEOs, chairmen, academics and corporate governance 
experts, the process for building better boards and improving board performance is 
explored. 
  
The authors first examine the impact of board composition, appropriate recruitment 
and the impact of directors‟ characteristics and capabilities, and the importance of 
directors‟ self assessment.  A key issue for effective board performance is defined as 
“finding the appropriate level of engagement”, and identifying what the role of the 
board is, and what the role of the management is.  An important issue examined by 
Nadler et al. is central to the scope of this review and deals with board leadership, 
structures and roles, board work processes and the role of leaders in shaping board 
culture.  The authors found that “whoever controls the agenda controls the board‟s 
ability to do useful work” (Nadler et al., 2006:85). The authors reported that in a 
2004 survey, an increasing number of boards were found to have control over the 
agenda, yet only 60% of boards reported to have significant influence over their own 
agenda (up from 41% in 2003).  The potential of conducting periodical executive 
sessions without the CEO was stressed.  The value of such meetings was seen to be 
the opportunity to air and discuss concerns openly in a less tense atmosphere, 
opening up the possibility of detecting problems early enough to take essential 
action.   In addition those sessions were considered to increase and highlight the 
board‟s independence.  Nadler et al.‟s study goes on to examine the role of the leader 
in shaping board cultures. Although boards can be considered to be a particular kind 
of team there are several anomalies that set it apart from other types of team.  The 
traditional, historical culture of a board is represented by factors such as status and 
social recognition, closeness, membership and loyalty to the CEO.  The survival 
motto was to show up, get along with colleagues and refrain from asking exposing 
questions.  The culture of an actively engaged board is a very different one, one that 
fosters openness, independence, integrity, accountability, action orientation as well 
as mutual trust and respect. Leaders cannot mandate a board‟s culture but through a 
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pattern of consistent and self-reinforcing decisions, actions, and behaviours it can be 
shaped (Nadler et al., 2006).   
7.5.3. Other studies on board processes, culture and teamwork 
Other studies related to processes, culture and teamwork are by Ingley & van der 
Walt (2002), Buchholtz et al., (2005), Lawler & Finegold (2006), Hoogheimstra & 
Van Manen (2002), and Mellahi (2005). 
 
The level of „affective conflict‟ was examined by Buchholtz et al., (2005).  Affective 
conflict has the potential to undermine the social structure essential for a team's 
effective functioning.  Affective conflict amongst the members of the board and the 
management team was found to be lower when the board practices high levels of 
monitoring activities, but as board involvement increases so does the level of 
affective conflict.  
 
A study by Hooghiemstra & Van Manen (2002) based on surveys and telephone 
interviews discussed non-executives‟ “exit or voice” options in cases of ethical 
dilemmas.  Directors were found not to be reluctant to resign.  However, directors 
were found to be more inclined to stay and try to voice their concerns in the cases of 
ethical dilemmas; resignation would only follow unsuccessful attempts at 
reconciliation.  Directors preferred that resignations would be conducted rather 
discreetly in order to avoid negative public attention. 
 
Lawler & Finegold (2006) explored the positive impact of having non-director 
executives attend board meetings.  Recent reforms have advocated the increased 
proportions of outside directors, therefore the proportion of inside directors has 
diminished, and this has resulted in poorer access to company inside information.  
Their paper demonstrates the positive effects of having non-directors attend board 
meetings.  Higher attendance was found to positively affect board communication 
and monitoring process, communications, board independence as well as 
performance management, board evolution and board effectiveness. 
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The value of the assessment of boards and individual board members was explored 
by Ingley & van der Walt (2002).  They explicitly looked at why board reviews 
should happen, what inhibits the process and what facilitates it, and how reviews can 
work.  Seminar discussions with directors revealed that board members were most 
uncomfortable with the accuracy and meaningfulness of appraisals, and the effect of 
the process on boardroom cohesion and dynamics.  Some confusion with regard to 
the purpose of evaluation and the relationship of the reviews with compliance and 
organisational performance was revealed.  Simplistic approaches were considered 
meaningless and the nature of the process as important as the outcome. 
 
A recent case study (Mellahi, 2005) examined the actions and involvement of the 
board of an Australian insurance company in a failing process.  Directors were found 
to be detached, aloof and lacking information in the conception stages of the crisis, 
the board put all its trust and confidence in management and demonstrated high 
levels of group think.  When warning signals started emerging, the board did not pay 
attention and continued to have faith in management.  When heading for failure 
became evident, two directors tried to raise their concerns but were ignored by both 
the CEO and chairman.  Eventually part of the board was replaced in order to 
increase the power of the board, but actions came too late, the board was in fact 
paralysed and inevitably the company went down.   
 
7.6. The effect of social ties on behaviour in the boardroom 
Board members‟ social capital (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998) and ties to parties and 
individuals external or internal to the company can affect relationships within the 
boardroom. Three papers were identified that linked social ties and social capital to 
board behaviour.  
 
Westphal (1999) examined the effect of social ties between directors and CEOs on 
the level of advice and counsel on strategic issues.  Contrary to literature advocating 
board independence to increase effectiveness, Westphal (1999) found that social ties 
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actually increased board involvement by encouraging collaboration between top 
managers and outside directors and therefore they enhanced the provision of advice 
and counsel from outside directors.  The effect of social capital on an individual‟s 
impact on board processes was studied by Westphal & Milton (2000) who suggested 
that minority influence on boards could be improved if minority members had 
previous experience of being in a minority position on a board, and if they had direct 
or indirect social network ties to majority directors through common memberships, 
for example of other boards (Westphal & Milton, 2000).  
 
Pye (2004) explored what effect external relationships have on the internal working 
of the board, particularly looking at the effect of context and time using empirical 
data from two interview studies conducted in the late 1980‟s and late 1990‟s 
respectively. Pye noted that traditionally research has looked at boards as 
homogeneous groups that perform generic functions and that the literature often does 
not differentiate between organisational contexts or between individual and group 
behaviour.  Her findings indicate that the effects of external relationships on the 
internal working of the board were both complex and wide ranging. External 
relations are factors of social capital, and as such they clearly help individuals gain 
board appointments.  However, stronger relations also tend to be related to lower 
levels of independence and thus can at the same time serve to diminish credibility. 
The views of outsiders and shareholders were found to have an effect on which 
information was presented at board level and from that, influence decision making.  
The data offered evidence of powerful and tight networks of influence that affected 
board conduct and performance. Pye (2004) suggested that examining social capital 
can contribute to the understanding of which line of action is taken and what form of 
discussion is practised.  
 
These papers clearly indicate that characteristics of the individual, including his/her 
internal or external relations and social ties, will affect the culture and behavioural 
patterns of the group that forms a board.  
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7.7. Refining the focus of process research 
Research on corporate governance seems to be branching off in various directions 
(Huse, 2005). Roberts et al., (2005) support the search for theoretical pluralism and 
greater understanding of board processes and dynamics.   
 
In a commentary on the Roberts et al. (2005) study, Pye & Pettigrew (2005) point to 
the need for strengthening the theoretical and methodological foundations of board 
process. These authors claim that:  “lack of theoretical framework often undermines 
the impact of process studies, so we also advocate the need to develop stronger 
theoretical focus and explication about theorizing, encouraging clarity of 
epistemological assumptions underpinning the research process” (Pye & Pettigrew, 
2005:S28). They furthermore stress the importance of attention to the issues of 
context and process over time and their relationship to outcomes, and caution against 
the attempt to over generalise from qualitative data without paying due attention to 
the issues of context and time.    In addition they stress the importance of clarity on 
the level of focus and analysis, and being more careful in distinguishing between 
individual behaviour and effectiveness, and board behaviour and effectiveness. 
Finally they point to the fact that not only are studies of actual behaviours of boards 
and directors scarce, but the little knowledge that does exist is not as well theorised 
or as effectively cross-referenced as are agency studies.  Pye & Pettigrew (2005) call 
for a shift of focus of board studies to an alternative and well founded process 
perspective on board behaviour, rather than creating the alternative view to agency 
theory.     
 
In another commentary on the same paper, Huse (2005) sets forward a framework for 
exploring behavioural perspectives of boards and corporate governance. The 
framework consists of four main areas: splitting the link between board composition 
and performance into intermediate stages; using a pluralistic approach to board role 
theories; applying theories from group and cognitive psychology to understand 
decision making; and finally, understanding the board in an open interacting system 
with various power relations and influences amongst the actors.  The framework 
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integrates three sets of theories: general theories such as contingency and 
evolutionary theory; role related theories such as agency and resource dependence 
theory; and finally, three sub-sets of process related theories.  The process related 
theories are: theories explaining the nature of the interactions taking place in the 
corporate governance arena including trust, emotions and adjustment to various kinds 
of pressure and influencing forces; theories explaining evolution and existence of 
formal structures and norms; and, theories explaining decision making culture, 
including cognitive conflict, openness, creativity etc. (Huse, 2005). 
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8. Female directors 
 
A topic of particular interest to me is the experiences of women on boards.  The bulk 
of studies on women directors have to do with the business case for female directors, 
advancement strategies and examination of the background and qualifications of 
female directors. Since these types of study tend not to deal with boardroom 
activities or experiences they are not included in this review.  However, it is not 
unlikely that these studies might inform behavioural factors on the board and might 
therefore be consulted at a later stage.  A few studies have looked inside the board at 
experiences of female directors. Those studies have mainly focused on how female 
directors cope in the largely male dominated world of boards.   
 
The first study is based on interviews with women who had left middle or senior 
managerial positions (Marshall, 1995).  Although it does not have the board as its 
main focus, it gives valuable insight into the socialisation aspects of women in a 
largely male dominated business world. The author found issues of living in and 
seeking to be effective in a male dominated environment as the issues most 
elaborated on by the interviewees. Women who had reached the upper levels 
reported feeling as constantly being tested out and as if they had interrupted the 
“normal life” of the senior men who had no willingness to develop a culture in which 
women could be included more equally (Marshall, 1995). 
 
All but one of the papers that looked at women on boards in particular were based on 
interview data.  The exception was Sheridan (2001) who surveyed 46 female 
directors serving on Australian boards.  Although the study was mainly centred 
around why the women were recruited and why they accepted the position, it briefly 
talked about board experiences which the women found to be generally positive, but 
also indicated that male CEOs and board members were to some extent 
uncomfortable with females on the board. 
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The remaining five studies are based on interviews with four to 20 female directors 
in four countries.  Bilimoria & Huse‟s (1997) study of two American and two 
Norwegian female directors, and their board experiences, revealed their common 
perception of adding, as females, a new more diverse perspective to the boardroom, 
focusing on women‟s and other soft issues and being an inspiration to other women 
in the company.  They also indicated putting in an effort to enhance board 
effectiveness by facilitating a comfortable atmosphere while not being afraid to ask 
difficult and probing questions. A difference was observed between directors from 
the two countries with respect to their awareness of and attitudes towards gender-
related boardroom processes and structures. The Norwegian women were more 
feminist oriented, talking about having to confront the male environment, while the 
American women talked about the importance of fitting in to the culture (Bilimoria 
& Huse, 1997) 
 
In a study based on interviews with 20 white women who sit on Canadian boards, 
Bradshaw & Wicks (2000) explored how these women first experienced and then 
complied with or resisted hegemonic masculinity. Their findings indicated that these 
women had generally reached their position through hard work and assimilating male 
behaviours.  They perceived themselves primarily as caretakers of shareholders‟ 
interests and were unlikely to see themselves as, or act as, change agents, but 
highlighted the importance of fitting in and not rocking the boat. Thus they were 
much more likely to comply with the masculine hegemony rather than to resist it.  
 
McGregor (2003) compared the experiences of older and younger women in New 
Zealand boardrooms. The paper gives an insight into what attitudes and styles 
younger women bring into the boardroom.  The younger women bring an informal 
attitude, they bring creativity and new ways of thinking and they tend to emphasise 
outcome rather than rituals. 
 
Zelechowski & Bilimoria (2003) looked the experiences of women corporate inside 
directors of Fortune 1000 companies. They found two distinct factors to have a great 
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influence on women on boards: the influence factor of the individual and the 
inclusion factor of the board culture.  The study demonstrated that despite being in 
the highest position, and despite being highly influential, women directors could not 
attain full effectiveness in non-inclusive cultures.  The indication of the study was 
that in order to reach optimal effectiveness, influence and inclusion must both be 
present. 
 
A very recent paper by Huse & Solberg (2006) looked at gender-related boardroom 
dynamics. More specifically, the study collected stories from a small sample of 
female directors on how they were able to contribute to boardroom discussion and 
avoid tokenism.  The authors found that contribution was highly dependent on the 
women‟s ability and willingness to make alliances with the most influential actors, 
and that their level of contribution could be enhanced with high levels of preparation 
and by asking critical questions during board meetings.  Furthermore, being present 
in decision making arenas, taking leadership roles and being visible were considered 
helpful for enhancing contributions.  Finally, understanding the boardroom dynamics 
from a gendered perspective was considered an essential ingredient for the effective 
contribution of female directors.  
 
What can basically be concluded from these studies is that female directors do feel 
women are bringing a new/different perspective into the boardroom, and to some 
extent fostering a more open culture.  At the same time they seem to be facing rather 
conservative and quite masculine rules and norms of behaviour and experiencing non 
inclusive cultures. There were, however, indications that barriers could be broken 
down through influencing behaviour, high levels of preparation and/or by possessing 
or earning high levels of social capital. 
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9. Synthesis and discussions 
 
This review started out with the question:  
 
What are the experiences and activities of directors (including non-executives) on 
corporate boards of directors? 
 
The main aim was to gain an understanding of what research had been done within 
the board setting. 
 
9.1. What are the experiences and activities of directors? 
Drawing on the findings of the review, several inferences can be made about 
activities and experiences of directors and boards.   The following sections deal with 
the main findings in terms of the boards as social entities, the role of the board and 
its involvement in strategy, board processes and females on boards.   
9.1.1. Inferences about boards as social entities 
The board represents a group as a decision maker at the apex of corporations 
(Bainbridge, 2002).  Groups are composed of individuals (Pye, 2004; Leblanc, 
2004a), and those individuals do need to relate with each other in order to operate, 
and are as such a social entity (Hill, 1995).  
 
Boards, who were initially inactive (Smith, 1958; Mace, 1971), are to a greater extent 
being empowered (i.e. Lorsch, 1995).  Boards that traditionally were CEO controlled 
seem to be somewhat in a transitional phase, indicated by Pettigrew & McNulty 
(1995), who defined both minimalist and maximalist boards depending on the level 
of interaction.  Furthermore there seems to be a trend for boards to become more 
active (Pye, 2000).  Increased board empowerment draws attention to the issue of 
separating the roles of the chairman and CEO and, where the roles have already been 
separated, to the particular responsibilities of the chairman and his relationship with 
the CEO.  By board empowerment, the role of the chairman becomes more powerful 
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and significant and in essence means that an individual has been replaced by a 
relationship at the apex of the corporation (Roberts & Stiles, 1999).  Involvement is a 
prerequisite for empowerment, which in turn calls for higher levels of interaction and 
integration.  However, little is understood in terms of board relationships, 
interactions, teamwork and decision making, and further research in the field has 
repeatedly been called for (i.e. Sonnenfeld, 2002; Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; 
Letendre, 2004; Leblanc, 2004a). 
9.1.2. The role of the board and board’s involvement in strategy 
The role of the board has been mapped out fairly clearly in literature.  The board‟s 
role is firmly rooted in well cross referenced theories such as agency theory (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983), resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and later, 
stewardship theory (Davis et al., 1997).   As already elaborated on, research on board 
roles has developed from looking at the level of activity (Mace, 1971; Lorsch & 
MacIver, 1989), to the nature of the activities and its paradoxes (Demb & Neubauer, 
1992a), and from there on to the interplay between role and context (Huse, 1998; 
Jonnergard et al, 2004; Jonsson, 2005), and the role of the non-executive director 
(Roberts et al., 2005).  A subcategory of board research deals with the board‟s 
involvement in strategy, and research in this field has dealt both with the level of 
strategic involvement and the nature of strategic involvement.  It can be concluded 
that the nature of the role of the board is fairly well established.  However, the level 
to which it is interpreted by individual board members remains unexplored.   
9.1.3. Board process research 
The approach I used to address the very much fragmented theme of board processes 
was to look in turn at each of the themes proposed by Hill (1995): power and control; 
chairman/CEO relationship; culture and teamwork; and, social ties.  In some ways it 
seemed like a logical, and a more manageable way at the outset, but given the very 
interactive nature of processes, it is at the same time somewhat difficult and even 
illogical to separate processes into distinct themes.  
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In my opinion, two things very much stand out from the process literature. First is the 
issue of what type of research methods are appropriate for the task.  There seems to 
be somewhat of an agreement that archival data and proxies will not do the job, and 
it seems that surveys might fall short as well.  That leaves methods such as 
interviews, case studies and observations which allow for more background and 
contextual information but are nevertheless far from being perfect. The second issue 
is the lack of coherence and consistency of the body of existing literature, which can 
very well be related to the lack of theoretical framework and a research agenda (Pye 
& Pettigrew, 2005; Huse, 2005).  
 
What can, however, be concluded from the literature at hand is the following: 
 
 Boards are becoming more empowered and involved, which in turn requires 
more interactions amongst board members. (Henke, 1986; Lorsch, 1995; 
McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999; Pye, 2000). 
 
 The chairman/CEO relationship provides leadership to the board and 
therefore sets the stage for the atmosphere and culture in the boardroom  
(Parker, 1990; Roberts & Stiles, 1999; Kakabadse et. al., 2006a; Nadler et al., 
2006).   
 
 Board cultures that foster openness, candour, questioning and constructive 
debate are more likely to be effective (i.e. Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; 
Sonnenfeld, 2002; Roberts, 2002; Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; Roberts et 
al., 2005; Nadler et. al., 2006). 
 
 The characteristics; capabilities and personalities of individual directors also 
influence board dynamics (Leblanc & Gilles, 2005).   
 
 Social ties and social capital can influence the dynamics of a board; either to 
facilitate discussion, lend credibility to individual directors, or influence which 
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course of action is taken in particular matters (Westphal, 1999; Westphal & Milton, 
2000 Pye, 2004).    
 
What can be concluded from these points is that boardroom culture, behaviour and 
dynamics are shaped by the interactions between the individual board members and 
the collective experience of the board as a group.   In this emerging field, a number 
of issues have been touched upon but some important areas have only partially been 
explored.  The relationship between the chairman and the CEO has been researched 
already in a number of studies, but little is yet understood about the interactions 
between other individual board members and how they relate to each other in order 
to perform meaningful actions in carrying out their director roles.   
9.1.4. Women on boards 
The studies of women directors dealt with the issues of: women‟s experiences of the 
masculine board culture and ways to adapt to it or confront it; women‟s experiences 
of their effect on the boardroom culture; and women‟s strategies for being heard in 
the boardroom.  Of particular interest is how women affect boardroom culture and 
what effect the board culture has on how women perceive and experience their roles 
in order to make their contributions on the board.   
 
What can be inferred from the key studies is the following: 
 
 Boards seem to be dominated by a masculine culture (Bilimoria & Huse, 
1997; Bradshaw & Wicks, 2000; Sheridan, 2001) 
 Boardroom dynamics are not gender-neutral (Huse & Solberg, 2006) 
 Despite being highly influential, women could not attain full effectiveness in 
non-inclusive boardroom cultures (Zelechowski & Bilimoria, 2003) 
 Making alliances, particularly with powerful people, will enhance women‟s 
contributions in the boardroom (Huse & Solberg, 2006) 
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The reviewed studies revealed important aspects of a gendered culture on many 
boards and the importance of support and alliances in the boardroom.  The nature of 
interactions between board members of the same, or different gender do not yet 
appear to have been explored, and nor has the effect of gendered interpretation of the 
director‟s role and contribution.  
 
9.2. Defining the research gap 
Drawing upon the three types of literature defined in this review, I have identified a 
gap in the knowledge regarding an understanding of the interpretation or sense 
making of the role of director by individual board members in a deeper way than just 
focusing on effectiveness (Roberts et al., 2005).  Furthermore it is noted that a 
gendered perspective has not been applied to director role interpretation.  
  
Based on this conclusion the proposed research question is: 
 
How do non-executive board members make sense of/interpret their roles and 
contribution as individuals, and is there a gendered effect? 
 
Figure 12: Mapping the gap in literature 
Director’s 
individual roles
Gender
Are perceived 
roles gendered?
Role interpretation
- sense making
Board 
processes
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9.3. Key papers to build on 
In the proposed research, the role of the board and board role theories are the main 
contextual factors. A key study to build will be: 
 Roberts et al., (2005), who elaborated on the importance of attachment and 
level of accountability to be able to contribute to their role on the board. This is 
the key paper upon which the proposed research will build.  In the paper the 
researchers examined non-executive directors‟ interpretations and experiences 
of the role of the non-executive in terms of making an effective contribution, 
but disregarded the key issue of gender.  Considering that, proportionately, 
more women are entering the boardroom (Singh & Vinnicombe, 2005), 
research on their role interpretation is of increasing importance.  
 
The following papers and book contribute significantly to the framing of the research 
questions.  From the role perspective there are:  
 Pye (2001b), finding that although the role of non-executive directors had 
changed over time, the main components had remained, calling for 
management accountability and guarding the interest of shareholders.  
 Pye (2002), concluding that sense making offers the most appropriate 
perspective from which to appreciate changing explanations of effective 
management.  
 Demb & Neubauer‟s (1992a) book, which deals with the paradoxes of boards 
of practising effective control without diminishing motivations of managers, 
and with the paradox of commitment and depth versus detachment and breadth.  
 
In addition, two commentaries from the Roberts et al.,‟s (2005) paper:  
 Pye & Pettigrew (2005) and Huse (2005), are quite important points of 
reference, as both these papers comment on the lack of coherence and 
consistency of the body of existing literature and relate that to the lack of 
theoretical framework and a research agenda for the field of board interaction.   
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From the gender perspective, there are:  
 Zelechowski & Bilimoria (2003), who claimed that the level of influential 
behaviour of the individual, and the level of inclusiveness of the board culture, 
affected the level of effectiveness of female board members.  
 Huse & Solberg (2006), who acknowledge the existence of gendered culture 
and highlight the importance of building alliances on the board.   
In addition:  
 Westphal & Milton (2000), investigating the effectiveness of minority board 
members and the effect of social ties and previous minority experience on their 
board influence, and 
 Pye (2004), examining the effect of social capital on board conduct and 
performance  
will be consulted in greater detail. 
 
9.4. A critical review of key papers for empirical studies  
The study by Roberts et al., (2005) is a key building block for my research.  They 
elaborated on the importance of director‟s attachment and level of accountability in 
order to fulfil their role on the board. In their paper the researchers examined non-
executive directors‟ interpretations and experiences of the role of the non-executive 
in terms of making an effective contribution. The two commentaries written on this 
paper (Pye & Pettigrew, 2005; Huse, 2005) will also be consulted. The auxiliary 
papers are grouped into three themes: process research on the role of the board, 
gendered board dynamics and female board members‟ contributions, and finally, the 
effect of social capital on board conduct and individual influence.  
9.4.1. The key study 
The main paper on which to build my study is that of Roberts et al., (2005).  The 
study, which was commissioned for the Higgs Review, highlights the failure of 
control and collaboration theories (agency and stewardship theories respectively) to 
reflect the live experiences of board members.  The authors firmly belief that, in 
order to fulfil the paradoxical role of controlling and supporting, developing 
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accountability in relation to strategy and performance is what is most important for 
boards.  They suggest that developing accountability is a central concept in 
explaining how boards operate effectively.   
 
The authors lay the foundations of the paper by criticising the dominant grip on 
agency theory on board research tradition. However, they caution against substituting 
agency theory with an alternative theory, but advocate theoretical pluralism and 
increased emphasis on qualitative research on key governance relationships, as well 
as focusing on understanding the dynamics of boards and the work and working 
conditions of non-executive directors.  They particularly highlight the importance of 
focusing on challenges of creating and sustaining accountability, and state that 
governance reforms should be focused on enhancing the effectiveness of boards and 
board members, and increasing the confidence of investors.  
 
In their literature review they give an overview of board dynamic research.  It is 
noteworthy that the bulk of these studies cast light on the paradoxical working of 
boards, noting the importance of embracing both control, monitoring, etc. and 
advising, supporting etc. rather than practicing either one or the other.  Examples of 
these paradoxes are cited by Roberts et al., (2005) as closeness and openness 
(Pettigrew & McNulty, 1998), competitive and complementary (Roberts & Stiles, 
1999), cognitive conflict and cohesiveness (Forbes & Milliken, 1999), and control 
and collaboration (Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003).  In addition they highlight the 
findings of Pettigrew and McNulty (1995) who describe minimalist and maximalist 
boards, depending on how actively non-executives contribute to dialogue within the 
board and create influence through contacts beyond the boardroom. 
 
The qualitative study conducted by Roberts et al., (2005) was based on 40 in-depth 
interviews with chief executives, chairmen, executive and non-executive directors, 
each lasting between one and two hours.  The study was, in the words of the authors, 
an opportunity to explore the invisible labour of boards, as opposed to the visible 
factors such as size, composition and independence of directors that condition rather 
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than determine effectiveness.  The aim of the paper was to offer an elaborated view 
of how attitudes, experiences and the conduct of non-executive directors can 
contribute to positive or negative board dynamics.   
 
The claim of Roberts et al. (2005) is that accountability, is “a central concept in 
understanding social action” and they note that it has been called a foundation stone 
of modern institutions.  They reason that the support and monitoring functions are 
activated by processes of accountability which are realised by the behaviours of 
board members and interactions between them.  Through this conduct, directors are 
constantly seeking to establish and maintain their confidence in the conduct of the 
company.  The findings of the study mainly confirm the issues of embracing the 
paradoxes highlighted in the authors‟ literature review. The authors make three main 
observations to that end, namely that non-executive directors must be engaged but 
non-executive, challenging but supportive and independent but involved.   
 
Before giving my assessment of the Roberts et al., (2005) paper, I will briefly consult 
the two commentaries on the paper, published in the same issue of Corporate 
Governance. 
 
Pye & Pettigrew (2005) point to the importance of paying attention to time and 
context and claim that “the data presented by Roberts, McNulty and Stiles are a-
contextual, hence lack this colourful contextual fabric and consequently, are 
circumscribed in what can be drawn from them”.  Pye & Pettigrew (2005) also point 
out that Roberts et al. elide between the individual and collective level of board 
effectiveness and thus their level of analysis is far from clear.  Finally they highlight 
the difficulty of theorising from qualitative data and advocate the need to develop a 
stronger theoretical framework.  Huse (2005) chooses to offer an alternative 
framework for exploring behavioural perspectives of boards and corporate 
governance.  A detailed review of this paper is given in my systematic review 
document. The Huse (2005) paper is a valuable building block in developing ideas 
on board process research.  However, after consulting the paper in more depth, I 
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found it to deviate from the direction in which I want to take my research.  Therefore 
I will, for the time being, not consider it further   
 
My criticism of the Roberts et al., (2005) paper has two main points.  First I would 
have to agree with Pye and Pettigrew (2005) and point to the confusion of the level 
of analysis in the study.  The Roberts et al. paper focused on board effectiveness 
through an examination of the work and relationships of non-executive directors, but 
the authors were unclear on how they distinguished between individual and 
collective behaviours, that is how they moved between individual behaviour and 
effectiveness and board behaviour and effectiveness.   In my study I will propose 
paying very careful attention to focusing on the individual level of analysis.   
 
My second point of criticism is the lack of attention to individual director 
characteristics, including gender.  To some extent this points in the same direction as 
Pye & Pettigrew‟s (2005) comment on the contextual blindness of the study.  Reports 
on male dominated boardroom culture (e.g. Bilimoria & Huse, 1997; Bradshaw & 
Wicks, 2000; Sheridan, 2001;  Huse & Solberg, 2006; Zelechowski & Bilimoria, 
2003) indicate that the way female board members can experience their role and 
express their behaviour is not identical with their male counterparts.  Therefore, 
further understanding of gendered role interpretation and role experience is needed.  
 
Thus my study will continue to examine role interpretation and role experience, like 
the Roberts, McNulty and Stiles paper, but will focus on the level of analysis of the 
individual board members, and the ways in which they experience their roles.  
Furthermore it will consider whether such role experience in the boardroom has a 
gendered perspective.  Finally, I will try to remain aware of other contextual factors , 
such as country, sector and company size, that may limit the potential of 
generalisation of individual board members‟ experiences of their roles. 
 196 
9.4.2. Process research on board role 
The most notable studies in the literature on board culture and dynamics are those by 
Pye (2000; 2001a, b).  These papers are based on two empirical interview studies of 
46 chairmen, CEOs, executive and non-executive directors of twelve boards, first 
conducted in 1987-88 and again on the nine of the twelve still existing in 1999.   In 
her studies, Pye works from social constructionist assumptions and adopts an 
interpretive approach in order to develop a process analysis of board dynamics. Of 
these, the 2001b paper is of particular interest to my research focus.  
 
Pye (2001b) looks at the relationship between corporate boards and investors and 
how accountability is developed in action. She elaborates on the effect of culture on 
board behaviour.  She notes that non-executive effectiveness is in many ways largely 
shaped by the board culture, and also examines how board culture and performance 
are evaluated by board members and investors. As in an earlier paper (Pye, 2000), 
she notes the environmental and contextual changes that have affected the way 
chairmen, directors and CEOs talk about organising and that the board profile has 
changed in terms of composition.  Although the role of the non-executive directors 
has changed, it still has the main two components of calling upon the accountability 
of management and safeguarding the interests of shareholders, as well as being 
expected to take part in strategic decision making.  Directors were found to describe 
the expectations towards their performance as contextual, indicating that there are 
different cultures amongst different kinds of boards, in many cases driven by the 
chairman, CEO or the chairman/CEO dyad.  Pye (2001b) also observed that the 
larger the board, the greater the likelihood of a dictated culture, and chairmen were 
also claimed to be the main enablers or inhibitors of non-executives‟ effectiveness. 
Effectiveness of non-executives was also defined in terms of their relative power 
established within a relationship. That is to say that if they lack access to 
information or understanding of the nature of items on the corporate agenda, they 
cannot be expected to deliver maximum effectiveness. Also, despite the will and skill 
of a non-executive, they can be considerably more or less effective depending on the 
boardroom culture. Board processes were frequently defined by directors as: “what‟s 
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on the agenda”, indicating a lack of awareness of the cultural element, and again 
underscoring the power of the chairman/CEO to form processes by composing the 
agenda.  Finally, institutional investors were found to have more power and influence 
over shaping the corporate future, and this group was essentially the most likely 
party to influence the replacement of a chairman.  
 
The Pye (2001b) paper pays due respect to the contextual factors, but gender is only 
partially considered due to the fact that female interviewees were very few in the 
sample.  The original purpose of the Pye studies was to gain a comprehensive picture 
of how a small number of individuals run large organisations. The issues of boards 
and corporate governance can fairly be said to have emerged, rather than have been 
intended.  Therefore, her paper has a rather wide perspective, touching upon many 
issues but lacking detailed consideration.  Although the paper is not very clear on this 
subject, I would assume that the level of analysis is about the board as a whole and 
on the collective behaviour of board members, rather than individual behaviour.     
 
Another publication with substantial relevance to my research is Demb and 
Neubauer‟s book on the paradoxes of boards‟ roles and expectations.  Demb & 
Neubauer (1992) interviewed 71 directors from 11 boards in eight different 
countries.  Their study focuses mainly on the role of the board, the division of 
responsibility between the board and management, the different perspectives of 
executives and non-executives, the board as a working group and assessment of 
performance.  After defining the role of the board, Demb and Neubauer (1992) go on 
to discuss the division of responsibility between the board and management and 
largely conclude that power balance results from personal influences, involvement in 
strategy, participation in CEO and management selection and exertion of control.  
The issue of involvement and attachment is widely discussed, as well as the value of 
having both in-depth knowledge and a broad perspective.  These perspectives were 
considered to be reasonably well balanced by combining the in-depth knowledge and 
attachment of the executive directors, with the broad perspective and detachment of 
non-executives.  The study examines the characteristics of the board as a working 
 198 
group in some detail. Boards were found to function best when they had relatively 
frequent meetings, informal interactions driven by an effective agenda, broadly based 
membership, good access to information and people, and a chairman and/or CEO 
who valued board members‟ input.   
 
The study is quite extensive and provides valuable insight into the paradoxical roles 
and responsibilities of corporate boards.  Although some attention is given to the 
input of the individual director, the focus is mainly on the board as a whole and 
board members‟ collective behaviour creating board effectiveness rather than 
individual effectiveness.  The study does not in particular examine board member 
interactions or influencing tactics.  Finally the study does not look at individual 
characteristics of directors and how these influence their perception or interpretation 
of their roles. 
9.4.3. Gendered board dynamics and female director contributions 
Two papers were found to be particularly relevant due to the fact that they focus on 
female directors and gendered board dynamics.  The shortcoming of both papers is, 
however, the fact that they look at gendered dynamics only from the female board 
members‟ perspective.  
 
A recent study by Huse & Solberg (2006), examined gender-related board dynamics, 
and looked in particular at how women can make a contribution on the board and act 
as role models.  The main purpose of the paper could be summarised as 
understanding boardroom dynamics through a gendered lens.  The study relied on 
narrative board/life stories of eight Scandinavian women with significant board 
experience.  The main areas explored were the background and experience of these 
women, and their advice to other women.   
 
The data were analysed and grouped into 28 themes and ten main findings were 
reported.  These ten findings were grouped into four themes; power inside and 
outside the boardroom, the board decision making process, the women directors and 
 199 
advice to other women. The first two findings were related to power inside and 
outside the boardroom, indicating that decision making on the board was, to a great 
extent, considered a power game and that decision making was influenced through 
alliance building. Three additional findings were related to the board‟s decision 
making process.  Women were found to emphasise preparation and stress the 
importance of doing their homework, while they considered male board members in 
general to do less than an acceptable job. Second, the women reported on lower 
levels of admittance to decision making arenas, lowering their levels of participation 
in decision making on the board.  In addition the women reported on the importance 
of the role of the chairperson in influencing decisions, and the key role the 
chairperson played in facilitating or muting board member contributions.  In terms of 
women directors, two findings were reported.  Signalling and tokenism were 
considered to be somewhat of an advantage in terms of getting a boardroom seat, but 
at the same time they were considered to put additional pressure on the female board 
member who reported experiencing barriers to influence and a constant pressure of 
having to prove themselves to be competent.  The women were also found to 
contribute to the board atmosphere, making it more friendly and open, particularly by 
being unafraid to ask questions.  One finding concerned male and female interaction 
and indicated that male/female attraction existed in the boardroom.  Finally two 
findings were related to advice to other women, first that board participation 
provided an enjoyable learning experience and second that visibility was a key factor 
for being appointed to a board.   
 
As indicated in the introduction of the Huse and Solberg article, it is an attempt to 
open the black box of actual board performance.  It looks at female board members‟ 
experiences from a wide perspective and, as can be expected, several issues emerge.  
In my opinion, the main weakness of the paper is that it lacks the focus and depth to 
cast light on, and provide understanding of, the many issues upon which it touches.  
In addition the study relies on a very small sample of interviewees.  Although one of 
the main themes of the study is the contribution of female board members, it falls 
short of examining influencing tactics and ways to ensure that their voice is heard, as 
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they hold, in most cases, a minority status.  Furthermore, no attempt is made to relate 
the experiences of women to the roles and responsibilities they have as board 
members.  Finally, the study relies on self reporting of female board members, but 
lacks the perspective of male board members. 
 
Zelechowski & Bilimoria (2003) interviewed six female inside directors on the 
boards of Fortune 1000 firms.  The aim was to seek out their own descriptions of 
their work and the circumstances enabling or inhibiting their success and 
contribution.  The interviews centred on examples and stories about their selection, 
socialisation, contributions, experiences, successes, mistakes, social activities 
mentoring and future careers.  
The authors synthesised their findings into the two interweaving themes of influence 
and inclusion.  In order to have a voice and contribute on the board, the female inside 
directors needed to have influence at an individual level and be included on the board 
level.  In terms of influence, the women reported on playing roles in various board 
decision making processes. They were found to mainly credit their influence to their 
own talents and performance and used good preparation and relationship building as 
their main influencing strategies.  In terms of inclusion, the main themes were 
support of their peers and being accepted as part of the group, the level of exclusion 
from decision making arenas, and the type of advice they received from their peers, 
which was found to be both positive career advice, and negative comments about 
changing themselves.   
 
The findings of the study are very well articulated and have practical implications 
both for female inside directors who must take actions to create allies and resource 
opportunities, as well as for corporations that must take responsibility to create a 
culture that can best utilise the contributions of female inside directors.  The main 
limitation of this study is the limited sample size, and the fact that it deals with inside 
directors as opposed to non-executive directors who are the main focus of the study.  
However, some of the questions set forth at the end of the paper can serve as a useful 
foundation on which to build. These are: “What characterizes the two dimensions of 
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influence and inclusion for women at the top of corporations?  Are women 
executives and directors who exercise high influence and who operate in highly 
inclusive corporate cultures more likely to be effective than other women at the top 
of organisation?  Are influential women in inclusive cultures more successful than 
others?  How do women who operate in less inclusive cultures adjust their influence 
attempts to be effective? ”  Like the Huse & Solberg (2006) paper, the Zelechowski 
& Bilimoria (2003) paper relies only on female directors‟ reports of effectiveness. 
My study, however, aims to look at the individual effectiveness of both male and 
female non-executives in search of gender similarities and contrasts in the 
experiences of their board roles.  
9.4.4. The effect of social capital on board conduct and individual influence 
Although it can be argued that collective social capital exists, social capital is very 
much an individual asset and, unlike tangible assets, cannot be transferred from one 
individual to another.  Therefore, studies on social capital, and its effect on board 
dynamics and board member influence, offer significant inputs to my study.  Two 
papers from this field were found to have relevance for my research. 
 
An additional paper to the Pye studies already mentioned focuses on the effect of 
internal and external relationships and network ties of board members Pye (2004).  
As in her earlier papers (Pye, 2000, 2001a, 2001b, 2002), Pye (2004) focuses on the 
importance of context and time for understanding board behaviour, but looks in 
particular at relationships and interactions of board members, amongst each other 
and with the external environment.  Three analytical themes were explored: the 
relationship between the chairman and chief executive, the apparent tightening of 
networks of power and influence among board memberships, and consolidation 
between board members and institutional investors.  The culture and workings of a 
board were found to be largely determined by the nature of the chairman/CEO 
relationship.  Looking at how boards had developed over time, there seemed to be a 
substantial increase in shared board memberships and board interlocks. Reputation 
and connections play a significant part in being selected for a board, and the fact that 
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somebody has been appointed to a board of a significant company increases the 
likelihood of being appointed to another.  Finally, Pye discusses the increasing 
importance of external connection and the increasing efforts of chairmen, chief 
executives and board members to ensure that appropriate messages are being 
communicated to, and understood by, those who had an interest in the companies‟ 
share value and potential. 
 
Although the studies by Pye are quite extensive and offer rich data which allows for 
comparing and contrasting over a period of more than ten years, its purpose and 
perspective is quite wide.  This particular paper, Pye (2004), is no exception.  It 
focuses on the general effects of interrelations and social capital on the board‟s 
working and its context, but does not examine the effects of individual social capital 
or lack thereof.  Furthermore, since it does not examine social capital at an individual 
level, aspects such as attitudes, and individual characteristics such as gender are 
neglected.  
 
A quantitative study by Westphal & Milton (2000) has minority status as its main 
focal point.  It examines the effect of social barriers due to different demographic 
profiles and whether these could be diminished or avoided through prior experience 
or social capital.  The study tests three main hypotheses; the first two test the effect 
of a director‟s prior experience while the third examines the effect of a board 
member‟s social ties.  The first hypothesis examines whether a minority director‟s 
prior experience in a minority role has a positive effect on relationships on the focal 
board and influence over decision making, and whether a minority director‟s prior 
experience in being one of a majority elsewhere has a negative effect on relationships 
and influence on the focal board.  The second looks at whether a majority director‟s 
experience in minority roles on other boards has positive effects on relationships and 
the influence of minority directors on a focal board.  The third examines whether 
common membership of minority and majority directors on other boards, and third 
party relationships between those players, has positive effects on relationships and 
influence on the focal board.  In general, the three hypotheses were supported, 
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indicating that prior experience and social capital did indeed reduce barriers that 
could be attributed to different demographic profiles.   
 
The authors defined demographic differences in five dimensions: functional 
background, industry background, educational background, race and gender.  The 
authors reasoned that the first three could indicate underlying differences in 
expertise, attitudes and beliefs, while gender and racial differences would mainly 
lead to barriers due to group categorisation and potential for intergroup bias.  
 
Westphal & Milton (2000) conducted a survey study on a sample of 1,312 board 
members of companies in the Forbes 500 index of industrial and service firms.  They 
collected 526 usable responses.  Their analysis was based on measuring a focal 
director‟s prior experience in a minority role on other boards, and common board 
memberships between the focal director and other majority directors, as the 
independent variables. 
 
Although the Westphal and Milton study provides evidence for the positive effects of 
experience and social ties on minority directors‟ relationships and input on a focal 
board, it does have some limitations.  First, as it is quantitatively based, it relies on 
proxies determining actual behaviour, and does not assess specific director influence 
tactics.  
Furthermore, it has the minority status of board members as a main focal point, 
whereas my study aims to focus on role and gender but not minority status per se.  
However, the Westphal and Milton study illuminates an important aspect, that of the 
significance of experience and social capital in having a voice in the boardroom.  
Finally, their assumption that male and female attitudes and values do not differ is, in 
my opinion, a limitation.  In contrast, my study will examine how gender-related 
attitudes and values affect interpretation of board roles.     
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9.4.5. Framing the empirical study 
In the concluding chapter of my systematic review, I put forward the following 
research question: 
 
How do non-executive board members make sense of/interpret their roles and 
contribution as individuals, and is there a gendered effect? 
 
After conducting a critical review of the key papers informing the research question, 
my focus has sharpened further, but the research question is mainly the same, except 
I have chosen to add the dimension of social capital. 
 
The research question now reads: 
 
How do non-executive board members make sense of/interpret their roles and 
contribution as individuals and to what extent is it gendered and/or affected by 
social capital? 
 
The study will thus focus on examining role experience and role interpretation 
including the process of accountability.  Accountability, according to Roberts et al., 
(2005), emerged from their interviews on role experience as the key activator for the 
support and monitoring functions that are realised by the behaviours of board 
members and interactions between them.   
 
While the main focus of the study will be on individual role interpretation and 
experience, taking into account the impact of gender and social capital, awareness of 
other individual characteristic such as personalities, attitudes and values will be 
maintained.  
 
 
 205 
10. Conclusions 
 
While research on boards is a relatively young field, research on board processes is 
still in its infancy.  The field is substantially fragmented and there is significant need 
for a stronger theoretical positioning.  Studying board processes and dynamics calls 
for a multilevel approach to complex and intertwined factors such as relationships, 
trust, and even feelings and emotions.  Dealing with such levels of complexity will 
make significant demands on researchers both in terms of methodological 
approaches and theoretical positioning.  
 
10.1. Learning and personal reflection.  
Doing a systematic literature review can be considered quite a task.  Initially, when 
you are not familiar with the work process it does feel rather overwhelming.  Once 
the initial phases were overcome, and gradually realising what it is that needs to be 
done and in what way, the process became clearer, but also appeared to me as the 
“only” sensible way to embark upon the task of mapping out the relevant literature.  
The process does give one a sense of security that the field has been well covered 
and no important areas omitted.  Using ProCite as a tool to record the process and 
findings was also extremely helpful.  
 
The problems an inexperienced researcher inevitably runs into are dealing with the 
narrowing of scope, accepting that trying to grasp everything at once is not only 
close to impossible but also highly inadvisable from a utility perspective.  For this 
reason the mistake of putting forward two research questions for the same review 
was made.  Another mistake made in the process was selecting too many papers from 
the review of titles and abstracts, in the faith that it would be better to include more 
articles “for the sake of security”.  Evidently these “better safe than sorry” articles 
were excluded in the full paper reviews, but resulted in higher costs in terms of time 
and effort.   
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Looking back on the process, although far from being easy, it was generally an 
enjoyable one, particularly since it gave me not only valuable practice in a rigorous 
process, but also proved to be a key into opening up the literature on board processes 
from a different perspective.  I do feel that I have grasped the content of the bulk of 
the literature done in the past decades and feel confident that I have defined a gap in 
knowledge to be filled with empirical research. 
 
10.2. Limitations 
Although the procedure followed in conducting this review is quite rigorous it is far 
from being flawless.  As already stated the review did, in general, not include 
reports, working papers or conference proceedings, and only a limited number of 
books were consulted.  Considering the fact that this field is quite new and research 
has been picking up at a fast pace, there is a high likelihood that more recent, but 
nonetheless relevant, papers are still work in progress or in press.  The process could 
have been improved by going through the reference list of the papers identified 
through cross referencing.  This was not done, primarily due to time constraint 
reasons, but also because it was felt that this would add a limited amount of new 
papers.  Finally, although titles, abstracts and full papers were assessed according to 
predetermined selection criteria, there is always a certain level of subjectivity and 
researcher bias involved in the selection process. 
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Appendix 1 – Key findings of empirical papers 
  Author(s) Title 
Method of 
data 
collection Sample Key findings 
1 Aldefer, 1986 
The invisible director on 
corporate boards Interviews 
41 CEOs and 
outside 
directors 
The board was found to be a group with dynamics and patterns that affect 
the behaviours of the board and its members, unfortunately board 
members tend to see themselves as individuals rather than as a group. 
2 
Aram & Cowen, 
1986 
The directors' role in planning: 
What information do they 
need? 
Interviews / 
case studies 3 companies 
Examines the roles of boards which are considered to practice board-
management relationships that resulted in creating and maintaining 
shareholder value.  The involvement of boards in strategic planning, 
management control and executive compensation were examined.  The 
success in value creation were attributed to the general conditions of 
having skilled people with adequate information and a clear understanding 
of their role, the specific condition commitment and effort of the directors, 
including time dedicated to the task, the nature of the board agenda and 
the systems for delivering information that can lead to effective decision 
making. 
3 
Bilimoria & Huse, 
1997 
The qualitative comparison of 
the boardroom experiences of 
US and Norwegian women 
corporate directors Interviews 
4 female 
directors 
The female directors reported on adding a different perspective to the 
boardroom and contributing to a comfortable but confronting atmosphere. 
Norwegian women tended to have a more feminist perspective while the 
US women talked about the importance of fitting in.  
4 Boulton, 1987 
The evolving board: A look at 
the board's role and 
information needs 
Interviews and 
case studies 
45 chief 
executives 
and 7 boards 
Boards were found to develop from a legitimising stage, through an 
auditing stage to a directing stage.  As the role develops the complexity 
and need for information increases.   
5 
Bradshaw & Wicks, 
2000 
The experiences of white 
women on corporate boards in 
Canada; Compliance and non-
compliance to hegemonic 
masculinity Interviews 
20 female 
board 
members 
Female board members were found first to experience and then to comply 
with or resist hegemonic masculinity on the board. 
6 
Buchholtz, Amason, 
Rutherford, 2005 
The impact of board 
monitoring and involvement on 
top management team 
affective conflict Surveys 
142 CEOs 
and top 
managers 
from 44 firms 
Affective conflict amongst the members of the board and the management 
team is lower when the board practices high levels of monitoring activities.  
As involvement of board increases so does affective conflict. 
7 
Demb & Neubauer, 
1992a 
The corporate board - 
confronting the paradoxes Interviews 
71 directors of    
11 boards 
Detects the similarities in board issues across countries and cultures. 
Deals with the paradoxes of boards of practising effective control without 
diminishing motivations of managers, and with the paradox of commitment 
and depth versus detachment and breadth. 
8 
Demb & Neubauer, 
1992b 
The corporate board - 
confronting the paradoxes Interviews 
71 directors of    
11 boards 
Detects the similarities in board issues across countries and cultures. 
Deals with the paradoxes of boards of practising effective control without 
diminishing motivations of managers, and with the paradox of commitment 
and depth versus detachment and breadth. 
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  Author(s) Title 
Method of 
data 
collection Sample Key findings 
9 
Finkelstein & 
Mooney, 2003 
Not the usual suspects: how to 
use board processes to make 
boards better Interviews 32 directors 
The authors identify five factors crucial for board effectiveness: Engage in 
constructive conflict, avoid destructive conflict, and work together as a team. 
know the appropriate level of strategic involvement and address decisions 
comprehensively.  Gives recommendations for procedures to increase the 
likelihood of these factors materialising.  Identifies four procedures for board 
effectiveness; selecting, structuring, staging and steering. 
10 
Freid, Burton & 
Hisrich, 1998 
Strategy and the board of 
directors in venture capital-
backed firms Surveys 
68 venture 
capital firms 
Directors in venture capital backed companies are more involved in strategy 
formulation and evolution than boards where members do not have large 
ownership stakes. 
11 
Gabrielson & 
Winlund, 2000 
 Board working style and task 
performance Surveys 422 CEOs 
Preparation and commitment, directors’ independence and degree of formal 
routines were related positively with both the control and service role, 
whereas use of knowledge and skills was only related to the service role and 
no relationship was found between formal evaluation procedures or 
frequency of meetings with task performance.  Concluded that a clearly 
defined working style in the board enhances task performance.  
12 Henke, 1986 
Involving the board of directors 
in strategic planning Surveys 234 chairmen 
Boards are active in influencing decisions of numerous strategy related 
issues. However, the boards did not seem to recognise their relatively high 
level of involvement in strategy decision making.   
13 Hill, 1995 
The social organization of 
boards of directors Interviews 42 directors 
Looks at how boards work as social institutions, examines the role, relative 
power, boardroom consensus and relationship with investors.  Finds there to 
be great emphasis on boardroom collaboration and consensus. 
14 
Hoogheimstra & Van 
Manen 
Supervisory directors and 
ethical dilemmas: Exit or voice? 
Telephone 
interviews & 
surveys 
43 / 220 
directors 
Discusses non-executives "exit or voice" options in cases of ethical 
dilemmas.  Directors were found not to be reluctant to resign.  How ever 
directors are more inclined to stay and try to voice their concerns in the 
cases of ethical dilemmas, resignation would only follow unsuccessful 
attempts of reconciliation.  Directors preferred that resignations would be 
conducted rather discreetly in order to avoid negative public attention. 
15 
Huse & Solberg, 
2006 
Gender related boardroom 
dynamics Interviews 
20 female 
directors 
Women director's contribution to boards was highly dependent on their 
ability and willingness to make alliances with the most influential actors, and 
that their level of contribution could be enhanced with high levels of 
preparation and by asking critical questions during board meetings. 
16 Huse, 1998 
Researching the dynamics of 
the board stakeholder relations 
Ethnographic 
case studies 3 companies 
Ethnographic study of three boards. Their role was found to be highly 
contingent on the circumstances the companies were in.  Issues of trust, 
time availability and paying attention to relationships in the boardroom were 
highlighted by the author. 
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  Author(s) Title 
Method of data 
collection Sample Key findings 
17 
Ingley & van der Walt, 
2002 
Board dynamics and the politics 
of appraisal 
Seminar 
discussions na 
Explores the value of the assessment of boards and individual board members.  
Why board reviews should happen, what inhibits the process and what facilitates 
it, and how reviews can work.  Seminar discussion with directors revealed that 
board members were most uncomfortable with the accuracy and meaningfulness 
of appraisals, and the effect of the process on boardroom cohesion and 
dynamics.  Some confusion with regard to the purpose of evaluation and the 
relationship of the reviews with compliance and organisational performance.  
Simplistic approaches were considered meaningless and the nature of the 
process as important as the outcome. 
18 
Jonnergard, 
Karreman, & 
Svensson, 2004 
The impact of changes in the 
corporate governance system on 
the boards of directors: 
Experiences from Swedish listed 
companies 
Two surveys 
with a 5 year 
interval 
461 / 345 
directors 
Examines the effect of change in the national pattern of corporate governance on 
board activities and attitudes.  Finds that the pattern of corporate governance in 
Sweden has shifted towards more external constraints and that boards’ activities 
have shifted more towards decision management, added a substantial amount of 
activities to their agenda and shifted their focus more towards a financial 
orientation. However the values and attitudes of directors appeared to be more 
stable over time.  
19 Jonsson, 2005 
The role model of the board: A 
preliminary study of the roles of 
Icelandic boards 
Surveys and 
follow up 
interviews 11 directors 
The author proposes four main board roles from the literature; rubber stamp, 
watch dog, advisor and pilot.  Directors of eleven Icelandic companies are 
surveyed on the role of the board they serve on and how this role has evolved 
during the past years.  Different boards were found to assume various roles; they 
could assume a single role or a mixture of roles.  Roles were found to change 
over time.   
20 
Judge & Zeithaml, 
1992 
Institutional and strategic choice 
perspectives on board 
involvement in the strategic 
decisions 
Interviews and 
archival data 
114 board 
members 
Organisational age was positively related to boards’ strategic involvement, 
whereas its level of diversification was negatively associated with board 
involvement, which is consistent with the industry perspective.  The board size 
and its level of insiders were found to be negatively related to board involvement, 
offering support to the strategic choice perspective. Finally board involvement 
was found to be positively related to financial performance.   
21 
Kakabadse, 
Kakabadse & Barratt, 
2006 
Chairman and chief executive 
officer (CEO): That sacred and 
secret relationship 
Interviews and 
observations 
26 board 
members 
The paper examines the chairman/CEO relationship through in-depth interviews 
with NEDs, CEOs and chairmen.  Chairmen were found to contribute to the board 
by being a platform for participation, determining role delineation and by affecting 
boardroom dynamics.  The study further examined the Chairman/CEO 
relationship, the impact on board effectiveness and the attributes of an effective 
chairman.   
22 
Lawler & Finegold, 
2006 
Who's in the boardroom and does 
it matter: the impact of having 
non-director executives attend 
board meetings Surveys 
200 board 
members 
Explores the positive impact of having non-director executives attend board 
meetings.  Recent reforms have advocated the increased proportions of outside 
directors, therefore the proportion of inside directors has diminished, and this has 
resulted in poorer access to company inside information.  The paper 
demonstrates the positive effects of having non-directors attend board meetings.  
Higher attendance was found to positively affect board communication and 
monitoring process, communications, board independence as well as 
performance management, board evaluations and board effectiveness. 
 210 
  
 211 
 
 
  Author(s) Title 
Method of data 
collection Sample Key findings 
23 
Leblanc & Gilles, 
2005 Inside the boardroom 
Interviews & 
observation 
200 directors /    
39 boards 
Individual characteristics affect the board dynamics; the authors define four types 
of functional directors and four types of dysfunctional directors. The composition 
of types has to be in line with the context of the corporation. 
24 
Lorsch & MacIver, 
1989 
Pawns or potentates: The reality 
of America's corporate boards 
Interviews / 
surveys 
100 directors, 
CEOs and 
corporate 
officers /900 
outside 
directors 
Directors largely passive except in situations of crisis.  Directors need to be more 
involved at normal times in order to serve as crisis preventers. 
25 Mace, 1971 Directors: Myth and reality 
In-depth 
interviews and 
seminar 
discussions 
75 directors /        
200 seminar 
participants 
Finds the board’s role to be; a provider of advice and counsel, to serve as some 
sort of discipline, and to act in crisis situations. The board did not have primary 
influence nor did it establish the basic objectives, corporate strategies or policies 
of the company.   
26 Marshall, 1995 
Working at senior management 
and board levels: Some of the 
issues for women Interviews 
12 former 
women 
managers 
Women that had reached the upper levels reported feeling as  constantly being 
tested out and as if they had interrupted the “normal life” of the senior men who 
had no willingness to develop a culture in which women could be included more 
equally. 
27 McGregor, 2003 
Girl power: double jeopardy or 
diversity in action behind 
boardroom doors in New 
Zealand? Interviews 
6 female 
directors 
Gives insight into what attitudes and styles younger women bring into the 
boardroom.  In the view of 3 younger and 3 older female board members the 
younger women bring an informal attitude, they bring creativity and a new  way of 
thinking and they tend to emphasise outcome rather than rituals.  
28 
McNulty & Pettigrew, 
1999 Strategists on the board Interviews 108 directors 
Examines the effect of non-executives on strategy.  Findings indicate that non-
executives rarely initiate strategy, but see their responsibility as making sure that 
there is a strategy in place and encourage its formulation.  Non-executives were 
found to participate to a higher extent than indicated in older studies, challenging 
the managerial hegemony theory.   The fact that boards rarely oppose 
management ideas was not associated to rubber stamping activities, rather that 
the board was working effectively as a sounding board; to test ideas and question 
assumption, advice and provide encouragement. 
29 Mellahi, 2005 
The dynamics of boards of 
directors in falling organizations Case study 1 company 
Examines the case of an Australian insurance company in a failing process.  
Directors were found to be detached, aloof and lacking information in the 
conception stages of the crisis, the board puts all its trust and confidence in 
management and demonstrate a high level of group think.  When warning signals 
start emerging the board does not pay attention and continues to have faith in 
management.  When the heading for failure becomes evident two directors try to 
raise their concerns but are ignored by the CEO and chairman.  Eventually part of 
the board is replaced in order to increase the power of the board, but actions 
come too late and the board is in fact paralysed.   
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  Author(s) Title 
Method of data 
collection Sample Key findings 
30 
Nadler, Behan & 
Nadler, 2006 Building better boards Interviews 
 50 directors, 
CEOs, 
chairmen, 
academics and 
CG experts 
The involvement of the board has been increasing, the role of the chairman/CEO is 
powerful in terms of controlling the agenda and creating the board atmosphere.  
Higher levels of involvement lead to better outcomes.  The amount and nature of 
information has a lot to do with how much board members can participate.    
31 Parker, 1990 
The company chairman: His roles 
and responsibilities Interviews 15 chairmen 
The changes in the business environment will call for different emphasis on the 
role of the chairman.  The essential role of the chairman is to make tomorrow's 
company out of today's. 
32 
Pettigrew & McNulty, 
1995 
Power and influence in and 
around the boardroom Interviews 20 directors 
Identifies minimalist and maximalist boards according to the level of activities of 
the non-executive directors.  Board activity was found to peak in times of 
organisational crisis.  Negative influence was easier to exercise than positive 
influence which was rather seen as non-executive intervention.   
33 
Pettigrew & McNulty, 
1998 
Sources and uses of power in the 
boardroom Interviews 12 directors 
Examines the critical incidence of the dismissal of the chairman of two companies.  
Examines the process of shift in power from the chairman to the non-executives 
and the leadership of the coup. 
34 Pye, 2000 
Changing scenes in, from and 
outside the boardroom: UK 
corporate governance in practice 
from 1989 to1999 Interviews 62 directors 
Examines the way directors talk about and explain "how to run a large 
organisation".  Their sense making was found to be quite different in 1999 as 
opposed to 1987.  The phrases; strategic focus, shareholder value and corporate 
governance were used by most directors in 1999, whereas those phrases were 
largely non-existent a decade earlier.  Also discusses the methodological 
implication of replications of organisational studies.  
35 Pye, 2001b 
Corporate boards, investors and 
their relationships: Accounts of 
accountability and corporate 
governing in action Interviews 
62 interviews in 
10 
organisations, 
repeated over a 
10 year interval 
The paper finds contemporary boards to be smaller, younger, better paid, with 
faster executive turnover and more non-executive directors. Although the role of 
the NED has changed it still has the main two components of calling upon the 
accountability of management and safeguarding the interests of shareholders, as 
well as being expected to take part in strategic decision making.  Directors were 
found to describe the expectations towards their performance as contextual, 
indicating that there is a different culture amongst different kinds of boards, in 
many cases driven by the chairman.  Institutional investors were found to have 
more power and influence over shaping corporate future. 
36 Pye, 2002 
The changing power of 
"explanations". Directors, 
academia and their sense making 
from 1989 to 2000 Interviews 
62 interviews in 
10 
organisations, 
repeated over a 
10 year interval 
Sense making offers the most appropriate perspective by which to appreciate 
changing explanations of effective management. 
37 Pye, 2004 
The importance of context and 
time for understanding board 
behaviour: Some lessons from 
social capital research Interviews 
62 interviews in 
10 
organisations, 
repeated over a 
10 year interval 
Effects of external relationships on the internal working of the board were both 
complex and wide ranging. External relations are factors of social capital, and as 
such they clearly help individuals gain board appointments, however stronger 
relations also tend to be related to lower levels of independence and thus can at 
the same time be an obstacle. 
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  Author(s) Title 
Method of data 
collection Sample Key findings 
38 Roberts & Stiles, 1999 
The relationship between 
chairmen and chief executives: 
Competitive or complementary 
roles? Interviews 
30 chairmen / 
chief executive 
dyads 
The benefit of separating the roles of chairman/CEO was found to be highly 
dependent on the process and nature of the relationship establishment between 
the chairman and CEO. 
39 Roberts, 2002 
Building the complementary 
board. The work of the plc 
chairman Interviews 
35 chairmen, 
chief executives 
and non-
executives 
Suggest that it is important that chairman and non-executives are clear about their 
non-executive role, openness and trust should be fostered in order to minimize the 
chance of executive suspicion towards the motives of the non-executives.  The 
chairman should emphasise gaining knowledge and insight into the business and 
encourage the non-executives to do the same and finally the chairman should 
make sure that complementary skills and knowledge are brought skilfully together 
and managed in order to create value. 
40 
Roberts, McNulty & 
Stiles, 2005 
Beyond agency conceptions of 
the work of the non-executive 
director: Creating accountability in 
the boardroom Interviews 40 directors 
Non-executive directors needed a certain level of attachment and particularly 
accountability towards executives in order to be of value both in the contribution 
and monitoring roles of the board.  Non-executives delivered, according to their 
findings, most value when they were engaged but non-executive, challenging but 
supportive and independent but yet involved.  
41 
Rosenstein, Bruno & 
Bygrave, 1993 
The CEO, venture capitalists, and 
the board 
Survey  
telephone 
interviews 162 / 98 CEOs 
Boards of venture capital backed high tech firms were found to have smaller 
boards, 82% with 40% or less outsider representation, and venture capitalists 
made up 40% of 55% of the boards. The CEO's found outside directors to be most 
useful were; as sounding boards, interfacing with the investor group, monitoring 
operating performance, monitoring financial performance, and recruiting and 
replacing the CEO.  Help was rated higher for early stage than later stage 
companies.  Venture capital board members were not seen to provide any better 
value than any other outside member.  More value added was attributed to venture 
capital members from the top 20 vac firms. 
42 Sheridan, 2001 
A view from the top: women on 
the boards of public companies Surveys 
46 female 
directors and 
executives 
Mainly focuses on advancement strategies, briefly talks about board experiences 
indicating that male CEOs and board members were to some extent uncomfortable 
with females on the board. 
43 Siciliano, 2005 
Board involvement in strategy and 
organisational performance Surveys 
275 CEOs and 
179 board 
members 
Examines the level of boards strategy involvement. Participation by boards was at 
mid-range level, directors reported higher involvement in strategy than did CEOs. 
Strategy involvement and financial performance were found to be positively linked.  
44 Spira & Bender, 2004 
Compare and contrast; 
perspectives on board committees Interviews 
5 non-
executives 
Compares and contrasts the tasks of the auditing and remuneration committees.  
These two committees can be seen as having a conflicting role; the audit 
committee being largely of conformance nature while the remuneration being of 
performance nature.  The findings of the researchers indicated that although 
membership of each committee makes different demands and requires a slightly 
different focus, the tasks are not as irreconcilable as has been suggested, and do 
depend on different individual behaviours and relationships. 
45 Stewart, 1991 
Chairmen and chief executives: 
an exploration of their relationship 
Series of 
interviews over a 
2 year period 
20 NHS district 
general 
managers and 
29 chairmen 
Five different roles adopted by chairmen were distinguished.  The partner role 
where each player complemented the other was found to be the most common 
one.  The study found the chairman and manager role to be very dependent upon 
on another and to occupy overlapping domains, resulting in what each party can 
do is very dependent upon the behaviour of the other.   
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  Author(s) Title 
Method of data 
collection Sample Key findings 
46 Stiles, 2001 
The impact of the board on 
strategy 
Interviews, 
surveys, case 
studies 
51 directors, 
212 company 
secretaries, 4 
companies 
Five different roles adopted by chairmen were distinguished.  The partner role 
where each player complemented the other was found to be the most common 
one.  The study found the chairman and manager role to be very dependant upon 
on another and to occupy overlapping domains, resulting in what each party can 
do is very dependant upon the behaviour of the other.   
47 
Westphal & Milton, 
2000 
How experience and network ties 
affect the influence of 
demographic minorities on 
corporate boards 
Surveys and 
archival data 526 directors 
Prior experience of minority directors in a minority role on other boards can 
enhance their ability to exert influence on the focal board, while the prior 
experience of minority directors in a majority role can reduce their influence.  Prior 
experience of majority directors in a minority role on other boards can enhance the 
influence of minority directors on the focal board.  Finally minority directors are 
more influential if they have direct or indirect social network ties to majority 
directors. 
48 Westphal, 1998 
Board games: How CEOs adapt 
to increases in structural board 
independence from management 
Surveys and 
archival data 221 directors 
Changes in board structure that increase the board's independence from 
management were associated with higher levels of CEO integration and 
persuasion behaviour toward board members and such behaviours served to 
offset the effect of increased structural board independence on corporate strategy 
and compensation policy.    
49 Westphal, 1999 
Collaboration in the boardroom: 
Behavioural and performance 
consequences of CEO-board 
social ties Surveys 
263 CEOs and 
564 directors 
Social ties between directors and CEOs were found to enhance provision of advice 
and counsel from outside directors on strategic issues. 
50 
Zelechowski & 
Bilimoria, 2003 
The experience of women 
corporate inside directors on the 
boards of Fortune 1000 firms Interviews 
6 female 
directors 
Two distinct factors to have great influence on women on boards; the influence 
factor of the individual and the inclusion factor of the board culture. 
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Appendix 2 – Overview of theoretical and methodological 
papers 
 
  
Theoretical or conceptual papers - 25
Author(s) Title
1 Bainbridge, 2002 Why a board? Group decision making in corporate governance
2 Barratt & Korac-Kakabadse, 2002
Developing reflective corporate leadership: The role of the non-
executive director
3 Bavly, 1986 What is the board of directors good for?
4 Cascio, 2004 Board governance: A social systems perspective
5 Cutting & Kouzmin, 2002 Evaluating corporate board culture and decision making
6 Forbes & Milliken, 1999
Cognition and corporate governance: Understanding boards of 
directors as strategic decision making groups
7 Goold & Campbell, 1990 Brief case: Non-executive director's role in strategy
8 Gopinath, Siciliano & Murray, 1994
Changing role of the board of directors: In search of new  strategic 
identity
9 Ingley & van der Walt, 2002 Board dynamics and the politics of appraisal
10 Johnson, 1997
The board of directors over time: Composition and the 
organizational life cycle
11 Leblanc, 2004a What's w rong w ith corporate goverancne: a note
12 Letendre, 2004 The dynamics of the boardroom
13 Lorsch, 1995 Empow ering the board
14 Mace, 1972 The president and the board of directors (HBR)
15 Mace, 1973 The president and the board of directors (McKinsey Quarterly)
16 Mizruchi, 1983
Who controls w hom? An examination of the relation betw een 
management and boards of directors in large American 
corporations
17 Nicholson & Keil, 2004 A framew ork for diagnosing board effectiveness
18 Pye & Pettigrew , 2005
Studying board context process and dynamics: Some challenges 
for the future
19 Rindova, 1999
What corporate boards have to do w ith strategy: A cognitive 
perspective
20 Schaffer, 2002
Board assessments of managerial performance: An analysis of 
attribution process
21 Smith, 1958 Put the directors to w ork!
22 Sonnenfeld, 2002 What makes great boards great
23 Strebel, 2004 The case for contingent governance
24 van der Walt & Ingley, 2003
Board dynamics and the influence of professional background, 
gender and ethnicity
25 Zahra, 1990 Increasing the board's involvement in strategy
Methodological papers - 2
Author(s) Title
1 Currall, Hammer, Baggett & Doniger, 1999
Combining qualitative and quantitative methodologies to study 
group processes: An illustrative study of corporate board of 
directors
2 Samra-Fredericks, 2000
Doing "boards-in-action" research - an ethnograpic approach to 
the capture  and analysis of directors' and senior managers' 
interactive routines
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper reports an empirical study for Project 2 of the Canfield DBA.  The study 
aims to explore the individual board members‟ interpretation of the non-executive 
role.  Building on previous studies of the non-executive role, the study adds the 
dimension of gender, by comparing and contrasting individual interpretation by male 
and female board members particularly.   Previous studies on the non-executive role 
have been criticised for eluding between the role and contribution of individual board 
members and the collective role and contribution of the entire board. Studies of 
female directors have, to a large extent, focused on women‟s board experiences and 
their roles as female directors but failed to connect female contributions to non-
executive role definitions and to look at female contributions in contrast to male 
contributions. This study aims to compensate for these factors by focusing on the 
individual level of analysis and looking at the similarities and differences of 
individual role interpretation and perceived contribution by both male and female 
board members.  
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2. Literature review 
 
Despite the interest and emphasis on corporate governance reforms in the last 
decade, surprisingly little is understood about actual board behaviour and the effect 
of individual board members on board dynamics and culture (Pettigrew, 1992; Huse, 
1998; Daily et al., 2003).  Perhaps due to limited access and focus on quantitative 
research the research tradition on boards has developed around board structures and 
effects of reforms, such as increasing the level of non-executives and separating the 
chairman and CEO roles in order for the board to fulfil its agency-based control role.  
Research has primarily relied on proxies, looking at board size, board composition 
(executives vs. non-executives), leadership structure (combined/separated 
chairman/CEO role) and, in some instances, demographics, and relating those to 
financial performance (Zahra & Pearce, 1989; Johnson et al., 1996). Studies have 
also been done on the relationship between compliance with corporate governance 
provisions and financial performance (Gompers et al., 2003; Laing & Weir, 1999), 
and relating board composition or demographics to compliance with corporate 
governance provisions (Singh & Vinnicombe, 2003).  Results have revealed largely 
inconsistent findings (Dalton et al., 1998;1999).  Great inferential leaps have been 
made from input variables such as board performance with no direct evidence on the 
processes and mechanisms which presumably link the inputs to the outputs 
(Pettigrew, 1992).  Phrases like “Board research on cross roads” (Daily et al., 2003) 
and “The coming revolution in corporate governance” (Leblanc, 2004a) are common 
in contemporary board literature.  This has called for a string of qualitative research 
focusing on what boards or board members actually do, rather than what they look 
like (e.g. Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003). 
 
Much of the research on boards of directors is centred around the role of the board, 
the context effect on the role, and the role of the non-executive directors (e.g. Mace, 
1971; Lorsch & McIver, 1989;  Zahra & Pearce, 1989; Demb & Neubauer, 1992a; 
Higgs, 2003; Roberts et al., 2005; Jonsson, 2005) .  This type of board research is 
largely rooted in board role theories such as agency theory (Fama & Jensen, 1983), 
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stewardship theory (Davis et al., 1997), stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984)  and 
resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  Although no definite 
conclusion can be drawn from research on the role of the board and its directors, it 
can be inferred that boards are becoming more active and more aware of their 
responsibilities.  A good deal about the nature of the board‟s role is becoming clearer 
and the paradoxes of being close enough to give valuable guidance and council, but 
yet distant enough to provide sound assessment and evaluation have been drawn 
attention to (e.g. Demb & Neubauer, 1992a; Roberts et al., 2005).  While early 
studies emphasised the non-executive‟s distinct roles of controlling, serving and 
advising (i.e. Pearce & Zahra, 1989), later studies have stressed the importance of 
embracing the paradox that implicitly lies in the demands of the different roles 
(Roberts et al., 2005).  It has also been claimed that boards are far from being 
insulated and static entities, but rather dynamic social makings that are affected by 
their environment and context (i.e. Jonsson, 2005; Jonnergard et al., 2004).    
 
A stream of studies has particularly focused on the strategic role of the board. 
Research on the boards‟ role in strategy has moved from arguing whether it is 
possible or even appropriate to be involved in strategy (e.g. Goold & Campbell, 
1990; Zahra, 1990) to measuring the level of strategic involvement and examining 
the nature of strategic involvement (Stiles, 2001; McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999).  The 
level of strategic involvement of the board seems to be, as with other board activities, 
increasing (Henke, 1986; McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999).  Involvement is found to lead 
to better developed, better thought out strategies which can be attributed to increased 
levels of discussion, scrutinising and questioning by the board (i.e. McNulty & 
Pettigrew, 1999; Rindova, 1999;  Siciliano, 2005).   
 
Regarding the issue of power, studies have looked at the division of power between 
the board and management and the relative power of the non-executives (Lorsch & 
McIver, 1989; Westphal, 1998; Pettigrew & McNulty, 1995; McNulty & Pettigrew 
1998), but not particularly at the relative power and influence of individual non-
executives or subgroups thereof.  Furthermore the Chairman/CEO relationship, 
 221 
including division of power, has been studied to some extent (Parker, 1990; Steward, 
1991; Roberts & Stiles, 1999; Roberts, 2000; Kakabadse et al., 2006a).   
 
A number of theoretical and conceptual papers have dealt with board dynamics and 
the board as a group involving relationships, teamwork, discussion and collective 
decision making (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Bainbridge 2002; Cutting & Kouzmin, 
2002; van der Walt & Ingley, 2003; Nicholson & Kiel, 2004).  Several attempts, 
most of them quite recent, have been made to look into the issue of board dynamics 
and group work on the board (Huse, 1998; Gabrielson & Winlund, 2000; Ingley & 
van der Walt, 2002; Buchholtz et al., 2005; Leblanc & Gilles, 2005; Lawler & 
Finegold, 2006; Nadler et al., 2006).   
 
The most notable studies in the literature on board culture and dynamics are those by 
Pye (2000, 2001a, b, 2002) that also focus on the issues of context and time with 
regard to board functions.   Pye (2000) reported that in terms of activities and 
dynamics, non-executive directors were found to have become much more influential 
in decision making whereas previously they were either allies of the chairmen or 
connected to “the right networks”, and being in contact with investors and the City 
was seen of much higher importance than before.  Pye (2001b) found non-executive 
effectiveness in many ways to be largely shaped by the board culture, and although 
the role of the non-executive directors had changed, it still had the two main 
components of calling upon the accountability of management and safeguarding the 
interests of shareholders, as well as being expected to take part in strategic decision 
making.  Directors were found to describe the expectations towards their 
performance as contextual, indicating that there is a different culture amongst 
different kinds of boards.  Effectiveness of non-executives was also defined in terms 
of their relative power established within a relationship, i.e. if they lack access to 
information or an understanding of the nature of items on the corporate agenda they 
could not be expected to deliver maximum effectiveness, and despite the will and 
skill of a non-executive they can be considerably more or less effective depending on 
the boardroom culture.    
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Westphal (1999) examined the effect of social ties between directors and CEO's on 
the level of advice and counsel on strategic issues.  Contrary to literature advocating 
board independence to increase effectiveness, Westphal (1999) found that social ties 
actually increased board involvement by encouraging collaboration between top 
managers and outside directors and therefore they enhanced the provision of advice 
and counsel from outside directors.  Westphal & Milton (2000) suggested that 
minority influence on boards could be improved if minority members had previous 
experience of being in a minority position on a board, and if they had direct or 
indirect social network ties to majority directors through common memberships, for 
example of other boards.  Pye (2004) noted that, traditionally, research has looked at 
boards as homogeneous groups that perform generic functions and that the literature 
often does not differentiate between organisational contexts or between individual 
and group behaviour.  Her findings indicate that the effects of external relationships 
on the internal working of the board were both complex and wide ranging. External 
relations are factors of social capital, and as such they clearly help individuals gain 
board appointments but are also seen as related to lower levels of independence and 
diminished credibility. The data offered evidence of powerful and tight networks of 
influence that affected board conduct and performance.  
 
Currently research on corporate governance seems to be branching off in various 
directions (Huse, 2005). Roberts et al., (2005) support the search for theoretical 
pluralism and greater understanding of board processes and dynamics.  In a 
commentary on the Roberts et al. study (2005), Pye & Pettigrew (2005) point to the 
need for strengthening the theoretical and methodological foundations of board 
process. The authors claimed that;  “lack of theoretical framework often undermines 
the impact of process studies, so we also advocate the need to develop stronger 
theoretical focus and explication about theorising, encouraging clarity of 
epistemological assumptions underpinning the research process” (Pye & Pettigrew, 
2005:S28). They furthermore stressed the importance of attention to the issues of 
context and process over time and their relationship to outcomes, and caution against 
the attempt to over generalise from qualitative data without paying due attention to 
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the issues of context and time.  In addition they stressed the importance of clarity on 
the level of focus and analysis, and being more careful in distinguishing between 
individual behaviour and effectiveness, and board behaviour and effectiveness. 
Finally they point to the fact that not only are studies of actual behaviours of boards 
and directors scarce, but the little knowledge that does exist is not as well theorised 
or as effectively cross-referenced as are agency studies.  Pye & Pettigrew (2005) call 
for a shift of focus of board studies to an alternative and well founded process 
perspective on board behaviour, rather than creating an alternative view to agency 
theory.     
 
One of the contextual factors lacking in studies of board roles is gender and whether 
role interpretation and contribution are identical or different between male and 
female board members.  In recent years interest has grown in the issue of females on 
corporate boards.  Since women on boards have to date remained few, the bulk of 
studies on women directors have to do with the numbers of women on boards of 
directors (Singh & Vinnicombe, 2006; Catalyst, 2005; Dalton & Daily, 1998; Daily 
et al., 1999) female director advancement strategies  (Catalyst, 2004b; Powell & 
Butterfield, 2003; Vinnicombe & Singh, 2003; Vinnicombe et al., 2000; Ragins et al. 
1998) and examination of the background and qualifications of female directors 
(Burgess & Tharenou, 2002; Burke, 1995, 2000; Kesner, 1988; Zelechowski & 
Bilimoria, 2003).  These studies, however, do not look at female directors in 
connection with their role as a board member. 
 
Quite a few studies have aimed at demonstrating the business case for female 
directors (Rose, 2007; Point & Singh, 2003; Bilimoria, 2000; Singh & Vinnicombe, 
2004; Carter et al., 2003; Schrader et al., 1997).  Although it can be assumed that the 
issue deals with roles and contribution, in fact these studies only attempt to link the 
number of women on boards to corporate performance or compliance to corporate 
governance procedures. A far cry from explaining a causal relationship between the 
two, so not surprisingly findings are inconsistent. 
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Moving closer to boardroom activities, a few studies have looked at the board 
experiences of female directors. Those studies have often focused on how female 
directors get along in the largely male dominated world of boards. Marshall (1995), 
although not looking at female directors in particular, gives a valuable insight into 
the socialisation aspects of women in a largely male dominated business world. 
Women who had reached the upper levels reported feeling as constantly being tested 
out and as if they had interrupted the “normal life” of the senior men who had no 
willingness to develop a culture in which women could be included more equally. 
Sheridan (2001) who surveyed 46 female directors serving on Australian boards, 
elaborated on female board experiences which the women found to be generally 
positive, but also indicated that male CEOs and board members were to some extent 
uncomfortable with females on the board.   
 
Moving even closer, to looking at input and contribution, Burke (1997) reported that, 
although women directors felt they were in general making little impact on female 
issues,  they did believe their contribution was mostly towards making female 
employees feel more positive about working for the company, a view seconded by 
Bilimoria (2007) who found that the number of women on boards had a positive 
effect on women in managerial positions.  An earlier study by Burke showed that 
female directors had little impact on top level women, with the exception of possibly 
acting as role models (Burke, 1994a).  Women have reported seeing issues of equal 
opportunity, balancing work/family needs, social responsibility issues, environmental 
issues and issues of female customers as important and appropriate for boards to 
address; however, they were not likely to draw attention to those issues (Burke, 
1994; McGregor et al., 1997).  Female board members have been associated with 
being more philanthropically driven (Ibrahim & Angelidis, 1994), advocating CSR 
activities  (Kakabadse et al., 2006b) and a positive relationship has been found 
between the number of women and minority directors and the level of charitable 
contributions made by companies (Wang & Coffey, 1992). 
 
 225 
Bilimoria & Huse‟s (1997) study of two American and two Norwegian female 
directors, and their board experiences, revealed their common perception of adding, 
as females, a new, more diverse perspective to the boardroom, focusing on women‟s 
and other soft issues and being an inspiration to other women in the company.  They 
also indicated putting in an effort to enhance board effectiveness by facilitating a 
comfortable atmosphere while not being afraid to ask difficult and probing questions 
(Bilimoria & Huse, 1997).  
 
Bradshaw & Wicks (2000) explored how women directors tended to first experience 
and then comply with or resist hegemonic masculinity. Their findings indicated that 
these women had generally reached their position through hard work and 
assimilating male behaviours.  They perceived themselves primarily as caretakers of 
shareholders‟ interest and were unlikely to see themselves as, or act as, change 
agents, but highlighted the importance of fitting in and not rocking the boat. Thus 
they were much more likely to comply with the masculine hegemony than to resist it. 
Some authors (e.g. Rose, 2007) have attributed the lack of correlation between the 
number of women on boards and financial performance to masculine socialisation of 
high ranking women, resulting in identical male and female behaviour.   
 
McGregor (2003) compared the experiences of older and younger women in New 
Zealand boardrooms. The paper gives insight into what attitudes and styles younger 
women bring into the boardroom.  The younger women were found to bring a more 
informal attitude as well as creativity and new ways of thinking, emphasising 
outcomes rather than rituals. 
 
Zelechowski & Bilimoria (2003) looked at the experiences of women corporate 
inside directors of Fortune 1000 companies. They found two distinct factors to have 
a great influence on women on boards; the influence factor of the individual and the 
inclusion factor of the board culture.  The study demonstrated that despite being in 
the highest position, and despite being highly influential, women directors could not 
attain full effectiveness in non-inclusive cultures.  The indication of the study was 
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that in order to reach optimal effectiveness, influence and inclusion must both be 
present. 
 
A recent paper by Huse & Solberg (2006) looked at gender-related boardroom 
dynamics. More specifically the study collected stories from a small sample of 
female directors on how they were able to contribute to boardroom discussion and 
avoid tokenism.  The authors found that contribution was highly dependent on the 
women‟s ability and willingness to make alliances with the most influential actors, 
and that their level of contribution could be enhanced with high levels of preparation 
and by asking critical questions during board meetings.  Being present in decision 
making arenas, taking leadership roles and being visible were furthermore considered 
helpful for enhancing contributions.  Finally, understanding the boardroom dynamics 
from a gendered perspective was considered an essential ingredient for the effective 
contribution of female directors.   One of the latest studies on the nature of women‟s 
contributions on the board (Konrad & Kramer, 2006) found that women make three 
contributions men are unlikely to make: broadening the discussion to a wider set of 
stakeholders, pushing answers to difficult questions and bringing a more 
collaborative approach to leadership.  These contributions, however, were less likely 
to emerge if the number of women on the board was limited to one or two.  
 
What can basically be concluded from these studies is that female directors do feel 
women are bringing a new/different perspective into the boardroom, and to some 
extent fostering a more open culture.  At the same time they seem to be facing rather 
conservative and quite masculine rules and norms of behaviour and experiencing non 
inclusive cultures. There are, however, indications that barriers could be broken 
down through influencing behaviour, high levels of preparation and/or by possessing 
or earning high levels of social capital. 
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3. Framing the research question 
 
The study aims to examine role experience and role interpretation of individual board 
members of large Icelandic companies.   
 
It builds on the previous examinations of the non-executive role (e.g. Demb & 
Neubauer, 1992a; Roberts et al., 2005) and aims to answer calls for clarity of the 
level of analysis (Pye & Pettigrew, 2005) focusing on the individual, and the 
individual‟s interpretation of his or her role and contribution on the board.  It 
furthermore seeks to add to the understanding of contextual factors (Pye, 2000, 
2001a) particularly the nature of role interpretation and perceived contributions by 
males and females respectively.  Previous studies on female directors have not 
explicitly related female board experiences to the framework of board roles, and have 
frequently focused on contributions that could explicitly be related to female board 
members (e.g. Burke, 1994a, 1997; Bilimoria & Huse, 1997; Bradshaw & Wicks, 
2000; McGregor, 2003; Zelechowski & Bilimoria, 2003; Huse & Solberg, 2006; 
Konrad & Kramer, 2006) as opposed to general roles and contributions of females as 
directors, with all the roles and responsibilities that come with that position. 
Furthermore, these studies were limited to examining the female experience.   
 
This study aims to sharpen the focus of the non-executive role and contribution to the 
individual level, as well as widening the study of female directors, by comparing and 
contrasting male and female role interpretation. The study is based on the ontology 
of social construction (Berger & Luckmann, 1966), assuming that reality is 
determined by people rather than objective external factors (Easterby-Smith et al., 
2002).  Furthermore, the epistemological assumptions underpinning the research 
process are of a feminist nature claiming that women‟s experiences, although 
presumably different from males‟ experiences are equally valid as a basis for 
knowledge (Blaikie, 1993).  
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The study aims to answer the research question: 
 
How do non-executive board members interpret their roles and contribution* as 
individuals, and is there a gendered effect? 
 
*Contribution is in this study defined as the value added by a particular board member to the culture, activities or 
decision making of a board, but NOT as any type of boardroom participation or impact.  
 
This study reports the findings of an empirical study based on interviews with 11 
board members on boards of six large Icelandic companies.  
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4. Research method  
4.1. Selecting the sample 
The study is conducted on board members of substantially large Icelandic 
companies.  Since listed companies are less than 30 and in the past years only 
between two and four of them have had a female board member at any given time, 
the population was defined as the 50 largest (by revenue) companies in Iceland.   
 
The size of corporate boards in Iceland ranges from three to nine people, with five as 
the most common size.  Boards consist only of non-executive directors. While it is 
allowed by Icelandic corporate law to have the CEO serve as a board member, 
common practice is to have the CEO attend and participate in all board meetings, but 
not as a formal member.  The dual Chairman/CEO role is prohibited by Icelandic 
corporate law.   
 
As I wanted to compare and contrast male and female role interpretation and 
therefore wanted to keep the context as similar as possible, my sampling strategy was 
to aim for;  
1. A pair of male and female board members from the same focal board  
2. Preferably try to identify boards in a similar context.  
 
My initial context definition was 
a) Male dominated boards (since that would normally be the situation on any 
board) 
b) Icelandic companies in international expansion (context – small economy to 
large economy transition phase) 
 
My interviewee recruitment strategy was to list and target female members of boards 
in the defined context.  Six female board members from large Icelandic boards were 
interviewed.  Subsequently, male counterparts for the six boards were identified.  
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Due to access difficulties, interviews could only be obtained from male board 
members from three of the boards.  Five males from three boards were interviewed.   
 
Since most of the interviewees served on multiple boards, more than 50 boards were 
represented; therefore 12 of the top 50 companies were represented.   
4.2. Conducting the interviews 
The interviews all took place between November 2006 and April 2007, either at the 
interviewees‟ working facilities or at the interviewer‟s office.  The interviews were 
semi structured and followed a pre-developed interview schedule (see appendix 1) 
but the interviewees were allowed to deviate from the schedule and the interviewer 
probed with additional questions when interesting topics came up.  Since the 
interviewees had been selected based on their presence on a particular board, they 
were asked to keep that board in mind as a focal board, but also encouraged to 
compare and contrast the focal board with other boards on which they currently or 
had recently served.  As it happened, most of the board members had substantial 
board experience and drew their comments and insights from various boards.   The 
interview schedule contained questions around, why the person was asked to serve 
on a particular board; the purpose and role they have on the board and what they do 
to fulfil it;  how they behave and interact in a typical board meeting and how their 
behaviour compares to that of other board members;  what type of relationships they 
have with other board members, to whom they feel accountable as a board member; 
what they have gained from serving on the board; and, what would be their greatest 
contribution or added value to the board.   
 
The interviews were audio taped and the recordings lasted 30-80 minutes.  The 
interviews were conducted in Icelandic, which is the native language of all 
interviewees. 
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4.3. The interviewees 
The interviewees were selected based on their presence on the six focal boards of one 
of the 50 largest companies in Iceland.  The focal boards consisted of five to seven 
non-executive board members, none of them including the CEO as a formal board 
member.   
The six female interviewees were aged 38-52 years, i.e. with an average age of 45 
years.  All of them had extensive business experience.  Four had completed a 
master‟s degree, one had completed an undergraduate degree and one did not have a 
university degree.  Two had substantial international work experience.  No particular 
patterns or similarities could be detected in their career description.  Four of the 
interviewees served on at least three substantial boards at the time of the interview.  
One served as chairman on all the three boards on which she served, one served as a 
chairman of a major company as well as being a board member on three other 
boards, and another on multiple subsidiary boards.  
 
The five male interviewees were aged 44-59 years, i.e. with an average age of 50 
years.  All of them had extensive business experience and two could be considered 
major stockholders in some of the companies on whose boards they served.  Three 
had completed a masters‟ degree, the other two had limited university education.  
Two had some international experience, the others did not.  Four served on at least 
three major boards at the time of the interviews and one on multiple subsidiary 
boards.   
 
4.4. Analyzing the data 
The interviews were audio recorded and transcribed in full (in Icelandic).  The text 
was transferred to the NVivo software tool intended for analysis of qualitative data, 
in order to facilitate the structuring of emerging themes.   
 
The analytical process mainly followed a structure described in Easterby-Smith et al., 
(2002:123-124).  The steps in the process I conducted were the following: 
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 The first step was to read through the transcripts two or three times with the 
aim of becoming familiar with the content, general tone and attitude of the 
interviewee.  Subsequently notes were made on possible themes and headings 
for the forthcoming coding.   
 
 The second step was to reflect on the data and informally relate them to the 
literature that had been previously covered.  Did the same themes emerge or 
were there different themes? 
 
 The next step was to transfer the transcripts into NVivo, and conduct the 
initial coding.  All transcribed text was covered and coded into free-nodes 
with the exception of the few comments that were obviously out of context 
with the main objective of the interviews.  Free-nodes were then subsequently 
constructed into tree-nodes.  At the end of this phase the following themes 
(tree-nodes) had emerged: 
o Ways of contributing 
o Credentials 
o Accountability 
o Ways of being successful 
o Relationships 
o Trust 
 
 After the initial coding a second coding was conducted which led to 
rearranging and combining some of the tree-nodes, and splitting some tree-
nodes into subthemes (child-nodes).  The following is an example of a tree-
node and its child-nodes: 
o Ways of contributing 
 Advising 
 Operational input 
 Setting standards and holding management accountable 
 Guarding shareholders interests  
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 Bringing different viewpoints 
 Bringing specific knowledge 
 Bringing strategic input 
 Asking questions 
 Applying judgement and insight 
 Acting as a sounding board 
 Supporting management 
 Being diplomatic 
 Developing people 
 Taking care of formalities 
 
The third level was to analyse the themes and subthemes and arrange them 
into chapter headings for the write-up (see chapter V).  Some child-nodes 
were related and brought together under the same chapter heading although 
some contained very little data and/or comments from a few interviewees and 
did not add any substance to the analysis.  As these were only a few they 
were omitted due to lack of significance to the theme of the study. 
 
 Under each chapter heading a presentation of the issue was made and the 
issue was backed up with selected quotes from the transcripts that illustrated 
that particular point.   
 
 A reassessment of the themes and chapter headings was made by going 
through the nodes again to make sure no relevant points had been missed or 
overlooked. 
 
4.5. Translation and researcher’s bias 
Since the interviews were conducted and transcribed in Icelandic, the native tongue 
of the interviewer and interviewees, illustrative quotes needed to be translated into 
English.  The translation was done by the author, and care was taken to be as 
accurate in the translation as possible, without losing the content and meaning of the 
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quotes.  No particular difficulties arose in the translation process, apart from two 
minor issues which are addressed in footnotes to subsequent chapters. 
 
As already mentioned some of the interviewees were personally known to the 
interviewer, while others were informal acquaintances or not known to the 
interviewer.  For the most part, interviewees saw the interviewer as a person of 
relatively high academic standard, with pure theoretical interest of the interviewee 
and his or her board activities.   All interviewees were candid and open in their 
narratives, although some were less outspoken than others.  Although outspokenness 
could to a large extent be attributed to the interviewee‟s personality, it could be 
detected that those interviewees that were known to the interviewer were generally 
more outspoken and talkative.   
 
Analysing the data is always prone to biases do to expectations and preconceived 
ideas of the researcher.  However, my approach was to observe the data with 
curiosity and an open mind.  The result was that many of the issues and themes 
emerging came as an interesting surprise.   
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5. Findings 
5.1. Interpreting roles and contributions 
Both similarities and differences were found in the way male and female board 
members spoke about their contributions to the corporate boards on which they 
served.  
5.1.1. Embracing the paradoxes   
Male and female interviewees seemed to share the agency view of holding 
management accountable.  Although not elaborating extensively on the issue, males 
and females alike talked about the role of setting standards, keeping an eye on 
management and pushing for results.  
 
I want to see; well we the board, we hire the CEO, we approve the corporate 
strategy the CEO suggests, we have an opinion on how the company can 
work, we provide the discipline … I make it my concern to look at how the 
CEO presents matters, and I’m thinking is he doing the right thing…I’m 
trying to get a feeling for if the guy is bluffing, not intentionally, it’s just, is he 
living up to standards, is he making sense, is it working.  M4 
 
At the same time everybody realises that their role is to look out for the 
decision making and to provide healthy criticism. F3  
 
I would say to make sure that the goals set by owners are fulfilled by 
management. M2  
 
You should ask critical questions and be inspiring for managers, and make 
them [the management] justify themselves, their decisions and actions. F5  
 
Because many of the companies we were dealing with were, unfortunately, in 
the situation where investments were made based on specific interests not 
because of return on investment, and I tend to be more focused on that. M5 
 
Although not quoted as often, another view shared by male and female interviewees, 
was the consultant role; to give management input and advice.   
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Probably to give input and advice, if there are matters or issues that I sort of 
spot. F4 
 
I think it would a bit depend on what company we are looking at, it’s different 
of course, in some companies we as a board are more directing, and in others 
we listen more and give advice. M2  
 
Furthermore, there was little difference in how males and females talked about to 
whom they felt accountable as board members.   Without exception, males and 
females alike identified owners and shareholders as the main party they felt they 
were accountable to, followed by other stakeholders such as customers and 
employees etc.  Although the similarities outweighed the differences, you could see a 
slight tendency for females to be a bit more vocal for views alternative to the 
shareholders‟ views. 
 
Yes, first and foremost towards the shareholders, after all the board is 
representing shareholders…we hire the CEO and dismiss him and he hires 
other employees so I don’t think my responsibility as a member of the board 
is so much directed at employees. M1  
 
Of course the owners first and foremost, I think men
1
 look at it that way. I 
think employees and the environment are secondary, but I say, you are 
representing owners on the board and it’s their interests you should look 
after, that is my first choice and I don’t think there can be any discount given 
on that.  M2  
 
Towards the shareholders of course but I am always inclined to take the 
customers’ side…so I would say the shareholders and the image, I do feel a 
bit responsible for the company not developing a poor image.  F1  
 
I feel very responsible towards the owner; I mean he is the one I am 
representing here.  And then also towards myself and what I stand for, I try to 
make sure of that. F2 
 
Shareholders, my role is to maximise shareholder return, and if I do that I am 
taking care of all the other things that matter, the employees, the customer, 
                                                 
1
 The word “men” is quite common in the quotes made by males.  While the proper English word to use would be 
“people”, the author decided to use the term “men” which is a direct translation from the language in which the 
interviews were conducted, as it better reflects the interviewees‟ use of terms and language.  
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not in any particular order, and the suppliers and everything that has to do 
with the operation. If you take care of the role of maximising shareholder 
return then all the other things get sorted out right, if you think about it in a 
proper manner.  M3 
 
I don’t know.  I feel responsible for all shareholders, the corporate image and 
how we are doing on the market, which is just extremely important to me.   
F6 
 
That’s very clear, it’s the largest shareholder (X) I’m representing them on 
the board. M5 
 
Five interviewees, three males and two females, were generally more specific in 
defining “guarding the interest of shareholders” as one of their key roles.  When 
taking a closer look at these individuals, what they had in common was that they 
were either large shareholders themselves in the company in question, or had been 
hired or appointed by an individual who was himself a large shareholder.  
Interestingly enough, out of the four individuals who defined “bringing different 
viewpoints” as one of their main roles, three of them did not belong to the group of 
five that defined “guarding the interests of shareholders” as their key role.   This 
might indicate the reasons why particular people are appointed to boards could 
influence role interpretation.   
5.1.2. Strategic input 
Although there was evidence of a number of similarities between male and female 
interpretations of their role on the board, the differences between the two sexes were 
even more evident. 
 
The most striking difference was in how male and female board members talked 
about their strategic input and the importance of that input.  All the males spoke of 
strategic input as being their main role and contribution on a board, while the females 
talked quite differently about it, not describing it as their main role or key 
contribution at all.   
 
 238 
The following quotes illustrate how some of the male interviewees spoke about their 
strategic input.   
 
My role is more to contribute in a strategic sense because this business is of a 
nature that requires a very long-term perspective…and in [another company] 
where I am the chairman, I come into the process much sooner from a 
strategic perspective, contributing to idea generation and reflections M1 
 
We can generally say that I have a strategic impact, regarding this [a 
particular matter] and other matters that have come up. M5  
 
To get men to look beyond the valley or look at the road ahead, try to see 
some kind of a big picture, what market are we working on how are we 
developing, what methods do we use, risk factors regarding competition or 
employees are what I would consider…so it’s a kind of fatherly role.  M2 
 
Of course we are very aware of the operational factors and we are very 
interested in the strategy, but the day to day operational issues we do not get 
bothered with, and it is not expected of us.  M1 
 
It’s about having a sense of judgement, that you can acquire the knowledge 
and experience of other people and know how to interpret when the manager 
comes and says he wants to do it in a certain way, that you have the big 
picture and can assess what he is saying.  I cannot get bothered with the 
numerical details; it’s a kind of common sense you have to have and a broad 
overview.  M4 
 
I think about my role as rethinking the business model or making a new 
business model that works… Boards of course should develop the strategy, 
set the course, “we are going in that direction”, if it’s a real board it’s 
saying; “we should go this way and archive these results”.  M3 
 
One of the interviewees gave a good example of his individual impact on strategy. 
 
So this meeting [due to my initiative] dissolved into a dispute about where the 
company was really heading…whether we needed to clean up inside the 
company and it evolved both around persons and not least what direction to 
take, it would make all the difference to whether the company was high or 
low risk, and they were taking the high risk at that time and I really pushed 
this matter...the result was that we got a new CEO in, he changed the strategy 
and the company recovered and has been doing well ever since. M5 
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5.1.3. Specific knowledge and skills 
The females, while not acknowledging the strategic role to a great extent, generally 
identified their main contribution as bringing somewhat more specific, often 
professional, knowledge and skills to the board.  They more often than not mentioned 
that they had a specific rather than general role on the board.  
Bringing specific knowledge or skills was not identified as a contribution by any 
male interviewees.  On the contrary, the males generally related their presence on the 
board to a much wider, more general level of experience.   
 
Of the two of us [representing a particular shareholder] the other one has a 
great deal of operational knowledge and I have extensive general 
experience…even though [this particular business] is new to me I think an 
old nose like mine can very well sniff out the pros and cons of particular 
matters.  M1 
 
We have a lot of guys [on the board] that have good operational knowledge, I 
on the other hand don’t have a lot of experience in business operations, I 
think it [my value] is more related to the fact that I have a lot more 
experience of being on corporate boards.  That’s the way I see it, it’s all 
about, I feel, that you have a certain level of judgement…that you have a 
vision and can see the big picture. M3 
 
Interestingly the males, to a greater extent than the females, talked about their level 
of insight and what life experience had taught them as being valuable input. 
Something one might rather have expected from female interviewees.  The following 
quote provides a good example.  
 
Well I think with more experience you grow as a person.  It’s a matter of 
confidence building, a wider perspective, vision, knowledge and general 
experience, when that builds up you have more to offer.  It changes when as 
you become more mature, life continues to develop
12
, new projects will come 
and as time goes by and the maturity and experience increase you see things 
more with the eyes of a “wise old man”.  M3  
 
                                                 
2
 Actually the interviewee used a word that means “creating poetry” 
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5.1.4. Support and teambuilding 
Being a sounding board to the CEO and acting as a supportive listener was identified 
as a valuable input by males and females alike. 
 
What managers in a company like this need is to have a board behind them 
that they can put their trust in and present the issues and get some kind of a 
reaction. M1  
 
The thing is when you have reached such a position [the CEO’s] you don’t 
have that many people you can turn to, there are issues of confidentiality, and 
there are a lot of things you don’t want to elaborate on just anywhere, then 
you have this group you can use for consultancy to gain perspective on your 
thoughts, you don’t just call anybody.  M2 
 
It’s such a great sounding board.  And you often say - if there is a problem; 
“Why don’t we sit down for an hour and discuss this – What is it? Let me 
hear your thoughts” - and things like that. F2 
 
 
However, the female interviewees elaborated more on the explicit role they played in 
supporting and backing up the chairman or the CEO.   
I feel I back up the CEO very well, and his team as well, so I feel there’s a lot 
of value in that, then the board is more comfortable, and I can get more 
involved and then I can back him and his actions up, so maybe, all things 
considered, I think I support him and back him up very well. F6 
 
When they initially appointed me I was not sure I knew how to do the job, but 
I was told that I was to be there to be consulted by and to support the 
chairman.  And you could say that today, all these years later, that I do in 
fact play that role towards the CEO, being there, to help and support him. F1 
 
And then I think I am a great support and backup to the CEO’s that I have to 
work closely with.  And I think they are comfortable in getting my support 
even though I don’t always have the solution. F6 
 
Many females also spoke of their role as contributing to a friendly atmosphere within 
the board and between board meetings – again something not mentioned by male 
interviewees.  
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One of my main contributions is being a great team player. […] I think I also 
have a feminine input because I have a very diplomatic nature – and I really 
want people to be content rather than discontent and I really dislike 
arguments.  I often take the role of rebuilding what has been demolished. F2 
 
And perhaps what I really am is acting as a diplomat on the board. I would 
really like to soften things up a bit; it hasn’t quite worked but I have a dream 
of putting some soft ingredient in there – it would be more fun. F1 
 
Then I think that in general people like talking to me, when I call and we have 
a chat about things, it varies of course, but in general I think I am a rather 
easy person to speak to. F6 
5.1.5. Asking questions  
One of the themes most elaborated on by females as a way of making a contribution 
or adding value on the board was by asking intriguing questions.  The questioning 
issue was not as apparent in the male conversations.  
 
Sometimes, the females quoted, the questions were initially asked with the mere 
purpose of gaining information, but it gradually became apparent that these questions 
had value as a way of discussing and probing issues. 
 
I don’t know, I always ask if there is something I do not understand, and even 
though I’m not a financial expert I do feel that I have to know what is going 
on.  And I don’t care if I ask questions that perhaps everybody else know the 
answer to, because sometimes these questions are the initiators of good 
discussions. […] I think I add value by dragging them back a little by asking 
and requesting explanations – you know big picture issues if I can because I 
want to understand, these are mainly things like mission, strategic 
implementation and such. F3  
 
And the importance of not being afraid to ask was highlighted. 
 
I don’t know, you should just ask and that is the way it is; people are not 
afraid of asking if they don’t know the answer, there is no shame in asking. 
F4 
 
I remember that [a colleague on the board] came to me and said “X, I think it 
is really great that you have the courage to ask questions, you are not like 
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some other people that don’t have the courage to ask” – so you should ask, 
not all the time though, you do have to pick and choose a bit. F2 
 
And perhaps most importantly the value of questions for management preparation 
and decision making was elaborated on.  
 
You should ask critical questions and challenge managers, and make them 
justify things to themselves.  And I think I do contribute in that way. F5 
 
You know, I keep an eye on this, so they [the management] should know, they 
should expect this question from me, because I always ask it, which means 
that they will have to be prepared.  F2 
 
One of the interviewees provided the insight that the willingness or motivation to 
question might be a gender-related thing.  
 
Well, because men tend to be more eager to make statements, I don’t know 
how to describe it, they act as if they have the complete view. While the 
women sort of work their way towards the information – the men make the 
statements, they claim they know things for a fact right from the start and 
then perhaps back off if there is a need to support their statements, while 
women sort of come from the other side and work their way towards the 
statement by questioning. F2 
 
Related to the theme of questioning, one interviewee thought she made a substantial 
contribution by bringing a different perspective to the board. 
 
I think I bring different points of view, different from the boys.  I ask about 
different subjects I think.  They are very focused on the financials – I’m more 
oriented towards a marketing perspective and the consumer’s point of view – 
I think I bring – perhaps a more simplified view. F5 
 
5.1.6. Assessing contributions 
Another way of gaining an understanding of the role interpretation of individual 
board members was to ask them about how they assessed their contribution and how 
they knew they were being successful on the board.  Again both differences and 
similarities appeared.  
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Both males and females noted that it was some sense of internal feeling of being 
content.   
 
I think it is a certain inner feeling that you sense; are you content or 
discontent [with your work] and that is something you ask yourself and find 
within.  M2 
 
You have this feeling; I should be here and they know I should be 
here…These are just some human factors you just feel it. F2 
 
I’m always content, I don’t do more than I am capable of and I do everything 
that I possibly can. M4 
  
If you sense you are bringing different perspectives and those perspectives 
are valued. F5 
 
There was, however, an interesting difference in the sense that the males more often 
related their successfulness to how the company was doing financially.   
 
And that the financial returns are such that the shareholders are content with 
having their money tied up in this operation. So it’s the operational returns 
that men are always demanding. M1  
 
Of course you have financial goals so you can see it black on white what is 
happening. M2   
 
At the end of the day it’s of course how the company is doing, if the share 
prices are going up or down, if we are achieving the goals the company is 
setting…But at the end of the day it is of course just the bottom line, the 
EBITA or the profit. M3  
 
Whereas the females mainly spoke of the feedback they got from people around 
them, for instance from their fellow board members or large owners.   
 
Well, if we start by (company A), I sort of assess it by what I hear from people 
around me; I have heard people expressing their appreciation of how the 
company has changed for the better.   F1 
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You feel how they [other board members] react to you, that they talk to you 
and want your opinion; I think you just start to feel that.  F2 
 
If you know that you have an impact on certain things on the board…. That 
they [the board members] listen when I talk. If I have not commented on an 
issue they ask and want to know what I think. And in conversation, they thank 
you for your input.  F3 
 
Success was also related by females to how well you could interact with fellow board 
members. 
 
Success is whether you manage to work with the people around you, I think 
that must be it.  F4 
 
In addition to measuring success by positive feedback, the importance of credibility 
and being valued was often mentioned.  This will be elaborated on more in a 
subsequent section on acquiring respect and credibility.     
5.2. Relationships 
In order to understand role interpretation on a deeper level, interviewees were asked 
to describe their relationships with other board members and elaborate on 
communication outside the boardroom.  An interesting pattern of differences 
between males and females emerged.  
 
Males and females seemed to talk about relationships from quite different 
perspectives.  Although having good relationships with members of the board was 
seen as being important and of value by both males and females, the males stressed 
and acknowledged the importance of having a good relationship with other board 
members to a much greater extent than the females did, and went into substantially 
more depth in describing the importance of relationships.   
 
The way females spoke about relationships on the board indicated that the level of 
interaction with other board members (most often all males) was at a minimum level. 
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There basically are none [interactions between board meetings] unless there 
is an issue that needs attention, maybe a phone call or two. F1  
 
I’m on good terms with [two of the board members] but that relationship is 
limited to the board meetings. F3 
 
The interactions were more often than not described as “a good working 
relationship”, friendly, but there seemed to be very little interaction on issues other 
than those “needed to be discussed”.   
 
 [In general] the interactions are friendly but formal. F1 
 
He [the chairman] is a very formal person, and we have a very professional 
relationship. F3 
 
I interact mostly with one of the board members, because he is a colleague of 
mine and we work together, so that goes without saying. F4 
 
Although the importance of relationships was acknowledged by some of the females, 
in general they did not elaborate on it to a great extent.  One female board member 
who acknowledged the importance of board members knowing each other well 
explicitly stated that this needed to be actively worked on. 
 
Yes I think it [building a relationship] matters a great deal.  And I think it is 
important to have board meetings that go on for more than one day.  People 
have different backgrounds and they don’t know each other and you need to 
build a team, and then it’s quite important that you know these people a bit so 
you can interact with them…If you are comfortable in a group you are more 
likely to speak up and bring your ideas forward. F5 
 
A certain level of reluctance to relationship forming was even mentioned by one of 
the female interviewees. 
 
I think a good relationship is preferable, but only up to a certain extent, it 
shouldn’t be too much.  F2 
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But some females noted that they were aware of more interactions between the male 
board members.  
 
I do know, however, that they [two other board members] are active between 
meetings and keep in touch. F3 
 
As already mentioned, the males elaborated substantially more on the relationship 
factor and its importance, and reported having a much more intense and deeper 
relationship with their fellow board members. 
 
I think it does matter that men know one another, they’re not simply sitting 
there with a straight back and a straight tie but that they can share social 
moments together, and I think it matters a great deal.  Then you simply get to 
know people better and can talk about something different from the company, 
just current events, so I think it is always beneficial that men have a good 
personal contact.  Even though they might have different interests at stake, 
it’s just good to know one another. M1 
 
The culture of the company is such that people speak what is on their mind, 
there are no laws that men should agree about everything, but I for one 
emphasise informal communication, not having things very formal…I think it 
is extremely important to keep informally in touch and that people are sort of 
linked to a common goal and a common vision…of course you have situations 
of conflicting interests, different visions and all…and it can lead to a dispute 
or something, but there is a much lower chance of that happening if you are 
in good informal contact…we speak amongst each other several times a week 
and keep an eye on things and all matters are discussed, it’s as simple as 
that. M2 
 
Yes they [informal relationships]  do [make a difference], very much so, if 
you didn’t have them – well it’s the forum that creates the drive, sometimes 
you need to discuss matters through somewhere else. M5 
 
Well at first when a board is formed, some people know each other but not all 
of them do, and then people start working together and the cooperation 
naturally depends on the personal chemistry. Let’s say things go well, then 
the board will be stronger the more people know each other, and you can 
have more dynamics when people have developed trust. M3  
 
  Yes, yes, it is so important to know how people will react. M4 
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One interviewee was particularly vocal on how much it mattered to be in the “in 
group”, to be able to have an effect on how things would evolve. 
 
Often times [informal] subgroups are formed...so it’s often a relatively tight 
nucleus within the board, particularly if the boards are large, that really 
makes the big decisions and prepares them prior to board meetings. ... If you 
belong to this group making the big decisions you’ll have a great deal of 
interaction, and those are informal, on the phone, you could have [informal] 
meetings in the evening or at weekends or something, where you go through 
things and set the course for how things should be played out and all.  So it’s 
going to depend quite a bit on what position you have whether your views are 
considered valid – whether you are in the group that is really pushing things 
forward. M5 
 
5.3. Trust 
The male‟s discussion about relationships with other board members often revealed 
the issues and importance of trust – trust among the members of the board, trusting 
management etc.   
 
You could say that the shareholder group in (Company A), they know each 
other, they have been in on other investments before, so they trust one 
another, you are just looking out for mutual interests there.  I’m not saying 
that the interests in (Company B) are incompatible, not at all, but maybe the 
investors there have a more diverse background.  Men might just need to get 
to know each other better.  M1 
 
If you are going to have space to be successful there has got to be trust 
amongst individuals, otherwise all the energy goes into the tension.  There is 
nothing as de-motivating as tension, I have experienced this…when there 
were great tensions between men and interests and it is so very de-motivating 
– it inhibited growth and there was a certain level of stagnation. M1 
 
Yes it [trust] is absolutely a fundamental. And of course in this group men 
have worked together for a long time so I think in the management team that 
we have there is a substantial part that has been there for a long time and we 
know each other well, and you have to trust these people you’re working 
with, its all about that. M2 
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Just in communicating, people get to know one another, and then you have a 
situation and people react in a certain manner and you perhaps see what kind 
of character the person displays…It’s sort of a part of game theory, you just 
know what the reaction will be, if you play a card you know what the reaction 
will be. M3 
 
When interviewees brought up the issue of trust they were probed for their definition.  
The definitions most often reflected something that was built up over time and, in 
line with the preceding quote, stating a certain level of predictability of behaviour. 
 
Trust is of course a subjective term, you sense quickly that trust is not 
something you go and buy, trust is something you acquire. It means that you 
are a man of your word, you don’t do one thing today and another thing 
tomorrow, you show that you are a solid character in the tasks you embark 
upon…. It takes a long time to acquire but you can lose it in one instant, it’s 
just very important to have a certain level of trust.  M1 
 
Speaking of trust, as important as it is, it’s also very fragile and when you go 
on a venture, just by my experience, you have to think very thoroughly when 
you have a lot at stake, who is with you in the boat, and how they are likely to 
react to different circumstances. M5 
 
It [trust] is something that takes a long time to build but you also need very 
little to ruin it.  I think it is, sort of, something that is or isn’t there, at the end 
of the day. It’s as simple as that. M2  
 
It’s probably because he [the chairman] knows how I work and how I think, 
and he thinks there is value in that. I just have to believe that. M4 
 
The female interviewees spoke quite differently about trust.  Again, their 
conversation was not very rich on the issue of relationship, and therefore their 
conversation about trust did not usually develop from the discussion of relationships.  
They rather went into discussing the trust issue when they were taking about their 
contributions on the board. In contrast to the males‟ comments about the importance 
of trust in general and building a level of trust amongst board members, the females 
talked about how important it was that they as individuals were trusted and respected 
as board members.   
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Of course you can assess whether you are respected, if you are respected 
then you are listened to and seen as credible. F5 
 
I try to ask questions rather than make straight comments; these are the 
things you try to do in order not to startle people, so it’s just a matter of how 
you approach things. F4 
 
If you feel that you are credible and the people that work with you believe in 
you, that the creditors are behind you, the board is behind you and that the 
shareholder is content. F6    
 
But in the same manner as male interviewees described trust as a certain level of 
predictability in behaviour, one of the female interviewees described how she gained 
other board members‟ trust precisely by behaving in a consistently predictable 
manner. 
 
In order to build credibility you need to show consistency in behaviour, I 
would say, so people know where you are coming from and know what type of 
person you are…. You try to be honest in your comments and feedback so 
when it comes to the board meeting the other individual can predict how you 
will react…it’s just the sort of …you need to build that trust with each 
individual and you do it by being consistent. F2 
 
Interestingly, one of the interviewees talked about her being respected on the board 
without really knowing why.   
 
I do feel that for one reason or another, without really understanding it well, 
that I have a great level of respect among the board members.  F1 
 
Being credible and respected was, by the female interviewees, often linked to being 
well prepared for board meetings – something not mentioned at all by the male 
interviewees.  
 
All the material is sent well in advance so you must show up really well 
prepared to board meetings. F3 
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We get the material in advance so I make a point of reading and preparing 
and marking the items I want to ask about. F4 
 
I keep very alert and try to prepare well for all the meetings. They [the 
CEO’s] make a point of being prepared, and we are responsible for reading 
and being prepared, so I have made up my mind on the issues that we will be 
discussing and I try to get my point across and participate.  People will listen 
to you if they hear that you have analysed the issue, so it is in my opinion 
most important.  If I ever showed up unprepared I would feel that I would 
have a much more difficult time participating. F2 
 
We have got a very good orientation within the company which is essential 
preparation. F5 
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6. Conclusions and discussion  
 
Before starting the project I have to admit that I was expecting to find some level of 
differences between male and female role interpretation – what types of difference I 
was not entirely sure about. In line with Konrad & Kramer (2006) I was perhaps 
anticipating that females would adopt a more stakeholder oriented view and men 
perhaps more of an agency view.  The findings however revealed differences not 
only of role interpretation but also differences of how males and females use 
relationships on the board, and how they talk about the issue of trust.   
 
As indicated in the literature review. the bulk of the research on the role of the board 
has been directed to the alternative views of agency, stakeholder and stewardship 
roles.  In line with Roberts et al. (2005) and Pye & Pettigrew (2005), the findings of 
this study indicate that the board role is substantially more complex than that. The 
findings support the view that going beyond the traditional theoretical framework is 
necessary and that searching for theoretical pluralism and having a greater 
understanding of board processes and dynamics is needed in order to fully 
understand the workings of corporate boards.   
 
The role females on board have adapted has been associated with bringing a wider 
perspective (Bilimoria & Huse, 1997; McGregor, 2003) and promoting the interests 
of a wider pool of stakeholders (Konrad & Kramer, 2006).  The findings of this study 
do not seem to support this view.  Both males and females considered bringing a 
different perspective as an important contribution, both parties explicitly stated 
shareholders as their number one priority, while looking out for other stakeholder 
was also seen as important by both males and females.  Additionally, in line with 
stewardship theory both male and females saw the advising and consulting role as 
important.  Hence, males and females alike were found to adopt an agency role at the 
same time as adopting stewardship and stakeholder roles.  This implies that board 
members in general seem to be embracing the paradoxical role of challenging and 
supporting (Roberts et al., 2005).    
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The findings do, however, not at all imply that the female board members have 
adopted  and assimilated to male-like behaviour as reported by Bardshaw & Wicks 
(2000). On the contrary, the substantial differences in role interpretation indicated in 
the study suggest there is a need to look beyond the agency, stewardship and 
stakeholder views as suggested by Roberts et al. (2005) and Pye & Pettigrew (2005).   
 
Supporting findings of increased board involvement in strategy (Henke, 1986; 
McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999; Stiles, 2001), male board members in this study 
reported a high level of strategic input to the boards on which they served; the 
females, however, did not.  Furthermore, the males reported having in input on a 
very wide and general level, whereas the females interpreted their role as bringing 
specific input based on specific knowledge and skills.  This characteristic of 
contrasting role interpretations by males and females has not been reported in any 
studies found  by the author.   
 
While the males reported to engage more in strategy, females elaborated more on the 
highly valuable roles of questioning, pushing for better preparation of management 
and improved decision making (McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999), a contribution that has 
also been reported by Bilimoria & Huse (1997), Huse & Solberg (2006) and  Konrad 
& Kramer (2006).   A further contribution by females, identified earlier by Huse & 
Solberg (2006) and Konrad & Kramer (2006), is that of facilitating a comfortable 
atmosphere in the boardroom.  This study supported these findings and indicated that 
contribution by facilitating a comfortable atmosphere is very much a “female type” 
of contribution, since the males did not at all elaborate on a contribution of this sort.   
 
Although both males and females reported having a role as a sounding board – 
identified as another highly valuable role by McNulty & Pettigrew (1999) – 
interestingly females seemed to interpret and conduct a supporting role to a much 
deeper level than the males did.  Why they adopt this role is not clear from the 
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findings of the study, but perhaps it is an indication that they tend to serve auxiliary 
functions in the governance structure rather than being in the limelight.  
 
Although the females in this study do not talk about the masculine nature of the 
boardroom or having to confront or conform to the masculine hegemony (Bilimoria 
& Huse, 1997; Bradshaw & Wicks, 2000), there are indications that women are in 
fact largely left out of the power arenas.   
 
While the female interviewees did not explicitly acknowledge the importance of 
alliances and inclusion found in previous studies (Zelechowski & Bilimoria, 2003; 
Huse & Solberg, 2006), they are very vocal about the importance of gaining respect, 
being listened to and acquiring a certain level of trust.  The emphasis they put on the 
importance of preparation, previously reported as a female contribution by; Bilimoria 
& Huse (1997),  Zelechowski & Billimoria (2003), Huse & Solberg (2006), but not 
at all indicated by male interviewees, can be related in general to their efforts to be 
accepted and appreciated as valuable board members. The same goes for assessing 
contribution by the nature of feedback the females received, as opposed to the male 
view of accepting credit for corporate results.  This indicates that the issue of being 
accepted and acknowledged as an individual contributor on the board, something that 
seems to go without saying for men, has to be worked at and earned by women.   
 
This very factor, a notion of having to earn credibility and justify their board 
presence, might shed light on the differences in role interpretation by males and 
females.   The reason the females interpreted their role and contribution in terms of 
specific knowledge and skills might precisely be a way of justifying their presence 
by specific or “tangible” factors.   
 
As social capital has previously been found to have positive effects on impact 
(Westphal & Milton, 2000; Pye, 2004), the fact that the females failed to 
acknowledge the importance of informal relationships and failed (whether by 
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neglecting or not being invited) to participate in such interactions, largely excludes 
them from the actual network of power and decision making loops.   
 
The fact that females have to struggle for respect and do not participate in power 
networks provides a reason to question the actual effectiveness of the contributions 
that they make. Perhaps they succeed in giving support and making the atmosphere 
more comfortable, but one cannot help but wonder whether these might only be seen 
as trivial contributions in the context of the business tasks the company is 
confronting.   
 
When, however, it comes to higher impact contributions like questioning and probing 
for better results the case might be different.  If board members making that type of 
contribution are not considered members of the “in group” the impact of that 
contribution is probably not going to be high.   
 
As elaborated on by one of the male interviewees, your impact and contribution will 
very much depend on whether you are part of the informal discussions of those 
holding the actual power, and that goes for both males and females.  Since the 
females are generally not part of the informal network, their contributions are less 
likely to have an impact.   The way I interpret it, it is not a matter of inclusion at the 
board level as that discussed by Zelechowski & Bilimoria (2003).  On the contrary, 
the females interviewed worked very hard at being respected and listened to at the 
board meetings, and there was no indication in the findings that they felt they were 
not being successful at doing that.  It is rather the issue of being a part of the actual 
power cluster and perhaps engaging in informal relationships in order to make 
alliances to such parties (Huse & Solberg, 2006).    
 
In an ideal world, the important contribution of pushing for better preparation of 
management and improved decision making would be a highly valuable ingredient of 
improving board performance.  The actual world and the context in which boards 
work is, however, much more complex, and informal relationships and politics play a 
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huge role.  Therefore, the potential contributions of individuals not connected with 
the power clusters are less likely to be realised. This is most likely the case for both 
males and females – it just so happens that women are more often positioned in the 
„out-group‟.  Identifying this hindrance to valuable contributions might, in part, be a 
way of explaining why, despite theorising about the many potentially valuable 
contributions brought to corporate boards by female directors, demonstrating a link 
between improved performance and a greater number of women on boards has not 
proved fruitful.   
 
In her study of top female executives, Marshall (1984) drew attention to the gendered 
culture, i.e. the business world being primarily masculine,  and concluded that 
women in business are “travellers in a male world” that was not designed by, nor for, 
them.  Tied in with this issue is the fact that both male and female managers have 
been found to have a tendency to display stereotypical masculine personality 
characteristics, and that being similar to those already in the majority or in positions 
of power is likely to affect one‟s career favourably (Kanter, 1977; Elmuti et al., 
2003).  Pulling together the female view of the importance of specific knowledge and 
skills, gaining credibility by high levels of preparation and their failure to connect to 
other board members on an informal level, then contrasting that to the male view of 
the importance of general knowledge, insight, informal relationships and trust, might 
be an indication that women have somehow got it wrong.  Their efforts to be 
included and accepted in the male dominated board environment seem to assume that 
the “rules of the (business) game” are based on objectivity, rationality and hard fact 
knowledge (attributes often associated with male-like behaviour), when they in fact 
seem to be highly subjective, social and emotional.   
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7. Proposal for further research 
 
This study has provided interesting and valuable insights into the role interpretation 
of male and female non-executives.  Many questions, however, remain to be 
answered.  Among those are issues such as further exploration into why female 
directors refrain from adopting a strategic role on the board but rather attribute their 
contribution to specific knowledge and skills.  Even more puzzling is their tendency 
to take on a supporting role for a particular person such as the chairman or the CEO.   
 
This study, although aiming to control for some contextual factors such as company 
size and country of origin, and particularly focusing on the gender context, leaves out 
several other contextual factors such as the nature of the business, industry, corporate 
lifecycle, nature and composition of shareholders, and perhaps more critically the 
context of individual board member appointments and their relationships to other 
board members, shareholders or stakeholders.  For instance, the findings of this study 
have indicated that the nature of relationships with large shareholders did have an 
impact on role interpretation.   
 
Expanding this study on to Project 3 provides several options.  At this point, I feel 
that I have somewhat saturated the views of the female interviewees, in addition to 
having somewhat exhausted the female samples available.  I therefore would be more 
interested in adding more male interviewees from the focal boards and other boards 
of major Icelandic companies in order to elicit a better understanding of the 
contextual factors driving role interpretation and claimed contributions, as well as 
deepening the understanding of relationships and trust.   
 
After conducting and analysing the findings of the empirical study for this paper, I 
have moved from the opinion that I need to study individuals from the same board.  
Since I am looking at individual role interpretation and contribution, not board 
dynamics or collective board behaviour, it is not really important to have matching 
pairs of, for instance, males and females from the same board.  What does matter is 
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that the interviewees come from boards of major Icelandic companies (the defined 
macro context), and that an eye is kept on contextual factors in the research process.  
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APPENDIX 1 – INTERVIEW SCHEDULE - PROJECT 2 
 
The interviewees will be asked to keep a particular focal board in mind in the discussion.  
However they are encouraged to compare and contrast their experience to other boards they 
currently serve,  or have recently served, on.  
 
Can you tell me about other boards you sit on? 
Geturðu í örstuttu máli sagt mér frá þeim stjórnum sem þú situr í 
How long have you served on this particular board? 
Hversu lengi hefur þú setið í þessari stjórn 
 
Why were YOU asked to serve on this particular board?  
(probe for evidence of particular qualifications or insight, social capital etc.) 
Hvernig kom það til að þú varst beðinn að taka sæti í þessari stjórn? 
 
How would you describe your role or purpose as a board member on this board? 
Hvernig myndirðu lýsa (túlka) hlutverki þínu og markmiðum sem stjórnarmaður í 
þessari stjórn? 
o Is it similar or different to roles you have on other boards? 
o Er það líkt eða ólíkt hlutverki þínu í öðrum stjórnum? 
o What do you do to fulfil that role? 
o Hvað gerir þú til að uppfylla þetta hlutverk? 
 
Can you describe how you would behave and interact in a typical board meeting? 
Geturðu lýst fyrir mér hvernig þú beitir þér á týpískum stjórnarfundi 
o Are there some issues that you usually comment on more than others? Why? 
Can you give me examples? 
o Eru einhver ákveðin málefni sem þú tjáir þig um frekar en önnur – 
hvers vegan, geturðu gefið mér dæmi? 
o What sort of behaviour or tactic is most effective for you to get your points 
across? 
o Hvernig myndirðu lýsa  þeim aðferðum sem þú beitir við að koma 
sjónarmiðum þínum á framfæri 
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o Would you say that your influencing strategy is the same as that of other 
board members, or is it different? How? Why? 
o Beitirðu svipuðum aðferðum og aðrir stjórnarmenn? 
o How do you know if you are being effective in your role? 
o Hvernig veistu hvort þú ert að ná árangri sem stjórnarmaður? 
o Do you feel that your behaviour, interactions or contributions have changed 
over the time you have served on the board?   Why? How? 
o Finnst þér þátttaka þín og framlag hafa breyst yfir þann tíma sem þú 
hefur setið í þessari stjórn – hvernig og hvers vegna? 
 
To whom or to what do you feel accountable as a director? Why? 
Gagnvart hverjum finnst þér þú first og fremst ábyrgur sem stjórnarmaður? 
 
Can you describe your relationships with other board members? 
Geturðu lýst samskiptum þínum við aðra stjórnarmenn – eru þau mikil eða lítil utan 
funda? 
o Did you know any of them prior to your appointment to the board? 
o Þekktirðu einhverja þeirra áður en þú settist í þessa stjórn 
o Have you developed your relationship with some board members more than 
others? Why? 
 
What have you gained from serving on this board? 
Hver er þinn persónulegi ávinningur af því að sitja í stjórninni/(um)? 
 
What do you think is your greatest contribution to this board? 
Hvert telurðu vera þitt helsta framlag sem stjórnarmaður í þessari stjórn? 
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1. Introduction 
 
This study constitutes Project 3 of the Cranfield DBA.  The study aims to explore the 
effect of board gender demography on male and female board members‟ 
interpretations of the non-executive role and how board gender demography impacts 
on female non-executive directors‟ contributions.  In a previous study on individual 
non-executive role interpretation conducted for this DBA, referred to in this project 
as Project 2, female non-executive directors serving on male dominated boards of 
large Icelandic companies were found to differ from their male counterparts in that 
female non-executives were found to be more likely to attribute their contributions to 
specific knowledge and skills, adopting auxiliary functions within the board, and 
emphasising challenging questions.  However, due to the females‟ lack of informal 
relationships, considered to be of vital importance by their male counterparts, and an 
assumed status of lower authority than that of the males, it was concluded that the 
valuable contributions of females might not be realised.   Table 22 summarises the 
findings from Project 2.   
 
 
Table 22: Summary of results from Project 2.  
 
 
FEMALES MALES
Basic role interpretation
specific / expert
Nature of contribution probing / questioning general / strategic
facilitating a good atmosphere
Reaffirmation feedback business results
Authority uncertain taken for granted
Relationships lacking essential
Trust important to gain trust the key ingredient
d
iffe
re
n
ce
s
looking out for shareholder interests (agency)
looking out for interests of other stakeholders (stakeholder)
advising and supporting (stewardship)
sim
ila
ritie
s
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In the two years since the interviews for Project 2 were conducted, there have been 
substantial changes in context. The economy has suffered a severe downturn, 
resulting in the collapse of a few large companies. These were subsequently 
reconstructed and their entire boards changed, resulting in a much higher female 
representation than ever seen before on boards of companies of similar size and 
significance.   This study aims to explore the effects of this extreme gender 
demographic context shift on role interpretation of non-executives and its impact on 
the contributions of female non-executive directors. Furthermore it seeks to bring 
together three sets of literature; the literature on the non-executive role, the literature 
on board behaviours and dynamics, and the literature on females on corporate 
boards.    
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2. Literature review 
 
In this literature review I will commence by giving the trends and current status of 
board research, followed by an examination of the literature on board roles, board 
culture, board improvement efforts and board dynamics. I will then briefly review 
contextual issues and finally report on the literature on females on boards.   
2.1. Focus of board research 
Despite the interest and emphasis on corporate governance reforms in the last 
decade, surprisingly little is understood about actual board behaviour and the effect 
of individual board members on board dynamics and culture (Pettigrew, 1992; Huse, 
1998; Daily et al., 2003;  Zelechowski & Bilimoria, 2004).  The research tradition on 
boards has developed around board structures and the effects of reforms such as 
increasing the level of non-executives and separating the chairman and CEO roles in 
order that board can fulfil its agency based control role.  Research has primarily 
relied on proxies, looking at board size, board composition (executives vs non-
executives), leadership structure (combined/separated chairman/CEO role) and, in 
some instances, demographics, and relating those to financial performance (Zahra & 
Pearce, 1989; Johnson et al., 1996; Johnson et al., 1996). Studies have also been 
done on the relationship between compliance with corporate governance provisions 
and financial performance (Gompers et al., 2003; Laing & Weir, 1999; Daily et al., 
2003), and relating board composition or demographics to compliance with corporate 
governance provisions (Singh & Vinnicombe, 2003).  Results have revealed largely 
inconsistent findings (Dalton et al., 1999; Dalton et al., 1998).  Great inferential leaps 
have been made from input variables such as board performance with no direct 
evidence on the processes and mechanisms which presumably link the inputs to the 
outputs (Pettigrew, 1992).  Phrases like “Board research at a cross roads” (Daily et 
al., 2003) and “The coming revolution in corporate governance” (Leblanc, 2004a) 
are common in contemporary board literature.  This has called for a string of 
qualitative research focusing on what boards or board members actually do rather 
than what they look like (e.g. Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003). 
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2.2. Roles of the board and its directors 
Research on actual board activities has been increasing in the last decade.  A good 
deal of this research is centred around the role of the board, and the context effect on 
the role of the non-executive directors.  This type of board research is largely rooted 
in board role theories such as agency theory (Fama & Jensen, 1983), stewardship 
theory (Davis et al., 1997) and resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978).  Although no definitive conclusion can be drawn from research on the role of 
the board and its directors, it can be inferred that boards are becoming more active 
and more aware of their responsibilities (Pye, 2000; Pettigrew & McNulty, 1995).  
Much of the nature of the board‟s role is becoming clearer and the paradoxes of 
being close enough to give valuable guidance and counsel, yet distant enough to 
provide sound assessment and evaluation, have been given attention (e.g. Demb & 
Neubauer, 1992a; Roberts et al., 2005).  While early studies emphasised the non-
executive‟s distinct roles of controlling, serving and advising (e.g. Zahra & Pearce, 
1989), later studies have stressed the importance of embracing the paradox that 
implicitly lies in the demands of the different roles (Roberts et al., 2005). Whilst 
independence, i.e. the capability to see things objectively and to foster openness, is 
seen as important, distinguishing the tasks and responsibilities of board members into 
the three conventional roles of serving, controlling and boundary spanning is 
considered less important (Stiles, 2001). Ultimately, involvement in strategy is found 
to lead to better developed, better thought out strategies which can be attributed to 
increased levels of discussion, scrutinising and questioning by the board (e.g. 
McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999; Siciliano, 2005).   
 
2.3. Traditional board culture 
Traditionally research has demonstrated that boards have been relatively inactive.  
Mace (1972, 1973) concluded that in theory the main roles of the board were: 
advisory to the president; providing discipline; and taking action in crisis, but in 
reality directors rarely had time for analysis and discerning questions were 
commonly regarded as unwelcome.  Lorsch & MacIver (1989) found boardroom 
culture to generally discourage directors from openly questioning and challenging 
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CEO performance or proposals.  Directors were found to lack a forum for discussion, 
and the reluctance to violate group norms created a potential for the delay in 
detecting problems or an upcoming crisis.   All too frequently the norms of delicate 
behaviours and taboos seemed to paralyse the board‟s abilities to act. Only when 
these norms were overcome was the board ready to deal with the crisis at hand 
Lorsch & MacIver (1989).    Hill (1995) found that consensus was the norm of 
executive groupings, and even though differences in opinion or perspective existed, 
they were rarely addressed within the boardroom.   The importance of board 
members being compatible with the board and working together on a consensual 
basis with collective responsibility was commonly stressed.   
 
Although boards, corporations and their environment and contexts have undergone 
much change since the 1970s (e.g. Westphal & Milton, 2000) the reality of 
boardrooms described by Mace (1971) and Lorsch & MacIver (1989) still seems to 
hold to some extent (e.g. Nadler et al., 2006; Hambrick et al., 1996).  The traditional 
culture of a board is represented by factors such as status and social recognition, 
closeness, membership and loyalty to the CEO.  According to Nadler et al. (2006), 
the survival mantra was to show up, get along with colleagues and refrain from 
asking exposing questions.  The culture of an actively engaged board, they claimed, 
is a very different one, being one that fosters openness, independence, integrity, 
accountability, action orientation as well as mutual trust and respect (Nadler et al., 
2006).   
 
2.4. Improvement efforts   
Despite countless attempts aimed at improving boards by structural methods, there 
are many that claim those efforts are useless. Sonnenfeld (2002) dismisses ideas of 
rules, regulations and structural board improvements to improve the effectiveness of 
a board.  The essence of effective boards, he claims, lies in the human factor and how 
people work together.  Great boards are those with a climate of trust and candour, 
those who foster a culture of open discussion, and encourage board members to look 
at issues from alternative perspectives (Sonnenfeld 2002).  Rules and regulations 
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have been driving organisations to make structural changes, but that does not imply 
that significant improvements in their informal systems have been made.  Boards are 
therefore following rules and regulations with a compliance mindset.  Many 
researchers share this view (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; Leblanc, 2004a; Letendre, 
2004; Murphy & McIntyre, 2007) and claim that governance research must look 
beyond the usual suspects (e.g. size, composition, leadership structure etc.) in order 
to explain board effectiveness (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003). Non-executive 
effectiveness is, in many ways, largely shaped by the board culture, according to Pye 
(2001b).  Furthermore, boards must ensure that individual members are held 
accountable and that they share information with other board members.  Finally they 
should constantly engage in evaluation of the board‟s own performance, for instance 
in terms of quality of discussion, credibility of reports, use of constructive 
professional conflict, interpersonal cohesion and level of knowledge (Sonnenfeld, 
2002). 
 
Although empirical research is scarce, there have been a number of theoretical papers 
on the issue and a few qualitative studies examining the factors that make boards 
effective.  In general, board efficiency can be attributed to two main factors, each 
consisting of a number of sub factors: the quality and traits of the individual board 
members on the one hand and the effectiveness or functionality of board processes 
and interactions on the other (e.g. Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; Murphy & McIntyre, 
2007).  Recommendations of theoretical and empirical papers are summarised below. 
2.4.1. Quality of individuals 
The required qualities of individual board members are adequate knowledge and 
skills, including complementary personal traits and abilities, independence of mind 
and an appropriate level of diversity.   
 
Theoretical papers have pointed out that effective corporate governance depends on 
the quality of the individuals (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003) and careful selection of 
board members (Cascio, 2004). Letendre (2004) claims that the crucial factor in 
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healthy and constructive boardroom dynamics is independent, intrepid, informed, 
and diverse directors willing to speak up when concerned or in doubt and willing to 
challenge each others‟ and management‟s assumptions. A review by Murphy & 
McIntyre (2007) suggested that teams should strive to have highly conscientious, 
agreeable, and open people, while valuing diversity in extroversion and emotional 
stability. In addition analytical and synthesising skills as well as personality traits 
have been considered as important (Murphy & McIntyre, 2007).   
 
The few empirical studies on board processes have supported these views.  Relative 
expertise and experience of non-executives and the skill and insight of the non-
executive of knowing when and how to intervene have been found to be an important 
factor in attaining power and influence on the board (Pettigrew & McNulty, 1995), 
and decision making processes are greatly influenced by the behavioural 
characteristics of individual directors (Leblanc & Gilles, 2005).  The actual depth 
and breadth of directors‟ knowledge as well as their ability to analyse and synthesise 
information has, in an extensive qualitative study of Canadian board members, been 
found to be one of the key features of successful boards (Maharaj, 2008b).  
 
A crucial attribute of an effective board member is to possess the ability to make 
independent decisions, or what Leblanc (2004a) calls: “the independence of 
judgement”. In addition to independence of mind, competencies and behaviours need 
to be emphasised as opposed to the “regulatory” independence of the non-executives.  
In order to be effective, boards must ensure that their directors are held accountable 
as individuals (Sonnenfeld 2002) and that they possess independence of mind, and a 
certain level of competence and behavioural characteristics (Letendre, 2004; Leblanc 
& Gilles, 2005; Maharaj, 2008b).  
 
Finally diversity, defined as a wide variety of human and social capital, experiences 
and values, has been shown to have a positive effect on boardroom dynamics (van 
der Walt & Ingley, 2003). Increased diversity can lead to a broader perspective on 
issues, richer sources of innovative ideas, broader levels of wisdom and increased 
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discussions that in turn would lead to better decision making (van der Walt & Ingley, 
2003; Letendre, 2004; Murphy & McIntyre, 2007). Although in some cases diversity 
has been associated with lower performance, it can be mitigated by the group sharing 
a common goal (Murphy & McIntyre, 2007).   
2.4.2. Functionality of board processes  
A number of factors have been defined as essentials of a functional board process. 
Among the most widely cited are: asking challenging questions, open discussion and 
active debate, appropriate levels of involvement, sufficient access to information, a 
shared goal, and the means for assessment and feedback (McNulty & Pettigrew, 
1999; Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; Roberts et al., 2005).   
 
Asking challenging questions has been defined as one of the key roles of boards 
(McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999; Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; Roberts et al., 2005; 
Maharaj, 2008a).   Asking informed but challenging questions phrased in the 
appropriate context, i.e. to probe for “what is being done?”, “why?” and “how does 
that affect so and so?”, can play a vital part in improving overall company 
performance (Roberts et al., 2005).   
 
In order to reach the stage of challenging questioning, the board needs to foster open 
discussion, candour and constructive debate  (e.g. Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; 
Sonnenfeld 2002; Rindova, 1999; Roberts, 2002; Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; 
Roberts et al., 2005; Siciliano, 2005; Nadler et al., 2006). Furthermore, the level of 
participation among board members at board meetings has been found to reduce the 
negative effects of groupthink, and to foster fluent transmission channels, 
independent thinking, the gathering and sharing of information, asking tough 
questions and questioning each other (Maharaj, 2008a).  According to the literature 
on group effectiveness, the degree of task conflict can play an important part in 
carrying out various roles; task conflict has been associated with higher group 
efficiency (Murphy & McIntyre, 2007).   The potential of conducting periodical 
executive sessions without the CEO has been suggested by Nadler et al. (2006). The 
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value of such meetings was seen as the opportunity to air and discuss concerns 
openly in a less tense atmosphere, opening up the possibility of detecting problems 
early enough to take essential or preventative action (Nadler et al., 2006).  
 
Another key issue for effective board performance has been defined as “finding the 
appropriate level of engagement”; establishing the parameters of the board‟s role 
and that of management (Nadler et al., 2006), as well as the appropriate level of 
strategic involvement (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003).  
 
An important part of a boards‟ effectiveness is adequate access to information 
(Demb & Neubauer, 1992a; Letendre, 2004; Leblanc 2004a) and adequate systems 
that can effectively deliver information for effective decision making (Aram & 
Cowen, 1986).  Nadler et al. (2006) claimed that the problem seemed to be that 
boards tended to get too much data but too little information. The effectiveness of 
non-executives has been defined in terms of their relative power established within a 
relationship, i.e. if they lack access to information or understanding of the nature of 
items on the corporate agenda, they cannot be expected to deliver maximum 
effectiveness. Despite the will and skill of  non-executives, they can be considerably 
more, or less, effective depending on the boardroom culture (Pye, 2001b). 
 
Emphasising that the board works together as a team with a common goal has 
been defined as an important part of board efficiency (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; 
Aram & Cowen, 1986).  A common goal can also counteract the negative effects of 
diversity and facilitate the constructive discussion of various views, and is positively 
linked to group performance (Murphy & McIntyre, 2007). Teams with high 
cooperative goals (mutually agreed upon goals) tend to discuss their opposing views 
open-mindedly and constructively, which in turn, develops confidence in the group 
dynamics that leads to effective team performance. But the limited research that has 
been performed suggests that directors themselves have differing and sometimes ill-
defined views of their roles (Murphy & McIntyre, 2007). 
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Finally, engaging in a feedback process and an evaluation of the board‟s own 
performance, for instance in terms of quality of discussion, credibility of reports, use 
of constructive professional conflict, interpersonal cohesion and level of knowledge, 
has been associated with improved board performance (Sonnenfeld, 2002; Cascio, 
2004; van der Walt & Ingley, 2002; Nadler et,al., 2006). In addition it is important 
for such reviews that directors have a clear sense of what is expected of them 
(Murphy & McIntyre, 2007).   
 
According to Leblanc & Gilles (2005), the essence of successful boards lies in the 
nature of how people on the board relate to each other, participate in discussion and 
reach decisions that will be affected by people‟s individual views, prejudices, 
behavioural patterns and cultural background.   The authors propose a model of 
board efficiency that is composed of board structure, board membership and board 
processes.  Board membership can be seen as the “competencies of individual 
directors”, whereas board processes are defined as: “the manners in which board 
organizes to, and actually does, make decisions” (Leblanc & Gilles, 2005:138).  In 
the authors‟ opinion, effective directors must possess independence of mind, and a 
certain level of competence and behavioural characteristics. 
 
In contrast, dysfunctional boards have been found to have detached, aloof directors 
who were lacking information in the conception stages of the crisis. The failing 
board put all its trust and confidence in management and demonstrated high levels of 
groupthink (Mellahi, 2005).   
 
2.5. Board Culture and Dynamics 
Culture, behaviour and dynamics are formed by the interactions between individual 
board members and the collective experience of the board as a group.  The board 
represents a group as a decision maker at the apex of corporations (Bainbridge, 
2002).  Boards are composed of individuals whose characteristics include capabilities 
and personalities that influence board dynamics (Leblanc & Gilles, 2005; Pye, 2004).  
Individual board members, however, have a tendency to define themselves as 
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individuals rather than as part of a united body (Alderfer, 1986), but that does not 
change the fact that, in order to be effective, those individuals do need to relate to 
each other and as such are a social entity (Hill, 1995).  In order for groups to make 
good decisions, they must not only be people equipped with knowledge, insight and 
diverse opinions, but also with the processes that actively promote the expression of 
diverse opinions (Atkinson & Atkinson, 2006).   
 
Non-executive effectiveness is in many ways shaped by the board culture (Pye, 
2001b). Having had a tradition of being relatively inactive (Smith, 1958; Mace, 
1971), boards have to a greater extent been empowered in recent times e.g. (Lorsch, 
1995; Pye, 2000). Boards that traditionally were CEO controlled seem to be in a 
somewhat transitional phase, as indicated by Pettigrew & McNulty (1995), who 
defined both minimalist and maximalist boards, depending on the level of 
CEO/board interaction.  Involvement is a prerequisite for empowerment, which in 
turn calls for higher levels of interaction and integration.  However, more needs to be 
understood in terms of board relationships, interactions, teamwork and decision 
making, and further research in the field has repeatedly be called for (e.g. 
Sonnenfeld, 2002; Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; Letendre, 2004; Leblanc, 2004a).  
 
Nicholson & Kiel (2004) propose a model that conceptualises the board as a social 
phenomenon.  The model is based on the premises that an effective board will have 
an effective fit between its intellectual capital and the role required of it based on 
contextual input variables.  The model seeks to explain how a board‟s intellectual 
capital influences board behaviours and how this behaviour is ultimately linked to 
corporate performance.  The contextual input variables that determine the firm‟s 
intellectual capital requirements and the role of the board are: organisation type, legal 
framework, constitution, history and strategy.  The board performs its roles by 
applying its intellectual capital to the tasks at hand.  The intellectual capital is 
composed of the board members‟ human, social and cultural capital as well as the 
board‟s social and structural capital. As boards are becoming increasingly active, 
there is a need for researchers to start taking an integrated approach towards the 
 273 
boards‟ set of roles instead of analysing the roles separately.  The authors propose 
that “effective governance results from a mix of intellectual capital that enables 
the board to carry out a set of roles dictated by the company’s individual 
circumstances” Nicholson & Kiel, 2004:443). The challenge in governance is to 
understand the roles required of a particular board and to match the intellectual 
capital accordingly.  
2.5.1. Groupthink 
Groupthink is prone to occur when there is a high level of similarity in terms of 
social and ideological background, when there is directive leadership, when the 
group becomes isolated from its external environment, and when the group is facing 
complex situations or high external pressure (Janis, 1972).  Among the symptoms of 
groupthink are illusions of invulnerability, an unquestioning belief in the morality of 
the group, a tendency for rationalising warnings and negatively stereotyping those 
who are opposed to the group‟s views.  Groupthink can result in consensus driven 
decisions and defective decision making (Janis, 1972). Groupthink can be minimised 
by assigning to all group members the role of “critical evaluator”, communicating 
with the external environment and by taking turns at playing the “devil‟s advocate” 
(Janis, 1972; Schwenk, 1989).  As boards have been found to be particularly 
susceptible to homosocial reproduction (the repeated selection of new members with 
similar characteristics to themselves), a cycle broken only when faced with crises 
(Murphy & McIntire, 2007), they may be particularly vulnerable to groupthink.  
2.5.2. Social ties   
Social ties to other board members have been found to facilitate influence at the 
board level but have been criticised for reducing levels of independence.  
 
Board members‟ social capital (Strebel, 2004) and ties to parties and individuals 
external or internal to the company can affect relationships within the boardroom.  
Social ties and social capital have been shown to influence the dynamics of a board, 
to facilitate discussion, lend credibility to individual directors, or affect which course 
of action is taken in particular matters (Westphal, 1999; Westphal & Milton, 2000; 
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Pye, 2004). Contrary to literature advocating board independence to increase 
effectiveness, Westphal (1999) found that social ties actually increased board 
involvement by encouraging collaboration between top managers and outside 
directors, thereby enhancing the provision of advice and counsel from outside 
directors.  Westphal & Milton (2000) suggested that minority influence on boards 
could be improved if minority members had previous experience of being in a 
minority position on a board, and if they had direct or indirect social network ties to 
majority directors through common memberships, for example of other boards.  In 
addition the biggest predictors of influence on a board have been found to be ties to 
others, membership in cliques, and prior relationships with other directors, but not 
independence from the company (Stevenson & Radin, 2009).  This study concluded 
that a greater density of strong ties might lead to higher levels of trust on the board. 
 
Pye (2001b) explored what effect external relationships have on the internal 
workings of the board. Her findings indicate that the effects of external relationships 
on the internal workings of the board are both complex and wide ranging. External 
relations are factors of social capital, and as such they clearly help individuals gain 
board appointments.  However, stronger relations also tend to be related to lower 
levels of independence and thus can, at the same time, serve to diminish credibility. 
The data offered evidence of powerful and tight networks of influence that affected 
board conduct and performance and Pye (2001b) suggests that examining social 
capital can contribute to the understanding of which line of action is taken and what 
form of discussion is practised.  
2.5.3. The Chairman/CEO dyad 
The chairman/CEO relationship provides leadership to the board and therefore sets 
the stage for the atmosphere and culture in the boardroom (Parker, 1990; Roberts & 
Stiles, 1999; Kakabadse et al., 2006a; Nadler et al., 2006).   Lorsch & MacIver 
(1989) concluded that in order to be effective, boards must be adequately involved at 
normal times to prevent trouble and crises.  In order to make this happen, much relies 
on the CEO or chairman to create inclusive working procedures and an atmosphere 
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of openness and dialogue. Hill (1995) found that elites existed within the board, 
primarily concentrated around the chairman and the CEO.  The chairman‟s role was 
considered to be a powerful one, particularly in terms of controlling the agenda as 
well as the nomination of non-executives and the appointment and dismissal of the 
CEO.  The way the chairman and chief executive work together has been defined as 
the board‟s single most important relationship (Hill 1995). 
 
Directors have been found to describe the expectations towards their performance as 
contextual, indicating that there are different cultures amongst different kinds of 
boards, in many cases driven by the chairman, CEO or the chairman/CEO dyad (Pye, 
2001b).  The role of the chairman in activating the potential of the non-executive 
directors was highlighted by Pye (2000). Organising away-days and keeping regular 
informal contact with the non-executives was seen as the role of competitive 
chairmen (Pye, 2000).  Leblanc & Gilles (2005) defined two types of chairmen; the 
functional conductor and the dysfunctional caretaker.  The conductor was found to 
possess the ability to involve other directors in the discussions and to effectively 
orchestrate the discussion and decision making process, where as the caretaker’s 
main characteristic was a lack of leadership abilities in general (Leblanc & Gilles, 
2005).   
 
2.6. Context 
Boards are by no means insulated and static entities, but rather dynamic social 
constructions that are affected by their environment and context (e.g. Jonsson, 2005; 
Jonnergard et al., 2004).  Several researchers have reported that boards tend to 
become more active in the event of crises (Minichilli & Hansen, 2007; Pettigrew & 
McNulty, 1995; Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Mace, 1971). Companies‟ circumstances 
and life-cycle phases have been shown to have an effect on board tasks and activities 
(Huse, 1998; Huse & Zattoni, 2008) as well as firm and industry contexts (Minichilli 
et al., 2009). 
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Pye & Pettigrew (2005) stressed the importance of attention to the issues of context 
and process over time and their relationship to outcomes, and cautioned against the 
attempt to over generalise from qualitative data without paying due attention to 
context and time. Pye (2001a) concluded that “you cannot step into the same river 
twice”, meaning that context and time will always have an impact on the study. 
 
In a notable study of context and time, Pye (2000) reported that the business 
environment had undergone significant changes over a ten year period which had 
largely affected the way boards were composed and how they worked.  A large 
indicator of change in focus was the fact that while the phrases “strategic focus”, 
“shareholder value” and “corporate governance” were a commonality to almost all 
interviews in 1999, they were practically non-existent ten years earlier.  Boards were, 
in general, found to be smaller in the later study, with a higher proportion of non-
executives and greater frequency of meetings. Directors‟ ages and tenure were found 
to be lower and a much greater emphasis was put on the “value added role” of the 
board members.  Women, who had been basically been non-existent in the earlier 
study were, however, still largely absent from the corporate board of directors.  In 
terms of activities and dynamics, non-executive directors were found to have become 
much more influential in decision making whereas previously they were either allies 
of the chairmen or connected to “the right networks”.   Furthermore the selection of 
directors seemed to follow a more structured approach than before.  Formal 
evaluation was, however, largely absent and only one out of the nine boards was 
practicing the use of a formal board evaluation process (Pye, 2000).    
   
2.7. Board gender demographics 
There is no doubt about the fact that the proportion of females on corporate boards 
has to date been low.  On the boards where females are present they have been 
represented in token proportions (Singh & Vinnicombe, 2006; Dalton & Daily, 1998; 
Daily et al., 1999).  In search of explanations for low numbers, literature has looked 
at female director advancement strategies (Catalyst, 2004b; Powell & Butterfield, 
2003; Vinnicombe, 2003; Vinnicombe et al., 2000; Ragins et al., 1998)  effects of 
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national culture (Terjesen & Singh, 2008) and an examination of the background and 
qualifications of female directors (Burgess & Tharenou, 2002; Burke, 1995. 2000; 
Kesner, 1988; Zelechowski & Bilimoria, 2004; Grosvold et al., 2007; Erkut et al., 
2008).   
 
A number of studies have sought to demonstrate the business case for female 
directors (Brammer et al., 2009; Luis-Carnicer et al., 2008; Campbell & Minguez-
Vera, 2008; Francoeur et al., 2008; Rose, 2007; Point & Singh, 2003; Bilimoria, 
2000; Singh & Vinnicombe, 2004; Carter et al., 2003; Schrader et al., 1997). 
Although it might be assumed that the studies dealt with roles and contribution, in 
fact these studies only attempted to link the number of women on boards to corporate 
performance or compliance to corporate governance procedures. This is a far cry 
from explaining a causal relationship between the two, so not surprisingly findings 
are inconsistent. 
 
There are, however, indications that gender demographics and the proportions of 
females on boards and other working groups can have an effect on relative power.  
The work of Ely (1995) and Kanter  (1977) demonstrates that the relative proportions 
of females in the workplace and in positions of power can, to a great extent, restrict 
or facilitate the input and effectiveness of females.  
 
In her seminal study, Kanter (1977) pointed to the relationship between women‟s 
behaviour and effectiveness, and their numerical representations in corporations.  At 
managerial levels, where female representation was low, women were found to be 
marginalised by the dominating majority of men.  They commonly held the status of 
tokens (with a numerical minority of 15% or less), and thus were confronted with 
features such as high visibility, and being stereotyped through excessive contrasting 
of the attributes that characterised them as a group, leading for instance to excessive 
performance pressures.  Kanter argued that only by establishing a critical mass of 
females, with the tipping point of around 35%, could symptoms of tokenism be 
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overcome and suggested that “Batch rather than one-by-one hiring of women for 
top positions should be the rule” (Kanter, 1977:282). 
 
In her research on professional women in either the male dominated or sex integrated 
upper echelons of law firms, Ely (1995) examined how women‟s presence in 
positions of power affected the social construction of gender difference and the 
processes that created and sustained women‟s gender identity at work.  She found 
that women in male dominated firms were more likely to perceive greater 
psychological and behavioural differences between men and women – women in 
male-dominated firms evaluated women‟s attributes less favourably and had 
carefully circumscribed gender roles. Women in sex-integrated firms, however, 
experienced less ambivalence about gender identity and were more inclined to 
integrate expressions of masculinity with expressions of femininity. They also 
considered feminine attributes to be a source of strength and competence, and 
experienced higher work satisfaction and less anger and frustrations about 
requirements to adapt masculine roles.  Overall Ely‟s findings suggest that in sex-
integrated firms the more fluid construction of gender might foster a more positive 
view of women and a higher level of their perceived and overall effectiveness.  
 
In a recent study (Konrad et al., 2008; Erkut et al., 2008; Konrad & Kramer, 2006) 
on Fortune 1000 board members, the effect of having three or more women on a 
board was demonstrated.  The study suggested that two women on a board, as 
opposed to one, increased the women‟s feelings of inclusion and comfort, provided 
validation and decreased stereotyping, resulting in a greater impact on the board.  
However, symptoms of tokenism still prevailed – women still had to work hard to be 
heard and had to be careful in keeping a certain level of distance from each other in 
order to avoid being seen as conspirators.   When the number of women on the board 
reached three or more, a critical mass seemed to have been achieved.  The women 
were more comfortable being themselves and associating with one another, the 
likelihood of stereotyping was drastically reduced and the women felt free to be more 
active, raise issues and felt they were being heard.  Even more interestingly, reaching 
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this critical mass seemed to have an impact on the males as well resulting in their 
adoption of a more collaborative style.   In addition it seemed to have an overall 
positive impact on the discussion and dynamics in the boardroom, shifting it to a 
more female oriented style “Women’s tendencies to collaborate, to ask difficult 
questions and to raise a broader set of issues start to become the boardroom 
norm.” (Konrad et al., 2008:155). 
 
These results suggest that numbers can play a critical role in terms of effectiveness 
and dynamics and that attention to gender composition might be needed to improve 
effectiveness, not only of females, but of boards in general. 
 
2.8. Female effectiveness on boards   
The question of how female directors are affecting the role, dynamics and results of 
boards is only partially answered.  Researchers have looked at input and contribution 
with regard to female issues, role models, balancing work and family, social 
responsibility and female customer issues. They found that although female directors 
see these issues as important, they were not likely to draw attention to them at board 
level (Burke, 1994a, 1997; McGregor et al., 1997; Bilimoria, 2006).  Female board 
members have been associated with being more philanthropically driven (Ibrahim & 
Angelidis, 1994), advocating CSR activities  (Kakabadse et al., 2006b), enhancing 
levels of charitable contributions made by companies (Wang & Coffey, 1992) and 
broadening the discussions to a wider set of stakeholders (Konrad & Kramer, 2006). 
 
Studies have indicated that female directors are making an effort to enhance board 
effectiveness by facilitating a comfortable atmosphere (Bilimoria & Huse, 1997), 
developing a more collaborative approach to leadership (Konrad & Kramer, 2006)  
and more importantly not being afraid to ask difficult and probing questions 
(Bilimoria & Huse, 1997; Huse & Solberg, 2006; Konrad et al., 2008; Erkut et al., 
2008). 
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Some studies have indicated that female directors were largely coping with the 
director role by assimilating male behaviours and not rocking the boat (Bradshaw & 
Wicks, 2000). Some have attributed the lack of correlation between the number of 
women on boards and financial performance to masculine socialisation of high 
ranking women, resulting in identical male and female behaviour (Rose, 2007). 
Others (e.g. McGregor, 2003) have found younger women to bring a more informal 
attitude as well as creativity and new ways of thinking, emphasising outcomes rather 
than rituals. 
 
A few studies have implied that the efforts of women were not being leveraged on 
the board.  Zelechowski & Bilimoria (2003) found that the influence factor of the 
individual and the inclusion factor of the board culture had a great effect on female 
contributions and concluded that despite being in the highest position, and despite 
being highly influential, women directors could not attain full effectiveness in non-
inclusive cultures.   Konrad et al., (2008) found that valuable contributions by 
females were less likely to emerge if the number of women on the board was limited 
to one or two.  The critical mass of three will not only increase the likelihood of 
being heard, being able to raise issues and feeling comfortable enough to associate 
with other members but can also affect males on the board by encouraging them to 
adapt a more collaborative style, and can have an overall positive effect on board 
discussion and dynamics.  Finally females‟ contributions have been found to be 
highly dependent on the women‟s ability and willingness to make alliances with the 
most influential actors and by understanding the boardroom dynamics from a 
gendered perspective (Huse & Solberg, 2006).  These findings are supported by 
studies like those of Marshall (1995) and Sheridan (2001) who indicate that women 
were not always welcome in the upper echelons, feeling as constantly being tested 
out and as if they had interrupted the “normal life” of the senior men who had no 
willingness to develop a culture in which women could be included more equally.  
 
What can be concluded from these studies is that female directors feel women are 
bringing a new/different perspective into the boardroom, and to some extent 
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fostering a more open culture.  At the same time they seem to be facing rather 
conservative and quite masculine rules and norms of behaviour, and experiencing 
non inclusive cultures. As research has shown, there seem to be indications that 
barriers could be broken down through influencing behaviour, high levels of 
preparation and/or by possessing or earning high levels of social capital.   
 
As previous sections of this literature review have shown, without a critical mass and 
alterations to traditional rules and norms, valuable contributions of females and 
possible improvements to overall board dynamics are highly probable to be marginal 
or even completely lost.  
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3. Findings of “Project 2” 
Project 2 set out to explore (and answer) the research question of; how non-executive 
board members interpret their roles and contribution as individuals and examining 
in that context, the nature of female vs. male role interpretation.   
 
The findings indicated that, in terms of basic role interpretation, male and female 
non-executives did not differ a great deal.  Males and females alike seemed to hold 
the view that guarding shareholders‟ interests is their number one priority, while at 
the same time providing an advisory and a consulting role, as well as bringing 
alternative perspectives to the discussion. Contrary to previous findings that females 
were more likely to bring a more philanthropic emphasis to the boardroom (Ibrahim 
& Angelidis, 1994), advocating CSR activities (Kakabadse et al., 2006b) or affecting 
charitable contributions made by companies (Wang & Coffey, 1992), there was no 
indication that females were more philanthropically driven or more likely than the 
males to emphasise the interests of other stakeholders, as attention to the interests of 
other stakeholders was mentioned as a secondary function by both males and 
females.  There was no indication either that the females thought they were playing a 
role in advocating female issues or serving as role models for women in the 
corporation.  (Burke, 1994a; 1997; Bilimoria, 2006; McGregor et al., 1997). 
Females, however, differed from males by reporting contributions to a comfortable 
atmosphere in the boardroom as well as practising active questioning, probing the 
management and pushing management for better preparation and improved decision 
making. This is in line with the findings of Bilimoria & Huse (1997). 
 
Males reported a high level of strategic input, and input on a very wide and general 
level, whereas females reported providing a more specific input based on their 
knowledge and skills within a certain business area.  Furthermore the males 
identified relationship building, informal interaction and trust amongst board 
members as key ingredients of successfully fulfilling their roles which is in line with 
previous findings that social ties increased effectiveness (Westphal, 1999; Westphal 
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& Milton, 2000; Pye, 2004; Stevenson & Radin, 2009). In contrast, the females 
reported that relationships with other directors other than interactions at board 
meetings were lacking.  Authority and effectiveness seemed to be taken for granted 
by males, but seemed to need effort and reaffirmation by the females.    
 
From the results of Project 2, it could be concluded that the boards examined were 
very much male dominated from a social perspective.  The few females on the board 
had very low levels of social relations with other board members, used specific skills 
to justify their presence on the board and had to work towards earning trust and 
credibility much taken for granted by the males.   
 
It could thus be inferred that valuable inputs from female non-executives, such as 
probing and asking critical questions (Finkelstein & Mooney 2003; McNulty & 
Pettigrew, 1999; Roberts et al., 2005; Maharaj, 2008a) might be lost due to lack of 
inclusion in the social interactions between board members, defined as essential by 
male non-executives (Sheridan, 2001; Marshall, 1984).  
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4. Framing the research question 
Project 2 built on previous examinations of the non-executive role (e.g. Demb & 
Neubauer, 1992a; Roberts et al., 2005) and aimed to answer calls for clarity of the 
level of analysis (Pye & Pettigrew, 2005) focusing on the individual, and the 
individual‟s interpretation of his or her role and contribution on the board.  It also 
attempted to add to the understanding of contextual factors (Pye, 2000, 2001a) 
particularly in relation to the nature of role interpretation and perceived contributions 
by males and females on male dominated boards.   
 
The contextual factors, however, are multiple and then there is also the issue of time 
to be considered.  Pye & Pettigrew (2005) stressed the importance of attention to the 
issues of context and process over time, and their relationship to outcomes, and 
cautioned against any attempt to over-generalise from qualitative data without paying 
due attention to context and time. Pye (2001a) concluded that you cannot step into 
the same river twice,  meaning that context and time will always have an impact on 
the study. 
 
As it happens, in the two years that have passed since I conducted the interviews for 
Project 2, some drastic changes have occurred in the macro economy that have led to 
some fundamental effects on a number of boards.   My curiosity was awoken when, 
suddenly, the gender composition of the boards of three large companies was 
drastically shifted and females were appointed to higher proportions than ever before 
seen on boards of large Icelandic companies.    
 
When the three major companies in the country went bankrupt in October 2008 and 
were subsequently taken over by the government, their entire boards were dismissed 
and new ones appointed. The percentage of females on the three boards is now 40%, 
60% and 100%.   Furthermore, the individuals that have been appointed to the 
restructured boards have different backgrounds to those who were dismissed, for 
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instance many come from academic positions.  This drastic shift can almost be 
compared to a laboratory experiment set up.   
 
My initial thoughts on the situation revolved around issues such as: What effects, if 
any, would this gender composition shift have on role interpretation and individual 
contributions?  It became particularly interesting to examine if this shift had an effect 
on the putative muting of females‟ contribution found in Project 2.  This led me to 
the following research question which is the focal question of this study:   
 
How does board gender demography affect individual role interpretation and 
what type of impact does it have on female director contribution? 
 
On the boards of the three companies, females comprise 100% (5 of 5), 60% (3 of 5) 
and 40% (2 of 5) board members.  In Project 2 the representation of women on the 
focal boards was 20% or less.  By comparing the findings of an interview study of 
the newly appointed members to reconstructed boards with the findings from Project 
2, patterns regarding similarities and differences could be detected.   
 
However gender composition was not the only factor that had changed since the 
interviews for Project 2 were conducted –  as already noted there have been some 
drastic changes in the macro environment since then.  The Icelandic economy is not 
only faced with difficulties due to a worldwide recession, but has also faced a 
complete meltdown of its financial sector.  This might potentially affect individual 
contribution and the way roles are interpreted.  In order to buffer the effects of the 
macroeconomic changes I decided to add to my sample male and female board 
members from boards where women were represented in token or minority positions 
(20-30%) of companies that had also been hit by the financial crisis.   
 
Finally, what must be kept in mind are the unusual circumstances of the new boards‟ 
conception and what criteria were used for selection of their members, i.e. the 
previous boards being entirely dismissed and new boards consisting of individuals 
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coming from a rather different background from the “traditional” board member.   
This is a contrasting factor to the boards of the other companies examined in this 
study, whose boards could in terms of composition be considered to be quite similar 
to those of the Project 2 study, i.e. consisting of members that were either large 
shareholders themselves, appointed by large shareholders, were employees of large 
shareholders, or appointed as independent non-executives.  How this affected 
individual role interpretation and director contribution was at the beginning of the 
study not clear, but was kept in mind throughout the analysis as a possible 
influencing factor.   
  
In this study interviewees were chosen based on two criteria: 
a) For the first group, membership of the newly formed boards where the 
gender composition and selection criteria had been drastically changed 
b) For the second group, membership of boards of other large Icelandic 
companies, also facing difficulties due to the economic downturn but still 
staying afloat.  
All the focal boards had five board members, all of them non-executive. 
 
This paper reports the findings of an empirical study based on interviews with 14 
board members, eight individuals from the newly appointed gender balanced or all 
female boards (five females and three males), and six individuals from male 
dominated boards of four other large Icelandic companies (three females and three 
males).  The results are compared and contrasted with the findings of Project 2, an 
empirical study based on interviews with 11 board members from male dominated 
boards of large Icelandic companies conducted from late 2006 to early 2007, (six 
females and five males). 
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Table 23: An overview of the samples from Project 2 and Project 3.   
 
The findings of Project 2 suggested that although female non-executives‟ basic 
understanding of their roles and responsibilities was similar to that of males, they 
were generally assuming auxiliary roles and to a great extent were, or felt, left out of 
social networks and actual power clusters, leading to the possibility that more crucial 
contributions such as asking challenging questions were not realised.   
 
This project sets out to examine if and how substantial changes in a gender 
demographic context (following the dramatic changes in the economic climate) could 
have an effect on individual role interpretation and the actual contributions of female 
board members.  It draws on three sets of literature; the literature of the non-
executive role, the literature on board behaviours and dynamics, and the literature on 
females on corporate boards.   
 
Project 2
Time of study Nov 2006-Apr 2007
Type of company Large Icelandic companies Large Icelandic companies
Gender 
demography
Male dominated boards   
females in token position (20%)
Male dominated boards     
females in token or minority 
position (20%)
Balanced boards 
males and females 
40-60% All female boards                   
Females in study 6 3 3 2
Males in study 5 3 3 0
Project 3
March-May 2009
Large Icelandic companies
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5. Research method  
5.1. Selecting the sample 
The study is conducted on board members of two types of companies. 
 
1) From the three newly formed boards of resurrected companies, now government 
owned. On these three boards women represent 40%, 60% and 100% of board 
members.   
 
2) From boards of four of the 50 largest (by revenue) companies in Iceland.  All 
these boards included only one woman, comprising 20% of the board.   
 
The size of corporate boards in Iceland ranges from three to nine people, with five as 
the most common size. Boards consist only of non-executive directors. While it is 
allowed by Icelandic corporate law to have the CEO serve as a board member, 
common practice is to have the CEO attend and participate in all board meetings, but 
not as a formal member. The dual chairman/CEO role is prohibited by Icelandic 
corporate law. 
 
A total of 14 non-executive board members were interviewed; eight from the newly 
formed boards and six from boards of other large companies.  Five of the directors of 
the newly formed boards were females and three were males.  From the boards of the 
other companies three were females and three were male.   
 
Many of the interviewees served on multiple boards, including all of the members 
from other companies, and about half of the members of the newly formed boards 
held multiple board seats on major boards. Individual members served on two to six 
major boards and more than 35 boards of substantially large companies were 
represented. 
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5.2. Conducting the interviews 
The interviews all took place between March and May 2009, either at the 
interviewees‟ working facilities or at the interviewer‟s office. The interviews were 
semi structured and followed a pre-developed interview schedule (see appendix 1). 
However, the interviewees were allowed to deviate from the schedule and the 
interviewer probed with additional questions when interesting topics came up. Since 
the interviewees had been selected based on their presence on a particular board, they 
were asked to keep that board in mind as a focal board, but also encouraged to 
compare and contrast the focal board with other boards that they currently or recently 
served on. As it turned out, most of the board members had substantial board 
experience and drew their comments and insights from various boards.  
 
The interview schedule contained questions around the following: why the person 
was asked to serve on a particular board, the purpose and role they have on the board 
and what they do to fulfil it;  how they behave and interact in a typical board meeting 
and how their behaviour compares to that of other board members;  what type of 
relationships they have with other board members, to whom they feel accountable as 
a board member; what they have gained from serving on the board; and, what would 
be their greatest contribution or added value to the board. 
 
The interviews were audio taped and the recordings lasted 45-65 minutes, with two 
exceptions where the interviews lasted around 30 minutes. The interviews were 
conducted in Icelandic, which is the native language of all interviewees.  Quotes 
were translated into English by the author and checked by the supervisor.   
 
5.3. The interviewees 
The interviewees were selected based on their presence on the seven focal boards 
that were picked from the pool of the 50 largest companies in Iceland. The focal 
boards consisted of five non-executive board members, none of them including the 
CEO as a formal board member. 
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The eight female interviewees were aged from 42-56 years, with an average age of 
47 years. All but one had substantial business experience. Six had completed a 
master‟s degree and two had completed an undergraduate degree. All of the females 
serving on the new boards had a master‟s degree. Only one of the women had 
substantial international work experience. No particular patterns or similarities could 
be detected in their career descriptions. Four of the interviewees served on at least 
three substantial boards at the time of the interview. One of the female interviewees 
served as board chairman, whilst three other had extensive experiences as chairmen.  
 
The five male interviewees were aged 52-63 years, with an average age of 56 years. 
Three, all from the other boards, had extensive business experience, but the three 
males on the new boards ranged from having substantial to average, and low levels 
of business experience.  Two of the directors from established boards had completed 
an undergraduate degree and one a master‟s degree, the three directors of the new 
boards had master‟s degrees or PhDs.  Two of the male interviewees served as 
chairmen on the focal board.  One had substantial international work experience.   
 
5.4. Analysing the data 
The interviews were audio recorded and transcribed in full (in Icelandic).  The text 
was transferred to the NVivo software tool intended for analysis of qualitative data, 
in order to facilitate structuring of emerging themes.   
 
As with the previous empirical study, the analytical process mainly followed a 
structure described in Easterby-Smith et al., (2002:123-124).  Although the previous 
study provided practice in analysing and picking up and constructing themes, it did 
by no means dictate the way that data from this study was analysed.  Indeed, while 
some themes re-emerged, many new themes surfaced while others disappeared.  The 
steps in the process I conducted were the following: 
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The first step was to read through the transcripts two or three times with the aim of 
familiarising with the content and the general tone and attitude of the interviewee.  
Subsequently notes were made on possible themes and headings for the forthcoming 
coding.   
 
The second step was to reflect on the data and informally relate it to the literature 
that had been previously covered.  Did the same themes emerge or were there 
different themes? 
 
The next step was to transfer the transcripts into NVivo, and conduct the initial 
coding.  All transcribed text was covered and coded into free-nodes with the 
exceptions of the few comments that were obviously out of context with the main 
objective of the interviews.  Free-nodes were then subsequently constructed into tree-
nodes.  At the end of this phase the following themes (tree-nodes) had emerged: 
 Authority 
 Civic duty 
 Confidence 
 Ways of contributing 
 Control and criticism 
 Dynamics and discussion 
 Gender related issues 
 Independence 
 Increased level of responsibility 
 Pre-meeting discussions 
 Reaffirmation 
 Relationships 
 Responsibilities 
 Role elaboration 
 Trust 
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After the initial coding a second coding was conducted which led to rearranging and 
combining some of the tree-nodes, and splitting some tree-nodes into subthemes 
(child-nodes).  The following are two examples of tree-nodes and their child-nodes: 
 Ways of contributing 
o Strategic 
o Specific contributions 
o Pushing for better results 
o Project management 
o Good preparation 
o Improving structures and ethics  
o Asking critical questions 
o Attention to detail 
 
 Dynamics and discussion 
o Tactics 
o Structure 
o Professionalism 
o Openness and honesty 
o Diversity 
 
The third level was to analyse the themes and subthemes and arrange them into 
chapter headings for the write-up (see chapter V).  Some child-nodes were related 
and brought together under the same chapter heading.  Some child-nodes contained 
very little data and/or comments from interviewees and did not add any substance to 
the analysis.  These were few and were, therefore, omitted due to lack of significance 
to the theme of the study. 
 
Under each chapter heading, a presentation of the issue was made and the issue was 
backed up with selected quotes from the transcripts that illustrated that particular 
point.   Care was taken to disguise any mention of particular persons or corporations, 
or other information that could reveal the interviewee‟s identity.   
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A reassessment of the themes and chapter headings was made by going through the 
nodes again to make sure no relevant points had been missed or overlooked. 
 
5.5. Translation and researcher’s bias 
Since the interviews were conducted and transcribed in Icelandic, the native tongue 
of the interviewer and interviewees, illustrative quotes needed to be translated into 
English.  The translation was done by the author.  Care was taken to be as accurate in 
the translation as possible, without losing the content and meaning of the quotes.  No 
particular difficulties arose in the translation process. 
 
As already mentioned, some of the interviewees were personally known to the 
interviewer, while others were informal acquaintances or unknown to the 
interviewee.  For the most part, interviewees saw the interviewer as a person of 
relatively high academic standard, with pure theoretical interest in the interviewee 
and his or her board activities.   All interviewees were candid and open in their 
narratives, although some were less outspoken than others.  Although outspokenness 
could to a large extent be attributed to the interviewee‟s personality, it could be 
detected that those interviewees who were known to the interviewer were generally 
more outspoken and talkative.   
 
Analysing data is always prone to biases due to the expectations and preconceived 
ideas of the researcher.  My approach was to observe the data with curiosity and an 
open mind.  The result was that indeed many of the issues and themes emerging 
came as an interesting surprise to the researcher.   
 
5.6. Elaborating on the group.   
Due to the nature of the sample it can easily be split into two subgroups.  Hereafter 
the newly formed boards will be referred to as gender balanced or female dominated 
boards and the other boards will be referred to as male dominated boards 
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a. Directors of gender balanced and female dominated boards (new 
boards) vs. directors of male dominated boards (other boards) 
b. male directors/female directors 
 
By the same logic it can also be divided into the four following subgroups 
i. females on gender balanced and female dominated boards (new 
boards) 
ii. males on gender balanced boards (new boards) 
iii. females on male dominated boards (other boards) 
iv. males on male dominated boards (other boards) 
 
Figure 13: Interviewee subgroups. 
Gender integrated /     female 
dominated boards
Male dominated boards
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e
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a
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6. Findings 
 
The main findings of this study indicate that few differences were found between the 
male and female directors on gender balanced boards, in terms of role interpretation, 
as being effective and being accountable.  Some differences and some similarities 
were found between males and females on male dominated boards, and the same can 
be said for females on gender balanced/female dominated boards and females on 
male dominated boards.  Differences far exceeded similarities between males on 
gender balanced and male dominated boards. 
 
I will start reporting the findings by attending to some context related issues.  I will 
then report the findings on basic and particular role interpretations, accountability 
and relationships and compare those to the corresponding findings of Project 2.  I 
will then proceed to an elaboration on boardroom dynamics emerging from this 
study. Finally I will illustrate the changing nature of reaffirmation of board members 
and the emerging issue of increased confidence of females on gender balanced and 
female dominated boards. 
 
6.1. Context related issues 
Before moving on to report the findings on role interpretation, there were two issues 
that emerged in all subgroups that had to do with the changed macroeconomic 
context, i.e. a more turbulent economic situation and the troubled situation that some 
of the companies were in.  These issues were the increased meeting frequency of 
boards and concerns related to increased demands on boards, and the higher level of 
responsibility due to turbulence in the economy. 
6.1.1. Meeting frequency   
In most cases boards were meeting much more frequently due to the fact that the 
companies were struggling.  The newly formed boards had met every week since 
their appointment in late October/early November 2008.  Many of the other boards 
had adopted a similar frequency, meeting every one or two weeks to deal with high 
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levels of pressing issues, while others that were in better shape were staying with a 
monthly meeting frequency.  Meetings were reported to be quite long, four to six 
hours or longer.   
6.1.2. Increased responsibility 
The issue of higher demands on board members and increased responsibilities of 
boards was mentioned by many board members, particularly those with high levels 
of board experience, and those serving on the male dominated boards.   
Well generally with private companies the responsibility is so much greater, 
much greater with board members in times like these, because you have a 
much higher chance of the board members being prosecuted even though they 
haven’t done anything wrong, because we face the risk that companies will 
go bankrupt,  and will not be able to pay their taxes.  F1 
 
In principle it is always a huge responsibility to serve on a board, as we are 
seeing more and more clearly in these times. M1 
 
But I am quite sure that we will be seeing the effects for a long time, in such a 
way that people will become much more careful. There are going to be 
lawsuits, much more than we have seen before. M6 
 
So the case today is that everyone is very aware of their responsibility. It 
varies between companies and their situation.  People ask more about their 
responsibility as board members, what a board member can be held 
accountable for. People are thinking about insurance matters and so on.  F3  
 
The view that boards had traditionally not been living up to expectations was also 
reported. 
But serving on a board, I think that it is a huge responsibility […] There is all 
too often in my opinion too much sloppiness going on and that is very 
irresponsible when companies have reached a certain level, not to mention 
being listed. This needs to be put in order.  M5 
 
It has been the tendency here pretty much just: “Let’s pick this guy for the 
board, it is this guy’s turn”.  People have not being thinking about the 
responsibility and the role.  F8 
 
Well in general – I hope and I think there are some improvements being made 
[…] I feel that in all too many companies have been affected, that the board 
is not effective enough.  M6   
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6.2. Basic role interpretation  
As in Project 2, similarities could be detected between all subgroups in terms of 
general role interpretations.  The interviewees seemed to have embraced the 
paradoxical role of keeping control and holding management accountable as well as 
supporting, advising and participating in strategy.   
6.2.1. Holding management accountable 
Males and females from all types of board shared the view that one of the main roles 
of boards was to hold management accountable.  This illustrates the fact that in terms 
of general role interpretation, the agency view of keeping control of management is 
defined as a basic role not affected by context. 
 
But it is of course important that you make sure that they [the management] 
are delivering the best results. F1  
 
If the board had no other role than to monitor the forecast and results, then 
that would be a full task.  M5  
 
And then there is the control part with regard to the income statement and the 
balance sheet and make sure that laws are obeyed. M2 
 
Of course it is one of the board’s main roles to review the financials.  […] 
And then there is all this routine control.  F6 
 
6.2.2. Supporting management 
Although not elaborated on by as many interviewees, supporting management was 
seen as an almost equally important task.  
But it [the board] should give him [the CEO] feedback and even to set limits, 
and I think a good manager can appreciate this; everybody needs some sort 
of feedback.  M2 
 
Number two is the management team, you need to collaborate and motivate 
the team […] and the other thing I always make sure that I do is, because 
some people think boards just have a control role, I do not share that 
opinion, I think boards also have a supporting role, that is just part of who I 
am, I pat people on the back and I think that it is just perfectly normal to do 
so.   F4 
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It’s of course number one to support the CEO of the company and to give this 
control which is very important, and to try to, and I think this is very 
important, to be in good contact with management not just the CEO but 
rather to get a feel for the management team.  F8  
 
6.2.3. Strategy involvement 
As demonstrated in the quotes above, the strategy function was widely mentioned by 
both males and females from all types of boards.   
To make sure that there is a strategy and a strategy process, it varies a great 
deal how much attention boards give to this task.  Some are just too lazy to 
think about it. But I think board members should participate, they will learn a 
great deal about the company.  F8 
 
Yes, yes, yes really important, draft the strategy for the next five years or so 
and then you just break it down to how you open in the morning and close at 
night. M1  
 
It is just right now, really important, this clear vision of where we are going.  
F4  
 
And then it is of course the strategy which is really important, to know where 
we are going – so it is the big picture discussion which you need at least once 
or twice a year.  You know, the short-term, and the long-term goals.  F6  
 
This finding is quite different from the findings reported in Project 2 where the 
females commented very little about their strategy role.   
6.2.4. Attention to detail   
Due to the notion that females often take on the role of attending to detail whereas 
males may be more inclined to look at the big picture, interviewees were probed on 
this issue.  However, there was no indication that females adopted a more detail 
oriented role.  Generally the participants were very aware of the importance of 
looking at the big picture and seeing things from a general perspective rather than 
from a detailed or specific viewpoint.   
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6.3. Particular roles 
In addition to the basic roles of controlling, supporting and participating in strategy, 
several other key roles were defined.  In contrast with the basic roles, the emphasis 
on these roles differed substantially amongst subgroups.  
6.3.1. Asking questions 
In Project 2, one of the key roles defined by females was to ask critical questions, a 
role that none of the males in Project 2 elaborated significantly on.  In this project it 
was again the females (from both subgroups), and more surprisingly also the males 
from the gender balanced boards that highlighted this issue, whereas the males 
from the male dominated boards made hardly any comment on this matter.   Asking 
questions was defined as a key element in opening up discussions, analysing and as a 
tool to improve decision making.   
What is really important to me is to ask a lot – I consider it to be one of my 
main duties – (…)– to ask until I understand it, so I can make my decision 
with a certain level of confidence, so I can be certain that the right things are 
being done, and it really applies to the entire board, everybody asks a lot.  F2 
 
You open up the discussion, and then you ask: “Do you think it is right 
to…?”  F7 
 
It is just to think it over; you know, put forward the right questions and you 
are on the alert with regard to what you are doing. F6   
 
You participate in discussion, ask questions, and gradually the board reaches 
a conclusion – and well – I feel I have contributed like other members – Yes, 
sort of advanced matters – then a decision is reached and I feel that these 
questions have sort of supported this decision making. M3 
 
Well, how do I contribute?  I contribute by active participation, by asking 
questions, and I do a lot of that. […]…there is plenty of time for discussion, 
for all enquiries and people do not hesitate, I don’t hesitate to ask questions 
that I consider relevant. M4 
 
Many of the females from the male dominated boards commented on the fact that 
their questioning was not always welcomed and in fact sometimes seen as an 
anomaly from accepted behaviour.  This provided the indication that questioning was 
traditionally not seen as part of the board culture.  The two first quotes below are 
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from male dominated boards and the later two from gender balanced or female 
dominated boards. 
Well I do obviously want some clear answers – This is often where the 
problem lies, you perhaps go and ask questions that people are not quite 
ready to answer. F6 
 
You get, you know: “Ohh, is she asking all those questions!”- But that really 
is the role of the board to ask.  But people sometimes take it like something 
personal. We are there to ask, also the silly questions.  F8  
 
And I think it is a characteristic of this board that we ask a great deal. Some 
[managers] might not be comfortable with that, and in fact many of them are 
not.  F2 
 
[In general] it is all too easy to come into this and say practically nothing, 
just be there for the ride to some extent, and I know it is not easy to play the 
role of the boring person who asks the difficult questions and is different, 
particularly in the environment we have been in for the past 2-3 years. F4 
 
The only male from a male dominated board to elaborate on questioning as a board 
role commented on the issue very late in the interview and in the context of boards 
needing to do a lot more questioning, supporting the notion that a culture of 
questioning was not the norm.   
I am quite sure that critical questioning by board members has been severely 
lacking.  You don’t need to fight like cats and dogs, I just mean that solid well 
worded and critical questions that experienced people have the cleverness to 
ask, and review things in that manner.  M5 
 
Without being probed on the issue, some of the females voiced their view on how 
they thought women tended to ask more, and that men cared less about the questions.   
I think we [women] ask more.  In my experience I feel the men generally ask 
less during meetings. I am not saying this to badmouth anybody, but I think 
we do ask more.   F2 
 
Because we [women] bring a very different view to the table.  We dig into 
matters, we are better at asking questions, we are more careful you know, 
while the guys are: “Come on, what’s the problem, just go for it!” – I mean 
we need both.  F8 
 
You know with these things I sometimes feel the guys are more like: “Oh! this 
doesn’t matter at all, quit the questioning.” This is why I am quite sure that it 
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was much easier at (board T) to change the entire board rather than to have 
me there asking questions F6  
 
6.3.2. Bringing specific knowledge and skills 
Specific knowledge and skills were mentioned by many of the board members, males 
and females alike, but never in the context of a main contribution or reason for being 
appointed to the board.  This is contradictory to the findings in Project 2 where 
women were found to have a tendency to highlight a particular set of knowledge and 
skills as the main reason for their appointment or value creation on the board.  On the 
other hand, in Project 3 the female interviewees most often referred to a broad level 
of knowledge and skills as their main source of credibility.   
So it is more about getting things up and running, to be able to have 
knowledge or opinions in different fields instead of being an expert in one 
field and not making sense of the others.  F6 
 
So I think they were looking for someone who could make a general 
contribution in order to strengthen the board. F1 
 
6.3.3. Rebuilding trust; ethics, transparency and consistent processes 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the role that was most elaborated on by the members of the 
gender balanced and all female boards collectively was the role of rebuilding trust, 
restructuring processes and making sure that delicate matters were handled in a fair 
and consistent manner.   
That is one of our most important tasks, to regain trust. It’s a key element for 
[the company] to be trusted. If there is no trust there is no company.  I think it 
is really important particularly now to construct these processes so the main 
guidelines are clear and you can explain these to the staff and customers, and 
we can be sure that people are using the same methods from top to bottom. 
And I think if people gradually feel that we are using the same methods over 
and over again, we will in spite of everything gain some trust.  F2 
 
I am very concerned that the board gains trust, it is really important to me 
and I hope that my actions will demonstrate this. I am very keen to make sure 
that there is no discrimination or anything of that sort, and that the processes 
ensure that everyone gets treated comparably. M3  
 
So we are working on a transparent process – there are just all sorts of 
requirements…that were not considered before.  F4 
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We know we are being watched closely so we try to do things very carefully 
and professionally.  Like in (a particular case) it was very important to make 
sure that the procedures were being scrutinised and that we had a well 
documented, open and transparent procedure.  F5 
 
And I have made a special point of getting an international professional to 
review all corporate governance procedures, so you could shamelessly say, 
to anyone, that this company complies with all international governance 
standards.  M4 
 
To regain the employees’ trust, regain the trust of customers…  F4 
 
This type of role interpretation, shared by both males and females on gender 
balanced boards and by females on the all female board, can be considered to be 
somewhat similar to the emphasis that the women in Project 2 put on improving 
board performance.   
6.3.4. Getting involved 
The males on the male dominated boards were particularly vocal about being 
involved in decision making and one could speculate that they were becoming overly 
involved or even taking a driving seat.   
In companies (E) and (F) [there is involvement] on daily basis, our system is 
such that we participate a lot in the companies’ operations.  In most cases we 
have daily contact with the management teams which is just part of the job – 
it takes up a lot of time. M1 
 
And then I think it is generally very important that board members are very 
knowledgeable about the company’s affairs and try to get involved in issues 
according to their strengths and expertise.  M6 
 
Like in company (G) – all [a certain type of decision]… we have the board 
involved in that, and really dig into it.  M1  
 
Some of the comments related to increased involvement due to the crisis situation: 
The boards are becoming much more active and a lot more supportive of the 
management team because the responsibility is huge.  M1 
 
Of course the thing is that lately, these issues now I mean the most recent, it 
is just so unlike everything else you have dealt with before, because of the 
tough environment and how bad the shape of the companies is so it has 
completely changed.  Under normal circumstances you plan to spend about 
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one day a month on the tasks but now, I think I have spent on this one board 
up to two months of work during a four month period.  M6 
 
Two of the males described at great length examples of how they had been involved 
in decision-making processes on certain occasions; most cannot be quoted for 
confidentiality reasons but here is an example.   
We had the first big blow last spring, so we (the board) have been on the case 
24/7 since.  (…) and we have been reacting ever since, so it has been a year 
now that the board has been involved in all operations in this period.  MX 
 
6.3.5. Being assigned to specific tasks 
Interestingly, two of the three females from male dominated boards had been 
assigned the particular task of attending to board processes, preparation of material, 
taking care of the meeting minutes and attending to follow-up matters at the board 
level.  
Well there is a certain logic behind having someone attend to the board 
processes, so the role is to make sure that the subcommittees, the audit 
committee and the remuneration committee are in order, and of course I have 
a bigger role than the other board members, ensuring that the preparation of 
meetings is in order, that the board members receive the documents in 
advance, and just overall making sure things are in order. F3 
 
I sort of have this control role, I see it that way, […] my strength is more on 
the accounting and financial side. […] If I look back a little I have experience 
in being a board secretary...and now I have this particular task of organising 
and preparing for the entire board meeting.   F6 
 
Although being assigned these specific tasks of taking care of processes and details, 
both individuals seemed very aware of the importance of long-term and big picture 
matters and participated (in some instances) more on discussions of these matters.   
I do have an opinion on all matters so I don’t focus [on the financials] at 
least not consciously, but I definitely note that other board members 
sometimes refer to my expertise when it comes to something that has to do 
with accounting procedures.   F3 
 
An interesting thing was that these two women seemed to have developed a tactic to 
prepare important issues in dialogues with other board members before addressing 
them at meetings. 
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I think generally we women do things differently from men.  You have not 
been making the phone calls before meetings to secure your position, you just 
want to come to the meeting, you have been busy with other matters, and then 
you come to the meeting and just want to get things done.  But then as 
experience and age teaches you, you realise that you might have to talk to 
some people and prepare them: I am going to ask this particular question, so 
do you think you can have the answers ready.  So one part is to maybe review 
the matter with the CEO before the meeting… so you don’t catch him off 
guard and he gets all defensive.  So I can just sense that if I make a point of 
preparing them before I bring the matter forward, then they can actually turn 
it into their own point, you see. F6 
 
I am not sure there is a certain tactic, but I think you need to be involved in 
the dialogue.  And I would say – you don’t dive into it in the first meeting of a 
new company or a new board.  It sort of comes gradually, you just interact, 
but I am fortunate to know the company and its operations well, so that helps.  
You also often try to have conversations before the meeting, that is a part of 
it.  F3   
 
These quotes illustrate that adapting a political behaviour in order to be effective in a 
male dominated board can be a strategy to become more effective.   
 
6.4. Accountability 
One of the contextual factors that are under examination in this project is the context 
of reasons and circumstances for appointments.  This is why I have chosen to report 
specifically on the interviewees‟ elaborations on why they thought they were 
appointed to the board and to whom they felt accountable.   
6.4.1. Why are they there? 
Males and female of the newly formed boards unanimously mentioned two things as 
being the most critical factors regarding why they were asked to serve on the board.  
These were high levels of professional experience and the fact that they were seen as 
relatively independent, undisputed and had not been involved in politics or high 
powered business circles for the past five to ten years.  In addition most of them 
mentioned that it was through referrals and recommendations that their names had 
come up when the government was searching for new board members that portrayed 
“professionalism and independence”.   
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I believe that it was references; I believe it made a difference that I had not 
been active in the financial sector when the big blows happened – but my 
experience and knowledge were useful. F1 
 
I at least think that he wanted someone who was honest and had never been 
involved in something dubious or dishonest so you could doubt the moral 
standards of the person…And that I am not connected to any of the big 
business circles that were in the playing field, so I should be in a neutral 
position.  F2 
 
Well, I was known to the minister and it may have to do with the fact that he 
knew I had experience in the sector – And when the crash hit […] I had a 
certain level of detachment. M2 
 
Without a doubt the underlying assumption was that it was people that had 
knowledge and skills to take on the task and also a requirement that these 
people hadn’t had anything to do with it before. F5 
 
So I assume in the light of my education and experience I am considered a 
professional and I am not connected to any political party either.  M4 
 
It is to have this variety, not just the education; it is also the attitude and the 
experience, more importantly the experience. F7  
 
I think it was that I have extensive experience in the sector […] so sector 
experience, and I know I was on a reference list with a few people, and when 
they get together and you know people from various places have wide 
connections, not just through one channel, there is a higher chance that you 
are seen and undisputed and not sort of connected to anyone in particular.  
And frankly I think it simply was the fact that I have the ability to get people 
to work together and that I have worked with groups of people to build trust.  
F4   
 
The members on the male dominated boards, in contrast were much more vague in 
why they were chosen to be on a particular board, one mentioned being a shareholder 
as the only reason, while others, both males and females, spoke at a fairly general 
level about experience, knowledge, education and general factors such as being a 
visionary or a problem solver. There was however no indication from the three 
females here that they had been appointed because of factors such as specific 
knowledge and skills, in contrast to the explanations by the females in Project 2. 
I assume that it partially has to do with experience and somewhere the 
education got you started.  Today I would say experience, I do think so, but of 
course you hope that you have been able to contribute your vision, that you 
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have developed over time and that your contribution is of value and 
appreciated. M5 
 
They are getting a person that has extensive – has developed a reasonably 
extensive experience (…) and I am in fact reasonably strategic as well. F3 
 
Well I think I would have to say experience and knowledge – just here, 
internationally, in all types of different positions.  F8 
 
Uhh – you know I am just not sure, I think one must definitely be experience. 
M6 
 
An issue that clearly set the members of the male dominated boards apart from the 
others was their high level of involvement with the particular company; many of the 
interviewees were former employees, employees of holding companies owning the 
focal company or had some other long-term connections or insights into the 
company‟s operations.   
It is clearly through my job responsibilities, it started out by being appointed 
the CFO and this has developed in such a way because I have good rapport 
with the shareholders.  F3 
 
 The boards I currently serve on are part of my job responsibilities. M5 
 
 Naturally in the cases of (A) and (B) it is clearly a part of the job.   F6 
 
But of course it has to do with the fact that I have my professional experience 
from (company Y) and it also had to do with the fact that I am proud of 
having worked for (Z) for all those years which was great schooling for me.  
M6 
 
With (company K), I managed the buying process [when working for the 
buyer] so that was a consequence because I had the knowledge and personal 
contacts.  F8  
 
6.4.2. To whom do they feel accountable? 
There were notable differences between members of newly formed boards and the 
other boards in terms of to whom they felt accountable as directors.  But the answers 
of males and females within each group did not differ. Without exception, the non-
executive board members identified shareholders as their number one priority, 
followed by other stakeholders such as customers, employees, society etc.  This is 
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very much in line with the findings of Project 2. 
The owner, just like I said before, just the number one stakeholder is the 
owner, than you need to take into consideration that there can be more 
stakeholders, particularly creditors, the environment and it somehow comes 
in this order.  M5 
 
The owner, yes, yes, that is where the biggest stakes are, it is the owner that 
is to say; the shareholder.  M1 
 
It is the stockholders, stockholders there is no doubt.  (…) but then you of 
course have to keep in mind I think the interests of customers and employees, 
and people have also contemplated the fact that companies can have a great 
effect and importance for a small country like Iceland so I think people need 
to – This responsibility can be a bit subjective but it is none the less extensive 
if you look at it that way.  M6 
 
Well if you think about it that way it is two things, perhaps the stockholders 
and then other stakeholders perhaps.  F3 
 
You sort of look at it in such a way that you are sort of responsible towards 
the owner who asks me to serve on the board, make sure that his affairs are 
well attended to, but at the same time you are there as an individual, but I 
just hope these two things go hand in hand.  F6 
 
It is of course owners, stockholders – yes I think I have sort of always thought 
of it that way and of course you are to a certain extent responsible towards 
the employees. If the company is not profitable, then it is irresponsible not to 
do something about it. People will lose their jobs if it doesn’t work out and 
the owners are putting down money to gain returns. F8  
 
The members of the gender balanced and the female only boards were, however, 
very clear that their top priority was the company and their own conscience, followed 
in some instances by accountability to society and the general public. 
Still we are always processing this in the interests of the company. F1 
 
My role is strictly to think about the interest of the company. … Towards the 
company.  I am not accountable to anyone else - if I do this properly that 
concludes my responsibility.  F2 
 
I am first and foremost responsible towards the company as such. M2 
 
I assume I am there to look out for the interests of the company and then you 
are there to try to fit these decisions and these views that are voiced, and 
make sure they are fair and just.  My allegiance is first and foremost towards 
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the company.  M3 
 
And then it is our interests, the company’s long-term interests.  F4 
 
The board is first and foremost there for the company and takes care of the 
company’s interest. That is role number one.  F5 
 
It is core, the objective of protecting the company’s interests…that is the first 
objective.  …I am first and foremost responsible towards the company as 
such and then society.  F6 
 
The fact that the restructured companies are now government owned explains to a 
great extent why the interviewees did not identify shareholders as being among their 
top priorities, and in some cases they explicitly commented that the position of the 
shareholder was of low priority or should even be countered.  
I think I should even go against the interest of the shareholder if I think he is 
making decisions that I feel are wrong with regard to the interests of the 
company. M2 
 
The interesting part is how explicit the members of the new boards were about being 
accountable to themselves and their own conscience.   
I am first and foremost responsible towards myself. That is completely clear 
in my mind. F4  
 
The public, the general public is my boss - And my own conscience.  M4   
 
Yes that is right it (my conscience) plays a very strong role – I would without 
hesitation resign if there is something I dislike and am not willing to take part 
in.  F1 
 
My responsibility towards the shareholder is non-existent, except to the point 
that I am responsible towards myself and a potential personal liability that I 
can create with my actions. M2 
 
Loyalty to the company and their own conscience surfaced again in the following 
discussion of how they cherished the fact that they were independent from the 
government as the owner or from politicians as the government‟s representatives.  
They were very vocal on the fact that they would only answer to the company and 
their own conscience, and were not willing to make any compromises.   
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6.4.3. Independence 
Although the members of the new boards had been appointed by the political parties, 
proportional to their representation in parliament at the time of appointment, there 
was ample evidence that in spite of that fact, they were anything but willing to be 
puppets of politicians or the government.   
God forbid I would ever fall into the trap of being a puppet for the owners, if 
there was something being done that I disliked I would without hesitation 
resign.  F1 
 
I think for instance that I should go against the interest of the shareholder if I 
think he is making decisions that I feel are wrong with regard to the 
company’s interests. Then he needs to assemble a shareholder meeting. M2 
 
I serve on the board of this company and there is no one who can tell me 
what to do, no one, no one.  I do not accept any instructions or messages with 
regard to how I should approach issues.  I am completely free and 
unattached.  M4 
 
What I do fear most on behalf of the company is that the politicians start 
interfering and I am quite determined that when they make the first pass I am 
out of here, I will not participate in a political mumbo jumbo. Then they can 
just shove it! F7  
 
Some even voiced concerns if pawns of politicians were to take over.   
But then something else happens, there are loads of people waiting on the 
sidelines ready to participate and that is a grave danger – If that happens the 
people with integrity will be gone and replaced by some puppets ready to lick 
the boots of the politicians. I am really afraid of that.  F7  
 
6.5. Relationships 
To clarify the social capital of interviewees, they were asked about the nature and 
level of their business and professional networks. All but three, one male and two 
females (one from a male dominated board and one from a gender balanced board), 
reported that their network was extensive or very extensive.   
I would say I was rather high average – I think so – I know a great number of 
people. F1 
 
It is very extensive…I don’t know, it is very large…because I have been 
serving on so many boards, and projects and within the government, all type 
of things, so I know a lot of people. F2  
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In Iceland I would say it is average now, because I have been working 
abroad for some time, but it used to be [5 years ago] quite extensive.  
M2 
 
I am gradually discovering how extensive it is – and it’s a bit peculiar. F4 
 
I consider myself to be quite significantly connected to the business society, to 
tell you the truth I have as a matter of fact significant connections.  M4 
 
I think very many people know who I am. F7 
 
In Project 2, an interesting pattern of differences between males and females 
emerged. Males and females seemed to talk about relationships from quite different 
perspectives.  Although having good relationships with members of the board was 
seen as being important and of value by both males and females, the males stressed 
and acknowledged the importance of having a good relationship with other board 
members to a much greater extent than the females did, and went into substantially 
more depth in describing the importance of relationships. The way females spoke 
about relationships on the board indicated that the level of interaction with other 
board members (most often all males) was at a minimum level, whereas males 
described interactions between board meetings and relationship building on a social 
level to be of utmost importance and a prerequisite for establishing trust.   
 
Interestingly, there seemed to be a whole different pattern amongst the interviewees 
in this study.  The three males on the male dominated boards reported relationships 
and informal interactions to be of high importance. In contrast the level of 
interactions between board meetings was reported low by all the females and males 
on the gender balanced boards and the all female board, and social interaction was 
almost non-existent.   
 
It needs to be noted that meetings of the new boards were quite frequent, due to the 
extensive tasks they are facing.  On the one hand the frequency can explain the low 
levels of interaction between members, but on the other, the grave situation could 
call for higher levels of informal interaction.  Nevertheless the interviewees reported 
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that the level of interaction was low with the exception of an occasional e-mail or 
phone call when the board needed to be informed about something or a practical 
matter needed to be resolved.   
Nothing worth mentioning, occasionally there will be a few emails sent 
between people, but that is rather the exception than the rule.  M3  
 
I would have to say rather low, because you are just attending to other 
matters, and often it is in the hands of the chairman.  F6   
 
It’s not a lot, not at all, but it might happen that people make phone calls 
regarding specific matters. M4   
 
Yes it exists when needed, then you just call…but not a lot, but it happens. F7   
 
The women on the male dominated boards also reported low levels of relationships 
and informal interactions, and some expressed the need for more informal 
interactions.   
It [informal interactions] is, it is rarely at a significant level.  It just depends 
on the issues we are working on, then it is just relating to that particular 
issue, but we rarely leave cases open but if they are then we interact, 
otherwise we don’t, so generally there is little.  F3 
 
I would say rather low, I think. It is also because you are attending to other 
matters and it is more in the hands of the chairman how active he is in 
communicating with the other board members.  F6 
 
I think there is way too little in fact. F8   
 
Although most of the participants had defined their business and professional 
network as high or very high, people on the gender balanced boards and the all 
female board had in general not known their fellow board members prior to being 
appointed.  Of course there were the exceptions of some people being former or, in a 
one case current, colleagues, and there were some instances of loose 
acquaintanceships between people, but these cases were limited to one or two people 
for each board member.  Social interactions were non-existent even between people 
that were formally acquainted, with the exception of one board having gone out to 
dinner once.   
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The situation was quite different for the males on the male dominated boards, who in 
fact could all be considered to belong to the more traditional male business network. 
But a lot of interactions between [meetings], so for all these boards, that 
would be typical (…) Because there [in a particular context] we work a lot 
together, sit on boards together and have some social interactions.  M1 
 
They are I would think, if people know one another it is quite all right, I mean 
they make calls and just discuss things in general, I think that is beneficial.  – 
Just very good. (…)  and I think when people (on the board) get to know each 
other, the board becomes more effective and people sort of come around and 
find the rhythm – I think it will work better.  M6 
 
One female from a female dominated board, who had extensive experience on other 
boards, explained that if preparation was thorough and the communication and 
discussions during board meetings was honest and open, less informal 
communication was needed.   
Sometimes it matters, but often it can be quite sufficient to attend meetings 
and prepare – because there is a lot of open discussion [on this board] and it 
is really the case that we can discuss matters in full at the meetings.  F2 
 
The board consisting only of females had, however, made a point of meeting 
informally as a group to discuss their approach.  
But perhaps, we [women] perhaps ask about different matters, we [the 
board] are actively discussing how we should approach matters and such 
things, and we have met outside the boardroom, even at a café, to go through 
some matters.  And it is also a new experience for me to be on an all female 
board, I have usually been the only female. FX1  
 
And we have met informally [interviewer: Does that matter?]  Yes, because 
sometimes you need to go deeper, talk to the individual not the board 
member.   FX2 
 
6.6. Boardroom Dynamics 
All the interviewees from the gender balanced and all female boards elaborated quite 
extensively on the dynamics and interactions at board meetings, whereas the 
members of the male dominated boards made much fewer comments on dynamics 
and in the few cases when they were mentioned, they were on a very general level. 
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6.6.1. Effective dynamics 
The members of the gender balanced and female dominated boards particularly 
reported a board culture characterised by openness, active participation, candour and 
collaboration.   
  …so I have never felt it is difficult to get attention, and it has worked 
extremely well and everybody is sort of on the same level I think…so I would 
definitely say that this is a good working team. F5   
 
I think the entire group is participating on a similar level, we get 
presentations from the executives, and then the entire board participates in 
questioning, it is rather informal, you don’t need to ask for permission to 
speak…” M3  
 
We need to be able to discuss matters without somebody worrying about what 
is permitted to be said and what is not – so I have tried to conduct it in such a 
way.  F4 
 
But the board is quite coordinated – right from the beginning we have had 
extremely good cooperation.  People have been relatively straightforward 
and open.  M2  
 
Somehow everybody got into their role and commented in a natural manner 
or as they felt they should. F1  
 
But I do think it is important when we are facing such huge matters…that 
everybody speaks their mind. Then you can assess all aspects… […]…we are 
just a much stronger team this way – there is no shyness, at least it washed 
off quickly, and people are quite open and frank, you know – The group is 
very motivated to put their thoughts on the table.  F7   
 
They also elaborated on the board as a whole being very active in putting questions 
forward. 
So we try to get to the point that you can trust that the decision is right…But 
the approach is of course just that people are vocal, they ask and try to figure 
out the context. […] And when we have met informally we just let it all out. 
We allow ourselves to ask about all matters, even “hearsays” that is just the 
way it is.  […]  And I think it is a characteristic of this board that we ask a 
great deal, some [managers] might not be comfortable with that but you just 
have to ask.  F2 
 
[Generally] it is so easy just to come in and be passive, just tag along and I 
know it is not easy to be the one asking the strange questions and be different.  
F4 
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Well it is a five people board so we have plenty of time for all discussions, all 
questions and people do not hesitate to ask.  M4  
 
Some mentioned that the board had high levels of diversity which positively affected 
the discussions.   
I would say that the board I serve on has a very good mixture. […]  I think it 
happened by coincidence, and I would say that it turned out very well in our 
case. We have people with different backgrounds, generally well educated but 
with very different experience, people coming from all over, and that is very 
important, you see it now, both men and women…you hear so often about 
these homogenous boards. Now I just see it, I would just say: “God help us if 
we were just five of the same type of people”, you know what happens very 
quickly is just that people will be “Uh, well I agree, I agree...” because 
people don’t see the other view.   F7 
 
I think that in a few instances we have heard more people’s philosophy on 
life, and it has been portrayed in how we think matters should be resolved 
[…] but it doesn’t happen very often but actually it would be rather 
preferable not to have everybody the same on the board anyway.  M2 
 
We are a harmonious team, the work has gone extremely well, particularly 
taking into consideration the political aspect. When you take people from 
here and there, it is not a given that they will work well together, but we work 
extremely well together, we interact and voice our opinions, that is not a 
problem.  And we do not always share the same opinions but we have been 
very successful working our way out of the problems and we are unbelievably 
unanimous when it comes to principles.  F5 
 
Despite low levels of previous or informal relationships, reported by male 
interviewees in Project 2 as being a prerequisite of developing trust in the 
boardroom, the members of gender balanced and female dominated boards seemed to 
have a developed a high level of trust.  
We have, I think, amongst us I think we have complete trust.  We say all 
things comfortable or uncomfortable. If we need to excuse someone from the 
meeting we do that as needed.  We think it is important that there is a high 
level of trust and I think we have it.  But not to the extent that it is too much 
and you start making the wrong decisions. No “Bay of Pigs” nonsense! F2  
 
My feeling is that we trust one another, there is nothing else going on.  No 
one is leery towards other people or anything of the sort.  M3 
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There is complete trust amongst us, for instance because we have been able 
to discuss very delicate matters and there has been no leakage.  There is 
complete trust between us. And that is one of the reason we work as well as 
we do.  F5  
 
And I think perhaps it surfaces not least in the sensation we have at meetings 
of: here we are - here we are to take on the tasks that were appointed to us, 
each in his or her own way, and the mutual understanding that there is trust 
amongst people and faith in the work done and decisions being made, and 
that decisions are carefully and deliberately made, taking into account all 
relevant considerations. M4   
 
It was interesting to note that the members of the gender balanced and all female 
boards, although coming from a diverse background seemed to share visions and 
values around the principles of how to run a board.   They also seemed to have taken 
time to discuss these things and noted that they had, most often early in the process, 
openly discussed objectives, goals, procedures and confidentiality, reported 
particularly by the females.   
I have made a point of approaching matters in such a manner that I am 
looking at them from the interest of the company, and the interest of the 
general public who is the owner, what people would consider reasonable.  
Fortunately the whole board has shared this view, so we were in harmony 
from day one, which is quite extraordinary.  […] F1 
 
But we try to be careful that the decision we make each time is the right one.  
On the other hand what we try to avoid, and you will hear that I use the term 
WE a lot, because we have discussed how we are going to approach decision 
making.  F2   
 
I knew two people before and the other two I didn’t know and what is 
different about this board compared to many other boards is that, even 
though it doesn’t look like it from the outside, we all have the same agenda, 
that is to rebuild the company – there is nothing complicated about that. 
[Board X – a newly formed board]… we have developed this through 
discussion and we have just emphasised an open and candid discussion.  F4 
 
And I’ve been thinking about this, because I was appointed to [board X – a 
newly formed board] the other day and we started immediately talking about 
the importance of confidentiality so people could speak freely at meetings – 
And I thought it was really positive and that is the way we did it at [the board 
meeting] when we started.  And of course we have allowed ourselves to speak 
very freely, we just say what we feel like saying.  F1  
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The thing was that we knew this [a particular decision] was the acid test, and 
we just spoke very openly about it: It is going to be tough and we need to do 
it carefully. […]   And we have just discussed it, sometimes you know, if we 
feel bad about matters, we keep it on the table too.  F5 
 
And that is really clear – we discussed it at length and we are quite 
determined if we ever start getting phone calls and instructions behind the 
scene then: No! Then we will just assemble a shareholders’ meeting and 
make the decision there.  F7 
 
A number of the females reported that their experience on a gender balanced or an all 
female board was quite different from what they had experienced on other (male 
dominated) boards in terms of open interactions.   
On this board perhaps the interactions are more open than in so many of the 
boards I have served on previously.  Maybe it is because we are trying to 
make sure that things are in good order.  F2  
 
No [open interactions are not the norm] I have sat in on meetings where, well 
of course it depends on the ownership as well, but yes sometimes it is just 
either the CEO or the chairman that drives the show and you really have to 
make an effort to put in a word.  And everything has been decided 
beforehand, what needs to be got through at the board meeting.  But that is 
not the case in this board, but I have seen it elsewhere. I have been in many 
board meetings, and some of the time the board is just a show off.  F7 
 
What is different about this board compared to many other boards is that, 
even if it doesn’t look like it from the outside, we do all have the same 
agenda. F4 
 
One female even mentioned that she was managing to get her ideas and concerns 
more easily across than in her previous positions where she had been the only female 
on the board. 
[We are making] …a lot of this type of decision that I am very content with, 
that WE are quite content with.  Some of the decisions we have made recently 
are of the kind that I have advocated for a long time [on other boards]. There 
were various issues that I was fighting for and never got through at [board 
Y], but I get to drive them home here.  I got very little support for some issues 
at [board Y]. F2 
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6.6.2. Counter dynamics 
As already noted, the interviewees from male dominated boards were not at all as 
vocal about dynamics and interactions. Two of the females, however, elaborated 
quite a bit on their experiences of feeling their questioning was not welcomed and 
was rather seen as annoyance or stalling.   
You see a tendency for communication between the chairman and the CEO, 
which is – of course they plan meetings but they need to make sure that all 
board members are informed about important issues, but it is like some 
people think it is officiousness, you are asking too many questions etc. […] 
Sort of – Oh, is she asking all those questions - but it really is the role of the 
board to ask.  But people sometimes take it like something personal. We are 
there to ask, also the silly questions.  F8  
 
Anyway I wanted to ask and find out why things are the way they are. […] 
Well I wanted some straight answers, this is where the problems lie, perhaps 
you often ask questions which people are not quite ready to answer. […]  
Like I said, sometimes it is like you are being excessively officious, but I 
choose to look at it in a way that you are trying to improve the operations 
and point to things that can be improved…and you are not always looking for 
someone to blame, you are trying to help people to manage their affairs 
properly. F6  
 
One female particularly and persistently talked about the lack of open discussion and 
that things could be improved by taking more time to discuss objectives, procedures 
etc.    
So you could make huge improvements if people sat down in the beginning 
and just reviewed how are we going to work together, and meeting without 
the CEO I think, and just discuss how they are going to work together – those 
traditions are missing […] Everyone is doing their best but you need a 
framework, a common vision and to open up the discussion.  It is like when 
someone is afraid to ask at school – you sometimes get this feeling, how am I 
supposed to act here?  And then everyone tries to emulate everyone else. […] 
I have never been on a board where people have sat down and discussed 
these issues.  F8  
 
She also commented on wanting to make improvements but not receiving interest or 
support in that regard.   
I would like to see a lot of improvements in how we structure things and such, 
but I am not exerting myself in changing everything. (Interviewer: why not?)  
Well I have often thought about it, of course. I have had my way in certain  
issues in a subtle way and made some improvements, but maybe people 
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haven’t felt the need for change because things were going so well. 
(Interviewer: do you get more support now that things are not going so well?) 
I don’t know, not necessarily, I’m not sure, no; perhaps it remains to be seen.  
F8 
 
When talking about dynamics and interactions, the males on male dominated boards 
were very vocal on the importance of a good interaction, relationship and trust 
between the chairman and the CEO.   
And like I have been saying, it is the chairman and the CEO, they need to be 
in touch more often than around board meetings and the trust between these 
two needs to be absolute – I mean absolute or good so to speak – so you have 
a certain level of certainty between the two that their minds are aligned and 
things are discussed at the right moments.  M5 
 
I think, well – I think it is good if it is in such a way that the chairman works 
closely with the CEO.  He is sort of the communicator to the board.  The 
CEO has to be able to discuss with the chairman: How should we handle 
these things? Should we take it to the board? Should we call a board meeting 
and clear the issue? So I think that is the best way, it is the absolutely most 
important thing that you have good cooperation between these two.  M6 
 
And I maintain daily contact with the CEO, and we perhaps conduct this 
together and then I communicate to the board. (…) It is a lot of work in this 
type of company at this point in time, and I really conduct it with him [the 
CEO].  M1 
 
Obviously since all these three have extensive experiences as chairmen it might 
come naturally to them to emphasise the chairman/CEO relationship.  It should, 
however, be noted that some of their comments imply that the board comes 
secondary to the chairman/CEO dialogue, which creates the danger of underutilising 
or muting the board. This is precisely the comment of one of the female on a male 
dominated board who happened to have extensive experience as a chairman herself. 
It varies a bit how CEO’s deal with it, I think generally they are not 
knowledgeable enough about how to work with a board, they just come there 
and think everyone has previous board experience…When is it OK to just talk 
to the chairman or how should the communication process be? – They are not 
fully aware of the board’s responsibility and perhaps that you need to inform 
everyone, not just the chairman.  You have sort of seen the tendency for the 
dialogue between the two, which is really, I mean of course the need to 
prepare the meetings – but you need to inform all board members of 
important matters, but it is like some people think it is officiousness to ask too 
much…  F8 
 319 
6.7. Confidence & Reaffirmation 
6.7.1. Reaffirmation 
Interviewees were not particularly vocal on how they knew they were being 
successful as board members. Although some people mentioned financial results, and 
contributing to creating a company, as their main indicator of success, matters 
relating to boardroom dynamics, such as having an input, moving the discussion 
forward, probing for answers and rationalisation of decisions was more common.  
 
A few people, most from male dominated boards mentioned financial results. 
Mainly, first and foremost it is the accounts; the income statement and 
balance sheet, at the end of the day are the criteria for all things – no matter 
what.  M1 
 
Well I am always so practical. It’s just the financial returns, although you 
might have episodes of different emphasis.  F3 
 
Results? Perhaps I am too single minded in that, but I clearly define results in 
terms of financial returns. M5 
 
[In general] I would have to say that operational results, that you are 
running the company in an efficient way and with enough returns – that is the 
criteria I use, yes.  This way I feel we can see if we are being successful in 
general, or not.  There is just nothing that beats that. F1 
 
At these companies the financial situation is still very unclear and financial 
information is scarce.  This in many cases forced people to look for other indicators 
of success, like in this one instance, of external feedback and self reassurance.   
I pay attention to the public discussion of the company…I pay attention to 
how openly people are willing to speak to me…Yes, it is sort of a feeling.  Do 
I feel comfortable at the end of meetings? If I do then – I don’t know how to 
approach it differently – I mean, we don’t have a proper balance sheet yet, 
hello!!! F4 
 
Unlike in Project 2, where it was strongly indicated that females mainly sought 
feedback by looking for feedback from owners or fellow board members and as 
being appreciated as individual contributors, there was no indication that the females 
in this study were looking for anything of the sort.  Like their male counterparts they 
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mentioned having an impact, being able to move the discussion forward, pushing for 
results and rationalisations as their main success indicators.  
Well, if I have a very strong opinion that I feel is essential to voice and I am 
able to voice it, that is success. I also feel it is success if I get a good debate 
about matters, that I perhaps am having doubts about and haven’t made up 
my mind, and I get a debate about it so I get to focus my opinion and come to 
a conclusion that I am confident about, I think that is success too.  I also 
think it is success to bring items to the meeting that evolve into something you 
think is of great importance. F5 
 
When I bring my comments, perhaps because I have an uneasy feeling about 
particular matters and I want some answers, and when I achieve getting to 
the point when I am reassured whether things are in order or not.  F6 
 
I think it surfaces in such a way that people realise that when they come in 
[to a board meeting], they know I am there and they expect that I might even 
turn every stone…If people learn to expect that, well I think that immediately 
delivers results. M4 
 
By pushing matters through, but also if I manage to open the debate and get 
more people to see – …You open the discussion and ask questions like: Do 
you feel it is right to…? F7 
 
Having an effect on process restructuring was also seen as an indicator of being 
successful. 
Now we are processing a lot of things – so now you are just looking at; are 
matters being handled in the way you want them to be handled, that is what 
you are looking at now.  F1  
 
The board discussed it back and forth…some details couldn’t be disclosed, 
but we agreed that the process should be transparent and completely fair.  
M3 
 
6.7.2. Confidence 
Although difficult to portray in quotes, the overall texture of the conversation with 
females on gender balanced and all female boards, and their manner of presentation 
indicated a high level of confidence with their role and position as board members, 
particularly when compared to the female interviewees in Project 2.  There seemed to 
be some inner sense that they were contributing and doing the right thing even 
though it wasn‟t “confirmed and approved” by some external body. This particular 
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quote gives a good example: 
And gradually throughout the years, I’ve been in the business for 20 years, 
you learn to trust your own judgement, finally the time comes that you learn 
to deal with and tolerate the uncertainty that inevitably comes with not 
having all the answers, and just say “All right, what is this?”, and because 
you cannot predict all outcomes, you sort of line up the decisions and little by 
little you learn: does this decision sit right, is this approach right? …and I 
am just using all these pieces, I don’t know if they would work under all 
circumstances, but here and now it works.  F4 
 
In some ways a higher level of confidence could be detected amongst all the females 
interviewed in this Project 3 study, not just the ones from the gender balanced and 
female dominated boards.  This is supported by higher levels of involvement in 
strategy by all females and the fact that they did not have as much tendency to 
attribute their credibility and contributions to tangible factors such as education or a 
particular knowledge or set of skills that was very much the focus of the females in 
Project 2.  Neither did they seem to be adapting the nurturing role of supporting the 
CEO or facilitating a comfortable atmosphere. Although two had been assigned a 
specific coordination/control role within the board, it did not keep them from 
adopting a strategic role at the same time.   
 
However, very much unlike the females on gender balanced and female dominated 
boards, the females on male dominated boards seemed to be dealing with frustrations 
and questioning the level of effect they were having in terms of getting their points 
across, questioning and making process improvements.  These two contrasting 
quotes illustrate this very well, the former from a female on a female dominated 
board and the latter from a female on a male dominated board.   
[We are making] …a lot of this type of decision that I am very content with, 
that WE are quite content with.  Some of the decisions we have made recently 
are of the kind that I have advocated for a long time [on other boards]. There 
were various issues that I was fighting for and never got through at [board 
Y], but I get to drive them home here.  I got very little support for some issues 
at [board Y]. F2 
 
I would like to see a lot of improvements how we structure things and such, 
but I am not exerting myself in changing everything. (Interviewer: why not?)  
Well I have often thought about it, of course I have had my way in certain  
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issues in a subtle way and made some improvements, but maybe people 
haven’t felt the need for change because things were going so well. 
(Interviewer: do you get more support now that things are not going so well?) 
I don’t know, not necessarily, I’m not sure, no; perhaps it remains to be seen.  
F8 
 
The main difference between females on different boards seemed to be that the 
females on gender balanced and female dominated boards seemed to be in an 
environment where they felt like a “fish in water” whereas the females on male 
dominated boards seemed to feel like a “fish out of water”.  
 
 323 
7. Discussion and conclusions  
7.1. Summarising the findings 
Project 2 left me with the question as to whether valuable contributions of female 
board members, such as questioning and probing for better decision making might be 
lost due to the fact that they were not participants of the informal networks identified 
as vitally important by their male counterparts.  Female board members had to 
struggle for respect and did not participate in power networks, this provided a reason 
to question the impact.  While they might have been appreciated in their roles as 
support givers and facilitating a good atmosphere, there is reason to consider if these 
might seem trivial contributions in the tasks the company is confronting.  Since the 
females, as opposed to the males, did not participate in informal networks, they were 
probably given an informal “out-group” status on the board, indicating that more 
challenging contributions like questioning and pushing for better results might not 
materialise.   
 
In Project 2 I concluded that: 
“In an ideal world the important contribution of pushing for better preparation of 
management and improved decision making would be a highly valuable ingredient of 
improving board performance. The actual world and the context in which boards 
work is, however, much more complex, and informal relationships and politics play a 
huge role. Therefore, the potential contributions of individuals not connected with 
the power clusters are less likely to be realised. This is most likely the case for both 
males and females – it just so happens that women are more often positioned in the 
out-group.” 
 
It was evident that the social culture and norms of boardrooms seemed to be quite 
masculine and deeply rooted in predetermined assumptions about behaviour and 
success.  
 
In this study I have sought to explore whether the gender demography of boards 
affects individual role interpretation and how it would have an effect on the impact 
of female directors in terms of their positions on the board and their contributions.  
The findings of both projects are summarised in table 24.  
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Table 24: Summary of main findings of Projects 2 and 3 
 
As in my previous study, both males and females on both types of boards had a 
similar general understanding of their basic roles and seemed to embrace the 
paradoxes of holding management accountable, as well as adopting a supporting role 
and participating in strategy.  In addition a responsibility towards a wider pool of 
stakeholders, such as employees, customers, creditors and society in general was 
looked upon as an important part of their responsibilities.  
 
In terms of a more specific role interpretation, this study has demonstrated that board 
gender demographics seem to have a greater effect on males‟ role interpretations 
than on females‟ role interpretations.  Females from all types of boards continued to 
be quite inclined to define questioning and improving board performance and 
decision making as some of their key roles.  However males on boards with gender 
balance were found to be much more likely than males on male dominated boards to 
adapt to these roles, namely to put forward critical questions, to probe, improve 
decision making and push for better board practices.  
 
From the findings of this study it is very clear that the power position and impact of 
contributions such as questioning, probing and improving board performance is 
Role interpretation
Value of 
contribution
Informal relationships Dynamics
P
ro
je
c
t 
2
How does 
gender have an 
effect? 
Females are more likely 
to contribute by asking 
critical questions and 
improving board 
performance
Females' contributions 
are less likely to be 
valued due to lack of 
inclusion
Males see informal 
relationships as extremely 
important.                                                       
Women are excluded 
from informal 
relationships
Not discussed
Females' role 
interpretation does NOT 
seem to be affected by 
gender demography.
Informal relationships are 
seen as important by 
males on male dominated 
boards.
Females on male 
dominated boards 
comment on lack of open 
discussions and questions 
not being welcomed.
Males tend to adopt roles 
like questioning and 
improving board 
performance when 
female proportion on a 
board is balanced or 
high.
Informal relationships 
seen as UNimportant by 
both males and females 
on boards where female 
representation is high.
Candour and open 
discussions seen as a vital 
part of being effective as a 
board by both males and 
females on boards with 
gender balance or high 
female representation
P
ro
je
c
t 
3
  
  
  
 
How does 
gender 
demography 
have an effect?             
Females' contributions 
are much more likely 
to be valued when 
female representation 
is high due to an equal 
power status to males.
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much more visible in the case of the females on gender balanced and all female 
boards than in the case of both the women from the male dominated boards in this 
study and in the Project 2 study. This is in line with Konrad et al., 2008).  In addition, 
what emerged to be quite characteristic of the women on gender balanced or female 
dominated boards was their high level of confidence.  In fact this confidence level 
could both be considered to facilitate effective contributions or be a result of females 
being more confident about their contributions. 
 
Informal relationships still seemed to be considered an important factor by the males 
on male dominated boards, as defined by the males in Project 2 who defined informal 
relationships as a prerequisite of trust, which in turn was in their opinion a necessity 
for an effective board.  The females seemed again to be absent from informal 
relationships, but interestingly in the case of the gender balanced and female 
dominated boards, informal relationships were not considered to play any role by 
males or females.  This finding is relevant in shedding light on previous findings that 
indicate that social ties on boards are important for effectiveness (Westphal, 1999; 
Westphal & Milton, 2000; Pye, 2004; Stevenson & Radin, 2009).  According to my 
findings they are important only to the extent that they are part of the “rules and 
norms” of the board.  
 
The most notable finding of this project is the high level of similarities and shared 
interpretation of the NED role between males and females on gender balanced 
boards, and how this contrasts with the male dominated boards.  The males and 
females on the gender balanced boards shared a unified understanding, not only of 
their basic role, but also in the way they elaborated on being successful in their role 
and to whom they felt accountable. This is very much in contrast with males and 
females on male dominated boards.  It was also notable how vocal the members of 
gender balanced and all female boards were about the level of open interactions, 
candour and trust on the boards.  They seemed to have made a point of discussing 
their mutual roles and objectives very early in the process.  Although the individuals 
came from different backgrounds and the level of informal relationships and previous 
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acquaintances was very low, their frequent meetings, open interactions and sharing a 
common goal seemed to have brought them sufficiently together to have in a 
relatively short time developed a high level of trust amongst each other.  The level of 
trust was particularly described as “not being afraid to voice your views and 
opinions, even though they contrast with those of other board members”.  This is 
very much in contrast with the findings of Project 2 where the male interviewees, on 
male dominated boards, defined informal relationships as prerequisites of building 
trust amongst board members.   
 
Project 2 Project 3
Males Males Males
FemalesFemalesFemales
Effective 
dynamics
Importance of 
Relationships
Centre of power
Authority taken 
for granted
Importance of 
relationships
Centre of power
Taking control
Asking questions
Independence 
Authority present
Asking questions
Seeking 
improvements
Asking questions
Nurturing roles
Authority lacking 
Feelings of 
confidence 
and being 
valued
Voicing 
feelings of 
not being 
valued
Ineffictive
dynamics
Asking questions
Independence 
Authority present
Reconstructed boards
Gender balance or females in 
high proportions
Boards of large companies
Females in token or minority positions
Boards of large companies
Females in token positions
 
Figure 14: A conceptual map of the findings of project 2 and project 3.  
 
 
While previous research (Konrad et al., 2008) supports the conclusion that gender 
composition is a significant source of the change in dynamics, one cannot rule out 
other explanations. Undoubtedly the gravity of the financial situation of the 
companies with newly formed boards and the recruitment process of the newly 
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appointed directors could play a role.  These alternative explanations will be 
explored further in the next section of this chapter. 
 
7.2. Effective dynamics 
Interestingly the gender balanced and all female boards seemed to possess some of 
the qualities that are described in the literature as features of highly effective boards, 
such as: engaging in open discussions and active debate (Sonnenfeld, 2002; 
Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; Cascio, 2004; Nadler, 2006; Buchholtz et al., 2005; 
Maharaj, 2008a), asking challenging questions (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; 
Roberts et al., 2005; Nadler et al., 2006; Maharaj, 2008a), and sharing a common 
goal (Aram & Cowen, 1986; Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; Murphy & McIntyre, 
2007). The boards seemed to possess high levels of knowledge and skills, 
independence of mind, and the diversity of the individuals, which have been 
considered as important traits of successful boards (Sonnenfeld, 2002; Finkelstein & 
Mooney, 2003; Leblanc, 2004a; Letendre, 2004; Pettigrew & McNulty, 2005; 
Nadler, 2006; Maharaj, 2008a).  Taking note of the fact that the members of the 
newly formed boards were appointed based on their experience, knowledge and 
skills and the fact that they had a good reputation and could be considered 
independent from political parties and business cliques, their human capital and 
independence could be considered to be high. The board members of the newly 
formed boards reported (with only two exceptions) high levels of social capital, and 
also commented on the high level of diversity amongst their fellow board members.   
 
As already stated, it must be kept in mind that the new boards were appointed by the 
political parties in proportion to their representation in parliament at the time of 
appointment.  However, the fact that the interviewees were very vocal on the issue of 
not being dependent on the parties that nominated them nor the government in 
general, and that they would sooner resign rather than becoming a puppet of 
politicians, supports the view that these individuals do possess an independence of 
mind.  The independence of the members of the newly formed boards was also 
reflected in their strong opinions of being accountable to the company and their own 
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conscience.  It somehow seems that the gravity of the situation, when the companies 
collapsed, and the uncertainty and haste required, “forced” the politicians to 
intuitively set aside political agendas and search for highly qualified individuals with 
undisputed integrity.     
 
In contrast to the gender balanced and female dominated boards, the members from 
the male dominated boards were not as vocal about boardroom dynamics and 
director interactions.  This lack of discussion and little emphasis on relationships 
outside the boardroom gives a reason to suspect that the openness and interactions of 
the male dominated boards are somewhat less than those of the boards with higher 
proportions of females.   This is supported by the persistent elaboration of the males 
on the importance and weight of the Chairman/CEO interactions, and comments by a 
female that a tradition for overemphasis on the chairman/CEO relationship somehow 
muted or demobilised the board as an entity.  As the chairman/CEO relationship has 
been defined as a key for setting the stage for board interactions (Parker, 1990; 
Roberts & Stiles, 1999; Kakabadse et al., 2006a; Nadler et al., 2006) and that the 
chairman can play a key role in activating or deactivating the board (Leblanc & 
Gilles, 2005) the overemphasis on the chairman/CEO relationship can lead to a less 
dynamic board.   
 
The repeated comments from females on male dominated boards (and the other 
females referring to previous experiences) indicated that questioning from women 
directors in particular was generally not seen as welcome.  Furthermore, matters 
sometimes needed to be discussed “off record” to get their points across, and the fact 
that they (the females) felt they were not successful in pushing things forward, 
favours speculation that the general culture of these boards was less open.  Open 
discussion and questioning did not seem to be the behavioural norm of the traditional 
male dominated boards, or at least not as appreciated as on boards with higher 
proportions of females.   
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It is evident that many boards are less effective due to the fact that they are operating 
in the more traditional modes.  Although not a subject of this project, the boards of 
Icelandic companies did not seem to be able to do much to prevent the huge effect of 
the economic downturn.  A good deal of that can be attributed to groupthink as 
described earlier in this paper.  In order to make improvements, the board‟s 
assumptions about rules and norms must be questioned and reconsidered.   
 
7.3. Moving into positions of effectiveness 
The relative positioning of females on boards seems to have shifted from Project 2, 
where females reported serving auxiliary functions, were somewhat insecure about 
their authority and felt excluded from the informal networks.  However, the degree of 
the shift is much greater in the case of the females on boards with high a proportion 
of females. 
 
The females on the male dominated boards seem to have slightly more authority in 
their positions. They had become more likely to participate in strategy discussions 
and emphasised having a general function in a similar manner to the males. This 
again is in contrast with Project 2, where females were found to consider their input 
to be in terms of specific knowledge and skills.  This could be explained by the 
macro change in the environment calling for more accountability of board members. 
This is not to say that the females were not behaving in an accountable manner 
before, but rather they were somehow sensing the urge to step in to a greater degree 
when the situation became graver.  It could also be attributed to the fact that there 
were cases when these females were serving on boards where there was another 
female present, in contrast to the situation in Project 2 where the females were 
always the only one on the board.  The females on the male dominated boards, 
however, persistently voiced their frustrations and feelings about not being effective 
enough, their questions not being well received, and their efforts for improvement 
were not being fruitful.  They were still absent from the informal networks which 
continued to be defined as important by their male counterparts.  It can, therefore, be 
concluded that although the females are stepping into more active roles, there is still 
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evidence that they do not entirely share the traditional male views on how to run an 
effective board and therefore do not experience being able to use their full potential.   
 
As already described, the males and females in all subgroups seemed to share similar 
interpretations of their NED roles, procedures and accountability.  The views of the 
males on the gender balanced boards, however, appeared to have a lot more in 
common with the views of the females from all subgroups (male dominated, gender 
balanced, all female) than with males on male dominated boards. One of the main 
reasons for appointing the members to the newly formed boards was absence of 
involvement and relationships with large businesses.  It can be inferred that these 
new males had not been socialised in the norms and behaviours of traditional boards, 
and therefore perhaps did not come with a preconceived idea of how they should 
operate.  The females on the gender balanced and all female boards were notably 
speaking from a platform of higher confidence than found among the other females 
interviewed in the two studies, and indicated that they felt content in their roles and 
were making a valuable contribution on the boards, despite the very challenging 
tasks the boards were facing.   
 
The bulk of studies on female board members have dealt with numbers, 
qualifications, career advancement strategies and strategies to fit and be effective on 
boards.  Females have been associated with positive contributions such as promoting 
open discussions and not being afraid to ask difficult and probing questions 
(Bilimoria & Huse, 1997; Huse & Solberg, 2006; Konrad & Kramer, 2006), but there 
have been several indications that effectiveness could not reach its full potential in 
non-inclusive cultures (Zelechowski & Bilimoria, 2003). 
 
The findings of this study support these findings, i.e. that women can indeed bring 
valuable contributions but these can very easily be diminished or muted by 
traditional assumptions of board effectiveness. My findings also support research that 
shows that on male dominated boards barriers can be broken down through 
influencing behaviour, high levels of preparation and possessing high levels of social 
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capital (Huse & Solberg, 2006) as two of the females on male dominated boards 
elaborated upon.  However, these factors are not prerequisites for female directors on 
boards where the culture and norms are more open and inclusive (Konrad et al., 
2008).   
 
Although this study focuses on studying the effect of the number of women on 
boards, one can speculate that exclusion need not be adapted to women exclusively. 
This could also be considered a trait of highly educated and experienced individuals 
who have not yet been socialised in the traditional rules and norms of boards.  It just 
so happens that women are more often to be found in this position.  This finding is 
similar to Kanter‟s (1977) observation of women more often being found in positions 
lacking power.   
 
7.4. Other contextual factors and alternative explanations 
Going beyond the gender demographic explanation for changed board behaviour, the 
two obvious alternatives would be the seriousness of the crisis and the unusual 
recruitment process of the new directors. 
7.4.1. The crises and the worsening economic situation 
The findings of this study indicate that contextual factors can have an effect on role 
interpretation and have an impact on female directors‟ effectiveness.  As indicated in 
the literature review, boards have been reported to become more active in times of 
crisis (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Mace, 1972; Mace, 1973), but such apparent effects 
of crises on board dynamics and discussion is not known to have been reported 
previously.  In fact Lorsch & MacIver reported on rigid norms and behaviours all too 
often paralysing boards‟ abilities to act, and delaying detection of problems or an 
upcoming crisis (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989).   
 
In the context of a worsening economic situation, board members are feeling the 
increased pressure of the responsibility borne by the board.  This is consistent with 
the findings of Lorsch & MacIver (1989) that boards become more open in periods 
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of crisis.  This might indicate that the female input of asking challenging questions, 
probing for answers and pushing for improvement, might be considered of higher 
value than when things are booming.  In an economic upswing there may be a higher 
likelihood of groupthink, less reason to question methods in general, and there is not 
a pressing need for alternative solutions. Therefore alternative views might not be as 
welcomed.   
 
However, what seems to be substantially more important is the general atmosphere 
and dynamic on the board which appears in this case to be largely affected by the 
board gender demographics.  Traditional rules and norms have not fostered an 
ambience of open discussion, task conflict and challenging questions.  Although 
research has shown these factors to be essential traits of successful boards, changes 
are occurring slowly.   In the context of gender proportions, while having two 
females on a board seems to be better than one, getting to a critical mass seems to 
make a substantial difference (Konrad et al., 2008) in terms of fostering both a 
common goal understanding, and dynamics that invite open discussions, questions 
and improvements.  
7.4.2. The recruitment process 
Taking into consideration the fact that the conditions and circumstances during the 
recruitment of the new boards were quite unusual, the criteria for recruitment could 
very well have an effect on how individual board members perceive their roles.  The 
literature on board recruitment processes is not very extensive.  It has mainly two 
aspects. On the one hand it claims that the director selection and recruitment 
processes are highly informal and mainly rely on the social networks of directors and 
CEOs (Daily & Dalton, 2004; Conger & Lawler, 2001; Kim & Canella, 2008; 
Ramirez, 2004; Westphal & Zajac, 1995; Shivdasani & Yermack, 1999; Hermalin & 
Weisbach, 1998).  On the other hand it offers suggestions for improvements and 
altered focus, paying increased attention to director competencies and independence, 
as well as the abilities of the directors collectively to construct a board that practices 
active interaction and appropriate levels of confrontation (Leblanc, 2004b; Cantor, 
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2005; Conger & Lawler, 2001; Maharaj, 2008b; Olson & Adams, 2004; Watson, 
2004). 
 
Research linking recruitment procedures to role interpretation is limited and mainly 
deals with the issue of director independence and ability to make decisions 
independent of management.  In my previous study there were, however, indications 
that individual role interpretations could be attributed to reasons for the appointment 
of particular board members: 
 
“Five interviewees, three males and two females, were generally more 
specific in defining “guarding the interest of shareholders” as one of their 
key roles. When taking a closer look at these individuals, what they had in 
common was that they were either large shareholders themselves in the 
company in question, or had been hired or appointed by an individual who 
was himself a large shareholder. Interestingly enough, out of the four 
individuals who defined “bringing different viewpoints” as one of their main 
roles, three of them did not belong to the group of five that defined “guarding 
the interests of shareholders” as their key role. This might indicate the 
reasons why particular people are appointed to boards – to influence role 
interpretation. (Project 2, 2007) 
 
This indicates that “who” appoints directors and under what conditions can affect 
how the individual behaves on the board and how the role is taken up.   The 
circumstances regarding the appointment of the three new boards were indeed quite 
extreme.  When the government took over the companies in October 2008, all the 
previous board members were dismissed and new ones were appointed by 
parliament.  Due to the extreme gravity of the situation one might even say that the 
board members were in fact appointed to “speak up”.  The boards of the other 
companies, however, similarly to the boards of the Project 2 study, consisted of 
members that were either large shareholder themselves, appointed by large 
shareholders, were employees of large shareholders, or were appointed from 
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alternative sources for the sake of being independent non-executives. This could be 
explored as a possible explanation for the difference in role interpretation and 
particularly the large difference in board dynamics.    
 
Literature on the board recruitment process 
The director selection process has traditionally seemed to be rather informal. Daily & 
Dalton (2004b) suggest that director recruitment has severely lacked planning and 
they call for a more formal process. The tendency has typically been to recruit 
individuals where there is an existing personal relationship to the recruiters or where 
the candidate is of a certain stature (Conger & Lawler, 2001).  This is supported by 
Kim & Canella (2008) who suggest that internal social capital of director candidates 
will enhance the likelihood of selection as the candidate is known, liked and trusted 
by incumbent directors. External social capital is also associated with new director 
selection, because it indicates increased effectiveness through linkages to the external 
environment. They also suggest that when powerful external forces in the 
environment are present, the importance of external social capital will increase, but 
decrease as the corporation ages. Internal social capital will have more value when 
the company is doing well, while external social capital becomes more important 
when the company is doing poorly (Kim & Cannella, 2008). Directors still appear to 
be chosen based on cultural similarity to the CEO and homosocial reproduction 
prevails. The challenge seems to be finding enough economic and political interests 
that can be gained from enhanced diversity or from improved corporate governance, 
and to educate and mobilise those interests (Ramirez, 2004).  On the same note, 
newly recruited directors have been found to have demographic similarity to the 
CEO when the CEO holds high power in relation to the board, whereas in the cases 
of relatively high board power, new directors have been found to share more 
similarities to the board (Westphal & Zajac, 1995).  In addition, the involvement of 
the CEO in the recruitment process has been found to result in recruiting directors 
that are less likely to monitor aggressively and are less likely to be independent.  
(Shivdasani & Yermack, 1999; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998).   
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Boards typically rely on recruiting CEOs of other firms and, as a second choice, 
professionals in accounting, law and finance, but many boards lack expertise in 
employee relations, change management, strategy formulation and organisational 
development (Conger & Lawler, 2001).  Studies of non profit boards, however, have 
shown them to pay more attention to diversity of board profile and regular rotation of 
board membership. They focus on balancing diversity, stakeholder representatives 
and governance skills. Directors‟ own networks are the major vehicle for recruitment 
(Parker, 2007). 
 
Although structural reforms in the recruitment process, such as recruiting more 
independent directors and separating the role of the chairman and CEO have been 
claimed to have some positive effects (Dulewicz & Herbert, 2008) there are loud 
voices that claim structural reforms are far from being the remedy needed to improve 
overall board performance, and that director qualifications and board processes are 
the issues on which boards should be focusing (e.g. Maharaj, 2008a). 
 
Leblanc (2004b) suggests that boards should identify the right mix of competencies 
and behavioural patterns that match the strategy of the firm and apply these 
effectively in recruiting and evaluating board members.  “This” Leblanc claims “will 
mark the end of the era when casual acquaintance and cronyism is the chief criteria 
for selection to a board. Directors will be chosen very carefully, and specifically for 
their behavioural characteristics and competencies. No longer will being a member 
of "the old boy‟s network" or being beholden to the controlling shareholder be a 
sufficient criteria for board membership” Leblanc, 2004b:7). Maharaj (2008b) calls 
for directors with knowledge, values and awareness of the effect of groupthink on the 
decision making processes.  Cantor (2005) defines three areas essential to effective 
board performance: the expertise and the experience of the directors and good board 
dynamics.   When evaluating director candidates, careful consideration should be 
given to their level of expertise, not only their possession of information but also the 
skill of knowing when to act and when not to act.  Of equal importance is the 
experience of the director, defined as being business savvy, having the will to act and 
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the wisdom to offer advice and consent.  The “proof” for competency in this 
dimension, Cantor argues, is having seen a particular candidate in action, and that is 
why boards are inclined to nominate people they know.  In addition to carefully 
selecting directors, the board must then take steps to ensure that the environment in 
which it operates can replicate and sustain best practices in corporate governance, 
engaging in board climate reviews – values, objectives and operating styles (Cantor, 
2005). 
Literature has suggested several prescriptive methods for more effective board 
procedures where the recruitment process plays an important role. Boards should 
particularly be looking for individuals that can contribute different pieces of 
knowledge and information to the total picture.  They also need people with 
sufficient power, defined as personal power, expert power and positional power.  
Power is demonstrated mainly in the ability of directors to confront and challenge 
management which has been identified as the most important characteristic directors 
look for in recruiting board members (Conger & Lawler, 2001). Power is claimed to 
be maximised when the board is made up of independent directors.  Finally boards 
should be looking for directors that are sufficiently available to attend to their board 
duties (Conger & Lawler, 2001).  Olson & Adams (2004) propose a functional 
approach to the selection of board members, who can and will work together as 
effective monitors, within the context of the new regulatory and private sector 
corporate governance standards. They suggest a 10-step plan including mapping 
what is needed, taking inventory of present directors, examining the social dynamics 
of the board and matching those to a new candidate with a successful track record, 
and the qualities, time and motivation to be a valuable addition to the board.  Watson 
(2004) claims that the province of British Columbia is taking a lead in public-sector 
governance reform, defining best practices in director recruitment that highlight 
candidates‟ competency matrix, personal attributes and ability to work with the 
chair/board, and defining processes for a proactive search for candidates as due 
diligence, diversity, transparency, and quality control, in addition to committing to 
best practices. 
 337 
Breaking the norms and assumptions of recruitment 
A great deal of the literature on board recruitments indicates that, in order to reach 
improvements in the board, recruitment process traditional norms have to be broken.  
When the economy took a catastrophic downturn in October 2008 and subsequently 
when the boards of the companies examined were dismissed and new boards formed, 
two major assumptions were broken. The first was that the financial sector, and in 
fact the business sector in general, that presumably had been very successful in terms 
of growth and financial returns during the past, had taken a huge plunge, and was no 
longer seen as a success story but rather as a failure.  This meant that a lot of the 
assumptions on how directors should be recruited, how things should be done, how 
decisions should be made, how boards should work and behave etc. were now up for 
scrutiny and questioning.  The second assumption had to do with the boards 
themselves.  In one blow the entire board was dismissed, its members disqualified 
and new members brought in.  As described in the findings of the study, the new 
members were selected based on their professional background, their neutrality and 
being impeccable. Although not explicitly stated, one can infer that in fact their 
primary duty was indeed to speak up.  While some of the new members had 
extensive board experience, others did not.  Unlike the traditional boards in the 
business word, the newly formed boards now had females in greater numbers than 
ever seen before and even in majority positions in two of the three boards. Faced 
with a huge task, the newly appointed members knew that they should do anything 
but emulate the norms and behaviours of their predecessors, and it was up to them to 
find out how.  The traditional rules and norms had been thrown out.   
 
Possible effects of the recruitment process 
Both male and female board members have been affected by the macro shift in 
assumptions, although in slightly different ways.  Generally people have become 
more aware of the huge responsibility of the board and its members.  With regard to 
the recruitment process, in essence, the politicians were forced to look beyond the 
traditional suspects for director candidates, such as CEOs of other companies etc. 
(Conger & Lawler, 2001).  What seems to have been achieved when composing the 
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new boards is something similar to what is being described as an ideal board, with 
competent individuals, effective dynamics and a very high level of individual and 
board independence (Leblanc, 2004b; Cantor, 2005; Conger & Lawler, 2001).  It did 
not, however, happen through a formal or rigid process, but it certainly involved a 
very different approach from what had traditionally been practised.   
 
These findings support the view that norms and traditions need to be broken in order 
to go beyond structural reforms.  Without doing so, the chances are that assumptions 
about profiles and board tasks remain unchanged and board progress will remain 
marginal or slow.  That applies to all types of different director attributes, currently 
missing, but very much needed to construct an effective board. It applies for instance 
to the scarce expertise in change management and organisational development 
(Conger & Lawler, 2001).  It also seems to have opened doors to the very scarce 
female directors. It seems evident that the circumstances and the recruitment process 
opened a way for very capable but “non traditional” individuals to the board.  Many 
females fall into this category and indeed unusual proportions were recruited to these 
boards.  These “unusual suspects” and the context they were working in succeeded in 
forming what has been defined in literature as effective board dynamics 
 
Huge failures or quantum leaps in the environmental context might just be the 
“earthquake” needed to shake up the obsolete traditions and assumptions of board 
recruitment and functioning.  It seems harsh, and one would certainly wish that 
boards could be reformed under less severe circumstances. Reformation needs a 
drastic questioning of the way things have been done and how directors have been 
behaving.  The question then becomes: “Are boards capable of doing that?”, or “Will 
it require a „cataclysm‟?”   This is an area that can provide fruitful contributions to 
the understanding and improvement of board workings and is well worth further 
research and examination. 
 
What seems to be yet another important factor is to redesign assumptions and norms 
about board roles and effectiveness.  The fall and restructuring of the companies and 
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their boards has provided excellent circumstances for doing just that.  In a complete 
collapse there is ample reason to question the previous rules and norms, and when 
the boards were rebuilt with a diverse set of individuals with ample human capital, a 
platform existed from which to create new ones.   
 
7.6. Conclusions 
The findings of this study indicate that board gender demographics, in this case 
gender balanced or all female boards, do have an effect on individual role 
interpretation of males particularly, and can facilitate and increase female director 
effectiveness and levels of confidence.  Although alternative explanations such as the 
severe economic crisis or the nature of the recruitment process can be offered, 
findings of previous studies support the conclusion that gender demography plays a 
significant role.  These findings are in line with those of Kanter (1977) and Ely 
(1995) who demonstrated that a lack of gender balance could inhibit effectiveness 
and gender integration could facilitate effectiveness. They support the findings of 
those who have previously defined the role of asking challenging questions as one of 
the major contributions of female directors (Bilimoria & Huse, 1997; Huse & 
Solberg, 2006; Konrad & Kramer, 2006; Konrad et al., 2008), but question the notion 
that high levels of preparation, influencing behaviour, alliance building and social 
capital are necessarily prerequisites of female effectiveness on gender balanced 
boards (Huse & Solberg, 2006), as high level preparations can be attributed to efforts 
to counteract tokenism and that informal relationships and social capital only seem to 
play a role when it is seen as the norm of the majority.  More particularly, my 
findings support and add to the findings of Konrad et al., (2008) that a critical 
number of women will not only reduce the effect of tokenism, and create a more 
supportive atmosphere where females are more likely to raise issues and be heard, 
but also that it does affect the male participants and the dynamics of the board in 
general. What my research also indicates is that the changes in this case are most 
likely to be facilitated by the fact that the entire boards were renewed and forced to 
redefine, not the role itself, but how they considered being valuable in their roles, and 
how the board should operate in terms of dynamics and processes in order to fulfil 
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their roles positively by promoting open discussion  (Sonnenfeld, 2002; Finkelstein 
& Mooney, 2003; Cascio, 2004; Nadler et al., 2006; Buchholtz et al., 2005; Maharaj, 
2008a), asking challenging questions (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; Roberts et al., 
2005; Nadler et al., 2006; Maharaj, 2008a), and sharing a common goal (Aram & 
Cowen, 1986; Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; Murphy & McIntyre, 2007). In line with 
Konrad et al., (2008), the reason that the boards were able to redefine themselves in 
such a way might indeed be because they had high proportions of females. 
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8. Limitations and suggestions for further research  
 
Undoubtedly the small sample and the isolated context of this study suggest 
substantial limitations.  The extreme economic conditions are not the norm for 
business and board settings.  Although not generalisable to all circumstances, this 
study casts light on the importance of context and the inertia of a traditional culture, 
limiting the contributions of members that are in a way “different” or not part of the 
social network, and this is not easily overcome.  
 
Research on board norms and culture are still scarce, and research on newly 
established boards is non-existent.  To further understand the contributions of 
individual directors, effects of diversity, and lay foundations for further board 
improvement, more research on board interactions, cultures and norms is 
encouraged.   
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APPENDIX 1 - INTERVIEW SCHEDULE - PROJECT 3 
 
The interviewees will be asked to keep a particular focal board in mind in the discussion.  However 
they are encouraged to compare and contrast their experience to other boards they currently or 
recently served on.   - The questions below are aimed to be a checklist of themes or points of 
discussion for the interviewee  
 
Can you tell me about other boards you sit on? 
 
Why were YOU asked to serve on this particular board? (probe for evidence of particular 
qualifications or insight, social capital etc.)    - probe for functional experience 
 
How would you describe your role or purpose as a board member on this board? 
 Is it similar or different to roles you have on other boards? 
 What do you do to fulfil that role? 
 
Can you describe how you would behave and interact in a typical board meeting? 
o Are there some issues that you usually comment on more than others? Why? Can you give 
me examples? 
o What sort of behaviour or tactic is most effective for you to get your points across? 
o Would you say that your influencing strategy is the same as that of other board members, or 
is it different? How? Why? 
o How do you know if you are being effective in your role? 
o Attention to detail? 
o Do you feel that your behaviour, interactions or contributions have changed over the time 
you have served on the board  - Why? How? 
 
To whom or what do you feel accountable as a director? Why? 
 
Can you describe your relationships with other board members? 
o Did you know any of them prior to the appointment to the board? 
o Have you developed your relationship with some board members more than others? 
Why? 
o How extensive is your social network? 
 
What do you think is your greatest contribution to this board? 
Anything else you would like to share or comment on? 
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